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Abstract 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 radically reformed the law on sex offences with the aim of 
providing coherent and clear sex offences that protect individuals. This thesis assesses 
the extent to which the new offence of sexual assault is sufficiently complainant-
centred. The law on indecent assault was unclear in its scope and this thesis examines 
the conceptual and practical difficulties in designating ‘inherently’ indecent contact with 
another. Analysing closely the decision in R v Court [1989] AC 28 and highlighting the 
‘context-dependent’ nature of sexual assault, this part of the inquiry aims to provide a 
comparison against which the offence of sexual assault in s.3 of the SOA 2003 can be 
evaluated. The essential problem the law has to deal with is how to respond to those, 
probably rare, cases in which the ‘sexual’ nature of an act is disputed or ambiguous. In 
attempting to protect members of society from unwanted sexual touching, the law has 
never adequately acknowledged or included complainants’ experiences. This thesis 
identifies and evaluates five possible legal approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’, which 
draw on existing theories of criminal responsibility. The definition of ‘sexual’ in s.78 of 
the SOA 2003 will be criticised for being unclear, ambiguous and insufficiently 
complainant-centred: the complainant’s interpretation of the touching is not a legally 
defined ‘circumstance’ to be considered in designating the conduct as ‘sexual’. Some 
aspects of the mens rea of sexual assault are unclear and controversial, and could be 
modified to make the law more ‘complainant-centred’. In particular, s.3 should be 
amended to include conviction of unintentional, yet culpable, sexual touchings. Whilst 
highlighting the insufficiently complainant-centred nature of s.3, this thesis 
acknowledges that there is a limit to how far the law on sexual assault can be 
complainant-centred if fundamental criminal law principles are to be upheld. 
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1 
Introductory Chapter 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Sexual offences and the fear of sexual offences have a profound and damaging effect on 
individuals and communities. The Sexual Offences Act 20031 (SOA 2003) in force from 1st 
May 20042 has radically reformed the law on sex offences, with the aim of providing 
clear and coherent offences that protect individuals. The Act abolishes some and re-
defines other of the pre-2003 sexual offences, whilst introducing many new, often 
overlapping, offences concerning invasions of sexual autonomy. One of the most striking 
characteristics of academic research and commentary in the field of sexual violence is 
that it is primarily focused on the crime of rape, the protection of vulnerable victims and 
the definition of consent.3 Rape is arguably the most controversial and publicised sexual 
offence and potentially the worst act committed by one person on another aside from 
murder. However, to date there is little research considering the scope and practical 
application of many of the new offences created by the SOA 2003, for example sexual 
assault under s.3 of the Act.  
 
Sexual assault is an important offence because it prohibits any non-consensual sexual 
touching, even through clothing, and therefore covers a wide range of offending 
behaviour. The wrongfulness of sexual assault derives from the fact that the victim has a 
                                                             
1
 Hereinafter „SOA 2003‟ or „the Act‟.  
2
 The Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Commencement Order) 2004. Sections 138 and 141 to 143 came into 
force on Royal Assent. 
3
 See for example: J. Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process, 2
nd
 edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002); J. Temkin & B. Krahe, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2008); E. Finch & V.E. Munro, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Intoxicated Consent and Drug 
Assisted Rape Revisited‟, (2004) Crim L R 789; V. Munro & E. Finch, „The Demon Drink and The 
Demonised Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape Trials Involving 
Intoxicants‟ (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 591; J. Spencer, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Child and 
Family Offences‟ [2004] Crim L R 347; J. Temkin & A. Ashworth, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) 
Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent‟ [2004] Crim L R 328; L. Kelly, J. Lovett & L. Regan. 
A Gap or a Chasm: Attrition in reported rape cases. Home Office Research Study 293 (HMSO, London, 
2005). 
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proprietary right over her own body. It is her body, she owns it, nobody else may use it 
without her saying so.4 Sexuality is an intrinsic part of one’s personality, it is one mode 
of expressing that personality in relation to others, and it is therefore fundamental that 
one should be able to choose whether to express oneself in this way. Even where a 
sexual assault involves no significant physical force, it constitutes harm in the sense that 
it invades a deeply personal zone, gaining non-consensually that which should only be 
shared consensually. The right of sexual autonomy provides that people have the right 
to decide with whom to have sexual relations.5 Much of our personal identity is tied to 
our gender and sexual expression and hence to our sexual self-determination. Sexual 
assault is a form of being subjected to another’s dominion. In sexual interactions, unlike 
in other interactions, it is even more important that we are able to control whom we are 
intimate with, since sexual relationships expose us more than other relationships and 
thereby make us more vulnerable. This is a reason why non-consensual sexual touching, 
even as a ‘joke’ is offensive. It makes the recipient merely a sexual being, vulnerable and 
exposed. 
 
Section 3 of the SOA 2003 also has practical significance for the courts: in 2008, 246 
people were tried at the Crown Court for sexual assault on a male and 2,109 for sexual 
assault on a female;6 in the same year 19 people were proceeded against at magistrates’ 
Courts for sexual assault on a male and 219 for sexual assault on a female.7 However, 
section 3 was barely discussed in Parliamentary debate on the SOA 2003 and the 
                                                             
4
 J. Gardner. & S. Shute, „The Wrongness of Rape‟ in J. Horder (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (4th 
series) (OUP, Oxford, 2000) p.205.  
5 The leading proponent of this view is S. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the 
Failure of Law (Harvard University Press, London, 1998). See also J. Larson, „Women Understand so 
Little, They Call My Good Nature “Deceit”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction‟ (1993) Columbia Law 
Review 93. 
6
 See Criminal Statistics Supplementary Tables, Vol.2, Table S 2.1(A) „Defendants Tried And / Or 
Sentenced At The Crown Court By Offences, Sex And Result‟ (HMSO, London, 2008). In comparison, in 
2008, 108 people were tried at the Crown Court for rape of a male and 1,714 for rape of a female. 
7
 See Criminal Statistics Supplementary Tables, Vol.1, Table S1.1 (F) „Persons aged 18 and under 20 
Proceeded Against at magistrates‟ Courts by Offence, Sex and Result‟ (HMSO, London, 2008). In 
comparison, in 2008, 20 people were proceeded against at magistrates‟ Courts for rape of a male and 238 
for rape of a female.  
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consideration of sexual assault, if at all, in most modern criminal law textbooks, is 
limited to a paragraph(s) merely describing the relevant legal test.8 Even those 
textbooks that focus specifically on sexual offences confine their analysis to a few 
pages.9 This thesis attempts to bridge that gap, analysing doctrinal and theoretical 
approaches to sexual assault: how could the offence be defined, how is the offence 
defined and how should it be defined? It examines critically the case for a more 
‘complainant-centred’ approach to sexual assault and argues that there are certain 
aspects of the definition that could be clarified and/or modified to render the offence 
more complainant-centred. Defining offences in a complainant-centred way is 
advantageous in placing complainants’ experiences at the heart of criminal law and 
widening the scope of behaviour amenable to prosecution. However, such approaches 
also bear significant problems and dangers for criminal justice: they might lead to ‘net 
widening’; they might lead to uncertainty and no fair warning; and they might result in 
unfair labelling.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the proportion of cases reported as rape and indecent 
assault that did not lead to a successful conviction rose dramatically.10 This provided 
impetus for a thorough review of the sexual offences law. In July 2000, the Home Office 
published a consultation paper, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on Sexual 
Offences,11 seeking opinions on proposals to reform the whole law of sexual offences. 
This thesis will evaluate the modernisation process, scrutinizing the decision to abolish 
                                                             
8
 For example: A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law, 6
th
 edn  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) 
describes the offence in 2 pages; D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law, 12
th
 edn (OUP, Oxford, 
2008) in just over 1 page; M.J.Allen, Textbook on Criminal Law, 10
th
 edn (OUP, Oxford, 2009) in 2 and a 
half pages. 
9
 For example:  R. Card, A. Gillespie & M. Hirst, Sexual Offences (Jordan Publishing Limited, Bristol, 
2008) analyses sexual assault in just over 3 pages; P. Rook & R. Ward, Rook and Ward on Sexual Offences 
Law & Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008) in 8 pages; K. Stevenson, A. Davies & M. Gunn, 
Blackstone’s Guide to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) in just under 
6 pages. 
10
 See the Report of the Joint Investigation into the Investigation and Prosecution of Cases Involving 
Allegations of Rape (HMCPSI, 2002). 
11 Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences Vol. 1 (Home Office Communications 
Directorate,  London, 2000). 
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the offence of indecent assault and introduce offences of assault by penetration (s.2) 
and sexual assault (s.3). Prior to the SOA 2003 the offence of indecent assault12 
prohibited an assault or battery perpetrated in ‘circumstances of indecency’. In Court,13 
the House of Lords gave detailed guidance on how the question of indecency should be 
left to the jury or magistrates. Lord Ackner suggested that matters might be clarified for 
the jury if they were to be asked whether they thought ‘right-minded persons would 
consider the conduct indecent or not’. It was in the context of this question that the 
House of Lords identified a tripartite categorisation of conduct: (a) conduct that was 
inherently decent; (b) conduct that was inherently indecent; and (c) conduct that may or 
may not be indecent. Designating certain conduct as inherently decent or indecent 
proved problematic and these same problems plague the definition of ‘sexual’ under 
s.78.  
 
The legal definition of sexual assault provides the normative framework for judging 
allegations, specifying the criteria that need to be met to find a defendant guilty. Sexual 
assault prohibits any unwanted sexual touching, ostensibly promoting the basic value of 
respect for sexual autonomy and highlighting how this value is so significant as to justify 
criminalization. Section 3(1) of the SOA 2003 provides as follows: 
‘A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally touches another person (B), 
(b) the touching is sexual,  
(c) B does not consent to the touching, and 
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’ 
Unlike section 1, which clearly defines all behaviour prohibited by the crime of rape 
(thereby limiting it to the non-consensual penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth 
with the penis) section 3 does not list those types of touching that constitute sexual 
assault. Sexual assault covers a broad range of unacceptable behaviour of varying 
                                                             
12
 Sexual Offences Act 1956, ss. 14-15. 
13
 [1989] AC 28. 
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seriousness. At the more serious end of the spectrum, sexual assault prohibits contact 
between the naked genitalia of the offender and the naked genitalia, face or mouth of 
the victim. At the lesser serious end of the continuum sexual assault also forbids any 
sexual contact between part of the offender’s body (other than the genitalia) with part 
of the victim’s body (other than the genitalia). The SOA 2003 therefore introduces a 
wide offence with ambiguity stemming from the broad definition of the central 
elements of ‘touching’ and ‘sexual’. Touching is defined in s.79(8) to include ‘touching- 
(a) with any part of the body, (b) with anything else, (c) through anything, and in 
particular includes touching amounting to penetration’. Touching is a very broad term, 
which has no de minimis exception and can therefore be described as a complainant-
centred provision. Sexual assault is however a narrower offence than indecent assault 
because it does not extend to situations where D intentionally or recklessly causes C to 
fear an immediate, unlawful sexual touching.  
 
Often, as with several other criminal offences, sexual assault appears to be an ‘I know it 
when I see it’ crime; in the sense that there is an innate quality that makes certain 
touching ‘sexual’ and that this will be obvious to a reasonable observer. However, when 
one delves deeper into the possible meaning and interpretations of ‘sexual’ it becomes 
apparent that it is far more complex than first thought. How, for example, do we 
distinguish conceptually and in practice between a ‘sexual’ kiss and a ‘non-sexual’ kiss? 
As Moulton remarks, ‘Some kissing is sexual, some is not. Sometimes looking is sexual; 
sometimes not looking is sexual.’14  The term ‘sexual’ does not have an essential quality, 
but is socially and historically contingent. It is difficult to identify a dominant or 
mainstream sexual standard (in the sense of a common consensus on appropriate 
sexual behaviour) in modern British society and thus to establish the scope of an offence 
of sexual assault, thereby distinguishing it from common assault. The law on sexual 
assault has to set out standards of behaviour in a complex cultural situation where the 
                                                             
14
 J. Moulton, „Sexual Behaviour: Another Position‟ in The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, 
4th edn. (eds) A. Soble & N. Power (Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, 1980) p.45. 
17 
 
boundaries of acceptable sexual behaviour are unclear. Parliament has indicated that 
the element of sexuality makes an assault potentially much more serious than a non-
sexual assault: the maximum penalty on indictment for sexual assault is ten years’ 
imprisonment and six months imprisonment or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum (currently £5000)15 or both on summary conviction,16 whereas common 
assault and battery are triable summarily only with a maximum penalty of six months’ 
imprisonment, or a fine, or both.17  
 
The legal meaning of the term ‘sexual’ could be judged from several different 
perspectives. This thesis identifies the possible normative choices that the term ‘sexual’ 
raises, analyzing the approaches against the fundamental aims and principles of criminal 
law. Sexual assault could be defined as an assault that involves the touching of certain 
body parts, basing proscription on a list of areas that have certain anatomical qualities. 
Alternatively, a circular formula may be employed, whereby an action or touching is 
‘sexual’ if a reasonable person would consider it ‘sexual’. This might involve 
consideration of the circumstances and purpose of the action or whether the action is 
‘objectively’ ‘sexual’. Other possibilities include an approach that focuses on the 
defendant’s attitude to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, a definition that invokes a 
kind of typical complainant’s perspective or a definition that emphasises the perspective 
of the individual complainant. This thesis argues that there are cogent arguments for 
adopting a complainant-centred approach to defining ‘sexual’, while acknowledging the 
importance of orthodox subjectivist approaches to liability. 
 
Section 78 defines ‘sexual’ in the following terms: 
‘For the purposes of this Part (except section 71), penetration, touching or any other 
activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that- 
                                                             
15
 Criminal Justice Act 1982, s.74, as read with the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 1980 s.32(9). 
16
 s.3(4). 
17
 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.39. 
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(a) whatever its circumstances or any person's purpose in relation to it, it is because of 
its nature sexual, or 
(b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the 
purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.’ 
Arguably, s.78 sets out an approach to, rather than a definition of the meaning of 
‘sexual’. Section 78 is tautological and assumes the reader already has an understanding 
of the meaning of ‘sexual’. It also mistakenly suggests that some actions are because of 
their nature ‘sexual’, failing to take account of the context-dependent nature of the 
term ‘sexual’. Section 78 also refers to ‘circumstances’ and the ‘purpose of any person’ 
without providing any further indication of what these terms mean. Section 78 is unduly 
complex and fails to make any explicit reference to the complainant’s experience of the 
action as a circumstance to be taken into consideration by the jury or magistrates. It is 
likely that most cases of sexual assault will be unproblematic, involving touching of the 
genitalia or female breasts. However, ambiguous cases will arise. The concern of this 
thesis is with those ambiguous cases at the fringes of liability, where the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the conduct is in dispute. 
 
The fault element of a crime attempts to ensure that only those who are morally 
culpable will be punished by the criminal courts. The mens rea of sexual assault requires 
that D must ‘intentionally’ touch another person and must ‘not reasonably believe’ that 
the other person consents to the touching. This thesis will examine three issues in 
respect of sexual assaults fault element: (1) D’s attitude to the likelihood of touching; (2) 
D’s attitude to the ‘sexual’ of the touching; and (3) D’s attitude to consent. This thesis 
will argue for the definition of sexual assault to be extended to include liability for 
reckless or careless touchings that are culpable. The law is unclear as to whether the 
defendant must appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. This is one aspect of the 
definition that ought to be resolved to make the offence more complainant-centred; 
requiring that the defendant be aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching might 
deflect the court’s attention away from the invasion of sexual autonomy. The law on 
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consent allows for the reasonableness of a belief to be determined in light of the 
defendant’s characteristics and it will be argued that this is inappropriate because it 
might result in juries responding to the reasonable belief test in divergent ways and 
might further reinforce stereotypes and value judgments about ‘appropriate’ sexual 
behaviour. Accordingly, the law is significant for not only what it does say but also for 
what it does not say. 
 
One key issue in contemporary criminal justice is the extent to which victims’ rights and 
interests can be accommodated within criminal procedure, evidence law and 
substantive offence definitions. In recent years, academic and political interest in 
victims of crime has continued to grow.18 Around the world, there have been numerous 
‘victim-centred’ reforms in criminal law and procedure concerning financial, 
psychological, medical and justice needs resulting from the crime, as well as the criminal 
justice response to crime. Various pro-victim initiatives and the advent of forms of 
restorative justice is evidence of a shift in criminal justice policy towards acknowledging 
that complainants have needs and interests and that the criminal justice system could 
and should acknowledge and respond to them. Academic evaluation of ‘victims’ rights’ 
has been dominated thus far by procedural issues (including participation in 
sentencing), but substantive law has been a somewhat neglected area.19 This thesis 
addresses the specific debate about the extent to which complainants’ perspectives and 
interests can and should be the focus of substantive criminal offences, most notably 
sexual assault. 
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Prior to the implementation of the SOA 2003, there persisted a commonly held view 
that the law on rape and other sexual offences, in terms of the legal definition per se, 
procedure and evidence was biased in favour of the male defendant and against the 
complainant who was predominantly female.20 Until fairly recently criminal lawyers and 
criminologists have focused on the defendant and assessments of his or her liability, 
leaving the complainant as a vague figure on the sidelines of justice. This thesis analyses 
the extent to which sexual assault, as defined under s.3 is sufficiently complainant-
centred. The focus is on one specific offence, sexual assault, and its substantive 
definition. Namely, this thesis is an inquiry into the ultimate question of what the 
definition of sexual assault is and should be.  
 
1.1.1 The nature and scope of victims’ and defendants’ ‘rights’ 
The Government has committed itself to ‘redressing the balance’ between victims’ and 
defendants’ rights and putting victims ‘at the heart’ of the criminal justice system on the 
basis that criminal justice has been unfairly weighted towards defendants for too long.21 
This section will consider what we mean when we speak of such ‘rights’ and why victims 
and defendants need ‘rights’ at all. The following is not intended to constitute an 
exhaustive analysis of the ‘rights’ of victims and defendants in the criminal justice 
system and whether the two are incompatible, because other writers have explored the 
tensions in detail.22 Nevertheless, before outlining the criteria that this thesis will 
employ to evaluate the complainant-centred nature of sexual assault, it is worth setting 
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the scene in order to contextualise discussion about the role and rights of victims in the 
criminal law. 
 
(a) Victims’ rights 
Traditionally the idea of a crime is that it is something that requires the intervention of 
the State and the tensions in the criminal process were presented by academics 
diametrically as those between the defendant and the state. Recent political and 
academic interest in the crime victim has attempted to challenge orthodox conceptions 
of criminal justice, positing the crime victim as a stakeholder with individual rights and 
needs. Over the last 30 years, the idea of ‘victims’ rights’ has featured prominently in 
political, criminological and legal discourse.23 However, there is considerable ambiguity 
as to the origin and substances of ‘victims’ rights’. There are a number of key rights, 
which legally binding and non-legally binding international instruments suggest that 
victims ought to be entitled to.24 These include, amongst others: compassion and 
respect; information on proceedings and rights; presentation of victims’ views; legal aid; 
swift case processing; protection of privacy and identity and compensation from the 
offender and the State. Since the Labour Government first expressed its interest in 
victims in its 1997 election manifesto25 there has been a succession of policies and 
legislative changes presented as addressing the needs of victims. These reforms have 
been backed up by lists of service standards in the form of the Prosecutors’ Pledge26 and 
the Victims’ Code of Practice.27 
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The concept of ‘victims’ rights’ is frequently invoked in relation to two categories of 
rights: ‘service rights’ and ‘procedural rights’.28 ‘Service rights’ include the right to be 
kept informed about the progress of the case, the provision of facilities and the right to 
counselling and other types of support. ‘Service rights’ have little effect on the position 
of defendants, but often require additional resources to be effective. More controversial 
than ‘service rights’ is the idea that victims ought to be able to exercise a right of 
participation within the criminal justice system. ‘Procedural rights’ or what might be 
labelled ‘participation rights’ refer to rights in relation to the trial process itself and have 
the potential to undermine the rights of defendants. Procedural rights might include 
victims being ‘encouraged, permitted, required or entitled to have input into criminal 
justice decision-making processes’.29  
 
The issue of victim participation in criminal justice is contentious and does not feature at 
all in any of the Council of Europe’s recommendations.30 International standards give us 
little indication of the extent to which victims ought to be able to participate, or how far 
their decisions should hold sway. Hall presents two reasons to explain the lack of 
certainty of the ‘right to participation’. First, he argues that ‘different legal traditions 
conceptualise participation and the normative role of victims in vastly different ways’.31 
The second reason arises from the lack of consensus as to what ‘participation’ actually 
entails. Edwards advocates four types of victim participation: control, consultation, 
information-provision and expression.32 The first type of participation would require 
victims to have control over a particular decision. There would be an obligation on the 
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criminal justice decision-maker to seek and apply the victim’s preference and such input 
would be determinative. The three other forms of participation Edwards categorises as 
‘non-dispositive’. In each, the victim is not the decision-maker, but his input might 
influence the decision. The second type of participation, consultation, means the 
‘process of ascertaining and considering opinions about the appropriate policy to be 
formulated or decision to be taken’.33 The third type of participation is to seek and 
consider victim information. For example, Victim Personal Statements (VPS) provide a 
formal opportunity for the victim to explain in their own words how the crime has 
affected them physically, emotionally and financially. The fourth type of participation is 
expression, which consists of the optional supply of information, and/or expression of 
emotion. The introduction of the VPS scheme and, more recently, victim advocates, 
does indicate that opportunities for participation in the criminal justice system are 
slowly improving. However, such rights are most common in the area of sentencing and 
whether victim participation at the trial stage of proceedings can be facilitated, whilst at 
the same time preserving core due process values is a challenge that adversarial 
jurisdictions will have to confront. 
 
This thesis will consider a third possible category of victims’ rights, which will be 
referred to as ‘substantive rights’. These are the ‘rights’, or what might more 
appropriately be labelled the ‘interests’, of victims in substantive criminal law. The idea 
here is that victims’ interests should be respected and their experiences taken into 
account in substantive law. These are not formal rights but interests that should be 
respected by the criminal law. This will be labelled a ‘complainant-centred’ approach to 
justice. Thus, the concern of this thesis is not complainant’s rights in relation to criminal 
procedure but the extent to which the definition of substantive criminal offences, most 
notably sexual assault, could and should acknowledge or take account of the 
complainant’s experience of an action. 
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(b) Meaning of ‘complainant-centred’ 
Orthodox subjectivist theory, which is traditionally applied in mainstream English 
criminal law, is concerned with the defendant and his blameworthiness. Orthodox 
subjectivists argue that the criminal law is about the just allocation of blame and 
responsibility, reserving the criminal sanction only for those who deserve it.34 A 
‘complainant-centred’ offence is one in which the complainant’s experience of the 
alleged act has a prominent place in determining whether and for what offence the 
defendant is liable. This may involve a lack of correspondence between D’s advertence 
and C’s experience, in the sense that C’s experience may have been unforeseen by D. A 
‘complainant-centred’ approach to substantive criminal law emphasises the conduct 
prohibited by the law and evaluates that conduct from the complainant’s perspective. A 
‘complainant-centred’ approach focuses on the interests of complainants that have 
been violated by the defendant and denotes an awareness of the centrality of the 
complainant and their rights and interests in the criminal justice system. A ‘complainant-
centred’ offence is one in which the law appropriately labels conduct and communicates 
the nature of the offender’s transgression to the complainant’s satisfaction. 
 
‘Complainant-centred’ offences are a species of constructive liability: they reduce ‘rule 
of law’ protections and respect for autonomy by rendering D liable for harm caused 
irrespective of D’s foresight of that harm;35 and to that extent conviction turns on the 
chance element of whether or not the more serious (unintended and unforeseen) harm 
results.36 Arguments for constructive liability posit that anyone who decides to 
transgress the criminal law should be held liable for all the consequences that ensue, 
even if they are more serious than expected. Gardner argues that, by intentionally 
attacking another, D changes his normative position, ‘so that certain adverse 
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consequences and circumstances that would not have counted against one but for one’s 
original assault now count against one automatically, and add to one’s crime.’37 The 
existing law of offences against the person, stemming from the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861) is replete with examples of constructive liability, and the 
offences of murder and manslaughter are perhaps the best-known instances in English 
law. In 2006, there was much controversy over the creation of new offences of causing 
death by careless or inconsiderate driving38 and causing death by driving whilst 
disqualified, unlicensed or uninsured,39 for which the fault element is much lower than 
the tragic result.40  
 
The strictest version of a complainant-centred offence would be an offence in which C’s 
experience of an action or omission is determinative and there is no fault element 
required; an offence of strict liability. That is not what I am advocating in this thesis: a 
strict liability offence of sexual assault would be too broad and potentially unfair to 
defendants. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the extent to which the substantive 
offence definition is and could be complainant-centred. The crucial issue for this thesis is 
identifying the criteria to be used in evaluating whether the substantive offence of 
sexual assault is complainant-centred.  It is not easy to define what it means for an 
offence to be complainant-centred and it is from the ambiguity of this phrase that the 
interesting discussion arises. This section will delineate two criteria that will be 
employed in this thesis to evaluate the extent to which the reform process was, and the 
definition of sexual assault is, complainant-centred.  
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Criteria 1: to what extent is the definition experience-focused rather than fault-based?  
The first criterion that could be employed in evaluating the complainant-centred nature 
of an offence is whether the definition acknowledges or takes into account 
complainant’s experiences. This involves consideration of whether the offence 
definition focuses on the direct effects on the victim and the extent to which 
complainant’s are accorded the status of ‘privileged speaker’. A ‘defendant-centred’ 
offence, or what will be labelled in chapter 7 as a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to 
criminal law, is concerned with culpability and thereby justice to the individual accused. 
Although this must be a part of any fair and just system of criminal law, it fails to take 
sufficient account of how the complainant experienced the act. A ‘complainant-centred’ 
approach prioritises social protection over justice to the individual accused. 
 
One possible element of a complainant-centred offence is that one or more components 
of the actus reus are defined in terms of the complainant’s experience of the act. This 
will be referred to as a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach. Chapter 8 will analyse the 
different approaches to liability that build in ‘complainant-subjectivity’, highlighting how 
the differences arise when we consider the relationship between C’s experience and D’s 
fault. Each policy option is ‘complainant-subjective’ in that C’s experience is an 
important part of the offence definition, but with each option, the weight given to C’s 
experience lessens. 
 
A further element for evaluation is whether the definition of the offence rests on a 
consensual view of what constitutes the unacceptable behaviour in question rather than 
the experience of the particular individual complainant. This highlights what 
philosophers label the ontological problems in defining conduct. Do such acts ever have 
an inherent value or meaning or do they only acquire such meaning when others 
experience or respond to them? Context-dependent offences (crimes where the tribunal 
of fact need to consider the totality of the circumstances of the act because the conduct 
prohibited by the law is non-essentialist) give rise to the possibility of different 
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interpretations, one of which is complainant-centred. The relevance of complainant’s 
experiences is therefore particularly relevant where the offence is a context-dependent 
one or contains a context-dependent term. In relation to context-dependent offences, 
the complainant’s experience is an important aspect in understanding the nature and 
seriousness of the act. 
 
Another issue for consideration under this first criteria is whether the offence requires 
mens rea in relation to every element of actus reus? The correspondence principle41 
concerns the relationship between actus reus and mens rea, requiring intention or 
recklessness as to all the elements in the actus reus. However, the principle places too 
much emphasis on culpability as it ensures that a defendant is punished only for causing 
a harm or circumstance that he chose to risk or bring about. It also applies less easily to 
context-dependent terms. The presumption in favour of mens rea focuses the court’s 
attention on D’s reason for acting and deflects attention from the complainant’s 
affective response to the action. 
 
Criteria 2: offence labelling  
The second criterion is whether the offence label sufficiently represents the nature and 
seriousness of the harm done to the victim. Fair labelling is a normative principle of 
criminal liability that attempts to ensure that offences are subdivided and labelled to 
represent fairly the nature and magnitude of the law breaking.42 For an offence to be 
complainant-centred the criteria is not that the offence is labelled ‘fairly’ but that it is 
labelled so as to reflect the complainant’s experience and interests. This criterion 
therefore follows from criteria 1: does the offence reflect the complainant’s experience? 
                                                             
41
 The Law Commission Report, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No. 
237, 1996) identifies three principles as inherent in a (defendant) subjective basis for liability. The first of 
these is the „mens rea principle‟, which imposes liability only for those outcomes which were intended or 
knowingly risked by the alleged wrongdoer. This ensures that „the act is attributable to the defendant‟. The 
second principle, the „belief principle‟, judges a defendant according only to what she believed she was 
doing or risking. The third principle is the „principle of correspondence‟. 
42
 See J. Chalmers & C. Leverick, „Fair Labelling in Criminal Law‟ (2008) 71 MLR 217. 
28 
 
Offence labels ought to be fair to victims so that the legal record accords with their own 
perceptions of the nature and seriousness of the harm done to them. An accurately 
labelled offence demonstrates that society is showing solidarity with the victim and 
appropriately condemning the defendant’s actions. The symbolic function of the offence 
name has been cited as a reason why it is appropriate to distinguish between a variety 
of criminal offences. For example, fair labelling has been used as an argument against 
the merging of the separate offences of murder and manslaughter as was suggested by 
Lord Kilbrandon in Hyam.43 In 1985, the Criminal Law Revision Committee quite clearly 
stated that the label ‘murder’ should be retained. They suggested that this label, like 
many others, carries a certain stigma and they were concerned that anyone convicted of 
murder ought on moral grounds to be deserving of the stigma.44 Problems also arise 
when offence labels are ‘morally neutral’, employ inaccurate terminology or contain 
ambiguous and context-dependent terms that can be interpreted in divergent ways. The 
question in this context is therefore whether the sexual assault label properly 
represents the wrongdoing suffered by the victim to the public at large. 
 
(c) Defendants’ rights 
One recurrent theme throughout this thesis is whether complainant-centred justice 
impinges on defendant’s rights. Defendants’ rights can usefully be broken down into 
two categories, legal rights and basic human rights.45 The former shall be dealt with 
here and human rights implications will be analysed below. The need to avoid wrongful 
convictions requires the criminal justice system to assume that the accused is innocent 
until proven guilty, and to insist that the burden of proving his or her guilt or fault falls 
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on the prosecution. Due process insists that the government must respect all of the 
legal rights that are owed to a person according to the law. 
 
The principle of legality or what is frequently rendered in England in terms of the ‘rule of 
law’ is a fundamental principle, with both procedural and substantive implications. It 
expresses respect for the principle of autonomy: criminal offences should be clearly 
enough defined to enable people who wish to be law abiding to live their lives confident 
that they will not be breaking the law. The principle of legality is so wide-ranging it can 
be usefully be divided into three distinct principles- the principle of non-retroactivity 
(which shall be analysed below), the principle of maximum certainty, and the principle 
of strict construction of penal statutes. 
 
The principle of maximum certainty in defining offences embodies what is termed the 
‘fair warning’ principle. The essence of the principle seems to be that the citizen is 
entitled to specificity so that he knows which acts will result in criminal liability. It 
directs attention to the defendant’s awareness of the existence and extent of the 
offence: ‘respect for the citizen as a rational, autonomous individual and as a person 
with social and political duties requires fair warning of the criminal law’s provisions and 
no undue difficulty in ascertaining them.’46 There is a related issue here concerning 
statutes that require the doing of an act in terms so vague that citizens have to guess at 
its meaning and differ as to its application. Some overly broad offences47 are tolerated in 
the belief that prosecutorial discretion is a more reliable means of identifying truly 
criminal incidents than legal definition. This flies in the face of maximum certainty and 
has implications for the consistent application of the criminal law. The principle of strict 
construction appears to state that any doubt in the meaning of a statutory provision 
should, by strict construction, be resolved in favour of the defendant. One justification 
for this might be fair warning: ‘where a person acts on the apparent meaning of a 
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statute but the court gives it a wider meaning, it is unfair to convict that person because 
that would amount to retroactive lawmaking.’48  
 
(d) Human rights implications 
Any discussion of victims’ rights and defendants’ rights cannot take place without 
consideration of human rights treaties and standards. The incorporation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into English law has affirmed the 
importance of the right to a fair trial and has had some impact in protecting the rights of 
defendants.49 Thus, it is necessary to highlight the possible human rights implications of 
a greater ‘complainant-centred’ approach, in particular, balancing the approach with 
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 7 (retrospectivity).  
 
Article 6 of the ECHR concerns the right to a fair trial and states that everybody has the 
right to a ‘fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law’.50 The right to a fair trial may include a right to 
Legal Aid where this is necessary to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial.51 Article 
6(2) provides that a person ‘charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to the law’. The effect of the presumption is that in any 
criminal trial the prosecution bear the burden of proving (beyond a reasonable doubt) 
that the defendant performed the relevant actus reus with the requisite mens rea in the 
crime alleged. Article 6(3) includes several additional requirements in respect of criminal 
cases. These include the right: to have the case against the accused explained to him in 
a way that he understands; for the accused to question witnesses giving evidence 
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against him and to be able to call his own witnesses. Article 6 may impact on the use of 
strict liability offences, 52 which shall be considered in 8.1.1 below. 
 
Article 7 of the ECHR, which is commonly known in academic literature as the ‘non-
retroactivity principle’, proscribes retrospective criminalization, including a prohibition 
on criminal laws which are too vague and uncertain. Article 7 states that there must be 
no punishment without law and provides:  
‘(1)   No one shall be held guilty of any offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
 (2)  This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
The essence of the principle is that no one can be found guilty of an offence if what they 
did was not a criminal offence at the time of its commission. It prevents Parliament 
passing laws that make criminal offences of things done in the past. Article 7 requires 
that the law must be clear so that people know whether what they are doing is against 
the law. The Court looks to whether the individual can know from the wording of the 
relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the court’s interpretation of it, 
which acts and omissions will make him criminally liable.53 Article 7 also protects 
defendants’ against any increase in the possible sentence for an offence that has taken 
place because of the law changing since the date of their action.  
 
In relation to sexual assault, the non-retroactivity principle might arise in relation to the 
possible interpretations of the meaning of ‘sexual’. If ‘sexual’ were to be defined from a 
‘complainant-subjective’ perspective, as will be outlined in chapter 8, then sexual 
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assault would become an experience-centred offence, which focuses on the 
complainant’s affective response to the touching i.e. did C experience the touching as 
‘sexual’. Non-consensual sexual touching would only result in criminal liability once C 
has interpreted it as an offence. Accordingly, when D committed the act it was not an 
offence. This promotes uncertainty in the law and one might argue that it violates the 
‘non-retroactivity principle’. However, there are other offences in English criminal law 
where the conduct element of the offence is defined from a ‘complainant-subjective’ 
perspective. For example, the definition of harassment in s.1(1) of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 199754 and the element of ‘racial hostility’ that applies to racially or 
religiously aggravated assaults55 are both defined from a ‘complainant-subjective’ 
approach. Nonetheless, the European Court of Human Rights has not declared such 
offences incompatible with the Convention. To date, the English Courts have taken a 
very narrow view of the protection afforded by Article 7 and have not yet held that 
common law crimes such as manslaughter by gross negligence56 and public nuisance57 
are incompatible with Article 7 on the grounds of their vagueness.   
 
1.1.2 Methodology 
Given the nature of the research questions, which evaluate the sufficiently complainant-
centred nature of sexual assault, the main method employed in this thesis is the 
examination and analysis of primary and secondary documentary material. The primary 
material includes a thorough review and critique of the Sexual Offences Bill, policy 
documents, Parliamentary debate and the Sexual Offences Act 2003, along with an 
examination of the relevant cases on indecent assault, in particular R v Court,58 and the 
limited cases on sexual assault since 2003. The secondary material includes academic 
literature in disciplines of law, philosophy, psychology, sociology and political theory. In 
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particular, this thesis will draw on Jaconelli’s concept of ‘context-dependency’59 to 
underpin my critique of the insufficiently complainant-centred nature of sexual assault. 
The research will also employ Duff’s notion of ‘practical indifference’60 to legal norms to 
justify liability for reckless, yet culpable sexual touching. The thesis will demonstrate 
how a defendant who fails to notice the risk that his action may be perceived by the 
complainant or a reasonable person to be ‘sexual’ is not as blameworthy as one who 
does avert to it, but betrays a qualitatively different but also culpable contempt for the 
values protected by the criminal law sufficient to justify punishment. 
 
1.1.3 Thesis overview  
This thesis systematically critiques the theoretical underpinnings and practical 
application of sexual assault as a distinct and individual sexual offence. It analyses the 
extent to which the offence is complainant-centred both in terms of its substantive 
definition, the offence label and at sentencing. Its aim is to discuss the tensions in 
criminal law between the rights of complainants and the rights of defendants, in light of 
one particular offence and make recommendations for a more complainant-centred 
offence of sexual assault. The jurisdictional scope is limited to the law of England and 
Wales.61 The thesis is divided into thirteen chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 analyses the extent to which indecent assault was a complainant-centred 
offence. This is an appropriate starting point as it sets the offence of sexual assault in its 
historical context and provides a point of comparison for evaluating the extent to which 
sexual assault is, and should be, complainant-centred. Chapter 2 will demonstrate how 
indecent assault was a widely and ill-defined offence which caught all non-consensual 
sexual behaviour (commonly referred to before the SOA 2003 as ‘sexual assaults’) falling 
outside the scope of rape. The actus reus of indecent assault required an assault or 
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battery, perpetrated in ‘circumstances of indecency’. Analysing closely the decision in 
Court, chapter 2 will highlight the problems of defining the ‘inherent’ nature of conduct 
as indecent or decent. The chapter will consider the merits of a ‘genital proximity’ test, 
which suggested that an action or touching was ‘indecent’ if it was proximate to an 
indecent event, for example an exposed sexual organ. It will further demonstrate how 
with regard to indecent assault, the complainant’s experience of the ‘indecent’ nature 
of the act was not a factor to be taken into consideration by decision-makers and in this 
respect, the complainant was sidelined by the criminal justice system. The mens rea of 
indecent assault required an intention to touch and an ‘indecent intention’. Although by 
their very nature most archetypal indecent assaults were intentional, an issue arose as 
to whether voluntarily intoxicated defendants were capable of forming the necessary 
intention to touch and whether indecent assault was an offence of basic or specific 
intent. The chapter finds that the requirement that D had an indecent intention 
considerably narrowed the scope of the offence. Chapter 2 concludes that indecent 
assault was an insufficiently complainant-centred offence. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates the justifications for creating a new offence of ‘sexual assault’ 
under s.3 of the SOA 2003. The chapter analyses a proposal, prior to the SOA 2003 for 
an offence of sexual assault, which would have criminalised any assault which of itself 
was ‘grossly sexually offensive to a person of ordinary sensitivity’. It is submitted that 
this proposed offence would have been more complainant-centred as the ‘bystander-
objective’ test of ‘indecency’ would have been supplemented by a ‘complainant-
subjective’ test, which would have focused on the complainant’s affective response to 
the assault. In 1997, the newly elected Labour Government pledged to help victims of 
sexual offences obtain justice, commencing in a detailed and lengthy review process in 
1999, the Sexual Offences Review.62 The chapter assesses the extent to which the 
various committees and reports dealing with the sexual offences reform adopted a 
sufficiently complainant-centred approach. Sexual assault is one of many new, often 
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overlapping, offences that deal with invasions of sexual autonomy. Chapter 3 will situate 
s.3 in the context of the other sexual offences and highlight the controversies with the 
new broad structure. The chapter concludes that s.3 is ill-defined, ambiguous and over-
inclusive in potentially overlapping with rape and assault by penetration.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses two elements of the actus reus required for a conviction of sexual 
assault: the requirement that D touches another person and the requirement that C 
does not consent to the touching. S.3 introduces a wide offence with ambiguous limits 
stemming from the broad definition of ‘touching’: touching is broadly defined in s.79(8) 
to include ‘touching with any part of the body, with anything else or through anything 
and in particular includes touching amounting to penetration.’ Sexual assault is limited 
to ‘touching’ and does not extend to cases where the complainant is put in fear of being 
touched, highlighting one respect in which the offence is less complainant-centred than 
indecent assault. Section 3 ought to extend to situations where the complainant 
apprehends immediate and unlawful sexual touching for the sake of clarity and 
consistency in the criminal law. The law fails to label a psychic touching appropriately, 
because the label does not sufficiently represent the nature and seriousness of the harm 
done to the complainant. The chapter proceeds to demonstrate how consent was one 
aspect of the law that required clarification and how the new provision on consent is 
more complainant-centred.  Sexual assault had as its underlying objective the protection 
of men, women and children from unwanted sexual touching, but the chapter concludes 
that s.3 is a widely drawn provision that is under-inclusive and inappropriately vague. 
  
Chapter 5 evaluates the need for a context-dependent approach to the meaning of 
‘sexual’. Legislation and research in the field of sexual offences, often refers to the 
‘sexual nature’ of conduct. However, the meaning of ‘sexual’ is socially and historically 
constructed, rather than having an innate quality and as such, there are numerous 
methods of distinguishing ‘sexual’ and ‘non-sexual acts’. The chapter examines the 
concept of context-dependency and seeks to demonstrate that sexual assault is a 
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context-dependent offence. The analysis will be limited to one aspect of context-
dependency; offences which are defined, at least in part, by the complainant’s 
experience of an act or omission. Chapter 5 proposes that no touching is intrinsically 
‘sexual’; it only becomes so when someone experiences and defines it as such. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the range of contexts, circumstances and perspectives 
that we need to appreciate in order to define an act as ‘sexual’, or identify the 
contested nature of an act.  
 
Chapter 6 analyses three possible perspectives from which the meaning of ‘sexual’ could 
be viewed and defined, critiquing the approaches against the fundamental aims and 
principles of criminal law. It starts with consideration of a non-interpretive approach. 
This would involve defining ‘sexual’ according to the body parts involved and devoid of 
any reference to the defendant’s knowledge or awareness of the act’s nature or the 
complainant’s experience of the touching. Whilst adhering strictly to criminal law 
principles of certainty and fair warning it is argued that a non-interpretive approach 
would not have the flexibility necessary for an offence of sexual assault, in particular 
failing to take account of the context in which the action occurred. The chapter 
proceeds to scrutinise two objectivist approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’. It explores 
what is meant by ‘objectivism’, demonstrating that an objective approach to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ would require interpretation by a ‘reasonable person’. A ‘bystander-
objective’ approach would arguably be the fairest approach as it would require an 
evaluation of the action that is neither defendant- nor complainant-centred. However, it 
is criticised for implying that there exists social consensus on appropriate standards of 
sexual touching. Under a ‘defendant-objective’ approach, the reasonable person is in 
the same position as and is credited with the knowledge of the defendant. The chapter 
concludes that these three approaches are insufficiently complainant-centred. 
 
Chapter 7 continues the evaluation of possible perspectives from which ‘sexual’ can be 
viewed and defined. It analyses a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to defining ‘sexual’ 
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that would be dependent on the defendant’s knowledge and awareness of the act’s 
nature. In requiring that the defendant had knowledge of or appreciated the ‘sexual’ 
nature of the touching this approach would adhere most clearly to the core principles of 
criminal liability; that you must prove a guilty mind in an accused before you can 
convict. A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach is criticised for failing to take account of how 
the complainant experienced the act, restricting the ambit of the criminal law and failing 
to acknowledge that a defendant is able to exercise control through his behaviour.  
 
Chapter 8 scrutinizes a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’. 
This approach would focus entirely on the individual complainant and enable her to 
define the parameters of her sexual and bodily autonomy. The chapter discusses how 
the crime victim has been, until recently, the ‘forgotten player’ in the criminal process. It 
demonstrates how the complainant’s perspective is an important and relevant factor in 
assessing the ‘sexual’ nature of conduct. There is precedent in English law for offences 
to be defined, if only partially, in terms of the complainant’s experience of an act and 
the prohibition of harassment under s.1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
and the definition of anti-social behaviour under s.1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
will be used as a case-studies. The chapter concludes that whilst a ‘complainant-
subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is desirable it would carry with it 
significant problems, most notably that a defendant could be liable for an act which 
nobody other than the complainant considered to be ‘sexual’, violating the principle of 
fair warning. However, a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is a preferable test because 
the complainant’s perspective is an important and relevant factor in assessing the sexual 
nature of conduct. 
 
Chapter 9 investigates the extent to which s.78 SOA 2003, the provision that defines 
‘sexual’, is sufficiently complainant-centred. Analysis of the provision itself and the post-
2003 case-law demonstrates that s.78 is vague, insufficiently precise and does not 
provide clear guidance on what constitutes ‘sexual’. s.78(a) provides that some acts may 
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be ‘indisputably’ ‘sexual’ but these are limited in number. S.78(b) gives juries and 
magistrates wide discretion to decide what other actions are ‘sexual’ and the chapter 
explores the processes by which they might make that decision through six different 
hypothetical situations. The chapter suggests that the lack of clarity and certainty that 
arises as a result of the s.78 definition is undesirable for complainants because juries 
and magistrates are not explicitly instructed to consider C’s experience as one aspect of 
an act’s circumstances and this may deter some from pursuing a complaint. The chapter 
concludes that s.78 is ambiguous and might therefore lead to inconsistent decisions.  
Chapter 10 analyses the requirement that D must ‘intentionally’ touch another person, 
considering the circumstances in which a defendant is responsible for a ‘sexual’ 
touching and arguing that liability should extend to reckless, yet culpable sexual 
touching. Reckless sexual touchings may be culpable and deserving of the label sexual 
assault because D has manifested an attitude of ‘practice indifference’ as to whether 
touching takes place. Chapter 10 further examines the relevance of involuntary and 
voluntary intoxication to a charge of sexual assault. It finds that the recent decision in 
Heard63 is complainant-centred in holding that s.3 is a basic intent crime, even though it 
appears to be a specific intent crime. This is complainant-centred because it means that 
voluntary intoxication cannot be used as a defence to sexual assault. However, the 
decision in Heard also formalizes the inherent failure of s.3 to recognise that some 
unintentional touchings are culpable and therefore worthy of a criminal response. The 
chapter concludes that some elements of the mens rea of sexual assault are unclear and 
controversial and these could be modified to make the law more ‘complainant-centred’. 
 
Chapter 11 analyses the reasonable belief in consent test. The chapter finds that the 
test is ‘defendant-objective’ and that this is inappropriate because it allows the jury to 
consider personal characteristics of the defendant in deciding the reasonableness of his 
conduct and therefore still leaves much scope for interpretation by judges and juries in 
individual cases. It further questions whether appeal courts are likely to read in to s.3 a 
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presumption of mens rea, namely that in order to be guilty D must either know the act is 
‘sexual’, know that reasonable people would consider the act ‘sexual’, be aware of the 
possibility of the touching being ‘sexual’, or be aware that reasonable people might 
label the touching ‘sexual’. This is one aspect of the definition that ought to be resolved 
so as to make the offence more complainant-centred; requiring that D be aware of the 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching might deflect the court’s attention away from the 
invasion of C’s sexual autonomy and fail to communicate law’s symbolic condemnation 
of acts interfering adversely with sexual self-determination. 
 
Chapter 12 examines the degree to which the law should and does reflect the 
individualised experiences of victims, as opposed to typical experiences, at sentencing. It 
highlights the problems of determining the seriousness of a sexual assault based on 
standard harm and culpability. It further draws attention to the problems of 
complainant-centred sentencing, most notably that it may undermine a subjectivist 
approach to criminal liability. Chapter 12 proceeds to examine the actual place of 
victims’ experiences in sentencing for sexual assault, considering the relevant provisions 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Sentencing Guideline Council’s (SGC’s) guidelines 
on sexual assault and the scope for individual experiences to be factored in through 
Victim Personal Statements and treating victim harm as an aggravating factor. It 
discusses whether sexual assault is primarily a personal rather than public offence and 
argues that in determining offence seriousness the individual victim’s experience should 
determine the harm component of the harm/culpability dyad. The SGC’s guidelines on 
Sexual Offences are welcome but, in the context of sexual assault, are flawed in focusing 
on the specific nature of the physical contact involved. The chapter concludes that the 
law on sentencing is more complainant-centred since 2003 than the respective 
provisions that existed for sentencing indecent assault, but that the actual place of 
victims’ experiences in sentencing is still somewhat ambiguous. 
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Chapter 13 discusses the thesis’ main conclusions and identifies further avenues for 
research. The overall argument of the thesis is that the substantive offence of sexual 
assault is insufficiently complainant-centred and that certain areas of the definition in 
s.3 could be clarified and/or amended to make it more complainant-centred. There is 
also a need to increase public awareness about the nature and scope of the offence of 
sexual assault and how it differs from rape and assault by penetration. In order to 
analyse sufficiently the practical application of the new law it would be necessary to 
conduct empirical research into how sexual assault cases are investigated, tried and 
sentenced. Sexual assault is an important and yet broadly defined offence which is 
predominantly ‘over-shadowed’ in theoretical commentary and empirical research by 
the crime of rape.  
 
1.1.4 A note on terminology  
In England and Wales there are two terms that refer to the person against whom a 
crime has been, or may have been, committed.  The more technical term ‘complainant’ 
is used to indicate the person who alleges that an offence has been committed against 
him or her. The word is neutral in respect of whether any crime has been committed 
against that person and therefore does not assume that another person, especially the 
accused in a trial committed the crime. Strictly speaking, a complainant does not 
become a victim unless and until the accused is convicted. In contrast, in everyday 
language the term victim is not restricted to persons in this situation. A person can be a 
victim even though no one is ever charged or prosecuted.64 Generally in this thesis, the 
more technical term ‘complainant’ will be used, given that the research comprises an 
evaluation of the substantive offence of sexual assault. In chapter, 12 the term ‘victim’ 
will be used as this analysis considers the sentencing of a defendant post-conviction. 
 
Throughout this thesis, I will predominantly refer to sexual assault in terms of its most 
frequently occurring dyad, male defendant and female complainant. There were 15,510 
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sexual assaults on a female aged 13 or over recorded by the police in 2008/09, 
compared with 1,154 on a male aged 13 or over.65 Based on the British Crime Survey 
self-completion module on intimate violence, 2.3 per cent of women aged 16 to 59  and 
0.4 per cent of men (of the same age) had experienced a less serious sexual assault 
(unwanted sexual touching) in the previous 12 months. It is acknowledged that sexual 
assault occurs between other dyads but for the sake of clarity and consistency, this 
thesis will refer primarily to the male defendant-female complainant relationship.  At 
times, the defendant will be referred to as ‘D’ and the complainant as ‘C’. 
 
The thesis is based on the law as of 1st January 2010. 
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2 
A Critical Analysis of the Extent to which Indecent Assault 
was Sufficiently Complainant-centred 
 
Indecent assault was a broad offence, which, based on the ‘ladder’1 of offences, came 
beneath rape and attempted rape. The offence, which was originally set out in sections 
52 and 62 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA 1861), then sections 14 
and 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (SOA 1956), was repealed by the SOA 2003 and 
replaced by a number of alternative offences, separating one offence in to several based 
on the types of assault and the categories of complainant. Sexual assault, set out in 
section 3 of the SOA 2003 is one such new offence. This chapter will analyse the old 
offence of indecent assault, consider its practical application and limitations, and 
thereby provide criteria against which the complainant-centred aspects of sexual assault 
will be evaluated. 
 
Three issues in particular proved problematic under ss.14 and 15 SOA 1956. First, the 
statute referred to assault, implying that the offence would be satisfied by causing C to 
fear being touched. Secondly, the concept of indecency was ambiguous and uncertain. 
In R v Court2 the House of Lords adopted the approach that indecency involved a 
contravention of standards of decent behaviour in regard ‘to sexual modesty and 
privacy’, but debate continued over whether D’s state of mind could be taken into 
account in determining whether an activity should be regarded as indecent. Thirdly, the 
decision in Olugboja,3 which held that consent was a question of fact for the jury, 
created uncertainty about when a person consents. 
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Part 1 will examine the history of indecent assault, acknowledging that it essentially 
penalised non-consensual sexual activity falling outside the scope of rape and 
considering the reasons for the vastly different maximum sentences for indecent 
assaults committed on males and females.  
 
Part 2 will analyse the actus reus of indecent assault highlighting how the offence 
required only the ‘causing of fear’ that C would be touched, rather than a physical 
assault and arguing that this is an important complainant-centred aspect of the offence 
that no longer features in the definition of sexual assault. It further examines the 
ambiguity of indecency as a concept and analyses the decision in Court where Lord 
Ackner introduced a tripartite categorisation of gestures: (a) conduct that was 
inherently decent; (b) conduct that was inherently indecent; and (c) conduct that may or 
may not be indecent. The decision will be criticised for failing to explain what made an 
act ‘inherently decent’ or ‘inherently indecent’ and assuming that there existed a 
consensual view of what constitutes indecent conduct. Part 2 also highlights how the 
requirement that C did not consent to the activity was not an element of the offence 
definition but that the approach favoured in Olugboja was applied to indecent assault in 
McAllister.4 However, the issue of consent remained at least partly unresolved in those 
situations where D exercised a deception in order to carry out an indecent assault. 
 
Part 3 will examine the mens rea of indecent assault, demonstrating how the 
requirement that the assault must have been committed ‘intentionally’ excluded 
reckless assaults and was therefore under-inclusive and insufficiently complainant-
centred. It will discuss whether the voluntarily intoxicated defendant was capable of 
forming the necessary intent to touch and whether indecent assault was an offence of 
basic or specific intent. It further analyses the decision of the House of Lords in Court 
requiring the prosecution to prove an ‘indecent intention’ on the part of the defendant.  
I will argue that this expression is capable of many different interpretations and 
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demonstrate how it caused much confusion for future courts. I will further contend that 
a defendant’s indecent or sexual motivation was an irrelevant consideration in 
determining whether his conduct was indecent.  
 
The actus reus of indecent assault required only the ‘causing of fear’ that C would be 
touched, rather than a physical assault and this is an important complainant-centred 
aspect of the law, which no longer forms part of the definition of sexual assault. 
However, the chapter concludes that indecent assault was insufficiently complainant-
centred in three important respects. First, indecent assault was a widely drawn 
provision that prohibited both a psychic or physical assault and therefore contravened 
the principle of fair labelling, as the label did not represent fairly the nature and severity 
of the conduct. The definition of indecent assault also prevented conviction of a reckless 
yet culpable indecent assault. Secondly, Lord Ackner’s categorisation of certain acts as 
incapable of indecency implied that the complainant was denied the status of ‘privileged 
speaker’: the complainant’s experience or perception of the act was not a factor to be 
considered in determining the ‘indecent’ nature of the act. Thirdly, the obligation on the 
prosecution to prove an indecent intention where the conduct itself was ambiguous 
further limited the reach of the offence.  
 
2.1 HISTORY OF INDECENT ASSAULT 
Until the seventeenth century there were very little in the way of pleas, verdicts and 
judgments on sexual violence.5 The OAPA 1861 was the first statute to expressly 
prohibit indecent assault, creating two separate offences of indecent assaults 
committed on a male and indecent assault committed on a female with vastly different 
maximum sentences. The SOA 1956 consolidated the law on sexual offences, retaining 
the distinction between indecent assault committed on a man and indecent assault 
                                                             
5
 See B.A. Hanawalt, Crime and Conflict in English Communities, 1300-1348 (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass, 1979) p.66; J.A. Sharpe, Crime in Early Modern England (Longman, London, 1984) 
p.49. 
45 
 
committed on a woman. Prior to the SOA 2003, indecent assault was essentially a 
‘catch-all’ offence covering all other non-consensual sexual acts falling outside the 
definition of penile penetration of the anus or vagina. 
 
2.1.1 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
The OAPA 1861 consolidated the previously complex mixture of common law and 
statute law into a single Act designed to deal with all offences of violence, detailing 
some fifty crimes where ‘the person’ could be harmed or endangered. It created 
offences of rape (s.48), indecent assault upon a female (s.52), forcible abduction of any 
woman with intent to marry or carnally know her (s.53), buggery (s.61) and indecent 
assault upon a male (s.62). Section 48 provided that ‘*w+hosoever shall be convicted of 
the Crime of Rape shall be guilty of Felony’ and sentenced to penal servitude for life or 
not less than three years. The section was silent as to the elements to be proved, leaving 
the substantive framework of the offence to be developed through the common law as 
‘unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent by fear, force or fraud’.6 
Serious penetrative and non-penetrative assaults that did not come within the scope of 
rape could be prosecuted only as indecent assault, which was originally governed by 
s.52 OAPA 1861: 
‘Whoever shall be convicted of any indecent Assault upon any Female, or of any 
Attempt to have carnal Knowledge of any Girl under Twelve Years of Age, shall be liable, 
at the Discretion of the Court, to be imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years, 
with or without Hard Labour.’ 
Section 62 prohibited ‘Unnatural Offences’ committed upon men including ‘any 
Indecent Assault upon Any Male Person’ with a maximum sentence of ten years ‘penal 
servitude’. Sections 52 and 62 did not define the conduct they prohibited and omitted 
to stipulate any actus reus or mens rea requirements. No consideration was given to the 
possible range and severity of violations that sections 52 and 62 proscribed. It was 
unclear whether slipping a hand up a skirt or penetrative assaults with objects other 
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than the penis, that were more recently classified as ‘indecent assault’, were banned 
under the OAPA 1861. However, it is important to be aware of judging Victorian society 
according to contemporary standards of unacceptable sexual behaviour. Whilst certain 
behaviour, such as putting a hand up a skirt might nowadays be classified as indecent or 
sexual assault, during the Victorian era it might have been just ‘harmless fun’ or ‘what 
men do’. 
 
In omitting to stipulate the elements of mens rea required for rape and indecent assault 
the OAPA 1861 failed to acknowledge and emphasise masculine responsibility for such 
actions. The Act perpetuated the debate about whether rape was a property crime, 
infringing a man’s rights over a woman’s sexuality, a physical crime of violation or a 
moral crime undermining female sexual chastity.7 The exclusion from any statutory 
definition of rape or indecent assault of any reference to women’s sexual autonomy for 
example in terms of lack consent shows that the legislation upheld and enshrined the 
Victorian belief in female passivity. Indecent assault had an even vaguer legal definition 
than rape. Lord Justice Brett in 1875 explained to one jury that, ‘I cannot lay down the 
law as to what is or is not an indecent assault beyond saying that it is what all right-
minded men, men of sound and wholesome feelings would say was indecent’.8 This 
reinforced the position that any interpretation of what action constituted indecent 
assault was in purely masculine terms. This is not surprising, given that it was only men 
who sat on juries and worked as magistrates. 
 
It was possible to charge defendants with both indecent assault and common assault 
allowing the jury to convict on the lesser charge if a ‘clear’ sexual intention could not be 
proven. In 1867, the Home Office was forced to seek guidance from the law officers 
concerning the most appropriate charge under the OAPA 1861 where an indecent 
                                                             
7
 K. Stevenson, „Observations on the Law Relating to Sexual Offences: the Historic Scandal of Women‟s 
Silence‟ [1999] 4 Web JCLI. 
8
 R v Baker, The Times, 31 July and 3 August 1875. 
47 
 
assault was committed, but no great violence used or actual bodily injury occurred.9 The 
Attorney General and Solicitor General advised that such assaults could properly be 
dealt with as aggravated assaults, presumably to avoid the necessary expense of a full 
committal.10 However, charging non-violent indecent assaults as aggravated assaults 
failed to acknowledge the sexual context of such assaults and a number of reported 
cases in The Times between 1861 and 1870 confirm that although the initial allegation 
was one of indecent assault the defendant was subsequently convicted of common 
assault.11 One might argue that this not only misrepresents the nature and extent of 
sexual violence in Victorian Britain, but also minimises the sexual aspect of the violation, 
indicating that complainants’ sexual autonomy was not being sufficiently respected. 
However, an alternative interpretation might be that some defendants were being 
inappropriately charged with indecent assault in the first place, and juries or magistrates 
were upholding the rights of defendants not to be found guilty of an offence for which 
there was insufficient evidence.12 
 
Often, as now, the main issue in most indecent assault trials was the perceived 
character of the complainant versus the perceived character of the accused. When a 
Maidstone policeman admitted entering a woman’s home at night and indecently 
assaulting her, the magistrate dismissed the charge because ‘the complainant had not 
borne a particularly moral character, and it was further contended that nothing but a 
little harmless fun had passed between the two’.13 An editorial published after two 
‘respectable men’ were convicted and fined for indecent assault reveals the firm 
conviction that such charges against ‘respectable men’ were inconceivable: ‘A public 
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officer whose business is to protect the public and a gentleman who was able to bring 
forward the most respectable witnesses are not the persons we should be inclined to 
suspect of such acts.’14 Even conviction for indecent assault did not necessarily cost a 
man his respectability. This provides some evidence that ‘yielding to temptation’ was 
perceived by newspaper editors, journalists, magistrates and politicians as normal 
behaviour for a man.15 
 
2.1.2 Indecent assault 1956-2004 
The SOA 1956 consolidated the law on sexual offences. Under sections 14 and 15 it was 
an offence ‘for a person to make an indecent assault on a woman’ and a man 
respectively.16 The wording of the two sections was virtually identical, apart from a 
specific provision dealing with the effect of an invalid marriage to a girl under the age of 
16.17 Indecent assault was considered the second most serious type of sexual offence, 
after rape.18 Rape became a statutory offence by virtue of s.1(1) SOA 1956, which simply 
provided that ‘It is an offence for a man to rape a woman’ and was later defined by 
statute in 1976. The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 provided a definition of 
rape that codified the common law as laid down by the House of Lords in DPP v 
Morgan.19 That provision was replaced by the Criminal Justice and Public Order 1994, 
s.142 which extended the definition to include non-consensual anal intercourse upon a 
male or female: a man committed rape if ‘he [had] sexual intercourse with a person 
(whether vaginal or anal) who at the time of the intercourse [did] not consent to it’. 
Sexual intercourse was defined as the penetration by the penis of the vagina or anus.20  
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Rape was narrowly defined in its scope and indecent assault was essentially a ‘catch-all’ 
offence covering all other non-consensual sexual acts falling outside the definition of 
penile penetration of the anus or vagina. Forced acts of oral sex and penetration by 
objects or other parts of the body remained collectively subsumed under the heading of 
indecent assault. Indecent assault was therefore widely defined, covering a multitude of 
activities of varying seriousness, without the gradation of offences that existed in 
relation to non-indecent assaults. Broadly speaking it covered any indecent touching of 
a person without consent and also fear of being touched, both of which will be explored 
below. The label on conviction did not differentiate between the vastly different forms 
of conduct and their disparate gravity. Temkin suggested that the indecent assault label 
was ‘mindless’, by which is presumably meant that it did not describe the essence of the 
wrongdoing, particularly in serious cases.21 
 
In 1954, the Wolfenden Committee was appointed by the government to consider ‘the 
law and practice relating to homosexual offences and the treatment of persons 
convicted of such offences by the courts’. This culminated in the publication in 1957 of 
the Wolfenden Report,22 which concluded that homosexual behaviour between 
consenting adults in private should not be subject to criminal sanction. The meaning of 
‘homosexuality’ was an immediate and enduring problem for the Wolfenden 
Committee. The Wolfenden Committee addressed the matter by way of a consideration 
of the meaning of ‘homosexual offences’ and formulated a list of offences that included 
amongst other acts indecent assault on a male by a male, indecent assault on a female 
by a female and gross indecency.23 The offences of indecent assault and gross indecency 
were frequently used to deal with homosexual behaviour, even though in a significant 
number of cases the actions were consensual. This demonstrates the victimization of 
gay men and women by legislators, the police and judges. However, the Wolfenden 
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Report did conclude that ‘*i+n practice, where homosexual offences *were+ concerned, 
most cases of indecent assault relate*d+ to offences against boys under sixteen’.24 It 
further confirmed the relatively rare nature of prosecutions for indecent assaults 
committed by a female on a female: ‘We have, however, found no case in which a 
female has been convicted of an act with another female which exhibits the libidinous 
features that characterise sexual acts between males’.25 This suggests that there was 
little evidence of indecent assaults committed by women on women and that women 
did not engage in such activities. Another interpretation is that it demonstrates a 
commonly held belief in the nineteenth century of the sexual passivity of women.26  
 
Until 1985, the maximum penalty for indecent assault on a female was two years 
imprisonment,27 compared with ten years for indecent assault on a male.28 Ashworth 
suggests this was ‘a legacy of the horror with which society viewed homosexuality and 
the undervaluing of female sexual and physical autonomy’.29 The result of this was that 
a degrading sexual attack on a woman where the defendant forced her to commit 
fellatio or inserted objects into her body was not even an arrestable offence, as this 
required a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. The Indecency with Children 
Act 1960 increased the penalty to five years where the offence was committed on a 
female under 13, so stated as such in the indictment, but where the victim was over 13 
the maximum remained at two years. This left a number of inconsistencies. If a male 
touched the external genitalia of a female, he faced a maximum sentence of five years’ 
imprisonment if she was under 13. If she was over 13 but under 16 even if she 
consented,30 he faced two years’ imprisonment. If he touched a male of any age in an 
identical manner the maximum penalty was 10 years. It was not until the passing of the 
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Sexual Offences Act 1985, that parity of sentencing was achieved and the seriousness of 
the offence on females was appreciated: under s.3 (3), both indecent assaults on men 
and women attracted the same maximum sentence of 10 years.31 This was in 
comparison with the maximum penalty of life imprisonment for rape of a female32 and 
ten years imprisonment for rape of a male (buggery).33 Although rape victims were 
given anonymity in 1976, victims of other offences within the Sexual Offences Act 1956, 
such as indecent assaults, were not given anonymity until the passing of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.  
 
2.2 ACTUS REUS OF INDECENT ASSAULT 
The actus reus of indecent assault required only the ‘causing of fear’ that C would be 
touched, rather than a physical assault and this is an important complainant-centred 
aspect of the offence that no longer features in the definition of sexual assault. 
However, the assault was also required to be perpetrated in ‘circumstances of 
indecency’ and the ambiguity of indecency as a concept caused problems for the courts. 
In Court, Lord Ackner introduced a tripartite categorisation of gestures but failed 
sufficiently to explain what made an act ‘inherently decent’ or ‘inherently indecent’, 
mistakenly assuming that there existed a consensual view of what constitutes indecent 
conduct. The judgment in Court further highlighted how the power to determine the 
indecent was allotted to ‘certain privileged speakers’,34 and emphasised the 
insufficiently complainant-centred nature of the offence as the complainants’ 
experience or perception of the act was not a factor to be considered in determining the 
‘indecent’ nature of the act.   
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2.2.1 Assault or battery 
Indecent assault was a more serious form of offence than common assault, but similarly 
required an assault (or battery) as a precondition for its completion. In 1952, Lord 
Goddard CJ explained that: 
‘an assault can be committed without touching a person. One always thinks of an 
assault as the giving of a blow to somebody, but that is not necessary. An assault may be 
constituted by a threat or a hostile act committed towards a person.’35 
The later case of Faulkner showed that the act needed not to be hostile.36 An assault in 
this sense was any act committed intentionally or recklessly, which caused another to 
apprehend immediate unlawful personal violence.37 Prior to the SOA 2003, the term 
‘assault’ in statutes was used both in a strict sense (‘sometimes called psychic assault’)38 
and in a broad sense to include a battery, i.e. any act which intentionally or recklessly 
inflicted unlawful personal violence on another (sometimes called ‘physical assault’).39 
Indecent assault could be classified as either a psychic or a physical assault, although in 
practice most indecent assaults involved a battery, characteristically taking a direct and 
immediate form e.g. deliberately groping breasts,40 striking someone on the buttocks,41 
kissing.42 If the assault had taken the form of a battery, it was not necessary for the 
complainant to be aware of the touching or of the circumstances of indecency. It was 
quite possible to indecently assault a person whilst he or she was sleeping.43  
 
On occasion, the offence was capable of being committed with a psychic assault; as in 
Rolfe,44 where D moved towards C with his penis exposed.45 The Lord Chief Justice 
commented that:  
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‘an assault may be constituted by a threat or a hostile act committed towards a person, 
and if a man indecently exposes himself and walks towards a woman with his person 
exposed and makes an indecent suggestion to her that, in the opinion of this court, can 
amount to an assault.’46  
An invitation from D for C to touch him intimately did not constitute an indecent assault 
on D’s part unless his conduct put C in fear of D’s touching her.47 In respect of a psychic 
indecent assault, the complainant must have been shown to be aware both of the 
assault and of the circumstances of indecency.48 The complainant’s perception of the 
incident therefore gained some significance, as the offence required only the ‘causing of 
fear’ that the C would be touched, rather than a physical assault. The reasoning in Rolfe 
and Beal v Kelly49 was taken a step further in Sargeant.50 There the defendant had 
grabbed the complainant, a 16-year-old youth, had wielded a stick in a threatening 
manner and had forced the youth to masturbate into a condom. The appeal against 
conviction for indecent assault, on the basis that where there was no actual touching of 
the complainant by the defendant the threat must be one of indecent touching, was 
dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The decision confirmed that there did not even have 
to be the threat of indecent touching. Instead, it sufficed to prove that there existed the 
coincidence of an assault and the necessary accompanying circumstances of indecency. 
This is an important complainant-centred aspect of the law. As we shall see in chapter 3, 
under s.3 SOA 2003 D must intentionally touch C, precluding conviction of a D who 
commits a psychic sexual assault51 or where there exists the coincidence of an assault 
and the necessary accompanying sexual circumstances. Thus, sexual assault is more 
narrowly defined than indecent assault. This is an important consideration in assessing 
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the extent to which s.3 is complainant-centred as will be demonstrated in chapter 4, 
section 4.2. 
 
In Ananthanarayanan,52 the Court of Appeal stated that ‘there is no room in this area of 
the law for any ‘de minimis’ exception’. The defence counsel submitted that the 
‘evidence of indecent touching by the appellant disclosed such trivial acts as not, in law, 
to amount to indecent assault at all’, which would have amounted to saying that so far 
as the law is concerned women have to put up with minor indecent assaults. The Court 
of Appeal held that: 
‘...there may be cases where the circumstances of an alleged indecent assault are such 
that a real question arises whether the public interest requires prosecution, but in 
principle there should be no doubt that under the modern law any deliberate and non-
consensual touching accompanied by circumstances of indecency constitutes the 
criminal offence of indecent assault.’ 
This demonstrates an important complainant-centred aspect of the law on indecent 
assault. Female complainants were protected from the objection that some indecent 
assaults were ‘too trivial’ to be the subject of legal control.  
 
2.2.2 ‘Circumstances of indecency’ 
The assault was required to be perpetrated in ‘circumstances of indecency’.53 Until 
1951, there was no English criminal case in the law reports in which the question of the 
meaning of indecent assault had been considered. Back in 1867, however, an Australian 
appellate court held that ‘indecent assault is nothing more than a common assault with 
circumstances of indecency on the part of the offender’.54 In Beal v Kelley,55 Lord 
Goddard expressed his preference for the definition given in Archbold’s Criminal 
Pleading Evidence and Practice: ‘An assault accompanied with circumstances of 
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indecency on the part of the prisoner’. In many cases, of course, there was no problem 
of categorising the assault as indecent e.g. where D touched C’s sexual organs. However, 
what of D who puts his hand on C’s thigh or around her shoulders? Was it relevant 
whether D acted out of a sexual motive? Could activities such as D washing C’s feet or 
cutting her hair for purposes of sexual gratification constitute indecent assault? 
 
The adoption of the word ‘indecency’ in this context, as opposed to sexual, suggests, as 
repeated on several occasions by the House of Lords in Court, that the original criterion 
was infringement of ‘contemporary standards of modesty and privacy’.56 The element of 
indecency distinguished indecent assault from common assault (a summary offence 
with a maximum term of six months’ imprisonment) and made it a more serious offence 
carrying a maximum term of ten years imprisonment and a far greater social stigma. 
Professor Glanville Williams suggested that touching a woman’s breasts and stripping a 
woman in public without sexual motive were acts not ‘sufficiently serious’57 to 
command the title indecent assault or penalties severer than those for common 
assault.58 According to Williams, the courts should have insisted that an indecent assault 
must relate to the normal erogenous zones, ‘the genital organ and its approaches’.59 
Williams suggested that a man who slaps or pinches the bottom of a fully clad female 
‘takes a liberty’ and commits a common assault.60 Although the assault was sexually 
motivated, there were in fact no aggravating sexual features about it, and therefore it 
should not be made an indecent assault. This would have devalued a woman’s sexual 
autonomy and trivialised what may be a very traumatic and psychologically harmful 
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experience for the complainant. The phrase ‘takes a liberty’ would also have raised 
more questions about when conduct is acceptable. In contemporary society, where the 
impact of sexual offending on complainants is well documented, we should strive to 
highlight the wrong of unwanted sexual touching, and not de-value the ‘sexual’ aspect 
of a violation.  
 
A further failure of Williams’ characterisation is that indecent assaults would normally 
engender very different reactions in the mind of the complainant than common 
assaults. A women even lightly molested by a breast fondling may well ‘quite reasonably 
feel not just an entirely justified revulsion as a depersonalised object of one-sided 
pleasure, but also a very real fear of what might be coming next’61 i.e. that the offender 
might decide to rape her. Prichard suggested that if courts had characterised the 
fondling of a woman’s breasts as not indecent, this would have created a hybrid offence 
of ‘indecent common assault’.62 This would have disregarded the distress peculiarly 
inflicted by the ‘indecent’ nature of the act, equating the fondling with a light tap on the 
shoulder. 
 
(a) The ambiguity of indecency 
The word ‘indecency’ can be related to a list of similarly ambiguous terms: decency, 
intimacy, privacy, modesty, immodesty, sexuality. Moran suggests that these terms may 
be associated with two general discourses through which a ‘discipline of the body is 
written and through which social hierarchies are initiated and managed.’63 The first 
theme is ‘civility’ (covering decency, indecency, intimacy, immodesty, privacy) and is 
categorised by Moran as having a concern for manners and described as a ‘medium 
through which both individuals and groups define themselves within social space’.64 The 
vagueness of the term ‘civility’ and its relationship with morals is problematic. Decency 
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refers to an individual’s adherence to social standards of appropriate speech and 
conduct. Indecency is therefore a socially and culturally constructed and historically 
contingent concept. Moran’s classification of the indecent within the theme of civility 
demonstrates that indecency is essentially a moral judgment and therefore context-
dependent, rather than having an essential quality.  
 
The second theme is ‘sexuality’ which emerged as an idea in the eighteenth century and 
whose social origin Moran suggests is more ‘closely associated with science, hygiene 
and sanitary government.’65 Foucault’s History of Sexuality Volume 166 now stands out 
as the key text in the histiography of sexuality.67 Foucault was not interested in sexuality 
itself so much as he was interested in how it became an ‘object for knowledge’. Whilst 
other cultures treated sex as an object of knowledge, as an ars erotica, or art of sensual 
pleasure, our culture was distinct in treating sex as an object of distanced, scientific 
investigation. Foucault identified four major focus points: the hysterical woman, the 
masturbating child, the socialization of procreative behaviour and the sexually 
‘perverse’. Whilst these themes persist today, new concerns have emerged including 
incest and child abuse. Foucault wrote that the concept of which activities and 
sensations are ‘sexual’ is historically determined and therefore part of a changing 
discourse.68 It is suggested that questions of regulating sexuality bring into focus the 
liberal view of a world split between public and private.69 Should practices such as 
prostitution, incest, sexual intercourse with children and homosexuality lie on the public 
or private side of the divide? The boundary between these two areas of life shifts over 
time and according to dominant beliefs, and therefore the dilemma continually presents 
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itself.70 Later in this thesis, I will consider the co-existence and management of these 
two discourses in the contemporary idea of defining an offence as ‘sexual’ rather than 
‘indecent’ and in the face of possible differences and conflicts.  
 
Williams defined indecent as ‘overtly sexual’.71 He thus highlighted what he perceived as 
the inter-relationship between sexuality and civility, putting the two regimes into a 
hierarchical relationship. The definition suggests that in law the body is now to be 
written through the signifying practice of sexuality: the indecent is to be defined as the 
sexual.72 Sexuality is thereby the ascendant of civility. Nevertheless, how are we to 
define sexuality? One possible approach is that there is a necessary relation between 
genitality and sexuality. However, this thesis will argue that the ‘sexual’ is not only a 
single necessary relation (genital/sexual) but also an assignable relation: no action or 
touching is intrinsically ‘sexual’ it only becomes so when someone experiences and 
defines it as such. Ultimately the problematic aspect of both indecent and sexual assault 
is meanings and thereby the ambiguity of gesture. How do you define an act as 
‘indecent’ or ‘sexual’ when it is capable of many meanings?73 It will be argued in chapter 
5 that sexual assault is a context-dependent crime, as the polysemic quality of the act 
often requires consideration of the relationship between the gesture and its meanings. 
The focus of this chapter is the courts’ approach to the meaning of ‘indecency’ in light of 
the two lexicons mentioned above and given that it was left undefined by the SOA 1956. 
 
(b) Indecency pre- R v Court: genital proximity 
A test of actual genital proximity or the suggestion of genital proximity became a 
practice through which the ambiguity of the indecent gesture could be controlled by 
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judges and juries. Lord Goddard, in Beal v Kelley,74 concluded that where a hostile act 
(for example, the touching of a shoulder without consent) is proximate to an indecent 
event (an exposed sexual organ, for example, the erect penis) then the assault is an 
indecent assault. In R v Leeson,75 the Court of Appeal concluded that the where the 
kissing of a girl against her will is ‘accompanied by suggestions that sexual intercourse 
should take place or that sex play should take place between them, the assault is an 
indecent one’. These precedents demonstrate one way in which the problem of 
ambiguity may be resolved.76 The genital proximity test was referred to and given 
further support by Lord Justice Gibson on behalf of the Court of Appeal in Court,77 but 
Lord Ackner attempted to resolve the problem of the ambiguity of ‘indecent’ by 
introducing a tripartite categorisation of gestures. 
 
(c) The decision in R v Court 
In Court, D, a shop assistant, placed a 12-year-old girl visitor, fully clothed, across his 
knees and struck her 12 times on her buttocks. When questioned by the police as to 
why he replied, ‘I don’t know why- buttock fetish’. He pleaded guilty to assault but 
denied that it was indecent. His counsel argued that the evidence of the secret motive 
should be excluded on the basis that it could not make indecent an assault that by 
reference to the overt circumstances was not ‘indecent’. This argument was central to 
the appeal before the both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. The House of 
Lords dismissed D’s appeal against conviction. Where a charge of indecent assault 
contrary to section 14(1) of the SOA 1956 was founded on facts capable of being given 
an innocent as well as an ‘indecent’ interpretation, it was necessary for the prosecution 
to prove not only that the accused intentionally assaulted the complainant but that in 
doing so he intended to commit an assault which right-minded persons would think was 
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indecent. Evidence as to the accused’s motive tending to explain the cause of his 
conduct was admissible to establish not only whether he intended to commit an assault, 
but an indecent assault. It was held per curiam78 that if the circumstances of an assault 
were incapable of being regarded as indecent by the trial judge or jury, the undisclosed 
intention of the accused could not make the assault an indecent one.  
 
The first issue arising from this case is how ‘indecency’ was determined. D’s motive may 
have been indecent but the act or its circumstances may not have appeared to be 
indecent to an objective observer, or vice versa. The House of Lords gave detailed 
guidance on how the question of indecency should be left to the jury. Lord Ackner 
suggested that matters might be clarified for the jury if they were to be asked whether 
they thought ‘right-minded persons would consider the conduct indecent or not’. It was 
in the context of this question that the House of Lords identified three categories of 
activity: (a) conduct that was inherently decent; (b) conduct that was inherently 
indecent; and (c) conduct that may or may not be indecent. 
 
Category 1: inherently decent conduct 
This category included conduct that was decent by its very nature. If an act was 
inherently decent, the act could not constitute an indecent assault even if D’s motive in 
perpetrating the act was a sexual motive. Lord Ackner with the concurrence on this 
point of all the other Lords said, ‘The Prosecution must prove...that the assault, or the 
assault and the circumstances accompanying it, are capable of being considered by 
right-minded persons as indecent.’79 At another point he added, ‘it is for the jury to 
decide whether what occurred was so offensive to contemporary standards of modesty 
and privacy as to be indecent.’80 One weakness of the decision in Court is the lack of 
examples given to demonstrate the conduct falling into the three categories. There was 
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no explanation as to what made an act ‘inherently decent’ and it appeared to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. Taking a shoe,81 or touching C’s skirt82 were considered 
by the courts to be inherently decent and therefore outside the scope of indecent 
assault, notwithstanding that they were done for sexual reasons.  
 
Category 2: inherently indecent conduct 
This category included conduct that was indecent by its very nature, regardless of 
whether D engaged in the conduct for sexual or other reasons. An inherently indecent 
assault occurred where an objective observer would be sure that he was witnessing an 
act that was indecent. An example of this type of conduct in Court was of a man who 
removed a woman’s clothing in public against her will. According to Lord Ackner, ‘those 
very facts, devoid of any explanation, would give rise to the irresistible inference that 
the defendant intended to assault his victim in a manner which right-minded persons 
would clearly think was indecent.’83 Situations where D might have a legitimate 
explanation include where D, a doctor, strips an unconscious woman lying in the road in 
order to resuscitate her. A prima facie indecent act would not have been considered 
indecent if it was committed by a medical professional for medical purposes. This 
analysis demonstrates how it was difficult to separate the actus reus from the mens rea 
of the offence. If the motive of D was a relevant issue in deciding whether an assault 
was indecent, this suggested that the two elements were not capable of being 
distinguished. 
 
A further example of inherently indecent conduct given in Court was the intimate 
examination of a woman. If consent was given, no offence had taken place. Where D, a 
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doctor took a vaginal sample from C under the guise of diagnosis, but in reality, took the 
sample for the purposes of some research he was undertaking, the offence of indecent 
assault was committed. Lord Ackner, speaking for the majority in Court, considered that 
if the assault or circumstances associated with the assault were inherently indecent by 
the standards of right-thinking people, establishing indecent assault need not involve 
proof that the assault was sexually motivated. 
 
One problematic aspect of the Lords categorisation of inherently decent and inherently 
indecent conduct is the meaning attached to the terms ‘inherently’ and ‘decency’. It is 
not clear from Court what the Lords meant by the term ‘inherently’, but they seem to 
have assumed that there are some categories of conduct that all people would agree 
are inherently decent or indecent. This highlights what philosophers label the 
ontological problems in defining conduct. Do such acts ever have an inherent value or 
meaning, or do they only acquire such meaning when others experience or respond to 
them? There is an assumption in the judgement that all jurors are ‘right-minded people’, 
but given the multiplicity of perspectives on sexuality in contemporary British society, it 
is very difficult to maintain that view. The decision in Court therefore appeared to rest 
on a consensual view of what constitutes indecent conduct; but that in itself included a 
significant value judgment. The difficulty of distinguishing an inherently decent act from 
an inherently indecent act is illustrated by the difference of opinion in cases on forcible 
kissing.84 In the Scottish case Boyle v Ritchie85 the High Court held that a kiss might be 
perfectly decent in an open social setting but indecent in a ‘lewd and libidinous setting’. 
 
Category 3: conduct which may or may not be indecent 
This category included conduct that may be rendered ‘indecent’ by the accompanying 
circumstances or D’s motive. The facts of Court itself fell within this category. Lord 
Griffith suggested that spanking a girl’s bottom is an ‘equivocal’ action. The buttocks are 
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an intimate part of the body in close proximity to the sexual organs and non-consensual 
touching of this part of the body is certainly capable of being indecent.86 Lord Ackner 
further stated: 
‘The conduct of the appellant in assaulting the girl by spanking her was only capable of 
being an indecent assault. To decide whether or not right-minded persons might think 
that the assault was indecent, the following factors were clearly relevant: the 
relationship of the defendant to this victim (were they relatives, friends or virtually 
complete strangers?), how had the defendant come to embark on this conduct and why 
was he behaving in this way?’87 
In Court, if D had been C’s father administering discipline, this would not have been an 
indecent assault. Nevertheless, the buttocks are an erogenous zone, and the use of 
spanking in a sexual context is well established not only in pornography, but also in 
popular culture88 and even in serious literature.89 In Court, as D was acting for sexual 
gratification, his motive made an incident capable of being considered indecent actually 
indecent. D’s motive was therefore a relevant circumstance in cases falling within this 
category.  
 
The Court of Appeal had adopted the approach that conduct may be rendered 
‘indecent’ by the accompanying circumstances or D’s motive in cases heard prior to the 
Court decision. For example, in Leeson,90 the defendant had assaulted a girl by grabbing 
her and kissing her against her will. The Court of Appeal held that this constituted an 
indecent assault, due to the defendant’s accompanying suggestions that she should also 
submit to sexual intercourse. However, it was not in all cases that surrounding 
circumstances would suffice to turn an assault into an indecent assault.  In Thomas,91 
the defendant touched and rubbed the bottom of a girl’s skirt. On a number of 
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occasions some months before, he had asked the girl to kiss him. The Court of Appeal 
held that whilst there may have been an assault on the facts, it was neither inherently 
indecent nor rendered so by the accompanying circumstances.92 The Court of Appeal in 
Thomas did not mention the Leeson decision, but it appears that the cases could be 
distinguished on the basis of proximity. In Thomas, the Court of Appeal held that ‘the 
girl was not simultaneously coupling the touching of her skirt with the request by the 
caretaker for a kiss’,93 whereas in Leeson the suggestion of sexual intercourse 
accompanied the touching. 
 
One consideration was whether D’s cutting of C’s hair, or washing C’s feet would have 
been capable of being an affront to C’s modesty or privacy? One might argue that even 
if D experienced sexual gratification from the act, it was merely an assault, not an 
indecent assault and that there was insufficient affront to C’s modesty or privacy to 
move it into the ambiguous category. If C treated the washing of her hair simply as part 
of her haircut, then the fact that D acted from a secret motive should not have altered 
the nature of the assault charge. However, arguably such an action should have been 
capable of constituting indecent assault, where C was aware of D’s purpose or 
experienced the action as indecent.  
 
The reference in Court to ‘contemporary standards’ acknowledged that what is 
considered indecent may change over time. This meant that it was possible for certain 
behaviour to come to be recognised as indecent and therefore possibly to move into the 
category of being capable of being indecent. The practice of toe sucking might therefore 
have become a practice that could be charged as indecent assault. However, the fact 
that the standards were to be determined by ‘right-thinking’ persons meant that only 
those standards that had general acceptance within society as a whole would have been 
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applied. Thus, the fact that D and C were members of a religious group who regard it as 
indecent for a man and woman to hold hands in public, would not have turned D’s 
holding of the C’s hand in the street against her will into an indecent assault. Nor would 
the fact that, for example, the complainant was a strict follower of the Islamic religion, 
which required her to be fully veiled in public, mean that she would have been 
indecently assaulted by a defendant who pulled aside her veil, revealing her face. D will 
have assaulted her, but whether the assault would have been considered indecent 
would have been for the jury to decide, according to contemporary standards of ‘right-
thinking’ people. 
 
(d) Court and the genital proximity test 
In Court, the Court of Appeal expressed some support for the genital proximity test by 
reference to an observation made by the trial court judge that stated that buttock 
spanking was an indecent assault as it was the repeated physical contact in an area 
immediately adjacent to the private parts.94 The introduction of the tripartite 
distinction, however, raised questions about the continuing significance of the genital 
proximity test. Lord Ackner in Court drew attention to the fact that genital proximity 
may not in itself be sufficient to sustain a finding of indecency and thus appeared to 
subsume the genital proximity test within category 3, conduct which may or may not be 
indecent. He suggested that whilst the act has the capacity to be indecent, the indecent 
quality of the act might also depend upon other factors. These he describes as the 
relationship of the defendant to his complainant, the method used to initiate the event 
and finally, evidence of the defendant’s reason for acting.95 These additional 
requirements did not imply that the genital proximity test had been rejected, but 
highlighted again the problematic nature of the idea that there is a necessary relation 
between genitality and sexuality. 
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(e) Court and the concept of ‘privileged speakers’ 
The judgment in Court further highlighted how the power to determine the indecent 
was allotted to ‘certain privileged speakers’.96 The initial determination that the act of 
the defendant was indecent was not made by the complainant: ‘The girl went home and 
told her mother that the appellant had spanked her for no reason and scared her.’97 The 
father made the initial determination of indecency, to the exclusion of the 
complainant.98 Evidence that this exclusion was not idiosyncratic was found in the rule 
that it was not necessary in order to prove indecent assault to show that the 
complainant was aware of the circumstances of indecency or apprehended the 
indecency.99 Lord Ackner’s idea that an act may be inherently indecent or incapable of 
indecency suggested that the defendant might also be denied the status of privileged 
speaker.  Where the act was judged by reasonable people to be inherently indecent, the 
defendant’s perception of the behaviour and appreciation of the indecent nature of the 
conduct was not a matter to be considered by the court. 
 
It became apparent that in general the privileged speakers were external to the event: 
the father, mother, social worker, police, jury and judge were all given a voice in 
determining the ‘indecency’. When the action was merely capable of indecency, the 
voice of the defendant may have been privileged in that evidence of the reason for the 
behaviour would be allowed which may have negated a determination by others that 
the act is indecent.100 However, the judge and jury retained the right to determine the 
ultimate significance of the defendant’s assertion. The complainants’ experience or 
perception of the act was not a factor to be considered in determining the ‘indecent’ 
nature of the act. The test of indecency should have involved looking at contemporary 
standards, the motivation of D and the experience of C. This goes beyond the decision in 
                                                             
96
 Moran, op cit, n 34. 
97
 [1987] 1 All ER 120, at 121j. 
98
 [1988] 2 All ER 221, at 230a-b. 
99
 Ibid, at 229j. 
100
 Ibid, at 232d-e. 
67 
 
Court, but it does not directly conflict with it, and there are clear advantages in adding 
C’s perception into the analysis. Since the offence was primarily concerned with the 
level of assault which C had suffered, rather than maintaining public standards of 
decency, evidence as to C‘s view of the nature of the assault should have been relevant. 
This is not to suggest that there should only have been an indecent assault where C, at 
the time, regarded it as being indecent. This would have excluded assaults on C’s who 
were sleeping, or otherwise unconscious: but, C’s view as to whether or not the assault 
had an indecent element should have been taken into account. Where C was not 
conscious of the assault at the time, her subsequent attitude, on becoming aware of 
what D had done, would have provided the relevant test. This approach would have the 
effect of giving appropriate recognition to the infringement of C’s right to bodily and 
sexual autonomy. It would not have meant that any assault that C regarded as indecent 
would have lead to D being guilty of indecent assault. D would still have to have the 
required state of mind to be guilty and C’s evidence would only be relevant in relation to 
the ‘indecent’ nature of the act. 
 
2.2.3 Lack of consent 
Although the complainant’s lack of consent was not an element of the definition of 
indecent assault, as absence of consent was an essential ingredient of assault per se it 
followed that there was no indecent assault if D touched C indecently when C had 
consented to that touching. The approach to consent favoured in Olugboja101 was 
specifically applied to indecent assault in McAllister.102 Olugboja left the decision on 
consent as a question of fact for the jury who had to decide what was in the 
complainant’s mind at the time of the offence. The Court of Appeal suggested that ‘real 
consent’ is a different ‘state of mind’ from ‘mere submission’,103 and that the difference 
between these two is a matter of degree.104 According to the Court, a clear case of ‘real 
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consent’ is that of the woman who agrees to intercourse out of love or desire for the 
man and who understands what she is doing. The Court suggested that there comes a 
point at which the woman’s state of mind will be so different from the ideal that she can 
no longer be said to give ‘real consent’, but must be described as ‘merely submitting’. 
The Court left to the jury the task of fixing that point, ‘applying their combined good 
sense, experience and knowledge of human behaviour and modern behaviour to all the 
relevant facts of the case’.105 This seemed to indicate that every case should be decided 
on its facts but without a framework of what was meant by consent and when effective 
consent was absent.  
 
Academic commentators responded in different ways to the Olugboja decision. Smith 
and Hogan stated that the distinction between consent and submission was ‘so vague 
that both judges and juries may have quite different ideas as to its application’.106 
Gardner, on the other hand, hailed the decision as a considerable breakthrough in 
advancing the legal protection of sexual autonomy.107 He argued that depicting consent 
as the state of mind of the individual complainant permitted the jury to decide in each 
case whether consent was present.108 Temkin contradicted this view, arguing that 
Olugboja ‘does little to increase the protection of sexual autonomy’.109 She suggested 
that in transforming issues of law into issues of fact for the jury, the decision created 
‘uncertainty’ and might have resulted in ‘oppressive behaviour going unpunished’.110 
Arguably, Temkin was concerned that the common assumptions of rape as ‘forcible 
violation’ would undermine the likelihood that defendants whose actions did not 
subscribe to the police’s, prosecutors’ or jurors’ common (mis)understandings would be 
charged and convicted. 
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In determining whether an indecent assault had taken place, any consent given by a boy 
or girl under the age of 16 was to be disregarded.111 Williams justified this stating that:  
‘even when a youngster does not realise the significance of what is being done to him or 
her, and does not suffer harm, the law has to consider the alarm and annoyance caused 
to the parents’.112 
Consent given by a ‘defective’ was also to be disregarded provided D knew or had 
reason to think that C was a ‘defective’.113 If a woman were to have sexual intercourse 
with a boy under 16, this would have been the offence of indecent assault by the 
woman even if the boy consented to, or instigated, the act.114 As in the case of rape, 
consent exacted by force, fear or fraud as to the nature of the action, or as to identity 
was not a defence. In Tabassum,115 D, who was not medically qualified, persuaded 
women to allow him to measure their breasts by representing that he was doing so for 
the purpose of a database he was preparing for doctors. His convictions for indecent 
assault were upheld because the women would not have consented to these acts if they 
had not believed that he had medical qualifications (even though they were fully aware 
of the nature of the acts to be done) and D knew that this was so.116 Though C was 
aware of the nature of the act, her consent may have been negatived if she was 
mistaken as to its ‘quality’.  
 
This chapter has so far demonstrated that in relation to the actus reus of indecent 
assault the offence had considerable merit: it included psychic assaults, which 
considerably widened the behaviour amenable to prosecution. However, the offence 
was also insufficiently complainant-centred in two significant respects. First, indecent 
assault was a widely drawn provision that prohibited both a psychic or physical assault 
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and therefore contravened the principle of fair labelling, as the label on conviction did 
not differentiate between the vastly different forms of conduct and their disparate 
gravity. Secondly, the requirement that the assault be perpetrated in ‘circumstances of 
indecency’ created an offence of ambiguity and uncertainty. Lord Ackner introduced a 
tripartite categorisation of gestures, but failed adequately to explain what made an act 
‘inherently decent’ or ‘inherently indecent’ and inappropriately assumed that there 
existed a consensual view of what constitutes indecent conduct. No reference was 
made to the complainant’s experience or perception of the act as a factor to be 
considered in determining the ‘indecent’ nature of the act. We now turn our attention 
to the elements of mens rea required for a conviction of indecent assault. 
 
2.3 MENS REA OF INDECENT ASSAULT 
The mens rea of indecent assault required both an ‘intention to touch’ and an ‘indecent 
intention’. The requirement that the assault must have been committed ‘intentionally’ 
and excluding conviction of a reckless, yet culpable indecent assault was under-inclusive 
and insufficiently complainant-centred. There was also confusion as to whether the 
offence was one of basic or specific intent and the relevance of intoxication to a charge 
of indecent assault. The House of Lords in Court also required the prosecution to prove 
an ‘indecent intention’ on the part of the defendant. This was an unnecessary addition 
to the definition of indecent assault, which was capable of different interpretations and 
might have caused much confusion for courts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
Table 2.1: The different possible mens rea requirements for indecent assault 
Contact Circumstances 
D’s knowledge of the indecent 
nature of the act 
D knows D does not know 
Intentional 
Objectively decent 
1 
X 
 
2 
X 
 
Objectively indecent 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
Ambiguous 
5 
 
 
6 
X 
 
Reckless or 
accidental 
Objectively decent 
7 
X 
 
8 
X 
 
Objectively indecent 
9 
 
10 
 
 
Ambiguous 
11 
X 
 
12 
X 
 
 
2.3.1 Intent to touch 
Although most aggravated assaults may have been committed intentionally or 
recklessly,117 for the purposes of the offence of indecent assault, the assault must have 
been committed intentionally.118 Thus in table 2.1 we see that liability may have been 
found for indecent assault in situations 3, 4 and 5 where the contact is intentional. 
Indecent assault would also have been possible in situations 9 and 10, where the 
conduct is reckless or accidental, however this is a separate intoxication issue that will 
be dealt with below. In Court Lord Ackner, for the majority, described the mens rea for 
indecent assault in the following terms: 
‘On a charge of indecent assault the prosecution must prove (1) that the accused 
intentionally assaulted the victim, (2) that the assault, or the circumstances 
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accompanying it, are capable of being considered by right-minded persons as indecent, 
(3) that the accused intended to commit such an assault as is referred to in (2) above.’119 
According to these criteria, the only situations that would constitute indecent assault in 
the table above would have been 3 and 5. Lord Ackner defined the mens rea element to 
be ‘intent’ and not ‘intent or recklessness’. Therefore, indecent assault could not have 
been found in situations 7- 12 above (excluding situations 9 and 10 that deal with 
intoxication). Lord Ackner stated that ‘it cannot in my judgment, have been the 
intention of Parliament, that an assault can, by a mere mistake or mischance, be 
converted into an indecent assault, with all the opprobrium which a conviction for such 
an offence carries’.120 The offence could not be committed accidentally as for example 
by ripping a woman’s clothing whilst attempting to force an exit from a tube train, 
which would come under situation 12. Nor could the offence have been committed 
recklessly, as where a man brushed past a buxom woman in a packed nightclub. He is 
aware that his chest might touch her chest but hopes that he has left enough room, 
which he has not.121 He acknowledged the risk of touching the woman, but continued. 
The definition of indecent assault laid out in Court excluded conviction of a reckless, yet 
culpable indecent assault. This demonstrates an insufficiently complainant-centred 
aspect of the offence. It mistakenly assumed that a D who was reckless and 
unintentionally touched C had not chosen his actions and should therefore not be liable. 
However, I will argue in chapter 10 that reckless sexual touchings may be culpable and 
deserving of the label sexual assault because D has manifested an attitude of ‘practical 
indifference’122 as to whether touching takes place. 
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(a) Intoxication 
Limiting the mens rea to intent did not seriously inhibit the range of application of the 
offence as the typical indecent assaults, which courts dealt with involved intentional 
touchings by defendants aware of the ‘indecent’ nature of the act. One important 
exception to this was the case of the voluntarily intoxicated defendant. Was the 
voluntarily intoxicated D capable of forming the necessary intent to touch?  If indecent 
assault was exclusively a crime of intent then it followed that it was a crime of specific 
intent for the purposes of the rules relating to intoxicated defendants.123 In DPP v 
Majewski,124 the House of Lords held that the authority which had been relied upon for 
the last half century was the speech of Lord Birkenhead in DPP v Beard,125 where he said 
that the cases: 
‘establish that where a specific intent is an essential element in the offence, evidence of 
a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such an intent 
should be taken into consideration in order to determine whether he had in fact formed 
the intent necessary to constitute the particular crime. If he was so drunk that he was 
incapable of forming the intent required he could not be convicted of a crime which was 
committed only if the intent was proved.’ 
The decision in Court that the mens rea of indecent assault was limited to intentional 
touching was modified by subsequent interpretation. In C,126 D placed his fingers in C’s 
vagina. He claimed that he was so drunk as not to know what he was doing and that it 
followed from Court that the prosecution must establish a specific intent on his part. 
The Court of Appeal, confirming D’s conviction for indecent assault, emphasised that in 
C D’s conduct was inherently indecent. When commission of the offence took that form, 
in relation to the ‘indecent’ nature of the touching, it could be regarded as a crime of 
intent or recklessness and therefore a crime of basic intent within the meaning settled 
in Majewski. Thus, liability for indecent assault could have been found in situations 9 
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and 10 in table 2.1. The recklessness is of the Cunningham127 variety and accordingly, D 
must have foreseen the possibility that he might cause C to apprehend unlawful 
personal violence or he might unlawfully touch C in circumstances which right-minded 
people would consider indecent. Both the assault and its circumstances must be 
foreseen by D. In C, the Court of Appeal was effectively importing new mens rea 
requirements into indecent assault: where the conduct was inherently indecent, the 
crime was one of basic intent. By contrast, the act in Court was an ‘equivocal act’ and a 
sexual purpose had to be proved in order to constitute an indecent act. In that form, the 
offence becomes an offence of specific intent. The relevance of intoxication to a 
conviction of sexual assault, under s.3 SOA 2003, has also produced controversies, 
raising similar issues in defining sexual assault as a crime of basic or specific intent. In 
2007, the Court of Appeal held in R v Heard,128 that sexual assault is a crime of basic 
intent and that therefore voluntary intoxication is unavailable as a defence to a charge 
under s.3.  This decision will be analysed in chapter 10. 
 
2.3.2 Indecent intention 
The House of Lords in Court imposed a requirement upon the prosecution of proving an 
‘indecent intention’ on the part of the defendant.129 This expression is capable of many 
different meanings. Lord Griffith highlighted the distinction in criminal law between 
motive and intent.130 In the context of indecent assault, the necessary intent is to 
commit an assault that the jury as right-thinking people consider indecent. The motive 
for such an act will usually be to obtain sexual gratification but it need not necessarily be 
so. One problematic aspect of the decision in Court is that Lord Ackner framed the third 
aspect of the mens rea in terms of ‘the accused intended to commit such an assault as is 
referred to in (2)’131 (i.e. an assault capable of being considered by right-minded persons 
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as indecent). This implies that the defendant intended to do an act that was in fact 
indecent when arguably he was saying that the third requisite aspect is that the 
defendant knew that the assault would be viewed by right-minded people as indecent. 
It has already been demonstrated above how the House of Lords in Court distinguished 
between three situations for the purpose of establishing the necessary ingredient of 
indecency. The effect of the decision is to create a parallel three situations in respect of 
establishing the defendant’s mens rea. 
 
Category 1: inherently decent conduct 
If the circumstances of the assault were incapable of being regarded as indecent, then 
the undisclosed intention of the accused could not make the assault an indecent one. 
Thus we see in situation 1 that if the circumstances of the assault were objectively 
decent, an indecent motivation would not result in liability for indecent assault. 
Indecency must be manifested in conduct, at least to the extent that ‘right-minded 
persons’ would consider, without reference to any communicated or uncommunicated 
motive of the defendant, that the conduct in question might involve indecency. In 
George,132 the removal of a girls shoes from her foot in order to gain sexual gratification 
was not an indecent assault, there being no circumstances of indecency. Similarly, in 
Thomas,133 the touching and rubbing of a girl’s skirt did not constitute indecent assault, 
as it was neither inherently indecent nor rendered so by the accompanying 
circumstances. 
 
Category 2: inherently indecent conduct 
Lord Ackner, speaking for the majority in Court, considered that if the assault or 
circumstances associated with the assault were inherently indecent by the standards of 
right-thinking people, establishing indecent assault need not involve proof that the 
assault was sexually motivated. Where the assault was either inherently indecent, or 
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rendered so by the surrounding circumstances, then provided the defendant was aware 
of those circumstances at the time, and intended to commit an indecent assault (i.e. an 
assault which right-minded persons would think was indecent) he possessed the 
necessary mens rea. This was so even where the defendant had no intention to obtain 
sexual gratification from his act. Lord Ackner gave the example of a defendant who 
removes a woman’s clothing against her will134 and suggested that whether he did so for 
his own personal gratification, through a desire to humiliate or embarrass his victim, or 
for any reason, is irrelevant. A primary consideration in disavowing sexual motivation as 
a prerequisite was to ensure the conviction of persons for indecent assault who exposed 
their victims to a sexual form of humiliation, such as stripping them in public, for 
reasons of misogyny or cruelty rather than in pursuit of sexual gratification.135  This 
appeared to be a more complainant-centred approach: the stipulation that D’s motive 
was irrelevant and that the focus was on what right-minded persons would think was 
indecent seemed a more complainant-centred (or at least a more objective) approach 
than one that gave prominence to D’s reason for acting. 
 
Sullivan suggested that the decision to exclude a requirement of proof of sexual 
motivation gave rise to the prospect of convictions for indecent assault for conduct 
undeserving of the ‘opprobrium’ that sexual offending attracts.136 He further suggested 
that a ‘measure of uncertainty’ was introduced as certain kinds of non-sexual motive 
could prevent conviction for indecent assault, even in cases of inherently indecent 
conduct, whereas other ‘chaste’ reasons for action would no longer be afforded a 
defence. Sullivan drew attention to the example of the intimate examination of a 
woman patient by a male doctor that featured in Lord Ackner’s judgment. According to 
Sullivan, the doctor will commit an indecent assault if he fraudulently induces a woman 
to submit to an unnecessary examination for the purposes of his own sexual 
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gratification. Nevertheless, on Sullivan’s interpretation of the Court decision, if an 
intimate examination were medically appropriate, a doctor would not have been 
convicted albeit that he received sexual gratification from carrying out the procedure. 
However, if the procedure were unnecessary in medical terms, a sexual motivation, 
though sufficient to establish indecency, would not have been a necessary condition of 
conviction. Sullivan held the view that a doctor stood to be convicted even though his 
uncommunicated motivation was non-indecent (such as scientific research) because, 
without a treatment justification, the procedure was ‘so offensive to contemporary 
standards of modesty or privacy as to be indecent’.137  
 
Sullivan’s concern that Court led to unfair labelling was based on a misapplication of 
Lord Ackner’s three categories and a misunderstanding of the relevance of C’s lack of 
effective consent. First, the intimate examination of a woman patient by a male doctor 
is not by its nature ‘indecent’ and therefore should not have fallen within the inherently 
indecent category. The intimate examination of a patient is conduct that may or may 
not be indecent, depending on D’s purpose(s), and therefore should have appropriately 
fallen within category 3, allowing the prosecution to adduce evidence of D’s ‘indecent 
motive’. Secondly, a patient who allows an intimate examination in the belief that it is 
necessary for treatment has not given an effective consent to an examination for the 
purposes of D’s own sexual gratification,138 being misled as to the nature as opposed to 
the mere quality of the act. Thus, what Sullivan viewed as an issue concerning the 
circumstances of indecency, was actually an issue concerning C’s effective consent to 
the procedure.  
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unnecessary examination for the purposes of his own scientific research. Under the SOA 2003 D‟s false 
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Category 3: conduct which may or may not be indecent 
Where an assault, viewed objectively, was at most capable of being indecent, then the 
prosecution could adduce evidence to show, not merely that the assault was indecent, 
but also that the defendant committed it with an ‘indecent intent’. The obvious example 
of such a situation is Court itself. The delivery of chastisement to the buttocks of a child 
is not necessarily indicative of an intention to touch indecently. Knowing that the 
defendant is acting for the purpose of sexual gratification resolves any ambiguity about 
the nature of the act. As a result, liability can be found in situation 5. 
 
If the prosecution were allowed to adduce evidence of ‘indecent motive’ then it was 
only reasonable that the defence should be able to counter that with evidence of a 
‘decent motive’. In Court, Lord Ackner cited with approval the decision in Pratt.139 The 
case involved two thirteen year-old-boys who were engaged in night fishing. They found 
themselves suddenly threatened with a gun by a man. As each boy was forced to 
undress, the other was obliged to shine a torch on him. The man concerned stood some 
distance and touched neither of the boys. The trial judge ruled that the prosecution had 
to prove an ‘indecent intent’ and consequently, he allowed the defence to adduce 
evidence of the defendant’s ‘non-indecent motive’, namely that he was searching the 
boys for cannabis, which he believed they had taken from him the previous afternoon. 
The trial judge’s direction was approved by Lord Ackner in the following terms: 
‘The defendant was entitled to put before the jury his explanation of his strange 
conduct in order to contend that the prosecution had not established that he intended 
to commit an assault which was indecent’.140 
However, given the House of Lords’ own categorisation of indecent assault it is not easy 
to reconcile the principles established in Court with the actual decision in Pratt. It 
appeared that what D did in Pratt was inherently indecent, as it would have offended 
contemporary standards of modesty and decency. However, this draws attention to the 
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context-dependent nature of terms such as ‘indecent’ and, as we shall see in chapter 5, 
‘sexual’. There was an obvious difference in this case between what D thought of what 
he was doing, how the boys may have experienced the situation and how it would have 
appeared to an objective observer. It may have offended standards of modesty and 
decency (depending on the context) and in such circumstances, whether his motive was 
sexual or otherwise was irrelevant. D’s evidence might refute a contention that he made 
the boys perform these acts for his sexual gratification; this is irrelevant however, to the 
issue of whether he knew that right-minded persons would regard such an incident as 
indecent. Whilst D might have argued that he did not think that ordinary right-minded 
people would regard his conduct as indecent, it is unlikely that such an argument would 
have been believed by the jury or magistrates. 
 
The decision in Court appeared to suggest that in cases where the act is ‘inherently 
indecent’, the court can infer an intention to commit the act knowing that it is indecent, 
relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving indecent intention. Only in cases 
where the decency of the act is ambiguous does the prosecution need to show that D 
intended to commit an act knowing that right-minded people would think it indecent. 
Bentil argued that, following the decision in Court, jurors might have been tempted to 
equate an accused person’s motive or purpose of obtaining sexual gratification from his 
assault, with his intention to commit the assault itself.141 This is a very subtle distinction 
that many jurors might have struggled with. If the circumstances of the contact were 
objectively decent or ambiguous and the motivation was non-indecent, there could be 
no liability for indecent assault. Thus in situations 2 and 6, D will not have been found 
guilty of indecent assault, but may have been liable for common assault142 or assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm.143  
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(a) Lord Goff’s dissent in Court 
Lord Goff, dissenting, rejected the characterisation that the defendant’s motive was 
admissible in evidence, on the ground that the majority had confused mens rea with 
actus reus. He suggested that a ‘so-called “indecent intention” has never formed an 
ingredient of the offence, and that it would be wrong now to introduce any such 
requirement’.144 The defendant’s sexual motivation was something purely in his mind, 
and according to Lord Goff, it should not be considered when determining whether his 
conduct was indecent. Lord Goff agreed with the submission of defence counsel that ‘to 
introduce a requirement of indecent motive would be undesirable in that it would 
create complications’ in what had so far been ‘treated as a relatively simple and 
straightforward offence’. He felt that the term ‘indecent intention’ was capable of 
bearing different meanings such as: (1) that an accused person intended to do an act 
which was, in fact, indecent; or (2) that an accused person intended to do an act for an 
indecent purpose of any kind; or (3) that an accused person acted with a particular 
indecent purpose, viz., with the motive of obtaining sexual gratification from his act.145 
Lord Goff inferred that the judge intended to attribute the last of those three meanings 
to the expression ‘indecent intention’ highlighting how this was not explained to the 
jury. Arguably, there is a fourth meaning which can be attributed to the term ‘indecent 
intention’; that D knew that the assault would be viewed by right-minded people as 
indecent. 
 
According to Lord Goff, a requirement that the defendant must have acted from a 
sexual motive would exclude from indecent assault cases where a man undressed a 
woman in public but did so not from the motive of obtaining sexual gratification, but 
because he was a misogynist, or because he wanted to cause the woman 
embarrassment, or out of sheer mischief. He suggested that it is the fact that the assault 
is objectively indecent which constitutes the gravaman of the offence, which is to be 
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found in the ‘affront to modesty’146 of the complainant: ‘If a man gives a young woman 
a good spanking on the backside, the jury will...have to consider whether the assault 
was such an affront to her modesty as to amount to an indecent assault.147Lord Goff 
suggested that either intent to obtain sexual gratification should be an ingredient of the 
offence, or it should not. Lord Goff summed up his dissent as follows: 
‘First, if the prosecution cannot establish that an assault is objectively indecent, they are 
not allowed to fortify their case by calling evidence of a secret indecent intention on the 
part of the defendant. Second, if an assault is prima facie indecent, the defendant may 
seek to show that the circumstances of the assault were not in fact indecent, and for 
that purpose evidence of his intention would be relevant and admissible.’148 
Lord Goff made it quite clear that he was not to be taken as saying that evidence of 
motive was never admissible. Thus, he conceded that such evidence might be 
admissible in certain cases where an accused person sought ‘to say that what, prima 
facie, might appear to be indecent was not, in fact, circumstances of indecency’.149  
 
The views expressed by Lord Goff were more preferable and more complainant-centred 
than the decision of the majority in Court. He highlighted the potential for injustice in 
cases where a man has been charged with what a reasonable person would call an 
indecent assault, but whom nevertheless claims that he is not guilty on the ground that 
he committed the assault only because he is a misogynist. In the vast majority of cases, 
the jury or magistrates would have been likely to have been able to glean from the 
circumstances of an assault whether or not the assault may have been indecent, 
without the need to have evidence of the defendant’s intention. Lord Goff’s argument 
appears to rest on the need for simplicity, clarity and consistency in the law. A 
consequence of his appeal for simplicity in the law is that complainants might have 
received greater protection under his approach. Requiring that courts establish an 
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indecent intention on the part of D might have deflected attention from the invasion of 
sexual autonomy. It is the fact that the defendant assaulted the complainant in 
circumstances of indecency that should have been at the heart of the offence. Lord 
Goff’s approach might have focused the court’s attention on the circumstances of 
indecency, including the complainant’s affective response to the touching. Indecent 
intention appears to have been an unnecessary ingredient of indecent assault and in 
chapter 5, I will argue that an intentional touching can be ‘sexual’ when there is no 
sexual intent. 
 
2.3.3 Knowledge or recklessness as to consent  
The fault element of indecent assault included knowledge or recklessness as to whether 
the other person was consenting. In the overwhelming majority of indecent assaults, the 
defendant would have known that the complainant was not consenting to the acts in 
question. Nevertheless, where the defendant was reckless as to whether the 
complainant was consenting or not, the courts applied a subjective recklessness test. A 
defendant would have been guilty only if he himself had considered the possibility that 
the complainant might not be consenting, but decided to continue with the act in any 
case. In Kimber,150 the Court of Appeal stated that a defendant would be reckless as to 
consent if he ‘couldn’t care less’ whether or not the victim was consenting. However, if 
the defendant himself believed, however unreasonable that belief may have been, that 
the victim was consenting, then he would have lacked the requisite mens rea. One issue 
for consideration was whether D could be acquitted when he honestly, but drunkenly 
believed in consent. In Fotheringham,151 the Court of Appeal held that self-induced 
intoxication was no defence to a charge of rape, whether the issue was intention, 
consent or mistaken identity. Given the courts’ reluctance to show any sympathy to 
intoxicated defendants, it appears that these same principles applied to indecent 
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assault. In R v Cluyer,152 the Court of Appeal held that the fact that D could not 
remember what had happened did not affect his responsibility for indecent assault.  
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
There are three points arising from this discussion of the controversies surrounding the 
offence of indecent assault, which will provide criteria against which to measure the 
complainant-centred aspects of sexual assault throughout this thesis. First, indecent 
assault covered a wide range of conduct, ‘from the relatively minor, such as bottom 
pinching, to the very serious, such as vaginal or anal penetration by a bottle or other 
object’.153 Indecent assault was unclear in its scope and failed to include adequately 
those forms of conduct and complainant experiences that such an offence ought to 
include: the assault must have been committed ‘intentionally’, thereby preventing 
conviction of a reckless, yet culpable indecent assault. The label on conviction did not 
differentiate between the vastly different forms of conduct and their disparate 
seriousness. Nevertheless, the actus reus of indecent assault required only the ‘causing 
of fear’ that C would be touched, rather than a physical assault and this is an important 
complainant-centred aspect of the law, which no longer forms part of the definition of 
sexual assault.  
 
Secondly, the offence required that the action be perpetrated in ‘circumstances of 
indecency’. Moran’s classification of indecency within the theme of civility suggests that 
the offence was concerned with individuals’ adherence to general moral standards of 
appropriate conduct.154 The decision in Court underplayed the notion of context-
dependency and assumed that certain acts have an inherent decent/indecent quality. 
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Simester and Sullivan described the offence as an ‘anachronism’, arguing that ‘its 
concern with an actus reus of indecency is beside the point in a modern law focused on 
sexual violence’.155 The judgment in Court rested on a consensual view of what 
constitutes indecent conduct, but that in itself includes a significant value judgement. 
This thesis will argue that sexual touching does not have an inherent value or meaning, 
but only acquires such meaning when others experience or respond to the assault. This 
is especially important when dealing with those actions as the fringes of liability. In 
respect of the indecent nature of the act, the law has never adequately acknowledged 
and included the experiences of complainants, denying them the status of ‘privileged 
speaker’. 
 
Thirdly, the obligation on the prosecution to prove an indecent intention where the 
conduct itself was ambiguous further limited the reach of the offence. The expression 
‘indecent intention’ was capable of many different interpretations and might have 
caused much confusion for future courts. A defendant’s indecent or sexual motivation 
should have been an irrelevant consideration in determining whether his conduct was 
indecent: the fact that the assault was objectively indecent or that C perceived the 
assault to be indecent should have been enough to constitute the offence.  
 
In chapter 3 the process of sexual offences reform will be evaluated, considering the 
extent to which the various committees and reports pre-2003 adopted a sufficiently 
complainant-centred approach. The justifications for creating a new offence of sexual 
assault will be examined. 
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3  
A Reconfiguration of Indecent Assault: 
Complainant-centred Reform? 
 
Indecent assault was a widely drawn and ill-defined offence that was unclear in its scope 
and failed to include adequately those forms of conduct and complainant experiences 
that such an offence ought to include. This chapter will analyse two proposals for reform 
of the offence of indecent assault. It will further consider the extent to which the 
various committees and reports prior to the SOA 2003 adopted a sufficiently 
complainant-centred approach. It will also consider the structure of the SOA 2003 
analysing the scope of the four consent-based offences contained in ss.1-4 and 
considering the extent to which the offences overlap with each other. 
 
 
Part  1 will scrutinize the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s (CLRC) 1984 report, Sexual 
Offences, which considered amongst other things, whether there should be two grades 
of indecent assault. The Report suggested that a new offence of ‘aggravated indecent 
assault’ could be created which could be defined based on (1) ‘penetration’, (2) 
‘aggravating factors’ or (3) a combination of the two. The third approach would have 
included the situation where before, during or after the commission of an indecent 
assault the offender did an ‘act which is likely, seriously and substantially to degrade or 
humiliate the victim’. This would arguably have been a more ‘complainant-centred’ 
approach than the other two options, as it would have focused on the direct effects on 
the complainant, rather than upon any one physiological aspect such as penetration.  
 
Part 1 will further analyse Sullivan’s proposal in 1989 for indecent assault to be replaced 
by a crime of sexual assault.1 Sullivan’s proposed offence would have covered any 
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assault which of itself was ‘grossly sexually offensive to a person of ordinary sensitivity’ 
and which would have required D to have been ‘aware of the circumstances which 
made his conduct or intended conduct grossly sexually offensive to persons of ordinary 
sensitivity’. This would have been supplemented by a ‘complainant-subjective’ test in 
that D would also be charged with sexual assault where his assault or battery did or 
would have caused gross sexual offence to the victim and where D ‘was aware that it 
would cause such offence to the particular victim’. Whilst a test of ‘gross sexual offence’ 
appeared to be focused on the complainant’s affective response to the assault, 
Sullivan’s caveat that D must have been aware of the circumstances which made his 
conduct grossly sexually offensive or aware that C would be caused such offence would 
have been a major limitation on his proposed offence being complainant-centred.  
 
Part 2 will consider the justifications for reform of sexual offences law in the context of 
the Home Office report, Setting the Boundaries2 and the White Paper, Protecting the 
Public,3 highlighting the lack of attention sexual assault received in the reform process 
and parliamentary debates and arguing that this has created an offence with ambiguity. 
 
Part 3 will evaluate the scope of the four new consent based offences contained in the 
SOA 2003, ss.1-4, focusing specifically on the underlying objectives for replacing the 
offence of ‘indecent assault’ with new offences of ‘assault by penetration’ and ‘sexual 
assault’. It will situate s.3 in the context of the other sexual offences; highlighting the 
controversies with the new broad structure and arguing that s.3 is over-inclusive in 
potentially overlapping with rape and assault by penetration. The chapter concludes 
that sexual assault is imprecise and unclear, establishing a residual offence that catches 
behaviour falling outside the scope of rape and assault by penetration. Section 3 is 
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potentially not complainant-centred and this is what I am going to explore in 
subsequent chapters. 
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Table 3.1: The indecent assault/sexual assault reform process 
Date and reform body Recommendations Actus reus Mens rea 
1984 
 
Criminal Law Revision 
Committee’s 15th Report 
 
 Rejected possibility of bringing the 
worst cases of IA into an artificially 
extended definition of rape 
 Max penalty for worst cases of IA 
10 years 
 No longer separate offences of IA 
on a male and female 
 
 
 Considered category of 
‘aggravated IA’ based 
on: 
1. Penetration 
2. Aggravating factors 
3. Penetration + 
aggravating factors 
 Considered offence of 
‘gross sexual violation’ 
 
 
 
 
 No discussion of mens rea 
issues 
 No consent reforms proposed 
1989 
 
Sullivan’s proposed offence of 
‘sexual assault’ 
 
 
 
 Replacing IA with an offence of 
‘sexual assault’ 
 
 Assault or battery 
 ‘Grossly sexually 
offensive to a person of 
ordinary sensitivity’ test 
 Supplemented by a 
‘complainant-subjective’ 
test- SA if it does or 
would cause gross sexual 
offence to the victim 
 
 
 
 Intention to touch 
 D must be aware of the 
circumstances which makes 
his conduct grossly sexually 
offensive 
 
1999 
 
‘Setting the Boundaries’ 
Sexual Offences Review 
 
 
 A new offence of ‘sexual assault 
by penetration’ to cover 
penetration of the vagina or anus 
by the insertion of an object or 
other body part 
 A new offence of ‘sexual assault’ 
 
 
 Sexual touching (defined 
as behaviour that a 
reasonable person 
would consider to be 
‘sexual’) 
 
 
 Intent or recklessness as to an 
assault 
 Intent or recklessness in 
relation to the lack of consent 
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to replace other non-penetrative 
sexual touching contained in the 
offence of IA 
 
 No consent 
 
2002 
 
‘Protecting the Public’ 
White Paper 
 
 
 A new offence of ‘sexual assault 
by penetration’ to cover 
penetration of the vagina or anus 
by the insertion of an object or 
other body part 
 A new offence of ‘sexual assault’ 
to replace other non-penetrative 
sexual touching contained in the 
offence of IA 
 
 
 
 
 
 No discussion of the 
specific actus reus 
requirements for an 
offence of sexual assault 
 
 
 
 
 No discussion of the specific 
mens rea requirements for an 
offence of sexual assault 
 
2003 
 
Sexual Offences Bill 
 
 
 A new offence of ‘sexual assault’  
to replace other non-penetrative 
sexual touching contained in the 
offence of IA 
 
 
 D touches another 
person 
 The touching is ‘sexual’ 
 C does not consent to 
the touching 
 
 Intention to touch 
 D does not believe C 
consents, or  
 A reasonable person in all the 
circumstances would doubt C 
consents 
 
2003 
 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 
 
 A new offence of ‘sexual assault’  
to replace other non-penetrative 
sexual touching contained in the 
offence of IA 
 
 D touches another 
person 
 The touching is ‘sexual’ 
 C does not consent to 
the touching 
 
 Intention to touch 
 D does not reasonably believe 
C consents 
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3.1 PROPOSALS FOR REFORM OF INDECENT ASSAULT 
Indecent assault was a broad offence that covered a wide and undefined range of 
conduct: there was no one specific activity that it covered. The offence did not 
sufficiently reflect the gravity and seriousness of sexual assaults perpetrated by the 
penetration of the anus or female genitalia by the insertion of an object, or other part of 
the body and this problem was exacerbated by its low maximum sentence. The 
requirement that the assault must have been committed ‘intentionally’ and excluding 
conviction of a reckless, yet culpable indecent assault was under-inclusive and 
insufficiently complainant-centred. The judgment in Court that certain acts have an 
inherent indecent/decent quality rested on a consensual view of what constitutes 
indecent conduct, which included a significant value judgment. In respect of the 
‘indecent’ nature of the act, the law has never adequately acknowledged or included 
the experiences of complainants. The requirement that the prosecution must prove an 
‘indecent intention’ where the conduct itself is ambiguous considerably narrowed the 
scope of the offence. Indecent assault was unclear in its scope and therefore failed to 
include adequately those forms of conduct and complainant experiences that such an 
offence ought to include.1 This section will analyse two specific proposals for reform of 
indecent assault, considering the extent to which the recommendations dealt with the 
problems highlighted here and in chapter 2.  
3.1.1 Criminal Law Revision Committee 15th Report 
One area of debate was whether indecent assault ought to be divided into two grades 
so that the more serious forms of assault could be labelled separately. In 1984, the CLRC 
considered whether there should be two degrees of indecent assault.2 The CLRC 
contended that indecent assault covered a ‘wide range of conduct, from the relatively 
minor, such as bottom pinching, to the very serious, such as vaginal or anal penetration 
                                                             
1
 There is an argument that the labelling of an offence should reflect the actual experiences of 
complainants‟. In chapter 4, I will argue that the „sexual assault‟ label contravenes the principle of fair 
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2
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by a bottle or other object’,3 with some members arguing that there were ‘in reality two 
broad categories of indecent assaults’.4 The first covered ‘violent’5 assault inflicted with 
an implement, such as a bottle and the second, lesser category, conduct including 
indecent touching through clothes. Some members of the CLRC expressed the fear that 
if the offence was not divided:  
‘a man convicted of indecent assault could unfairly incur the stigma of being regarded as 
a serious sexual offender simply because of the maximum penalty applicable to the 
offence, when the facts of his case were comparatively minor and he had been punished 
by a small fine.’ 
Other members of the CLRC were of the opinion that indecent assault should not be 
treated as if it were a unique offence. They argued that courts in passing sentence can 
be trusted to ensure that defendants are treated fairly, and used the example of theft to 
demonstrate an offence which is defined to include under one heading cases covering a 
range of seriousness. Not all members of the CLRC agreed but a new category of 
‘aggravated indecent assault’, which would provide an alternative charge to indecent 
assault, was still considered. This, they argued could be based on (a) ‘penetration’, (b) 
‘aggravating factors’ or (c) a combination of the two. 
 
(a) ‘Penetration’ 
Liability would arise where there was penetration of the mouth by a penis or of the 
vagina or anus by an object or by the hand.6 Some members of the CLRC concluded that 
a slight penetration of the vagina by a fingertip was not serious enough to merit 
inclusion in an ‘aggravated’ category of indecent assault. Aggravated indecent assault 
would therefore require deeper penetration by more than one finger, the whole hand 
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or even a fist. It was agreed, however, that it would be ‘wholly impracticable’ for the law 
to distinguish between various forms of manual penetration and they suggested 
therefore that it would be open to the prosecutor to charge ordinary indecent assault in 
comparatively minor cases. The CLRC concluded that to define aggravated indecent 
assault by reference to penetration would have the advantage of simplicity and clarity, 
but also be, ‘open to the charge of concentrating unduly upon one physiological aspect 
and fostering the unfortunate impression that any indecent assault lacking penetration 
is trivial’.7 
 
(b) ‘Aggravating factors’ 
The presence of any one of a list of aggravating factors would turn an ordinary indecent 
assault into an aggravated one. In the Australian State of Victoria, the offence of 
indecent assault8 is aggravated by the following circumstances: where the offender 
inflicted serious personal violence, has an offensive weapon, degraded or humiliated the 
victim or was aided or abetted by another person.9 The Committee questioned whether 
these factors are appropriate for distinguishing one offence from another and 
considered that it might seem ‘artificial’ to adopt the concept for indecent assault and 
not to use it for the other sexual offences, to which the circumstances equally apply. 
The Committee did not elaborate on why it might be inappropriate to distinguish 
offences on the basis of aggravating factors, but it might have been because aggravating 
factors could be taken into account at sentencing. Another interpretation might be 
because they were reluctant to distinguish between ‘archetypal rape’10 and ‘aggravated 
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rape’,11 on the same basis that feminist groups disagree with the separate distinction of 
acquaintance rape. All rape is harmful12 and distinguishing offences based on 
aggravating factors might place the offences in a hierarchy of seriousness.  
 
(c) ‘Combination approach’ 
The aggravated offence would consist in an act of penetration or where immediately 
before or after the commission of an indecent assault the offender does an act which is 
‘likely seriously and substantially to degrade or humiliate the victim’.13 There were 
differences of opinion between members over how a ‘degrade or humiliate’ test would 
work and the CLRC also noted that it lacked the certainty generally required for the 
criminal law. This approach would arguably have been more ‘complainant-centred’ than 
the other two approaches because it would have focused on the likely effects on the 
victim, rather than upon any one physiological aspect such as penetration, or the 
presence of a particularly serious circumstance. A ‘degrading or humiliating’ test would 
have been experience-centred, focusing decision-makers’ attention on the violation of 
bodily integrity. However, some members of the CLRC expressed concern that such 
words might lead to ‘substantial inconsistencies between the verdicts of different 
juries.’14 Other members considered that, with proper guidance, juries and magistrates 
could make the ‘degrading or humiliating’ test work. They highlighted how the criminal 
law contains a number of flexible concepts that are left to juries to decide, such as the 
meaning of grievous in grievous bodily harm.15 In their opinion the objection on the 
ground of uncertainty would have had less force when what is in issue is the drawing of 
a dividing line between two offences rather than between conduct that is punishable 
and conduct that is not. 
                                                             
11
 „Aggravated rape‟ might include situations where the offender is armed with a weapon, where there is 
more than one offender or where the victim is below a certain age. 
12
 Although Gardner and Shute argue that the harmfulness of rape is not sufficient to justify treating it as a 
serious wrong. See J. Gardner & S. Shute, „The Wrongness of Rape‟ in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 
(eds) J. Horder (4
th
 series) (OUP, Oxford, 2000).  
13
 Op cit, n 2 at 4.22. 
14
 Op cit, n 2 at 4.22. 
15
 OAPA 1861, ss.18 & 20. See DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290. 
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The CLRC was predominantly concerned with fairness to the defendant in the imposition 
of a proportionate sentence and failed to consider how the proposals would affect 
complainants. They did suggest that, if the offence were divided, defendants would 
probably be less inclined to plead guilty to the aggravated offence, knowing that it 
attracted a higher maximum penalty and that this ‘would not be in the interests of the 
victim’,16 because it would require them to give detailed evidence in court on the 
precise nature and extent of the defendant’s acts.  
 
After discussion and much disagreement, the CLRC made no recommendation on 
whether the offence of indecent assault should be divided and the offence remained 
unaltered. They did however recommend that the maximum penalty for the worst cases 
of indecent assault should be 10 years’ imprisonment and that there should no longer 
be separate offences of indecent assault on males and females.17 Although they were 
unable to resolve their own differences over whether and how the offence of indecent 
assault should be divided, the CLRC recommended that if it were to be divided the name 
‘indecent assault’ should be retained for the lesser category of offences. However, they 
were again divided over what to call the aggravated offence. Options included ‘gross 
sexual violation’ or ‘aggravated sexual assault’ with a desire, based on the advice of the 
Policy Advisory Committee, to move away from the concept of ‘indecency’ in this 
context. It is likely that the CLRC were keen to avoid the ambiguity and uncertainty of 
the term ‘indecent’ for the aggravated offence, with a preference to focus on the 
‘sexual’ nature of the transgression.   
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 Op cit, n 2 at 4.13. 
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 This proposal was approved by the Law Commission and incorporated into the draft Criminal Code Bill 
as cl 111: 
„A person is guilty of an indecent assault if he assaults another in such a manner, of which he is 
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(a) indecent, whatever the purpose with which the act is done; or 
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The Law Commission stated that cl 111 incorporated the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in 
Court. (Law Com No 177, 1989, para 15.46). Given the wording of cl (b) it is possible that an assault 
which is „indecent only if the act is done with an indecent purpose‟, could have been interpreted as 
extending the offence to those cases where the act is objectively innocent, but the defendant nevertheless 
had a secret indecent motive. 
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The purpose of the CLRC’s Fifteenth Report was to ‘review...the law relating to and 
penalties for sexual offences’.18 However, the primary concern and dominant feature of 
the report was the offence of rape, with the offence of indecent assault being a lesser 
concern. This same issue arose in relation to the SOA 2003: the scope and nature of the 
offence of rape was the prevailing issue, with the three new consent based offences of 
assault by penetration, sexual assault and causing sexual activity without consent being 
predominantly overlooked by the drafters and in parliamentary debate.19 
 
The issue of whether there should be two grades of indecent assault continually 
presented itself in academic debate.20 Ashworth suggested that there was a strong 
argument for having two grades of indecent assault in English law, or for moving some 
of the more serious forms of the crime, i.e. forced fellatio or cunnilingus into a 
broadened crime of rape or ‘serious sexual assault’.21 He asserted that much of the legal 
controversy concerned not the more serious varieties of indecent assault but the more 
ambiguous forms, where the element of indecency was used to separate the sexual 
offence from common assault.22 The newly defined crime of sexual assault provides no 
further guidance regarding this matter and the dividing line between ‘sexual’ and ‘non-
sexual’ contacts remains unclear. Section 78 of the SOA 2003 explains an approach to, 
though not a definition of ‘sexual’ based on the criteria proposed in Court.23  
3.1.2 Sullivan’s 1989 proposed offence of ‘sexual assault’  
In 1989, Sullivan argued that the crime of indecent assault should be abolished and 
replaced by a crime of sexual assault that did not use indecency as a defining element.24 
This suggestion was based on a consideration of the combined effect of R v Philip 
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 Op cit, n 2 at 1.1. 
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White25 and R v Court. White, though merely a Crown Court decision held that there was 
no common law or statutory offence of assault with intent to rape. D followed a woman 
in the street, grabbed her, pulled her into an alleyway, and onto the ground. Defence 
counsel adopted the argument of Spencer that the offence of assault with intent to rape 
no longer existed in English law.26 Spencer maintained that assault with intent to rape 
was an established offence at common law which became a statutory crime by virtue of 
s.38 OAPA 1861, but which was then abolished by the Criminal Law Act 1967. 
 
Sullivan was concerned that serious assaults in terms of victim endangerment and 
trauma but which did not involve any overt indecency, bodily harm or act sufficiently 
proximate to constitute an attempt to commit a serious sexual offence stood to be 
punished as ‘mere common assaults’. Sullivan envisaged the situation where serious 
wrongdoing in terms of sexual threat occurred, but where there was not an appropriate 
charge. His example is of a girl walking in an isolated place who is ‘accosted’27 by a man. 
She runs away, chased by the man, who closes on her. Before he can catch her, a third 
party arrives on the scene and the man makes off. The girl is terrified and suffers serious 
trauma. Subsequent to his arrest, the man confesses he intended to rape the girl. On 
such facts, indecent assault was unavailable as a charge. The conduct would not suffice 
the minimum indicia of indecency insisted upon in Court. In order to be capable of being 
indecent, conduct must ‘suggest a possible form of sexual activity in its own right’ to the 
right thinking observer. If the girl was physically unharmed, other forms of aggravated 
assault28 seem ruled out and a charge of attempted rape may have failed on the 
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 [1988] Crim L R 434. 
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 S. Spencer, “Assault with intent to Rape-Dead or Alive” [1986] Crim L R 110. 
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question of sufficient proximity.29 Sullivan argued that falling back on common assault 
with its low maximum penalty30 was unsatisfactory, particularly if the defendant had 
previous convictions for serious sexual offences.31 Table 3.2 provides a comparison 
between the conduct and fault elements of indecent assault and Sullivan’s proposed 
offence. 
 
Table 3.2: A comparison between indecent assault and Sullivan’s proposed offence 
 Indecent assault Sullivan’s ‘sexual assault’ 
Actus reus 
 Assault or battery 
 Circumstances of 
indecency 
 Assault or battery 
 Gross sexual offence 
 
Determining 
the aggravating 
feature 
 ‘Right thinking 
people’ test 
(bystander-
objective) 
 
 ‘Gross sexual offence to a person 
of ordinary sensitivity’ test 
(bystander-objective), or 
 ‘that it does or would cause 
gross sexual offence to the 
victim’ (complainant-subjective) 
Mens rea 
 Intention to touch 
 D must be aware of 
the circumstances 
which would 
amount to 
indecency 
 Intention to touch 
 D must be aware of the 
circumstances which makes his 
conduct grossly sexually 
offensive, or 
 D must be aware that it would 
cause such offence to the 
particular victim 
 
                                                             
29
 The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s.1(1) requires that the D has carried out acts which are „more than 
merely preparatory‟, with the intention of committing the complete offence. The interpretation of the 
phrase „more than merely preparatory‟ has been problematic. Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 
1992)
29
 [1993] 2 All ER 190 suggested that in the case of rape, actions which were some way from the 
commission of the full offence could nevertheless be sufficient for the actus reus of an attempt. It was not 
necessary to prove that D physically attempted to penetrate the woman‟s vagina with his penis. Sullivan‟s 
hypothetical scenario appears sufficient for it to be left to the jury to decide whether D did acts that were 
more than merely preparatory towards the commission of the offence. 
30
 Criminal Justice Act 1988, s.39 (six months). 
31
 It is also worth noting that the accused in White pleaded guilty to an alternative count of abduction 
contrary to section 17 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and the judge found that D intended to have 
unlawful sexual intercourse without consent and sentenced D to two years imprisonment. 
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Sullivan suggested that a crime of sexual assault could cover any assault which of itself 
was ‘grossly sexually offensive to a person of ordinary sensitivity’. It could also cover any 
assault that although not sexually offensive per se was committed ‘with intent to 
perform any further non-consensual act which would have been grossly sexually 
offensive to a person of ordinary sensitivity.’32 Suppose D pushed C to the floor with the 
intention of undoing her trousers and touching her vagina, but who was frightened off 
by a passer-by. It is unclear whether such an action would have constituted psychic 
indecent assault. There would have been the possibility of a charge of attempted 
indecent assault, 33 or failing that, common assault. Under Sullivan’s proposed offence, 
pursuit of sexual gratification would not be a defining element: the sexual offensiveness 
of the conduct or any intended further conduct would suffice to make the assault a 
sexual assault. Additionally there would be an assault notwithstanding that the assault 
of itself or any intended non-consensual act further to the assault would not cause gross 
sexual offence to a person of ordinary sensitivity ‘provided that it does or would cause 
gross sexual offence to the victim of the assault and the defendant was aware that it 
would cause such offence to the particular victim.’34 Three areas in particular are worthy 
of discussion: (a) the meaning of ‘gross sexual offence’, (b) the ‘person of ordinary 
sensitivity’ standard and (c) the mens rea requirements. 
 
(a) Gross sexual offensiveness 
Sullivan did not define the phrase ‘gross sexual offensiveness’ stating simply that ‘*t]his 
standard is adopted as suitable for a serious offence with a high maximum penalty.’35 If 
the test of ‘sexual offensiveness’ was judged from C’s point of view, it would have had 
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 Sullivan, op cit n 1, at 337. 
33 An attempted indecent assault occurred when D did an act that was „more than merely preparatory‟ to an 
indecent assault, but for whatever reason, he failed to complete the substantive offence. The question was 
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 Sullivan, op cit n 1, at 337. 
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 Ibid, at 338. 
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the benefit of focusing on the complainant’s sexual autonomy and it is likely that in the 
majority of cases any unwanted sexual touching would cause offense. The requirement 
that the sexual offensiveness was ‘gross’ might have raised issues of interpretation and 
would arguably have limited the scope of such an offence. It would potentially have 
prevented any ‘minor’ touching of the buttocks or breasts from constituting sexual 
assault. Sullivan himself suggests that ‘a non-genital touching of a clothed woman by a 
man...would not ordinarily raise an issue of gross sexual offensiveness’.36 An offence of 
gross indecency was previously used by the law as a means to regulate physical 
expressions of homosexuality.37 There was a marked reluctance on the part of the 
English judiciary to define the term ‘gross indecency’. The prevalent view was that it was 
both unnecessary and unwise to attempt a rigid definition.38 The flexibility inherent in 
the phrase ‘gross indecency’ may have been taken as a genuine attempt by the drafters 
to leave open to juries the decision as to whether certain conduct deserved censure.  
 
(b) Person of ordinary sensitivity 
Sullivan suggested the substitution of the Court test of ‘right-thinking people’ with the 
test of ‘person of ordinary sensitivity’.39 Sullivan argued that the test of ‘right-thinking 
people’, with its ‘moralistic overtones might encourage a more unyielding judgmental 
standard than the collective sexual mores possessed by a particular jury’.40 A ‘bystander-
objective’ standard of ordinary sensitivity would preclude any argument that the actual 
complainant, by virtue of his or her previous sexual history, was less than normally 
sensitive in sexual matters and thus had not been caused or threatened with gross 
offence. The fact that the complainant through lack of understanding of the nature of 
the act by virtue of age, mental impairment or deception was not caused sexual offence 
would equally be irrelevant.  
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 Ibid. 
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 Sexual Offences Act 1956, s.13. 
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 The Wolfenden Committee Report suggested that three forms of conduct would normally constitute 
„gross indecency‟: mutual masturbation; intercrural contact; and oral-genital contact. 
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Under Sullivan’s proposed offence, an action would also constitute sexual assault ‘if it 
does or would cause gross sexual offence to the victim.’ His offence would therefore 
have been more complainant-centred than indecent assault as it would have taken into 
account any harm caused to an individual complainant. The ‘person of ordinary 
sensitivity’ test, a ‘bystander-objective’ test would have been supplemented by a 
‘complainant-subjective’ test. Sullivan highlighted how the ‘bystander-objective’ 
standard is not ‘universally applicable’: 
‘In a plural multi-racial society and in a matter so fundamentally subjective as sexuality 
the protection of a serious offence should be given to those caused or threatened with 
gross sexual offence albeit that the defendant’s conduct or intended conduct would not 
have caused that degree of reaction in a person of ordinary sensitivity’. 
Sullivan’s proposed offence would have focused on the harm caused to an individual 
complainant, albeit that they are not a ‘person of ordinary sensitivity’. There is an 
important caveat here though; namely, that D would have had to be aware that ‘it 
would cause such offence to the particular victim’. Sullivan’s test might have resulted in 
liability where D assaulted C with knowledge that C for whatever reason was abnormally 
sensitive in sexual matters. Thus, it would have resulted in liability where an abnormally 
sensitive complainant knew her assailant (for example because they were or had been 
in a relationship, were relatives or were known acquaintances) and because of such an 
acquaintance, D was aware that his assault (or battery) would cause gross sexual 
offence to the victim. It would also have resulted in liability where C held a particular 
religious or cultural belief, pertaining to sexual matters and where D was aware of this. 
This ‘complainant-subjective’ test would have taken account of the harm caused to an 
individual complainant rather than a ‘reasonable-complainant’. 
 
(c) Mens rea 
There would be two elements to the mens rea of Sullivan’s proposed offence. The first 
element encompasses proof that the ‘defendant was aware of those circumstances 
which made his conduct or intended conduct grossly sexually offensive to persons of 
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ordinary sensitivity.’ There is an ambiguity here. The phrase may be interpreted as 
meaning that the defendant must be aware only of the circumstances. Alternatively, it 
may mean that D must be aware that those circumstances made his conduct offensive. 
Sullivan clarified this vagueness towards the end of his article when he states that ‘proof 
should only be required that he was aware of those circumstances involved in his 
conduct or projected conduct which made for gross sexual offensiveness to ordinarily 
sensitive people’.41 Sullivan does not explain why he argued for a requirement that D 
must be aware of the circumstances that made his conduct grossly sexually offensive. 
One explanation might be based on a belief that an individual is only blameworthy when 
there is a knowing and conscious risk of sexual offense. Sullivan might have been 
concerned that without such a requirement the threshold for criminal liability for sexual 
touching would have been set too low. His approach appears to have been concerned 
with fairness to defendants. Accordingly, if D was thoughtless or did not care that C 
would be caused such offence, he could not have been convicted.  
 
The second element to the mens rea of Sullivan’s proposed offence would have required 
that D be aware that the assault would cause such offence to the particular victim. 
Sexual assault would be committed by a person aware that his intended non-consensual 
act further to the assault causes or would cause that degree of reaction in the particular 
complainant.42 Sullivan’s stipulation that D must have been aware that C would be 
caused offence would have been a major limitation on his proposed offence being 
complainant-centred. It would have prevented liability where C was caused gross sexual 
offence (even though the person of ‘ordinary sensitivity’ would not have been caused 
offence) but where an ignorant or indifferent D was unaware that the assault would 
cause such offence to the particular victim. 
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3.2 REVIEW OF THE LAW ON SEX OFFENCES 
In 1997, the newly elected Labour government pledged to help victims of sexual 
offences obtain justice, commencing in a detailed and lengthy review process in 1999, 
the Sexual Offences Review.43 This section will evaluate the reform process, arguing that 
although the Review had as its guiding principle a belief that the criminal law should 
protect everyone ‘equally’ from non-consensual sexual activity, it failed to define 
adequately what sort of behaviour the criminal law should and should not prohibit. One 
of the most striking features of the sexual offences reform process is the degree of 
attention paid by the members of the Review and during Parliamentary debates to 
some offences, most notably rape and crimes against children, and therefore the lack of 
consideration of the scope and definition of other new offences, for example sexual 
assault. Although the Review’s intention might have been to create discrete offences, 
the process in fact created four new, often overlapping non-consensual sexual offences 
and failed to scrutinise and justify the sorts of behaviour encapsulated within each 
crime adequately. 
3.2.1 Sexual Offences Review 
The Setting the Boundaries Review suggested that there were three main ‘push’ factors 
towards a reform of the law on sex offences. First, the law was described as a 
‘patchwork quilt of provisions’; secondly there was a recognition of the change in 
societal attitudes and thirdly, there was acknowledgment of the high attrition rates for 
rape and other sexual offences. These justifications for reform highlight the 
government’s commitment to providing ‘clear and coherent offences that protect 
individual complainants’. 44   
 
In Setting the Boundaries, the review noted how the law governing sex offences was 
complex, and made more difficult by piecemeal changes and amendments. Pre-2003, 
Parliament had not considered the structure of sex offences as a whole since 1956, and 
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even then the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (SOA 1956) was a consolidation Act passed with 
little debate. The statutory framework was also supplemented by a number of common 
law offences such as outraging public decency. Important changes have occurred since 
1956, notably the decriminalisation of homosexuality in private in 1967, the abolition of 
the marital rape exception45 and the change to the definition of rape in 1994 to include 
non-consensual penile-anal intercourse.46 The review team suggested that ‘it is time for 
a root and branch examination of what the law should be and how it should be framed 
to meet the complex and changing needs of society.’47 
 
The SOA 2003 is intended to modernize the law of sexual offences and to bring it more 
closely into line with contemporary attitudes. In the past century, society has undergone 
rapid and fundamental change. The law forbids discrimination on the grounds of race,48 
disability49 or sex50 and sexual orientation is gaining greater protection.51 Society further 
recognises that children and the mentally ill are very vulnerable to sexual exploitation. 
The review noted that the existing law was plagued with inappropriate language; for 
example, the term ‘defective’ was used for individuals with learning disabilities.  
 
The new framework was designed to ‘plug existing gaps and seek to protect society 
from rape and sexual assault at one end of the spectrum and from voyeurism at the 
other.’52 It is interesting that the Review refers to a ‘spectrum’ of sexual offences. This is 
open to dual interpretation. One interpretation of the use of the word ‘spectrum’ is that 
that the SOA 2003 should be viewed as a ladder of offences of decreasing severity, with 
rape (s.1), assault by penetration (s.2) and sexual assault (s.3) as the most heinous 
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crimes and voyeurism (s.67), sexual penetration of a corpse (s.70) and sexual activity in 
a public lavatory (s.71) as the least serious offences. However, whilst all the sexual 
offences are not equally serious, this approach might be seen to de-value the individual 
harm caused by any act of sexual aggression. Adopting this perspective would indicate 
that sexual assault is beneath rape on the ladder of seriousness; however, there could 
be some very serious acts falling within sexual assault. Whilst I am not rejecting the 
notion of a ladder of offences in which certain offences should be seen as more serious 
than others, it is unlikely that this is what the Review had in mind when referring to a 
‘spectrum’ of sexual offences. Arguably, the correct interpretation of the reference to a 
‘spectrum’ of offences is that it highlights the extremely diverse nature of sexual 
offending and this is exemplified by the 54 different offences created by the legislation. 
 
The high attrition rate for rape and sexual assault cases acted as a strong ‘push’ factor 
towards the strengthening of the law on sexual offences. Home Office figures show that 
the conviction rate in terms of the annual number of convictions as a percentage of the 
number of reported rapes is declining. In 1977, there was a conviction rate of 32 per 
cent of reported rapes.53 By 2004/05, it had fallen to 5.3 per cent.54 In respect of 
indecent assault, the conviction rate also declined. In 1995, there was a conviction rate 
of 19.9 per cent55 and by 2003, this had dropped to 11%. Attrition in sexual offences has 
been the subject of a large amount of academic discussion and there are a number of 
high quality studies that confirm the phenomenon.56 There is no specific research on 
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attrition in indecent assault cases, however a number of factors have been associated 
with the process generally: (1) no-criming, (2) cases where no further action is taken by 
the police, (3) cases where no further action is taken by the CPS, and (4) the jury 
decision not to convict.57  The Government hoped that the reformed law would play its 
part in reducing the attrition rate in sexual offences and helping to convict the guilty. 
This was to be done by providing ‘a clearer legal framework for juries as they decide on 
the facts of each case’.58 In respect of sexual assault, the fact that key terms such as 
‘sexual’ and ‘consent’ are under-defined means that the objective of reducing attrition 
rates may be no more than a hopeful aspiration.  
 
The terms of reference for the review were: 
‘To review the sex offences in the common and statute law in England and Wales, and make 
recommendations that will: 
 Provide coherent and clear sex offences which protect individuals, especially 
children and the more vulnerable, from abuse and exploitation; 
 Enable abusers to be appropriately punished; and 
 Be fair and non-discriminatory in accordance with the ECHR and Human Rights 
Act.’59 
Both the Setting the Boundaries Review and the Protecting the Public White Paper 
asserted as their guiding principles a belief first, that the criminal law should protect 
everyone ‘equally’60 from non-consensual sexual activity and secondly that the criminal 
law should not intrude unnecessarily into the private lives of adults.61 In addition, they 
accepted that there are certain circumstances in which constraints need to be imposed 
in order to protect others from harm. Thus the Review adopted a framework of respect 
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for personal freedom, subject only to the requirement to avoid harming others, which 
replicated Mill’s famous principle that ‘the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others’.62 Essentially the harm principle is that each person should be 
allowed to do and say what he or she likes if this does not harm the interests of 
others.63 Simply because an activity is seen as immoral or harmful to the actor is not a 
good enough reason to justify criminalising it.64 Mill offers no definition of what counts 
as harm, without which ‘the application of the harm principle remains impracticably 
indeterminate’.65 Feinberg, having built on Mill’s analysis defines harm as a ‘thwarting, 
setting back, or defeating of an interest’.66 In turn, a person’s interests comprise those 
things that make his life go well; thus we are harmed when our lives changes for the 
worse.67  
 
Lord Devlin suggested that there are moral principles that are so fundamental to the 
way people lead their lives that they are society’s ‘moral cement’.68 However, to what 
extent is this true in an increasingly diverse, multi-cultural, multi-faith society? In 
Protecting the Public, the Home Secretary frequently refers to ‘our common values’, 
assuming the existence of a shared popular consensus as to what constitutes right and 
wrong sexual behaviour. Munro suggests that in doing so ‘he alludes to the existence of 
a communitarian dimension to the sexual offences reforms that is barely acknowledged 
in the individual rhetoric of the liberal philosophy’.69 The White Paper suggests that the 
Sexual Offences Bill deals with conduct that the Home Office concludes is 
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‘unacceptable’, but does not attempt to answer the question ‘unacceptable to whom?’  
The idea that sexual offences embody social standards of right and wrong will be 
discussed further in relation to the meaning of ‘sexual’, which is a defining feature of 
many of the new offences.70 
3.3 SEXUAL ASSAULT: OVER-INCLUSIVE? 
The SOA 2003 repeals the SOA 1956 and its various amendments.71 It creates several 
new offences, with the primary concern of this thesis being the new offence of sexual 
assault. Sexual assault is not an isolated offence; it is one of many often-overlapping 
offences that deal with invasions of sexual autonomy (see table 3.1 below). It is 
therefore necessary to consider the statutory context in which sexual assault was 
considered worthy of a distinct label. This chapter will proceed to analyse the structure 
and scope of the four non-consensual sexual offences set out in ss.1-4 SOA 2003. I will 
argue that the lack of consideration by the Government and Parliament of sexual assault 
has resulted in an offence which is ill defined, ambiguous and which is over-inclusive 
because it overlaps with sections 1 and 2. Sexual assault is potentially not complainant-
centred and it is this characteristic that I shall explore in subsequent chapters. 
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 Although there was an explicit philosophy of respect for privacy, personal freedom and a focus on 
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paternalistic, moralistic rationale for criminalisation. Critics have argued that the Act‟s treatment of sexual 
activity between minors and its failure to review prostitution-related activity ultimately undermines its 
liberal pretensions regarding justifiable intervention by supporting an agenda, according to which deviance 
from the sexual norm in itself justifies criminal intervention.
70
 See F. Bennion. Sexual Ethics and Criminal 
Law: A Critique of the Sexual Offences Bill 2003 (Lester Publishing, Oxford, 2003) p.13; A. Bainham & B. 
Brooks-Gordon, „Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences‟ in B. Brooks-Gordon et al. Sexuality 
Repositioned: Diversity and the Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) pp.261-96; J. Spencer, „The Sexual 
Offences Act 2003: Child and Family Offences‟ [2004] Crim L R 347. 
71
 There were 77 amendments to the original Act. 
108 
 
Table 3.3:  Structure of SOA 2003, ss.1-4 
Offence Elements to be proved Sentencing maxima 
Rape (s.1) 
 Intentional penetration of 
vagina, anus or mouth with 
penis 
 No consent 
 No reasonable belief in 
consent 
Life imprisonment  
(Indictable only) 
Assault by penetration 
(s.2) 
 Intentional penetration of 
vagina, anus or mouth with a 
part of the body or anything 
else 
 Penetration is ‘sexual’ 
 No consent 
 No reasonable belief in 
consent 
Life imprisonment 
(Indictable only) 
Sexual assault 
(s.3) 
 Intentionally touching another 
person 
 The touching is ‘sexual’ 
 No consent 
 No reasonable belief in 
consent. 
On indictment: 10 years 
Summarily: 6 months72 
Causing sexual activity 
(s.4) 
 Intentionally causing another 
person to engage in an activity 
 The activity is ‘sexual’ 
 No consent 
 No reasonable belief in 
consent 
On indictment: 
 with penetration: 
life imprisonment 
 without 
penetration: 10 
years 
Summarily: 6 months73 
 
Section 3 SOA 2003 creates a new offence of sexual assault.74 This is intended to cover 
behaviour which was previously charged as indecent assault, but which falls outside the 
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scope of the new offence of assault by penetration. As a result, the parameters of the 
offence are very wide. There are a number of specific differences between the crime of 
indecent assault and the new offence of sexual assault. First, although both offences are 
framed in terms of an ‘assault’ section 3 is limited to touching and does not extend to 
cases where the complainant is put in fear of being touched. Secondly, the adjective 
‘indecent’ has been replaced with the term ‘sexual’. Thirdly, sexual assault is centred 
upon the concept of ‘consent’, which was not a feature of the definition of indecent 
assault. Section 3(1) of the SOA 2003 provides as follows: 
‘A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally touches another person (B), 
(b) the touching is sexual, 
(c) B does not consent to the touching, and 
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’ 
The new offence of sexual assault is triable either way and carries a maximum penalty of 
10 years on indictment and six months imprisonment or a fine not exceeding the 
statutory maximum (currently £5000)75 or both on summary conviction.76  
 
The Sexual Offences Review’s recommendations on rape and assault by penetration did 
not cover a range of behaviour it considered unacceptable, from ‘frottage’,77 fondling 
and groping to ‘quite serious assaults’.78 The Review suggested that these acts ‘are all 
distressing to the victim because there is a clear sexual intention, and they are often 
directed at the more sensitive and private parts of the body or carried out by the use of 
the private parts of the perpetrator’.79 This suggests that these acts are distressing 
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because there is a sexual intention and therefore that such contact would not be 
distressing if there was no obvious sexual motive. However, sexual intention is not a 
necessary ingredient of sexual assault. The sentence also refers to ‘private parts’. 
Arguably, the Review should have clarified what it meant by this phrase and if it was 
referring to the genitalia should have made this explicit. Any part of the body could be 
labelled ‘private’, each person having the right to set the boundaries of their bodily and 
sexual autonomy.80 The Review wished to refer to such activities as an assault, to cover 
not only touching but also behaviour that puts the complainant in fear of being touched. 
The Review highlighted how an offence that may not include a severe81 assault could 
include a high level of fear, coercion, degradation and harm inflicted on victims.82 They 
recommended a new offence of sexual assault to replace other non-penetrative83 sexual 
touching that was previously contained in the offence of indecent assault. Section 3 
actually creates an offence of ‘sexual battery’ rather than a strict offence of ‘sexual 
assault’ as will be explained in chapter 4.  
 
The Review accordingly recommended the creation of a new offence of sexual assault to 
cover ‘sexual touching’; defined as ‘behaviour that a reasonable bystander would 
consider to be sexual, which is done without the consent of the victim’.84 This 
recommendation was accepted by the Government, included in Protecting the Public85 
and enacted in s.3 of the 2003 Act. There was limited Parliamentary debate about the 
definition and scope of sexual assault. The majority of the legislative debates focused on 
the most controversial clauses, namely those dealing with rape, offences against 
children and offences committed by those in a position of trust. Although the SOA 2003 
creates over 54 offences and there are obvious time constraints to the amount of time 
                                                             
80
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spent discussing each individual crime, it is important in terms of fairness to 
complainants and defendants’ that the reform process should consider and deliberate 
on all the controversies. This lack of discussion has resulted in the creation of an offence 
with ambiguity. The definition of touching expressly includes ‘touching amounting to 
penetration’.86 Theoretically, therefore, s.3 covers rape and assault by penetration, as 
demonstrated in figure 3.1, although it seems contrary to the intentions of Parliament 
to bring these activities within the offence.  
 
Figure 3.1: The overlap between s.1, s.2 and s.3 
 
 
Section 1(1) replaces and extends s.1 SOA 1956 and defines rape in the following terms: 
 ‘A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus, or mouth of another person (B) with his 
penis, 
      (b) B does not consent to the penetration, and  
      (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’ 
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Assault by 
penetration 
(S.2)
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The requirement of penile penetration has resulted in the provision being gender-
specific. The justification against gender-neutrality was that the offence of penile 
penetration is of a particularly personal kind, carrying with it the risk of pregnancy 
and/or disease transmission.87 The provision not only includes penetration of the vagina 
or anus but also encompasses non-consensual oral sex (specifically fellatio)88 as this was 
agreed to be just ‘as abhorrent, demeaning and traumatizing’ a violation and ‘equally, if 
not more, psychologically harmful than vaginal and anal rape.’89 It also carries similar 
risks of disease transmission. Non-consensual oral sex was previously charged as 
indecent assault and including it within the new definition of rape addresses some of 
the concerns about the broad scope of indecent assault highlighted in chapter 2; namely 
that the label on conviction did not differentiate between the vastly different forms of 
conduct and their disparate gravity. Doubts about broadening the offence were 
expressed inside and outside Parliament, largely because fellatio could easily be brought 
within the offence of assault by penetration and there was thought to be a risk that 
classifying forced oral sex as rape might devalue the offence or make juries reluctant to 
return rape verdicts in such cases. The Home Affairs Committee rejected such doubts, 
regarding the change as ‘right in principle’ and adding that there was no reason to think 
that juries would be reluctant to convict on the new definition.90 
 
Section 2 creates a new offence of assault by penetration. Under s.2(1): 
‘A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) with a part of 
his body or anything else, 
      (b) the penetration is sexual, 
      (c) B does not consent to the penetration, and 
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      (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’ 
The Review concluded that the offence of indecent assault did not sufficiently reflect 
the gravity of serious sexual assaults perpetrated by the penetration of the anus or 
female genitalia by the insertion of an object, or other part of the body e.g. digital 
penetration. Indecent assault covered a wide range of behaviour from touching91 to 
‘truly appalling violations’92 and the sentence of 10 years imprisonment was considered 
‘inadequate’ for the worst cases.93 The forced entry of physical objects such as 
bottlenecks, vibrators and screwdrivers can often cause as much or more fear and 
distress, and potentially worse internal injuries, than penile penetration of the vagina or 
anus. s.2(1) reflects this and carries the same maximum penalty (life imprisonment)94 as 
rape.  
 
The Review recognised that other penetrative assaults could be as serious in their 
impact on the complainant as rape and that they should not be regarded lightly.95 
Implicit in the discussion was that s.2 violations do not deserve the label ‘rape’. The 
review was uneasy about extending the definition of rape to include all sexual 
penetration, on the basis that rape is commonly understood as penile penetration 
committed by men on women or men. Sexual assault by penetration can be as horrible, 
as demeaning, and as traumatising as penile penetration, possibly causing worse 
internal injuries, providing justification for a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The 
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label on conviction distinguishes penetration committed with the penis from other non-
penile penetration.  
 
There is a clear overlap between rape and assault by penetration as any penetration 
with the penis would amount to an assault by penetration, as demonstrated in figure 
3.1 above. Where it is clear that the penis is the object with which somebody has been 
penetrated, a person will always be charged with rape. The two sections were drafted as 
they were because there may be circumstances where it is not clear with what the 
complainant was penetrated. If C is blindfolded or unconscious, for example, there may 
be a reasonable assumption that C was penetrated with a penis, but it will not always be 
clear and C might have been penetrated with an object. 
 
Section 4 creates a new offence of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without 
consent, which has no direct precedent in law.  Under s.4(1): 
‘A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally causes another person (B) to engage in an activity, 
      (b) the activity is sexual, 
      (c) B does not consent to engaging in the activity, 
     (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’ 
The maximum penalty for this offence is life imprisonment if the activity involves 
penetration96 and ten years if the activity does not involve penetration.97 Previously 
where a person compelled another against their will to commit a sexual act either upon 
themselves, or with a third person or animal, it was not clear with what offence they 
would be charged. It was possible to charge such activities as indecent assault, as in 
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Sargeant,98 but this meant that a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment applied. 
The label indecent assault also failed to reflect the gravity of such an assault because it 
covered a wide and undefined range of conduct. A further option would have been a 
charge of common assault, although this would not have reflected the sexual nature of 
the act and would have limited the sentence to a maximum of six months’ 
imprisonment.  
 
Section 4 was recommended in the report and is intended to make a clear statement 
that compelling others to do sexual acts against their will is an offence.99  This offence 
overlaps greatly with the offences discussed above, since in most cases D who rapes, 
sexually penetrates or sexually assaults C will also be causing C to engage in non-
consensual sexual activity, although this is dependent on the meaning of the term 
‘engage’. However, its purpose is to catch a number of situations beyond the reach of 
those offences. Parliament has created a vague offence that is wide enough to cover 
procuring for prostitution, forcing a victim to masturbate100 or forcing a victim to 
perform acts with third parties or with animals. The new offence is also intended to deal 
with women who compel men to penetrate them.101 Causing a person to engage in 
sexual activity appears to be quite a complainant-centred offence, prohibiting actions 
that previously fell outside the scope of indecent assault. The essence of the conduct 
element is that D must cause C to engage in the sexual activity and this can be effected 
by explicit or implicit threats, or by use of a position of authority or dominance, rather 
than by actual physical coercion. 
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The overlaps between sections 1-4 demonstrate one respect in which s.3 is over-
inclusive and is arguably an example of the drafters attempting to cover all possible 
eventualities. S.79(8) could give rise to plea-bargaining, where the defendant indicates a 
willingness to plead guilty to sexual assault in return for the rape charge being dropped, 
thereby avoiding the stigma of a rape label and the possibility of life imprisonment. In 
considering whether to accept a plea, the CPS102 will discuss the situation with the 
victim or the victim’s family wherever possible, to explain the position and obtain their 
views in order to help them to make the right decision.103 According to the CPS Policy for 
Prosecuting Cases of Rape, the CPS will always take proper account of the victim’s 
interests and will not accept a guilty plea that is put forward upon a misleading or 
untrue set of facts. If a defendant offers to plead guilty to a different and possibly less 
serious charge, the prosecutor should only accept the plea if he or she thinks the court 
is able to pass a sentence that matches the seriousness of the offence, particularly 
where there may be aggravating features. 
 
There is also the possibility that sexual assault charges may be utilised where there is 
insufficient proximity to charge attempted rape. Suppose D follows C into a nightclub 
toilet and attempts to undo her trousers. C fights back as she believes she will be raped 
and her trousers and top are ripped by D. D’s charge is sexual touching and not 
attempted rape. 104 The fact that touching can include penetration means that it would 
be no defence to a charge under s.3 for a defendant to allege that, in fact, he committed 
rape or assault by penetration. This is significant, because in some cases it will be clear 
that D has sexually assaulted C but not clear what conduct that assault involved: for 
example, where C is unconscious or asleep. 
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Generally, a defendant indicted for sexual assault may not be convicted in the 
alternative of common assault. This is because under s.6(3) of the Criminal Law Act 
1967, the jury may bring in a verdict of guilty of ‘another offence falling within the 
jurisdiction of the court of trial’. Common assault, which used to be a triable either way 
offence, was redesignated a summary offence by s.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
However, there is provision in s.40 of the 1988 Act enabling a count charging common 
assault to be included in an indictment if it is founded on the same facts or evidence as a 
count charging an indictable offence. A count of common assault may therefore be 
included as an alternative count on an indictment charging sexual assault and where 
that is done an alternative verdict of guilty of common assault may be brought in. On a 
summary charge, the magistrates have no jurisdiction to find the defendant guilty of a 
lesser offence.105  
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The Sexual Offences Review was a detailed and lengthy process culminating in the 
implementation of the SOA 2003. The Review had as its motivating factors a desire to 
consolidate and clarify the law on sexual offences that had been described as ‘archaic, 
incoherent and discriminatory.’106 What emerged was a new piece of legislation 
designed to ‘plug existing gaps and seek to protect society from rape and sexual assault 
at one end of the spectrum and from voyeurism at the other.’107 The terms of reference 
for the Review included making recommendations that will ‘*p]rovide coherent and 
clear sex offences which protect individuals’. Accordingly, there appears to have been a 
desire to make the law more complainant-centred. The new offence of sexual assault 
had as its underlying objective the protection of men, women and children from 
unwanted sexual touching. However, no sufficient consideration was given to the scope 
and nature of the crime, creating an offence of ambiguity. Whilst the offence of rape 
prohibits specifically listed conduct, sexual assault is a residual offence that appears to 
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catch non-consensual conduct falling outside the scope of rape and assault by 
penetration. Consequently, sexual assault required sufficient analysis throughout the 
review process and in Parliament but this did not materialise. One aim of the SOA 2003 
was to achieve greater clarity, so that people could know what behaviour was 
unacceptable. It may be an advantage that there are many separately labelled offences; 
but the Act ‘adopts an unusually prolix style of drafting criminal provisions, and there 
are many overlaps between offences.’108 This appears not to have been the best means 
to achieve the desirable objective of clarity. Whilst the Government appears to have 
adopted a complainant-centred approach to the sexual offences reform, this is what I 
will be questioning in the next chapters. Chapter 4 will analyse the requirements that D 
touches another and that C does not consent to the touching, which are necessary to 
establish the actus reus of sexual assault, in light of the complainant-centred nature of 
the reform process. 
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4 
The Touching Problem: an Analysis of the Requirements 
that D Touches Another and that C does not Consent 
 
This chapter will begin the process of analysing the extent to which sexual assault is 
complainant-centred, evaluating two elements of the actus reus required for a 
conviction. Section 3, the provision that defines sexual assault, requires that D in fact 
touched another person and that C does not consent to the touching. For a conviction of 
sexual assault, the touching must also be ‘sexual’. This element of the actus reus is the 
most contentious and ambiguous and accordingly will be analysed in chapters 5-8.  
 
Part 1 will analyse the requirement in section 3(1)(a) that D ‘intentionally touches 
another person’.1 Touching is broadly defined in s.79(8) to include ‘touching with any 
part of the body, with anything else or through anything and in particular includes 
touching amounting to penetration.’ The definition of touching contains no de minimis 
exception and is therefore complainant-centred to the extent that there are no 
touchings that are ‘too trivial’ to be the subject of legal control.  
 
Part 2 will consider why section 3 is limited to sexual touching given the offence is 
framed in terms of a ‘sexual assault’. Sexual assault is narrower than indecent assault 
because it does not include situations where D intentionally or recklessly causes C to 
fear an immediate unlawful sexual touching.  In this respect, the definition is under-
inclusive and insufficiently complainant-centred. Whilst there are other offences that 
could be charged, section 3 ought to extend to situations where the complainant 
apprehends immediate and unlawful sexual touching for the sake of clarity and 
consistency in the criminal law. The law fails to label a psychic touching appropriately, 
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because the label does not sufficiently represent the nature and seriousness of the harm 
done to the complainant. 
 
Part 3 will analyse the requirement in section 3(1)(c) that the complainant ‘does not 
consent to the touching’. The introduction of a test for consent that focuses on the 
complainant’s ‘freedom and capacity to make that choice’ and the introduction of 
conclusive and evidential presumptions have clarified this area of the law and offered 
enhanced guidance on the issue of sexual consent. This demonstrates one area of the 
reform process that appeared to focus on justice for the complainant. However, in 
respect of sexual assault there remain issues about which touchings are impliedly 
consented to, both between strangers and between those in an intimate relationship. At 
the fringes of liability, there remains uncertainty about the meaning of ‘consent’. 
 
4.1 THAT D IN FACT TOUCHED ANOTHER PERSON 
The first requirement for a charge of sexual assault under s.3(1) is that D ‘intentionally 
touches another person’. Leaving aside the intentionality issue, which will be dealt with 
in chapter 10, the focus of this section is on the issue of what constitutes touching. The 
meaning of touching is very broad and is welcome because it contains no de minimis 
exception. This is complainant-centred to the extent that there are no touchings that 
are ‘too trivial’ to be the subject of legal control. 
 
4.1.1 What constitutes ‘touching’? 
Section 79(8) of the 2003 Act provides that for the purposes of Part 1 of the Act, 
including s.3, ‘touching includes touching-- a) with any part of the body, b) with anything 
else or c) through anything, and in particular includes touching amounting to 
penetration’.2 There is no requirement that C must be aware of the touching, and so the 
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offence of sexual assault may be committed against someone who is asleep or 
otherwise unconscious3 or who simply does not notice that the touching has occurred. 
 
(a) Any part of the body 
Touching includes touching with any part of the body. Sexual assault will therefore 
include touching with the hand, fingers, tongue, toes or any other part of the body. By 
virtue of s.79(3), the reference to ‘part of the body’ includes a reference to a part 
surgically constructed and accordingly sexual assault can be committed with an artificial 
hand, finger or toe. The reference is to touching with any part of the body, and not 
necessarily with D’s own body. If D seizes X’s hand and, before X can resist, places it on 
C’s breast, D will thereby have touched C.4 
 
(b) With anything else 
‘Anything else’ is not defined but is sufficiently all-embracing to limit any judicial 
deliberation about what it may or may not cover. For the purposes of sexual assault, 
touching will therefore include touching with an object or with part of another person’s 
body. An example of a touching by something other than a part of the body would be 
where D pushes a vibrator against C’s breasts or genitals. This raises the issue of 
whether D has to be holding on to the implement that touches C.  
 
Example A 
D intentionally throws a ball at C’s groin. There is little doubt that a battery can be 
carried out through an object. In Fagan v MPC the defendant committed a battery by 
failing to remove his car, which he had accidentally driven onto the complainant’s foot.5 
As throwing a ball at someone clearly amounts to a battery, it seems inevitable that this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
activity with a person with a mental disorder), and s.38 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a 
mental disorder).  
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4
 X would not be liable because his involvement is involuntary and the touching unintentional on his part. 
5
 [1969] 1 QB 439. 
122 
 
would (putting aside issues of C’s consent) constitute touching, albeit of an indirect 
nature. This action does not constitute an everyday touching which is ‘generally 
acceptable in the conduct of daily life’.6 If the action was accidental and occurred during 
a football match, there would be an implied consent to the physical contact. However, 
where the indirect touching is both intentional and of a ‘sexual’ nature, it could be 
charged as sexual assault. One might question whether this makes the offence too 
broad and potentially over-inclusive, as there is the possibility of liability where an 11-
year-old boy deliberately throws a tennis-ball at another 11-year-old’s groin.  
 
Example B 
D fires a water hose at C, with the intention of soaking C’s flimsy t-shirt and making it 
transparent, thereby making visible her breasts. By virtue of similar reasoning to the 
Fagan decision, it has been well established that spitting on someone7 or throwing beer 
on them8 constitutes battery. Firing water at a woman would therefore constitute 
battery. Sexual assault ought to extend to situations, such as in the given example, 
where there is a deliberate targeting of C and where the action constitutes an invasion 
of her sexual autonomy. 
 
There will inevitably be more ambiguous cases than those mentioned. Selfe gives the 
example of D, who, whilst in an office with C, directs a strong fan on C’s legs, thereby 
deliberately causing her skirt to billow upwards revealing her underwear.9 The 
defendant here has not himself ‘touched’ even the clothing of the complainant, and 
Selfe therefore suggests that this does not constitute ‘touching’ for the purpose of the 
SOA 2003. In establishing liability for sexual assault, the difficulty here is separating D’s 
motives from what D appreciated about the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct and how 
others (particularly C) interpret the incident. However, in the context of s.79(8) it is 
                                                             
6
 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374, at 379. 
7
 Smith (1866) 176 ER 910. 
8
 Savage [1992] 1 AC 699. 
9
 D. Selfe, „Sexual Assault and the Sexual Offences Act- A Touch Too Far‟ [2006] Crim L R 165. 
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possible to decide what constitutes ‘touching’ without reference to D’s motive. D’s 
motive might have been to humiliate and degrade C, but D might also just think that his 
action is funny, or that he is being ‘playful’ or ‘flirtatious’.10 D’s motive is irrelevant to 
the issue of whether his action constitutes ‘touching’ for the purpose of s.3, although it 
might have relevance to the determination of the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct, as we 
shall see in chapter 9.  
 
(c) Through anything 
The issue of touching through clothing was discussed in R v H (Karl Anthony).11 Whilst 
walking across some fields the appellant grabbed the complainant’s tracksuit bottoms 
by the fabric, attempted to pull her towards him and, without succeeding, attempted to 
place his hand over her mouth. She broke free and escaped. The appellant was 
convicted of sexual assault and appealed. Two issues arose in the Court of Appeal. First, 
whether the touching of B’s tracksuit bottoms alone amounted to the ‘touching’ of 
another within the meaning of s.79(8) of the 2003 Act. The appellant argued that under 
s.79(8)(c) there can be no touching of another unless pressure in some form is brought 
against the body of the person concerned. Thus, although a sexual assault may involve 
D’s stroking or fondling C’s body through her clothing, it cannot merely take the form of 
touching or tugging at C’s clothing. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, which 
would have had the unfortunate consequence that if D attempts to tear off C’s clothes, 
that might not involve any touching for the purpose of sexual assault. Where a person 
was wearing clothing, touching of that clothing constituted touching for the purposes of 
the offence contrary to s.3. The Court drew attention to the opening words of section 
79(8), that ‘touching includes touching’ and in particular ‘through anything’ and said: 
                                                             
10
 There is the possibility that C might perceive D‟s motive to be humiliation and degradation, but that that 
may not actually be D‟s motive(s). Similarly, C may well realise that D intended the incident as a joke but 
not experience it as such. This demonstrates the difficulty the law faces in considering D‟s motive(s) and 
what D appreciated about the conduct whilst giving due acknowledgment to the complainant‟s affective 
response to the action.  
11
 [2005] 1 WLR 2005. 
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‘Subsection (8) is not a definition section...It was not Parliament’s intention by the use 
of that language to make it impossible to regard as a sexual assault touching which took 
place by touching what the victim was wearing at the time.’12 
Therefore, it was unnecessary for there to be some form of pressure brought against 
the body of the individual who was alleged to have been assaulted for touching to occur 
for the purposes of s.3. There is no requirement of force or violence: the lightest 
touching will suffice. The second issue that arose was whether the touching had been 
what a reasonable person would consider ‘sexual’ for the purposes of s.78 SOA 2003. 
This issue will be dealt with in chapter 9, section 9.3. 
 
Although s.79(8) clearly includes ‘touching through anything’ within the interpretation 
of touching, some commentators had suggested that the SOA 2003 required physical 
contact with C’s body. Card suggested that, ‘lightly touching an outer garment so thick 
that no physical contact is made with *C’s+ body would not suffice’.13 Following the 
decision in H, such conduct is capable of being a touching since the touching of C’s 
person may include C’s clothing. This is consistent with the decisions in relation to 
common assault generally. In Thomas,14 where D had touched the bottom of C’s skirt, 
the Court of Appeal said obiter that ‘*t+here could be no dispute that if you touch a 
person’s clothes while he is wearing them that is equivalent to touching him’. Based on 
the decision in H, touching would also cover the situation where D grabs and raises the 
complainant’s skirt, without her consent, revealing her underwear.15 It is submitted that 
as with the old law, there is no room for any ‘de minimis’ exception.16 Female 
complainants should be protected from the objection that some sexual assaults are ‘too 
                                                             
12
 Ibid per Lord Woolf CJ at p.2011. 
13
 R. Card, Sexual Offences: The New Law (Jordan Publishing Limited, Bristol, 2004) para 2.3.2. 
14
 (1985) 81 Cr App R 331, at 334. 
15
 S.3(c) also covers D who engages in frottaging (rubbing his genitals against a fellow passenger on public 
transport). See Tanylidiz [1998] Crim L R 228. 
16
 Ananthanarayanan (1994) 98 Cr App R 1, 5 per Laws J. See recently Mills [2003] EWCA Crim 3723, 
where a two-second touching of a barmaid‟s breasts by a customer did constitute indecent assault. 
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trivial’ to be the subject of legal control.17 Patting a woman’s bottom through her 
clothing may constitute the offence.18  
 
(d) Touching amounting to penetration 
The definition of touching expressly includes ‘touching amounting to penetration’.19 
Theoretically, therefore, s.3 covers rape and assault by penetration, as analysed in 
chapter 3. 
 
4.2 SEXUAL ASSAULT: ASSAULT OR BATTERY? 
Sexual assault is confined to touching and so, unlike the offence of indecent assault, 
does not extend to cases where the complainant apprehends immediate and unlawful 
sexual touching. Accordingly, the offence is too narrow and under-inclusive. Whilst 
there are a number of other offences that might be charged where C is put in fear of 
being touched, the law in these circumstances violates the principle of fair labelling as 
the label does not sufficiently represent the nature and seriousness of the harm done to 
the complainant. 
 
The Sexual Offences Review20 considered whether it would be more appropriate to 
adopt the term ‘sexual touching’ rather than ‘sexual assault’ as used in some other 
jurisdictions.21 They did not elaborate on why the term ‘sexual touching’ might have 
                                                             
17
 In Court, Lord Ackner gave as an example of inherently indecent conduct the case of a defendant who 
removed, without consent, a woman‟s clothing in public. Selfe by way of example suggests that such an act 
may involve the removal of a bikini top to reveal a woman‟s breasts whilst she is asleep. Selfe suggests that 
there is no actual direct contact with, that is touching of, the body of the complainant. Arguably it is 
impossible to remove a bikini top without touching the person. Perhaps one could untie a string bikini, but 
assuming the complainant was asleep on their front, the defendant would need to roll them over to actually 
remove the top and this would certainly necessitate a touching. 
18
 CPS guidance on charging practice suggests that prosecutors must have regard to whether the public 
interest warrants a prosecution in respect of conduct „at the lower end of the scale‟. There may, however, be 
features that make such an offence more serious. Examples listed in CPS guidance include abuse of 
position of trust, use of drugs, use of violence or coercion and repeated offending. 
19
 S. 79(8). 
20
 Home Office Consultation Paper, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences, July 2000. 
Hereafter referred to as „the Review‟. 
21
 E.g. s.260 Maine Criminal Code, „Unlawful Sexual Touching‟. 
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been better but one interpretation might be that this would have adhered more closely 
to the principle of fair labelling. The principle of fair labelling attempts to ensure that 
offences are subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude 
of the law breaking. A further advantage of the use of the label ‘sexual touching’ might 
be that the word touching is easily understandable to the lay public and would not have 
created the confusion about the scope of the assault/battery distinction. The Sexual 
Offences Review decided to recommend the ‘sexual assault’ label to stress that the 
offence ought not to be limited to just non-consensual touching, but also extended to 
cases where the complainant is put in fear of being touched.22 However, although the 
offence is titled ‘sexual assault’ there is no reference to assault in the definition and the 
crime is essentially one of sexual battery. 
 
The terms ‘assault’ and ‘battery’ are often used interchangeably by laymen and even 
lawyers. Technically, however, they are two separate crimes.23 In 1983, Williams 
suggested a more accurate terminology to express the difference between these two 
offences.24 He labelled ‘assault’ ‘psychic assault’ and ‘battery’ ‘physical assault’. ‘Psychic 
assault’ is committed where D intentionally or subjectively recklessly25 causes the 
complainant to apprehend immediate unlawful force to his person.26 Battery is 
committed where D intentionally or subjectively recklessly applies unlawful force to 
another.27 The slightest degree of force, even mere touching, will suffice.28 Collins v 
Wilcock29makes it clear that ‘everyday touchings’, such as those that occur on busy tube 
trains, are not batteries. This raises issues of what are ‘everyday touchings’ and whether 
there are touchings, even sexual touchings which are impliedly consented to in everyday 
life.  This will be analysed in section 3 below. 
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 The Review at para 2.14.2. 
23
 Taylor, Little [1992] 1 All ER 708. 
24
 G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law 2
nd
 edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1983). 
25
 Venna [1975] 3 All ER 788. Approved obiter in Savage and Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699. 
26
 Fagan v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1968] 3 WLR 1120. 
27
 Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 3 All ER 468. 
28
 Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149. 
29
 [1984] 3 All ER 374. 
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4.2.1 Causing C to fear being touched: a lacuna in the law? 
The new offence under s.3 falls short of the Review’s stated objective to include fear of 
being touched, in that it is confined to touching and so, unlike the offence of indecent 
assault, does not extend to cases where the complainant apprehends immediate and 
unlawful sexual touching.30 In essence, the Government has adopted the popular 
understanding of the term ‘assault’. It is not enough to constitute sexual assault for D to 
cause C to think that he is about to touch her, if the touching does not in fact occur. So, 
for example, if C sees D’s hand moving towards her breast and perceives that he is 
about to touch it, and manages to move out of the way just in time, there is no 
completed offence, although the circumstances may amount to an attempt. 
Accordingly, there appears to be a lacuna in the law as sexual assault does not cover 
situations where the defendant causes the complainant to apprehend a sexual touching. 
One might argue that although s.3 might not apply where C is put in fear of being 
touched, this is not problematic because this behaviour might be captured by one of a 
number of other offences. However, with so many alternative charges, this is 
overcomplicating the issue and making the law too complex. Practically it might cause 
confusion for the police and CPS when interpreting the behaviour and choosing the 
most appropriate charge. My point is not that section 3 is under-inclusive in precluding 
fear of being touched, because there are other offences that could be charged, but that 
section 3 ought to extend to situations where the complainant apprehends immediate 
and unlawful sexual touching for the sake of clarity and consistency in the criminal law. 
The SOA 2003 fails to label a psychic sexual touching appropriately.  
 
The offence is termed a sexual assault, which like indecent assault beforehand, 
presupposes that it would encompass all forms of assault and battery as agreed by their 
Lordships in Court31 i.e. both physical and psychic indecent assaults. An indecent 
physical assault included a battery or touching, whether the complainant was aware of 
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 See Rolfe (1952) 36 Cr App R 4. 
31
 [1989] AC 28. 
128 
 
it and the surrounding circumstances or not. This did not cause a problem as all 
batteries necessitated an unlawful touching.32 An indecent psychic assault occurred 
where the complainant apprehended or feared an immediate and unlawful indecent 
touching through words or gestures: it did not require touching.33 In Rolfe,34 D moved 
towards C with his penis exposed and the Lord Chief Justice commented that ‘if a man 
indecently exposes himself and walks towards a woman with his person exposed and 
makes an indecent suggestion to her that in the opinion of this court, can amount to an 
assault.’ This will no longer constitute sexual assault, as D commits no touching. 
However, it might constitute attempted sexual assault or exposure, as will be discussed 
below.  
 
The decision in Sargeant35 demonstrates how the scope of indecent assault was much 
wider than sexual assault. D forced a 16-year-old boy to masturbate into a condom after 
threatening him with a stick. It seemed to the Court of Appeal that to compel somebody 
to masturbate in a public place was an indecent act and there was, accordingly, in the 
circumstances of the present case a coincidence of the ingredients required to establish 
indecent assault. There was no battery as such but the Court of Appeal held that the 
wielding of the stick constituted an indecent assault because the circumstances were 
indecent and a threat sufficient. It would appear that a ‘psychic’ sexual assault of the 
type committed in Sargeant is intended to be caught by the new s.4 offence of causing 
another to engage in sexual activity without their consent. However, s.4 does not 
extend to the situation where C is put in fear, but not compelled to act in any particular 
way. Consider the situation where C is forced to undress in front of a man wielding a 
bat, and whom she fears will sexually assault or rape her. It is possible that such a 
defendant could be charged under s.4 with causing sexual activity without consent. In 
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 Taylor, Little [1992] 1 All ER 299. 
33
 R v Ireland [1997] 3 WLR 534. 
34
 (1952) 36 Cr App R 4. 
35
 [1997] Crim LR 50. 
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respect of a conviction under s.4, it is the complainant who has to engage in the sexual 
activity so only if the woman does undress, could it fall under this section.36  
 
The question that arises is why there should be a separate offence of ‘psychic’ sexual 
assault, where C apprehends immediate and unlawful sexual touching. Sexual offences 
protect an individual’s sexual autonomy by providing the opportunity for criminal 
punishment for unjustified infringement. The actus reus of common assault requires 
only that D causes C to apprehend that she is about to be struck. There may be an 
assault where D has no intention to commit a battery but only to cause C to apprehend 
one.37 The requirement is for apprehension, not fear. Applying the concept of assault to 
non-consensual sexual touching there appears to be no justifiable reason why the law 
should not criminalise instances where D causes C to apprehend that she is going to be 
touched sexually. If sexual assault were an indictable only offence, there might be an 
argument against ‘psychic’ sexual assault on the basis that such acts might not be 
sufficiently serious to justify imprisonment. However, sexual assault is triable either 
way. One argument in favour of criminalising ‘psychic’ sexual assault as the Setting the 
Boundaries Review identifies is so as ‘not to diminish the importance of the offence of 
sexual assault’.38 The Review quite rightly proposes that ‘[a]n offence that may not 
include a severe assault could include a high level of fear, coercion, degradation and 
harm inflicted on victims.’39 
 
What the law on sexual assault should emphasise is the affective response D brings 
about, namely C’s experience of the touching or apprehension of the threat of touching. 
Horder argues that ‘what should be regarded as morally significant about the actus reus 
of a psychic assault is that it is experienced as a threatening confrontation by the 
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 Although that is dependent on the meaning of the term „activity‟. 
37 Logdon v DPP [1976] Crim LR 121. 
38 Home Office Consultation Paper, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (July 2000) 
at para 2.14.2. 
39 Ibid. 
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victim.’40 The morally significant way in which the harm of ‘psychic’ sexual assault might 
occur is ‘through confrontation’.  What matters is C’s perception of what is happening or 
what might happen. This provides an argument for the decision in Ireland,41 that words, 
no less than a gesture, are capable of amounting to an assault. The wrong of psychic 
sexual assault and the justification for it being a separate offence contained within s.3 
SOA 2003 is the experience of being threatened with sexual interference, being 
confronted with sexual interference, an experience that induces a fear of unlawful 
sexual touching. Regardless of whether D’s intention was to touch C or to cause C to 
apprehend that she will be touched, the focus of the law on sexual assault should be the 
impact on C in being touched or being confronted and caused to apprehend unlawful 
touching.  
 
There are a series of other possible offences that a defendant who causes a complainant 
to apprehend  that she will be touched could be charged with and I will attempt to 
demonstrate how such offences fail to communicate the nature of the complainant’s 
violation. An essential part of an offence being complainant-centred is that the label 
reflects the conduct as experienced by C. This is one aspect of the principle of fair 
labelling. 
 
4.2.2 (Un)fair labelling 
Fair labelling is a normative principle of criminal liability that attempts to ensure that 
offences are subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and magnitude 
of the law breaking.42 The law performs a labelling function, designating some conduct 
as acceptable and other conduct as criminal. The principle of fair labelling refers to the 
accurate naming of the crime of which the offender is convicted: the law needs 
precision in order to identify exactly what offence the wrongdoer has committed. When 
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 J. Horder, „Reconsidering Psychic Assault‟ [1998] Crim LR 392. 
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 [1998] AC 147. 
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a crime occurs, justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done.43 One of the 
justifications for the principle of fair labelling is that ‘*f+airness demands that offenders 
be labelled and punished in proportion to their wrongdoing.’44 Horder argued that: 
‘*W+hat matters is not just that one has been convicted, but of what one has been 
convicted. If the offence in question gives too anaemic a conception of what that might 
be, it is fair neither to the defendant, nor the victim, for the wrongdoing of the former, 
and the wrong suffered by the latter, will not have been properly represented to the 
public at large.’45 
One might question why it matters what the offence is called, as long as the degree of 
punishment is not excessive. It appears that it is relevant for a number of connected 
reasons, all of which relate to the communicative function of the offence name.46 Thus, 
we must consider the particular audiences to whom the offence label is important. The 
law must communicate to the offender exactly what the conviction is for and why he is 
being punished, in order that his punishment appears meaningful to him, not just an 
arbitrary harsh treatment. The law should also communicate the crime to the public, so 
that it too may understand the nature of the offender’s transgression. Accurate labelling 
also provides information about an offender’s conviction to criminal justice agencies 
and most importantly to this thesis, it serves to show to the victim that justice has been 
carried out. 
 
One important issue in fair labelling theory is whether offence labels could and should 
sufficiently represent the nature and seriousness of the harm done to the victim? 
Offence labels ought to be fair to victims so that the legal record accords with their own 
perceptions of the nature and seriousness of the harm done to them. An accurately 
labelled offence demonstrates that society is showing solidarity with the victim and 
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original. 
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appropriately condemning the defendant’s actions. Problems may arise where plea 
bargaining or a charging direction means that the offence of which the offender is 
convicted is not in fact the one which the victim believes has been committed. For 
example, D is charged with rape, but is convicted in the alternative with sexual assault, 
where the maximum sentence is 10 years’ imprisonment rather than life imprisonment 
for rape. The victim believes she has been subject to a rape and the label accordingly 
does not reflect with sufficient moral weight the harm that has been suffered. This may 
be one such instance where the offence label is so manifestly out of line with the 
offender’s conduct as to be unfair. Another example might be where D pleads guilty to 
common assault but C perceives what happened to be sexual assault. Where a psychic 
sexual touching has occurred the victim has a legitimate interest in fair labelling in that 
she deserves to have her suffering reflected by an offence of appropriate seriousness.47 
The desire of the victim may be to see the ‘sexual’ circumstance reflected in the label 
attached to the offence.  There are 7 alternative offences that could cover ‘psychic’ 
sexual assault. However, the point here is that these other offences are inadequate 
because they fail to label appropriately the situation where C apprehends immediate 
and unlawful sexual touching.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
47
 The counter-argument to this is that it would be unfair to the offender if the offence label over-
represented his culpability and unfair to the public if it under-represented it. There is also an issue here in 
relation to consistency of application of the criminal law. I will deal with this counter-argument in 8.4.2 
below. 
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Table 4.1: Possible charges when someone is put in fear of being touched sexually 
Offence Actus reus Mens rea Maximum Sentence 
(a) Attempted sexual assault  
(CAA 1981) 
-  D has done an act which is more 
than merely preparatory to the 
commission of sexual assault 
- D intended to assault C sexually  
Indictment: 10 years’ imp 
Summarily: 6 months imp or 
a fine, or both 
(b) Intent to commit a sexual 
offence  
(SOA 2003, s.62) 
- D commits any offence 
- D intends to commit a sexual 
offence 
Indictment: 10 years’ imp1 
Summarily: 6 months imp or 
a fine, or both 
(c) Exposure  
(SOA 2003, s.66) 
- Exposure of D’s genitals 
-  D intends that someone will see 
them and be caused alarm or 
distress 
Summarily: 6 months imp or 
a fine, or both 
Indictment: 2 years imp 
(d) Common assault  
(CJA 1988, s.39) 
- Apprehension of imminent 
unlawful force 
- D intended or was reckless that C 
would apprehend imminent 
unlawful force 
Summarily: 6 months imp a 
fine not exceeding level 5, or 
both 
 
(e) Public Order Offences 
 Fear or provocation of 
violence 
(POA 1986, s.4) 
- Threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour 
- Towards another person 
- D must intend or be aware that 
the words or actions are 
threatening, abusive or insulting 
- D must intend that C will fear 
violence or provoke the immediate 
use of violence  
Summarily: 6 months imp, a 
fine not exceeding level 5, or 
both 
 Intentional 
harassment, alarm or 
distress  
(POA 1986, s.4A) 
- Threatening, abusive, insulting or 
disorderly words or behaviour 
- D must intend or be aware that 
his conduct may be threatening, 
abusive, insulting or disorderly 
- D must intend his behaviour to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress 
Summarily: 6 months imp, a 
fine not exceeding level 5, or 
both 
 Harassment, alarm or 
distress  
(POA 1986, s.5) 
- Threatening, abusive or insulting 
words or behaviour 
- Towards another person 
- D must know or appreciate that 
the words or actions are 
threatening, abusive or insulting 
Summarily: a fine not 
exceeding level 3 
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(a) Attempted sexual assault 
One obvious issue for consideration is whether D who intentionally causes someone to 
apprehend immediate and unlawful sexual touching is guilty of attempted sexual 
assault.1 If so, does that mean that there is actually an offence of ‘psychic’ sexual 
assault? The SOA 2003 does not mention attempts to commit any of the offences 
therein contained. However, under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (CAA 1981), s.1(4) 
an attempt may always be left to the jury where any of the substantive offences are 
charged.2 The fault element of an attempt rarely causes much difficulty: it must be 
shown that the defendant intended to cause the proscribed harm and had the necessary 
knowledge of facts and circumstances. In order to satisfy the mens rea of attempted 
sexual assault D must intend to touch C and not reasonably believe that C consents. 
Intentional conduct is understood to mean a ‘purposive’ or direct intent rather than an 
oblique intent. If D trips whilst walking on a busy street and accidentally touches C’s 
breast, D does not intend to sexually assault C. He is not guilty of attempted sexual 
assault. 
 
One complicating issue in charging an attempted sexual assault is proving the conduct 
element: it must be shown that D exhibited some willingness to bring his criminal 
intentions to fruition. The CAA 1981 requires D to have done an act that ‘is more than 
merely preparatory to the commission of the offence’.3 Every step towards the 
commission of an offence, except the last one, could properly be described as 
‘preparatory’ to the commission of the offence. However, R v Geddes4 held that a 
criminal attempt offence required evidence that a defendant had moved from the stage 
of planning and preparation to implementing his intention. Consider a scenario where D 
pushes C to the floor and begins to undo his trousers. C may well fear that she is about 
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to be sexually assaulted. Given that the ‘more than merely preparatory’ test is one for 
the jury, such a situation could result in a conviction for attempted sexual assault. 
Nevertheless, a jury might also conclude that there is insufficient proximity. It might be 
the case that practically no sensible prosecutor would charge attempted sexual assault 
because of the difficulties of proof. Just because a man sticks his hand out does not 
mean that he is going to grope a woman’s breast. 
 
Whilst there are issues concerning the decision to prosecute in cases of attempted 
sexual assault, there are also issues about the labelling of such actions. In the context of 
non-consensual sexual touching, the label ‘attempted sexual assault’ appears to be 
defendant-centred because it focuses on D’s personal behaviour; the fact he did not 
succeed in committing the relevant act. An essential part of an offence being 
complainant-centred is that the label reflects the conduct as experience by C. In respect 
of sexual offences, there may be instances where the psychological impact on C would 
be the same regardless of whether D succeeds in committing the act e.g. whether he 
does in fact touch C’s breasts or vagina or not. Accordingly, the label ‘attempted sexual 
assault’ does not accurately convey the complainant’s affective response to a ‘psychic 
sexual assault’. In offences that result in tangible harm the conduct involved in an 
attempt will often be far removed from the type of harm that would be needed to give 
rise to a charge under the relevant substantive offence.5 Sexual offences are somewhat 
different because sexual harm is contentious and not always easily identifiable and 
therefore C’s experience could be the same whether or not D completes the action. 
Attempted sexual assault implies that D was unsuccessful in completing the action, but 
fails to acknowledge that C might have been caused to apprehend immediate and 
unlawful sexual touching. In the context of psychic sexual assault, it is the confrontation 
as opposed to D’s failure to complete the action that such an offence ought to convey. 
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A further  legal difficulty arising with a charge of attempted sexual assault is whether the 
evidential presumptions in s.75 of Act should be applied where there is a defence of 
consent. The ambit of s.75 is clearly stated in subsection 1, where if in proceedings for 
an offence to which this section applies it is proved: ‘(a) that the defendant did the 
relevant act.’ This condition will not be satisfied by an attempt to commit a sexual 
assault. In 2002, Hilary Benn also made clear that the list of circumstances in s.75 is 
exhaustive and ‘it will not be possible to amend it other than by means of primary 
legislation,’6 ruling out extension of the provision to include attempts by means of 
judicial interpretation. By virtue of s.4 CAA 1981, courts may generally impose a 
sentence as heavy as the defendant would have received had he succeeded with his 
sexual touching. The Law Commission has favoured this approach since attempts ‘may 
range in scope from the offence which is frustrated at the last moment... to the earliest 
and most remote acts of preparation which can properly be regarded as an attempt’.7 
 
(b) Intent to commit a sexual offence 
A further offence that could be charged where C apprehends an immediate and 
unlawful sexual touching is common assault with intent to commit a sexual offence, one 
of several new offences contained in the SOA 2003.8 Under s.62, a person commits an 
offence if ‘he commits any offence with the intention of committing a relevant sexual 
offence.’ A ‘relevant sexual offence’ is defined by s.62(2) to mean any offence under 
Part 1 of the Act (ss.1-79), including an offence of aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring such an offence. Intent to commit a relevant sexual offence covers the 
situation whereby the defendant hoped that the sexual activity would be consensual, 
but intended to sexually assault her if there was no consent. The maximum sentence on 
conviction on indictment is life imprisonment where the initial offence was kidnapping 
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or false imprisonment,9 otherwise 10 years’ imprisonment.10 Summarily the maximum 
sentence is 6 months imprisonment11 or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or 
both.12 D could therefore be liable for common assault with intent to rape or sexually 
assault in situations where he intended to touch but was prevented before the 
commission of the act took place. However, if his intention is to humiliate or degrade 
the complainant, rather than commit a specific sexual offence he could not be charged 
under this section.  
 
(c) Exposure 
The act of indecent exposure originally set out in s.4 Vagrancy Act 1824 and now 
punishable under s.66 SOA 2003, prohibits the exposure of D’s genitals, where D intends 
that someone will see them and be caused alarm or distress. A person who carelessly 
exposes his genitals does not commit an offence under s.66, nor does he commit such 
an offence even through deliberate exposure unless he acts with the specific intent 
required by s.66(1)(b). This requirement means that a defendant who intends that C will 
see his genitals, but does not contemplate C’s alarm or distress, or thinks that they ‘will 
like what they see’ will not be liable. One problem with the law on exposure is that the 
offence does not communicate anything of the complainant’s experience, other than 
her alarm or distress. The law on exposure fails to recognise the significance of such acts 
on complainants’ for example where C fears she will be sexually assaulted or raped 
following the exposure. 
 
 (d) Common assault 
Where D does not fulfil his intention of touching C but commits a psychic sexual 
touching there is the possibility of a charge of common assault under s.39 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988. The essence of common assault is that it consists of causing 
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apprehension of an immediate touching or application of unlawful force. In Ireland and 
Burstow,13 the Court of Appeal held that words, unaccompanied by any threatening 
conduct, could amount to an assault.14 The primary purpose of the offence is to penalize 
the deliberate or reckless creation of fear of attack. The fault element required for 
common assault is either intention or advertent recklessness as to the respective 
conduct element. Where such an assault puts the complainant in fear of a non-
consensual sexual touching the law fails to label the incident appropriately. The label 
common assault implies a non-sexual assault (e.g. where D threatens to strike C but is 
prevented from doing so) and in the context of psychic sexual assault therefore fails to 
convey the significance of C’s apprehension of an unlawful sexual touching (e.g. where D 
threatens to ‘molest’ C). 
 
(e) Public Order Act offences 
A defendant who has caused a complainant to fear a non-consensual sexual touching 
could be charged with a public order offence. In particular, D could be charged with one 
of the three less serious offences provided by the Public Order Act 1986, ss.4, 4A and 5. 
The offences are described by their respective marginal notes as: ‘fear or provocation of 
violence’, ‘causing intentional harassment, alarm or distress’ and ‘harassment, alarm or 
distress’. These summary offences do not involve actual violence and may be ‘seen as a 
response to the call for a simplified and more practical scheme of offences for dealing 
with group disorder’.15 For example, the offences can be used to deal with groups of 
people who persistently shout abuse or obscenities at passers-by. However, these 
offences are inappropriate as a response to the causing of fear of a sexual assault 
because they fail to acknowledge the ‘sexual’ element of the offending behaviour. The 
focus of such offences is public order and not the complainant’s affective response to 
the defendant’s conduct. Consider an intoxicated group of young men who follow and 
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make sexually explicit comments towards a lone woman in the street. They put her in 
fear of being sexually assaulted or raped. Under current law, this is most likely to be 
charged, if at all, under the POA 1986. The public order offences fail to reflect the 
complainant’s experience, who may quite legitimately have feared that she was going to 
be sexually assaulted or rape.  
 
If C is caused to fear a sexual assault, the law should punish D and label the 
transgression in a fair and appropriate way. In excluding the causing of fear within the 
remit of sexual assault the offence is inappropriately labelled and less complainant-
centred than indecent assault. The definition of sexual assault should be extended to 
cover the situation where the complainant is put in fear by the defendant’s words alone, 
irrespective of the absence of any physical contact. Thus if D were to approach C from 
behind, and whilst unseen by C to utter rude and threatening words which made her 
apprehend an immediate battery of a ‘sexual’ nature, the charge should be sexual 
assault, communicating C’s affective response to the violation and showing solidarity 
with C. In failing to define such acts as sexual assault, the law fails to recognise the 
significance of certain acts on complainants. The above discussion demonstrates how 
s.3 fails to achieve the Review’s stated objective to include fear of being touched 
because it does not extend to cases where C apprehends immediate and unlawful sexual 
touching. Whilst there are other offences that could be charged in such situations, s.3 
ought to include such behaviour for the sake of clarity and consistency in the criminal 
law. 
 
4.3 THAT C DOES NOT CONSENT 
The presence or absence of consent has long been the crucial concept in establishing 
sexual offences. However, defining and proving consent is a difficult determination and 
this is due in part to the very nature of sexual offences: the absence of witnesses, the 
lack of clarity as to what constitutes consent, the continuing presence of myths and 
stereotypes about sexual assault. The nuances of sexual encounters and the power of 
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ingrained attitudes interact to create considerable problems in applying any definition 
and standards. Concerns about the extraordinarily low conviction rates for sexual 
offences, especially for rape,16 has led to a tightening of the mens rea requirements and 
the introduction of a definition of and a number of evidential and conclusive 
presumptions focusing on the complainant’s consent. Before the SOA 2003, to be guilty 
of rape a man must have known that, or been reckless as to whether, the other party 
was not consenting.17 The ‘mistaken belief in consent’ test (which was established in 
DPP v Morgan18) did not require D’s mistaken belief in consent to be objectively 
reasonable. The SOA 2003 now provides a general test of what is reasonable in all the 
circumstances. Section 3(2) states that: ‘*w+hether a belief is reasonable is to be 
determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to 
ascertain whether B consents.’  The reasonable belief in consent will not detain us here 
but is the focus of chapter 10. 
 
This section will analyse the actus reus requirement necessary for a charge of sexual 
assault that C does not consent to the touching.19 The requirement that C did not 
consent to the assault was not a feature of the statutory definition of indecent assault, 
but implied through the decision in McAllister20  and provides evidence of one respect in 
which the new law is more complainant-centred. The SOA 2003 is the first piece of 
legislation in English law to attempt a statutory definition of ‘consent’ in the context of 
sex offences. The SOA 1956 did not attempt to define it, with courts treating consent as 
an ordinary word and thus as ultimately a matter for the jury or magistrates. Olugboja21 
left the decision on consent as a question of fact for the jury who had to decide what 
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was in the complainant’s mind at the time of the offence. The Court of Appeal suggested 
that ‘real consent’ is a different ‘state of mind’ from ‘mere submission’,22 and that the 
difference between these two is a matter of degree.23 This approach was analysed in 
chapter 2 and will not detain us again here. Consent now has a much more complainant-
centred meaning than before the SOA 2003. However, there remain issues about which 
touchings are impliedly consented to, both between strangers and between those in an 
intimate relationship. At the fringes of liability, there remains uncertainty about the 
meaning of ‘consent’. This has received little attention in the literature, which has 
focused on consent in rape, where the issues are different.  
 
4.3.1 What constitutes consent? 
The SOA 2003 defines ‘consent’ in s.74: ‘a person consents if he agrees by choice, and 
has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.’ It is implicit in the definition that 
consent can be given only by the person in question and not (for example) by a partner 
or parent or someone in a position of authority over that person. In requiring that a 
person must have the freedom and capacity to make the relevant choice, this offers the 
potential for a less one-dimensional understanding of agency (than the Olugboja 
definition decision which left the meaning of consent undefined and failed to locate 
consent in the interaction between the parties) thus acknowledging that the notion of 
consent cannot be ‘radically divorced from the circumstances under which the choice is 
made’.24 In determining whether agreement has been given to a particular sexual act a 
court or jury should look at the whole background circumstances, emphasising the 
essentially interactive nature of sexual conduct. Section 74 is intended to be a factual or 
‘attitudinal’ definition, turning on what C felt rather than what C expressed. 
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4.3.2 Implied consent 
Section 3 SOA 2003 requires that the touching in question must be without C’s consent. 
In some situations, sexual touching proceeds on the basis of the consent of the parties 
without there being discussion or negotiation about it, for example where the parties 
have a long-standing relationship and regularly engage in a particular type of sexual 
activity. The giving of consent in this way, implied consent, may also arise through 
conventions by which certain actions, or even doing nothing at all, can be understood as 
the giving of consent. Accordingly, in the context of sexual assault, there are two 
situations, admittedly at the fringes of liability, where the meaning of ‘consent’ is vague 
and the boundaries of sexual assault become indistinct. First, consent to sexual touching 
may be problematic when C and D do not know each other and secondly, consent may 
be problematic where C and D were in an ongoing sexual relationship at the time of the 
offence. 
 
(a) Where C and D do not know each other 
The first situation is where C and D do not know each other. Collins v Wilcock25 makes it 
clear that all citizens ‘impliedly consent’ to ‘all physical contact which is generally 
acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life’.26 The decision in Collins v Wilcock thus 
creates an exception for the ‘exigencies of everyday life’27 such as the jostling that 
occurs on busy tube trains. There are two possible explanations for that decision. First, 
when entering crowded places or attending events when touchings are common, a 
person impliedly consents to the physical contact. Secondly, some everyday touchings 
are an inevitable part of life and it is thus necessary to create a general exception to the 
offence of battery to cover these. Most of the physical contacts of everyday life are not 
actionable because they are impliedly consented to by all who move in society and so 
expose themselves to the risk of bodily contact. So nobody can complain of the jostling 
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that is inevitable from his presence in, for example, a supermarket, an underground 
station or a busy street; nor can a person who attends a party complain if his hand is 
seized in friendship, or even if his back is slapped.28  
 
This then raises the question of what touchings are ‘generally acceptable’ and whether 
there are touchings which are impliedly consented to in everyday life, which could be 
interpreted as ‘sexual’ by the complainant’. Is a kiss on the cheek impliedly consented 
to? What about having your bottom pinched? The point here is not that there are 
certain sexual touchings that are always impliedly consented to, because there is always 
a room for argument about what is generally acceptable conduct, and that may depend 
on relational, social and spatial contexts. My point is that there is the possibility of cases 
arising at the fringes of liability, where the issue is whether C impliedly consented to the 
touching and where the boundaries of sexual assault become unclear. 
 
One only needs to consider the range of consensual and non-consensual ‘speculative 
touching’ that occurs in nightclubs. Is having your bottom pinched part of the expected 
conduct in a nightclub that everyone should be expected to tolerate? To what extent do 
people consent to minor non-sexual touching, for example a hand on a shoulder to 
signify that someone is trying to squeeze past, as opposed to brushing past someone’s 
breasts on a crowded dance floor? Nightclubs are busy, crowded places with many 
people lacking spatial awareness because they are intoxicated. Although people who 
enter nightclubs consent to the minor annoyance and ‘hustle and bustle’ of entering a 
crowded environment, they do not consent to unjustified invasions of their sexual 
integrity. Pinching C on the buttocks, touching C’s breast, kissing C or rubbing against 
someone who does not consent are all invasions of C’s sexual autonomy. They are all 
deliberate willed actions carried out by D and the tolerable conduct exception should 
not extend this far. One might argue that we should not be too puritanical or over-
enthusiastic about using the criminal law to sanction speculative touching in nightclubs. 
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However, in any sexual interaction, either there is or there is not consent to the sexual 
touching and this ought to be determined based on direct and/or indirect evidence of Cs 
state of mind at the time of the alleged assault. The Canadian Supreme Court has 
resisted a ‘tolerable conduct’ exception to sexual conduct, on the grounds that the 
exception is limited to ‘the casual, accidental or inevitable consequence*s+ of general 
human activity and interaction... *as opposed to+ singling out another person’s body in a 
deliberate targeted act’.29  
 
It is by no means clear whether social conventions exist in respect of sexual conduct,30 
or if they do exist whether it is correct to use them to establish consent or a lack of 
consent. Serious questions arise whether there are in fact conventions of this type that 
are accepted and understood by all parties whose actions are to be interpreted by 
them. What of the boss who pinches the bottom of his employee or the stolen kiss at 
the office Christmas party? There are some good reasons to suppose that some of these 
conventions reflect a one-sided, partial view of sexuality. There is an extensive literature 
that indicates that men and women adopt different perspectives in the context of sexual 
interaction.31 If this is the case then such conventions should not be used as a means of 
determining consent. 
 
Does s.74 provide a definition of consent that offers hope for the better protection of 
the intoxicated partygoer? If so, does this mean that the ‘art of seduction’ is criminalised 
under English law? If English law rejects any notion of implied consent to sexual 
touching, does it risk criminalising harmless sexual overtures in ‘ambiguous cases’ where 
there is a real issue of whether a sexual assault occurred? These types of cases have yet 
to appear before the courts. An obvious and common scenario is of two intoxicated 
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students at a nightclub, who do not know each, but who start kissing and intimately 
touching each other.32 If C and D have been kissing consensually, does that mean that C 
consents to D putting his hand up her skirt and touching her vagina? There is a concern 
that the rejection of the doctrine of implied consent to sexual touching would result in 
the unjust conviction of an accused who has commenced consensual sexual touching 
that unbeknownst to him at some point becomes unwanted, but unexpressed by the 
complainant. Where C changes her mind, there is obviously a transitional period where 
that change of mind is going to have to be communicated in some manner to D.  
 
(b) Where C and D do know each other 
The second situation is where C and D do know each other. This may be because they 
are in or have been in a sexual relationship. Where there is such a relationship, there 
must ordinarily be some element of sexual give and take within it, and although D’s 
mistimed sexual touch might be rejected by C, C would not ordinarily be considered (or 
consider herself to be) the victim of a sexual assault. It might of course be different if 
sexual relations between them have broken down or if D persists in touching C despite 
clear indications that she does not consent at the time or indeed to that kind of 
touching.33 Consent is communicated differently in different types of sexual 
relationships. The dynamics of a sexual relationship may well be such that consent to 
sexual contact (e.g. a kiss, hug, pat or caress) is presumed between the participants until 
and unless a contrary indication is issued. This will be a question of fact in every case, 
but if the principle were not recognised it would mean that a large proportion of 
married or cohabiting partners would at some time have committed, and/or been the 
complainant of sexual assaults.34 There is a concern that if the doctrine of implied 
consent to sexual touching is not recognised by English law, that this might result in the 
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unjust conviction of D who was involved in an ongoing sexual relationship with C at the 
time of the alleged offence.  
 
4.3.3 S.74: a communicative model of consent? 
Academics have responded in different ways to the s.74 definition. Munro and Finch 
argue that the enhanced guidance on the issue of sexual consent has attempted to 
‘bring a more communicative understanding of sexuality, grounded in agreement about 
intercourse between the parties, rather than on a presumption of male 
proposition.’35Lacey supports this definition suggesting that it ‘pins its colours firmly to a 
significantly positive conception’ of sexual autonomy, encouraging a communicative 
model of consent and shifting ‘the doctrinal boundaries of rape… in the direction which 
cogent feminist analyses have argued to be desirable’.36 Rumney is more sceptical of the 
extent to which this framework in fact encourages a more communicative model, 
pointing out that the provisions continue to operate by placing the complainant, and her 
freedom and capacity as manifested in her conduct and words, at the centre of judicial 
scrutiny.37 The approach seeks to examine the complainant’s behaviour in a broader 
context, within which the behaviour of the defendant, amongst other things, will also be 
considered. 
 
Consent remains a somewhat vague term that juries can still interpret and apply for 
themselves with attendant problems of consistency and coherence. Section 74 
describes consent in terms of four other contested concepts: agreement, freedom, 
choice and capacity. These terms can be interpreted in radically divergent and often 
minimalist ways, but ultimately the responsibility for this interpretation is left in the 
                                                             
35
 V. Munro. & E. Finch, „Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room‟ (2006) 26 LS 303. For 
a description of the distinction between communicative notions of consent and attitudinal notions of 
consent see N. Brett, „Sexual Offences and Consent‟ (1998) 11 Can J Law & Juris 69. 
36
 N. Lacey, „Beset by Boundaries: The Home Office Review of Sex Offences‟ [2001] Crim L R 3. 
37
 P.N.S. Rumney, „The Review of Sex Offences and Rape Law Reform: Another False Dawn?‟ (2001) 64 
MLR 890, at 900. 
147 
 
hands of the judicial studies board and the judiciary, and then in the hands of jurors.38 
This has the potential to result in inconsistent and incoherent decisions between juries. 
Koski’s research confirms the tendency of jurors to rely on erroneous views about the 
inevitability of male sexual initiative and the inherently whimsical or passive nature of 
female sexuality.39 Finch and Munro’s study of mock jury deliberations found that most 
jurors concluded that if the complainant experiences a high level of intoxication she did 
not consent to intercourse, since she lacked the capacity to do so under s.74.40 A 
number of participants however, indicated that the complainant, so long as she 
remained conscious, retained the capacity to make a choice.41 Finch and Munro observe 
that: 
‘the fact that freedom, choice and capacity are terms whose meaning is within 
everyone’s understanding does not entail that everyone understands those terms to 
mean the same thing, either in the abstract, or in specific cases’.42 
The study also showed that the introduction of the requirement that the complainant 
agree by choice in circumstances of capacity and freedom, did little to prevent some 
jurors from continuing to presume consent in the absence of positive dissent. Some 
participants insisted that, even in the case of a heavily intoxicated complainant, they 
would expect to find some evidence of a struggle to establish non-consent. Unlike rape, 
sexual assault is triable either way and therefore magistrates will have to interpret and 
apply the meaning of consent. Finch and Munro’s study focused on mock jury 
deliberations and there does not appear to be any research about how magistrates do 
or might view consent. 
 
The problem of leaving jurors and magistrates to interpret consent in sexual assault 
cases lies in the ambiguity of sexual encounters. The meaning attributed to the groping 
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of a barmaid’s breasts or the stolen kiss at the office Christmas party depends very 
much upon the mental picture the fact-finder applies to such situations. Actions that 
involve minimal or fleeting contact leave the victim little time to express any resistance 
and might appear to fact-finders not to constitute ‘real’ sexual assault. The factors 
typically attributed to ‘real’ rape and sexual assaults include the use of force, a stranger 
assailant and an outdoor attack. LaFree makes the point that since sexual assault cases 
typically lack corroborative evidence, there is more scope for fact-finders to be 
influenced by personal values.43 The absence of consent should be determined by 
reference to C’s subjective internal state of mind towards the touching, at the time it 
occurred. S.74 has a more complainant-centred meaning than the definition of consent 
pre-2003 but there are still concerns about its interpretation in the context of sexual 
assault, especially involving situations arise at the fringes of liability. As Finch and Munro 
rightly conclude, ‘s.74 did not do all that might be hoped… partly as a result of 
stereotypical views about ‘appropriate’ gender roles, but partly also because of the 
vagueness of its central definitional terms’.44   
 
4.3.4 Evidential and conclusive presumptions 
The general definition of consent is supplemented by ss.75 and 76 of the SOA 2003, 
which represent a new departure in the law governing non-consensual offences in that 
they set out respectively evidential and conclusive presumptions. These have been 
welcomed for sending out important social signals about the boundaries of acceptable 
sexual behaviour. Section 75 provides that there will be certain situations in which a 
complainant is deemed not to have consented and that the defendant will be presumed 
not to have had a reasonable belief in such consent unless evidence to the contrary is 
adduced. The circumstances include where violence was used against the complainant, 
where the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious, or where the complainant 
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was stupefied or overpowered at the time of the relevant act.45 The significance of the 
presumption depends on how demanding the evidential burden imposed on the 
defendant to establish a ‘real issue’ about consent or reasonable belief in consent 
proves to be.46 Section 76 specifies two situations where in all cases the complainant is 
presumed irrebuttably not to have consented. The situations are first, where D induces 
the complainant by impersonation and, secondly, where D intentionally deceives the 
complainant as to the nature and purpose of the act. Deceiving a person as to the 
purpose of an act applies where D deceives C as to the ulterior reason for or objective of 
the act. For example, in Piper,47 several women agreed to be measured for a bikini by D 
on the (false) basis that it was necessary to determine their modelling potential, 
whereas in fact it was for his sexual pleasure. D’s conviction for sexual assault was 
upheld. The Court of Appeal held that the victims had been deceived, exploited and 
humiliated. 
 
Temkin and Ashworth have cast doubt on the three tiered approach to consent 
questioning whether obtaining compliance through fraud or deception can really be 
deemed worse than ‘other ways of avoiding true consent, such as using threats or 
violence, administering drugs, or taking advantage of a sleeping or unconscious 
person’.48 Finch and Munro criticise the decision to make the list of s.75 circumstances 
exhaustive. They highlight the omission of other situations of dubious consent, for 
example, where the complainant has been subjected to threats other than those of 
violence or where the complainant is self-intoxicated to a point short of stupefaction.49 
Tadros argues that it is a mistake to call the provisions in sections 75 and 76 
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presumptions.50 They are not evidence of lack of consent but are rather circumstances 
that constitute rape. Tadros has gone as far as suggesting that the law should be re-
structured so as to place minimal reliance on such a contested concept such as 
consent.51  
 
4.3.5 Intoxicated consent 
There are two issues here. First, how the law deals with the situation where C is 
involuntarily intoxicated and secondly, how the law approaches the impact of voluntary 
alcohol consumption on the ability to give consent to intercourse. Under s.75 (2)(f), it is 
stated that consent is presumed to be absent in any situation in which: 
‘Any person had administered to or caused to be taken by the complainant, without the 
complainant’s consent, a substance, which, having regard to when it was administered 
or taken, was capable of causing or enabling the complainant to be stupefied or 
overpowered at the time of the relevant act.’ 
In situations in which an individual has been given an intoxicant without their consent, 
whether by the defendant or a third party, there will be a prima facie presumption that 
she did not consent to intercourse or sexual touching.52 
 
An important issue arose in Bree,53 regarding the impact of voluntary alcohol 
consumption on the ability to give consent to intercourse. The defendant and 
complainant had been drinking together and engaged in sexual intercourse. The 
defendant was convicted of rape. The prosecution had alleged at the beginning of the 
trial that D had raped the complainant when her level of intoxication was so great that 
she was effectively unconscious and incapable of consenting within the meaning of s.74. 
However, by the end of the evidence, the prosecution case was that although the 
complainant had been conscious and capable of consenting, she had not in fact 
                                                             
50
 V. Tadros, „Rape without Consent‟ (2006) 26 OJLS 515. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 For a detailed consideration of the scope and application of s.75(2)(f) see Finch & Munro, op cit, n 92. 
53
 [2007] EWCA Crim 804. 
151 
 
consented. The appeal focused upon misdirection by the trial judge in addressing the 
effect of voluntary heavy alcohol consumption as it applies to rape. The Court of Appeal 
determined that misdirection had occurred and that the appeal be allowed. The central 
principle was that where the complainant had voluntarily consumed even substantial 
quantities of alcohol, but, nevertheless, remained capable of choosing whether or not to 
have intercourse, and in drink agreed to do so, that would not be rape, although as a 
matter of practical reality, capacity to consent might evaporate well before a 
complainant became unconscious. 
 
The current approach to consent is an improvement on the pre-2003 law in that it 
provides a definition of consent and guidance and examples on certain situations where 
consent is to be disregarded. Consent has been given a special meaning in the context of 
sexual offences. The idea of consent is and will continue to be inherently ambiguous and 
in the context of sexual assault difficulties might arise in the context of implied consent. 
There ought to be no ‘ordinary conduct of everyday life’ exception for touchings that C 
experiences as ‘sexual’. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
There are three main issues arising from this discussion. First, touching is a broad, all-
embracing term which has no de minimis exception and is therefore complainant-
centred because there are no touchings that are ‘too trivial’ to be the subject of legal 
control. Secondly, the new offence is limited to a battery and does not extend to cases 
where C apprehends immediate and unlawful sexual touching. Whilst this behaviour 
might be captured by one of a number of other offences, section 3 ought to be 
extended to cover psychic sexual touchings for the sake of clarity and consistency in the 
criminal law. The law fails to label a psychic sexual touching appropriately, failing to 
communicate the complainant’s affective response to the action. In this respect, sexual 
assault is under-inclusive and less complainant-centred than indecent assault. 
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Thirdly, whilst consent will often prove a difficult concept in cases of rape and sexual 
assault, the definition of ‘freedom and capacity’ in s.74, and the evidential and 
conclusive presumptions have clarified this area of law. The parameters of consent have 
been defined, enabling the full legal meaning of the term to be clearly understood by 
judges and juries. Sexual assault is primarily a crime against the sexual autonomy of 
others and clarifying the concept of consent in terms of C’s ‘freedom and capacity to 
make that choice’ reaffirms each person’s liberty to withhold sexual contact. Given the 
determination to clarify the law on consent,54 this aspect of the definition of sexual 
assault is more complainant-centred than the respective provision that existed under 
common law for indecent assault. However, there remain issues about which touchings 
are impliedly consented to, both between strangers and between those in an intimate 
relationship. At the fringes of liability, there remains uncertainty about the meaning of 
‘consent’. 
 
Whilst some of the inherent problems with indecent assault have been addressed, the 
reform process failed adequately to define the parameters of sexual assault, resulting in 
a widely drawn provision that is under-inclusive and inappropriately vague. Chapter 5 
will seek to demonstrate that sexual assault is a context-dependent offence, thereby 
evaluating the need for a complainant-centred approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’. It 
demonstrates how there is precedent in English law for offences to be defined, if only 
partially, in terms of the complainant’s experience of an act. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
54
 Lord Falconer spoke of the need for „crystal clarity‟, HL Deb, col 772, 13 Feb 2003. 
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5 
The Need for a Context-Dependent Approach 
to the Meaning of ‘Sexual’ 
 
The requirement that an activity or touching is ‘sexual’ is a defining feature of many of 
the new offences contained in the SOA 2003. However, sexuality is socially constructed 
rather than having an essential quality and consequently the term ‘sexual’ is context-
dependent. This chapter will demonstrate why the law needs a context-dependent 
approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ in respect of sexual assault. Context-dependent 
offences give rise to the possibility of different interpretations, one of which is 
complainant-centred. I will argue that given its context-dependent nature, the definition 
of ‘sexual’ should include consideration of all the relevant circumstances including the 
complainant’s affective response to the touching. The complainant’s experience is an 
important aspect in understanding the nature and seriousness of the act.  
 
Part 1 will highlight how sexuality is socially and historically contingent rather than 
having an essential quality. According to this perspective, the meaning of a touch or 
movement is dependent on the interactions between the ‘participants’. People act 
towards things based on the meaning those things have for them; and those meanings 
are derived from social interaction and are modified through interpretation.1 The 
chapter will consider the ontological essence of sex and analyse four methods of 
distinguishing ‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts as outlined by Alan Soble, one of the 
leading authors on the philosophy of sex.2 According to Soble whether an act can be 
characterised appropriately as ‘sexual’ may be dependent on four possible factors: the 
body parts involved, the extent to which it provides sexual pleasure, the actor’s 
                                                             
1
 H. Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (University of California Press, Berkeley, 
1969). 
2
 A. Soble, Sexual Investigations (New York University Press, New York, 1998) ch 3. 
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intentions and the extent to which the act is procreative.3 I will argue that none of these 
four methods are a satisfactory way of distinguishing ‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts.  
 
Part 2 will examine the concept of context-dependency, to identify a category of 
criminal offences in which D’s action may or may not, ‘depending on the circumstances’, 
constitute the commission of an offence.4 The analysis will be limited to one aspect of 
context-dependency; offences which are defined, at least in part, by the complainant’s 
experience of an act or omission. The argument of this section is that no action or 
touching is intrinsically ‘sexual’: it only becomes so when someone experiences and 
defines it as such. Sexual assault is therefore a context-dependent crime. There is no 
essential characteristic that makes an act ‘sexual’ and so recourse must be had to the 
complainant’s affective response to the touching. Part 2 will attempt to define both 
‘context’ and ‘circumstances’ considering whether they are synonymous terms and 
highlighting their problematic nature.  
 
Part 3 discusses those circumstances that may render an action or touching ‘sexual’. I 
will discuss the relevance of the relationship between the parties; the purpose of the 
defendant; the spatial or temporal context and the complainant’s affective response to 
the touching. I will argue that sexuality impinges on our lives in a polymorphous way 
and accordingly any definition of ‘sexual’ should consider all the possible circumstances 
of an action, including the complainant’s affective response to the touching. The chapter 
argues that no touching is intrinsically or inherently ‘sexual’ and accordingly the term 
‘sexual’ is context-dependent. Context-dependent offences give rise to the possibility of 
different perspectives: the defendant’s perspective; the complainant’s perspective; a 
reasonable-bystander perspective and within each of these categories, it is possible to 
identify different strands. In order to appreciate sufficiently the nature and seriousness 
of the action recourse must be had to the complainant’s experience.  
                                                             
3
 Ibid. 
4
 J. Jaconelli, „Context-Dependent Crime‟ [1995] Crim L R 771. 
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5.1 SEXUALITY AS A SOCIALLY AND HISTORICALLY CONTINGENT CONCEPT 
Howard Becker maintained that no behaviour is deviant or criminal until it is so defined 
and thereby labelled by a section, or the whole, of society.5 Becker argued that: 
‘*D+eviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of 
the application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is one to 
whom that label has successfully been applied: deviant behaviour is behaviour that 
people so label’.6 
Each society creates deviants and criminals by making rules whose breach will constitute 
deviance or criminality, and these rules are not constant.7 In 1969, Herbert Blumer 
coined the term ‘symbolic interactionism’ to describe the perspective that people act 
towards things based on the meaning those things have for them; and those meanings 
are derived from social interaction and modified through interpretation.8 Blumer 
claimed that people interact with each other by interpreting or defining each other’s 
actions instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions. For the interactionist, sexual 
meanings, as well as deviance, exist as ambiguous and problematic categories rather 
than as universal absolutes. Mead’s analysis of symbolic interactionism saw it as a 
presentation of gestures and a response to the meaning of those gestures. Mead 
defined a gesture as any part or aspect of an ongoing action that signifies the larger act 
of which it is a part, for example, the forcible removal of a person’s clothes as an 
indication that D might rape C. The gesture has meaning for the person who makes it 
and for the person to whom it is directed. The meaning of a sexual touch is accordingly 
dependent on the interactions between the participants. To say that an act that involves 
physical contact with any sexual part of the body is the distinguishing feature that 
makes it ‘sexual’ is flawed. In a medical examination of the genitals, the acts performed 
are ordinarily not ‘sexual’ even though sexual parts are touched. Physical contact with 
                                                             
5
 H. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press, New York, 1963). 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 J.Tierney, Criminology: Theory and Context 2
nd
 edn (Pearson Education Limited, Edinburgh, 2006).  
8
 Blumer, Op cit, n 1. 
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any sexual part of the body is neither necessary nor sufficient to define an act as 
‘sexual’. 
 
In the same way that no behaviour is deviant until it is so labelled, no action is ‘sexual’ 
until it is characterized as such. Notions of sexuality and the legal responses to sexuality 
are not fixed but are socially and historically contingent. As Foucault argued, it is a 
mistake to assume either that such social understanding is uncontested or that law is 
the only disciplinary mechanism in the production and control of sexuality: 
‘We must…abandon the hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered in an age 
of increased sexual repression. We have not only witnessed a visible explosion of 
unorthodox sexualities; but… a deployment quite different from the law…has 
ensured…the proliferation of specific pleasures and the multiplication of disparate 
sexualities.’9 
There is no cross-cultural, ahistorical common denominator, or essence that makes 
‘sexual’ acts ‘sexual’. Accordingly, that which is considered ‘sexual’ will vary enormously 
between individuals and groups and may even vary across a period of time with the 
same people. Bodily movements acquire meaning only by existing within a culture that 
attaches meaning to them. Changes in sexual behaviour and beliefs contribute to and in 
turn are influenced by changes in sexual concepts. Advances in birth control, for 
example, have effected how we perceive and conceive sexuality. Certain kinds of 
touches and movements might be labelled as ‘sexual’ acts in one culture but not in 
others. For example, in a number of European cultures friends and relatives greet each 
other with a kiss to both cheeks. This practice is not seen by them as ‘sexual’, but due to 
the ambiguity of physical movements and the fact that in many societies kisses are 
‘sexual’ these pecks could on occasion be intended or interpreted as ‘sexual’. In the 
Sambia and Etoro tribes in New Guinea, young boys fellate older males to orgasm and 
                                                             
9
 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Peregrine translation, New York, 1976) p. 49. 
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ingest the ejaculate.10 The tribes consider this ‘fellatio insemination’ akin to breast-
feeding in that both acts provide nourishment to growing children. In such 
circumstances, this ‘fellatio insemination’ is not recognised in that culture as ‘sexual’, 
even though it might be considered a standard ‘sexual’ act in Western culture.  
 
Within an individual society, there are likely to be people with differing expectations 
and contested understandings of certain acceptable or unacceptable (both ‘sexual’ and 
‘non-sexual’) conduct. It is difficult, if not impossible, to identify a dominant or 
mainstream sexual standard in modern British society. The sexual liberalisation of the 
1950s and 1960s11 allowed people to explore and express their sexuality like never 
before. The decriminalisation of homosexuality12 in 1957 and the recognition of marital 
rape in 199113 are perhaps two of the biggest indicators of how British society’s 
acceptance of sexual behaviour has changed over time. The law on sexual assault 
therefore has to set out standards of behaviour in a complex cultural situation where 
the boundaries of ‘acceptable’ sexual behaviour are unclear. 
 
5.1.1 Distinguishing ‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts 
One of the main concerns of this thesis is how we are to define those types of touching 
that are ‘sexual’. How, for example do we tell the difference between a ‘sexual’ and a 
‘non-sexual’ kiss? To begin this analysis we must consider the ontological essence of sex. 
For the benefit of this analysis, consideration will be given to four views of the essence 
of sexual activity as outlined by Alan Soble, one of the leading authors on the philosophy 
of sex.14 The first view is that sexual acts by their very nature involve physical contact 
with the genitals. The second concept is that sexual acts are those that produce ‘sexual’ 
                                                             
10
 See G. Herdt, Guardians of the Flute (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994); K. Raymond, 
„Witchcraft and Sexual Relations‟ in P. Brown & G. Buchbinder, (eds) Man and Woman in the New 
Guinea Highlands (American Anthropological Association, Washington D.C., 1976).  
11
 See J. Gagnon, Sexual Conduct: the Source of Human Sexuality (Aldine Transaction, London, 2004). 
12
 Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (Her Majesty‟s Stationary Office, 
London, 1957); Sexual Offences Act 1967.  
13
 R v R [1991] 4 All ER 481; Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994, s.1. 
14
 Soble, op cit, n 2. 
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pleasure. The third theory is that sexual acts are those that are accompanied by or flow 
from a sexual intention. Lastly, is the notion that sexual acts are those that are 
procreative in form. I will argue that none of these four possible ways of distinguishing 
‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts is satisfactory because sexuality is a socially and 
historically constructed concept. 
 
(a) Body parts 
The basic idea in Soble’s first analysis is that sexual acts by their nature involve physical 
contact with the genitals, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as the ‘external organ 
or organs of generation’.15 According to this view, one must first identify the sexual 
parts of the body and then decide whether an act is ‘sexual’ by observing whether it 
involves contact with one of those parts. According to Laumann sexual activity is: 
‘mutually voluntary activity with another person that involves genital contact and sexual 
excitement or arousal, that is, feeling really turned on, even if intercourse or orgasm did 
not occur.’16 
The definition does not make penile-vaginal penetration necessary for an act to be 
‘sexual’, but requires some kind of contact with someone’s genitals. Physical contact 
with the scrotum or penis of a male and/or the vulva or vagina of a female would 
constitute a sexual act as these anatomical features constitute the genitalia.17 
Nevertheless, an analysis of sexual activity should not be restricted to genital contact, as 
there are a variety of ‘erogenous’ body parts, areas that ‘give rise to sexual desire’.18  D’s 
touching of C’s breasts might be perceived by C or reasonable people to be ‘sexual’, 
even in the absence of any prior or subsequent contact with the genitals. Sometimes the 
hands are used in ‘non-sexual’ acts and at other times they are used in ‘sexual’ acts. 
Those in a loving relationship may press their hands together and feel a surge of sexual 
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 Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com [Online] (Accessed: 21
st
 November 2009).  
16
 E. Laumann et al, The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices in the United States 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1994). My emphasis. 
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 K. Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology: The Unity of Form and Function (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 
New York, 2010) p.1048. 
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 Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com [Online] (Accessed: 21
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pleasure. Whether the hands are a ‘sexual’ part of the body therefore depends on the 
nature of the particular activity in which they are engaged. A touch on the arm might be 
a friendly pat, an assault or part of a sexual exchange. The physical features alone do 
not distinguish a friendly, consoling pat from a sexual event or request for attention. 
The arm touch exhibits polysemicity; it is devoid of any one meaning. Described in an 
opposing way the arm touch may have no meaning and will not have any meaning until 
other factors are taken into account.  
 
This first view of the essence of sexual activity presupposes that it is possible to 
construct a list of definite bodily movements that comprise the domain of sexual acts. 
However, the diverse range of bodily movements, coupled with the number of sensitive 
body parts, prevents such a comprehensive list being drawn. A further caveat to such a 
catalogue is the relative neglect of the context of the act. Some sexual acts are in certain 
contexts, not ‘sexual’ at all. Massaging a breast might be considered ‘sexual’ if done by 
lovers, but not when done during a breast cancer examination. Looking, touching an 
arm or a back rub are all activities that may or may not be ‘sexual’. The fact that an act 
involves physical contact with any sexual part of the body is not therefore the 
distinguishing feature that makes it ‘sexual’. Bodily movements acquire meaning, 
whether ‘sexual’ or not, only by existing within a culture that attaches meaning to them. 
 
(b) Sexual pleasure 
Soble’s second analysis suggests that sexual acts are those that produce sexual pleasure 
and was originally advanced by Robert Gray.19 For Gray, sexual activities are just those 
that ‘give rise to sexual pleasure’.20 According to Gray, producing sexual pleasure is both 
necessary and sufficient for acts to be ‘sexual’: ‘any activity might become a sexual 
activity’ if sexual pleasure is derived from it and ‘no activity is a sexual activity unless 
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 R. Gray, „Sex and Sexual Perversion‟ in A. Soble, The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings 4th 
edn (Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, 1980). 
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 Ibid, at 160. 
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sexual pleasure is derived from it’. This view implies that acts performed to obtain 
pleasure which fail are not ‘sexual’ acts.21 Consider a man who touches the breasts of a 
woman standing at a bar for the purposes of sexual gratification. She does not 
experience sexual pleasure and neither does he. Under this second analysis, this is a 
failed sexual act and so not ‘sexual’ at all, because it does not produce sexual pleasure. 
On the contrary, I would argue that whilst sexual pleasure is not a necessary condition 
for an act to be classified as ‘sexual’ it might be sufficient for an act to be ‘sexual’. Some 
members of British society may well define an act as ‘sexual’ even though it is not 
pleasurable. A couple may not enjoy sex or find it pleasurable, but engage in intercourse 
in the hope of conceiving a child. On Gray’s view, they have tried to engage in sex, but 
failed and their acts are not ‘sexual’ at all. A lifeguard might unintentionally feel sexual 
arousal and pleasure during resuscitation of a swimmer, even though he acts from a 
‘non-sexual’ purpose. Even though homogenous British society does not classify the 
mouth-to-mouth contact of resuscitation as ‘sexual’, it can become ‘sexual’. Gray notes 
the possibility that one and the same act might be ‘sexual’ for one participant but not 
for the other. On his view, the prostitute who performs pleasure-less fellatio is not 
engaging in sexual activity even though her partner is. Under this analysis, the act is 
‘sexual’ if one of the participants experiences pleasure.  
 
(c) Sexual intention 
Soble’s third theory is that sexual acts are those that are accompanied by or flow from 
the actor’s sexual intention. Under this analysis, a sexual intention is an intention to give 
and/or experience sexual arousal. The idea that sexual acts are to be analysed in terms 
of this motive occurs in the law. For example, in Michigan ‘sexual contact’ is defined as: 
‘the intentional touching of the victim's or actor's intimate parts or the intentional 
touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate 
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parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose 
of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose…’
22
 
Under this analysis, it is not the touching of certain body parts that makes an act 
‘sexual’; it is that the actor touches them with a certain purpose. Thus, it could be 
argued that the lifeguard’s action in resuscitating the swimmer is ‘sexual’ if he intends 
to get sexual pleasure from contact with her. If he happens to feel sexual pleasure that 
is not enough to make his acts ‘sexual’. One of the problems of defining sexual acts in 
terms of a sexual intention is that as a definition it is circular. If one argues that a sexual 
intention arises when one desires for or intends to produce sexual pleasure that 
inevitably leads to the question ‘what does sexual mean?’ Sexual activity has many 
purposes: to express affection, make money, kill time, relieve stress, burn calories, etc. 
The motive one has cannot therefore distinguish ‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts. A 
couple who engage in sexual intercourse purely for procreation purposes may 
experience no sexual arousal and yet they are performing what is historically a central 
case of ‘sexual’ activity, as we shall see below. Intentions are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to categorise ‘sexual’ acts because they are focused on solely on the 
defendant’s reason for acting and fail to consider C’s affective response to the action. 
Suppose D touches C’s breasts. D might protest that he did nothing ‘sexual’ and his 
reason for acting was to satisfy his curiosity, amuse his friends or win a bet.  However, 
even if not by intention, D has done something that might be perceived by C and/or 
reasonable people to be ‘sexual’.  
 
(d) Procreation  
Soble’s final analysis suggests that sexual acts are those that are procreative in form. 
This is not surprising, for the procreative act is biologically and historically a central case 
of sexual activity. However, there are many acts that have the potential to be labelled 
‘sexual’ despite not being procreative in form: kissing, fellatio, cunnilingus, holding 
hands. An expanded version of this analysis might suggest that the various activities 
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commonly called ‘foreplay’ fall within the domain of the ‘sexual’. These acts are ‘sexual’ 
because of psychological or physiological links with sexual intercourse. The intent to 
procreate might be sufficient to categorise sexual acts but it is not necessary. 
Homosexuals experience arousal and desire and engage in sexual acts without any 
procreative intent.  
 
Soble’s analysis identified two sufficient conditions for an act to be ‘sexual’: that it 
produces sexual pleasure, or that it is procreative in form. The first explained why 
pleasurable acts are ‘sexual’, whether procreative or not, while the second explained 
why procreative acts and their concomitants are ‘sexual’, whether pleasurable or not. 
However, this does not mean that an act has to correspond with one of the two 
categories otherwise it is not ‘sexual’. The point is merely that these are sufficient 
conditions for determining whether an act is ‘sexual’. There is no necessary condition 
for acts to be classified as ‘sexual’ and therefore no identifiable essence of sex. 
However, acts that produce a certain kind of pleasure, or are procreative, are ‘sexual’, 
both transculturally and ahistorically. 
 
5.2 SEXUAL ASSAULT: A CONTEXT-DEPENDENT CRIME?  
It may be argued that some types of touching are ‘sexual’ by nature; for example the 
penetration of a woman’s vagina with a man’s penis. However, even these types of 
touching involve a process of labelling and require interpretation by the participants 
involved. Jaconelli identified a category of criminal offences in which D’s actions may or 
may not, ‘depending on the circumstances’, constitute the commission of an offence.23 
Those crimes, which Jaconelli argued most typically comprise offences where the actus 
reus consists of some form of communication,24 he labeled ‘context-dependent’ crimes. 
Sexual touching is a method of communication and self-expression. One of the 
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 Jaconelli, op cit, n 4. 
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 Jaconelli focuses on speech crimes as examples of context-dependent crimes, specifically: obscenity, 
contempt of court, incitement to racial hatred and public order offences. 
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fundamental aspects of communicative sexuality is the idea of mutuality, that is, a form 
of sexuality that is concerned with exchange and agreement. A leading proponent of 
communicative sexuality, Lois Pineau, has argued that ‘communicative sexual partners 
will not overwhelm each other with the barrage of their own desires... a person engaged 
in communicative sexuality will be most concerned with the mutuality of desire’.25 This 
emphasis on communication between sexual partners also re-asserts the law’s function 
of protecting ‘sexual self-determination’.26  
 
Jaconelli used the label context-dependent without offering a sufficient definition or 
explanation of what he meant by the term. He confined his discussion to one element of 
context-dependency: offences that are defined at least in part by the complainant’s 
experience of an act/omission. Accordingly, an offence is context-dependent if it 
requires a particular reaction in the complainant. In labelling certain offences as 
context-dependent one is drawn to the inevitable conclusion that there are a range of 
(or what Jaconelli suggested as ‘the overwhelming majority of’) criminal offences that 
can be described as context-independent. Context-independent offences are ones in 
which the circumstances or result required as part of the actus reus can be factually 
determined. Rape27 is a context-independent offence because the requirement of penile 
penetration is definitive: it does not require interpretation from the complainant’s or 
defendant’s perspective. Equally, murder is a context-independent offence as death has 
an objective quality. The actions of the accused and the harm inflicted on his victim are 
coextensive. Neither rape nor murder requires judgment or opinion from any of the 
parties involved or from a reasonable person’s perspective. 
 
Context-dependent crimes, on the other hand, are ones where the tribunal of fact needs 
to consider the totality of the circumstances of the act/omission because the conduct 
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 L. Pineau, „Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis‟ (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 217, at 236.  
26
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prohibited by the law is non-essentialist; it has no inherent value or meaning. This 
argument subscribes to the theory of relativism: the idea that some elements or aspects 
of experience or culture are relative to, i.e. dependent on, other elements or aspects. 
Thus, crimes that are context-dependent have as their defining feature an element of 
actus reus that involves non-specifically defined conduct and requires interpretation by 
the jury or magistrates. Context-dependent terms ‘involve an interaction between 
subject and observer, the labels being the means of conveying to others the observer’s 
affective response to the subject’.28 Jaconelli maintained that context-dependent crimes 
are a subdivision of ‘result crimes’,29 in that the law is concerned with whether ‘in the 
particular context under consideration, the harm that it strives to avert has in fact 
materialized.’30 However, not all context-dependent crimes are result crimes and so the 
tribunal of fact might be required to consider whether the conduct prohibited by the 
law has occurred.  
 
The meaning of terms such as ‘beauty’, ‘damage’ and ‘anti-social’ are context-
dependent; they all require an affective response by an observer. Anti-social behaviour 
is a paradigmatic example of a context-dependent offence. No behaviour is inherently 
anti-social. Whitehead argued that: 
‘virtually any activity can be anti-social depending on a range of background factors, 
such as the context in which it occurs, the location, people’s tolerance levels and 
expectations about the quality of life in a certain area’.31 
The inherent subjectivity of anti-social behaviour means it is ‘extremely difficult to 
define in any meaningful sense.’32 The behaviour of others may be seen as anti-social 
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because it does not fit parochial cultural and social understandings of norms of 
behaviour.  Repeatedly having an excessively noisy party in a deserted field is unlikely to 
make other people’s lives a misery. However, if you repeatedly have a loud party in your 
house in a residential area, it is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to the 
neighbours. The physical location and temporal environment of the party and people’s 
tolerance levels to behaviour of this kind are therefore the deciding features in 
determining whether this behaviour is anti-social.  
 
‘Sexual’ does not have the same objective quality as a term such as ‘death’. Nor does it 
have the same objective quality as ‘dangerousness’ in driving offences which is explicitly 
stated in the Road Traffic Act 1988, s.1 to be objectively assessed by reference to the 
standards of the reasonably competent driver. Sexual assault is therefore a context-
dependent crime: the ‘sexual’ nature of an act cannot be determined without having 
reference to the ‘context’ in which it occurred. The problem with context-dependent 
terms such as ‘sexual’ is that they are open to different interpretations. Whilst D might 
honestly believe that no one would consider his squeezing of C’s bottom to be ‘sexual’, 
C might in fact experience the touching as ‘sexual’. Whether the touching is ‘sexual’ 
involves an interaction between the subject (D’s touching) and observer (D’s perception 
of the touching, C’s affective response to the touching or an objective bystander’s 
perspective). The ‘sexual’ circumstance requires interpretation by the jury or 
magistrates: it is not ascertainable without evaluation of the action’s context. 
 
While there may be some non-consensual, non-medical sexual touchings that all 
persons would consider to constitute an invasion of sexual autonomy,33 the dependence 
of ‘sexualised’ touching on subjective interpretation and context-specificity means some 
actions will be unacceptable in one situation, but accepted or even celebrated, in 
                                                             
33
 For example touching of the penis or vagina. 
166 
 
another context. This can be demonstrated by the example of kissing.34 A kiss may be 
used as an expression of affection, respect, greeting, farewell, sexual desire or romantic 
affection to name but a few.35 There are many ways in which a kiss can be delivered and 
its meaning both to participants and to onlookers will vary accordingly. In her analysis of 
late medieval culture, Shenigorn suggests that kissing had not yet acquired twentieth-
century sexual connotations.36 While kissing is widespread in industrialised countries, 
the Middle East and among Hindu groups, for other such as those in Japanese and 
Chinese societies, kissing was not in the sexual repertoire until contact with 
industrialised society.37 In India public displays of affection and sex are still largely 
taboo;38 nonetheless, many Indian sculptures depict incredibly explicit sexual acts, 
which are deemed important expressions of fertility and therefore not considered 
obscene. The categorization of kissing as ‘sexual’ depends on the relationship between 
the parties, the purpose of the kisser and the area of the body that is being kissed. A 
long-lingering kiss offered as an expression of romantic affection or desire between 
those in a relationship is likely to be experienced as ‘sexual’ by the participants and 
labelled as ‘sexual’ by reasonable onlookers. However, it is unlikely to be experienced or 
labelled ‘sexual’ where a grandparent issues a slobbering greeting to a reluctant 
grandchild. The physical nature of the kiss (i.e. the use of tongue(s) in the former case) 
and the relationship between the parties acquires great significance. Where D 
approaches C as she walks home late at night and tries to kiss her, it is likely that most 
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 See K. Harvey, The Kiss in History (ed) (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005); A. Blue, On 
Kissing: from the metaphysical to the erotic (Indigo, London, 1997). 
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 See C.C. Bombaugh, The Literature of Kissing, Gleaned from History, Poetry, Fiction and Anecdote 
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reasonable people would consider this action to be ‘sexual’, there being no obvious 
justifiable purpose to D’s action.  
 
As was demonstrated in section 5.1 above, sexuality is a socially and historically 
contingent concept. In some cultures, the removal of a female shoe might be considered 
to be an act that by its nature is ‘sexual’. Nudity and the exposure of genitals are not 
always actions that are by their nature ‘sexual’. In some cultures, nudity is viewed as 
‘non-sexual’. Athletes in Ancient Greece commonly competed nude, but often no 
female participants or spectators were allowed at these events.39 In Germany, Finland 
and the Netherlands, nudity in mixed sex saunas is considered ‘non-sexual’. However, in 
Britain some people perceive nudity in saunas as having sexual connotations. Artistic 
nudity is not always ‘sexual’ and often reflects social standards of aesthetics and 
morality.40 In British culture, nudity in art is more accepted by some people than actual 
nudity.41 Even in a gallery that depicts nude art, nudity of a visitor is typically not 
accepted. Models remove their clothes for health awareness or charitable purposes e.g. 
to raise awareness of breast or testicular cancer. It is the context that renders nudity 
‘sexual’ and it is not the case that nudity is in any event inherently ‘sexual’ irrespective 
of the circumstances in which it arises. Whilst the nudity of adults in certain situations 
has become acceptable, increasing social awareness about paedophilia and child 
pornography has instilled in some cultures concerns over dangers associated with child 
nudity.42  
 
One problem with the use of the term context-dependent and a problem which Jaconelli 
does not address in his article is the meaning of the terms ‘context’ and ‘circumstances’. 
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 See P. Veyne, A History of Private Life: From Pagan Rome to Byzantium v.1 (Harvard University Press, 
Harvard, 1992). 
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 See the work by Spencer Tunick at http://www.spencertunick.com [Online] (Accessed: 13
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prison on charges of Breach of the Peace and Contempt of Court.  See http://nakedwalk.org/ [Online] 
(Accessed: 15
th
 January 2010). 
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 See S. Ost, Child Pornography and Sexual Grooming (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009). 
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Does the context of a crime include motives, consequences or circumstances? All of 
these terms are problematic. Context is something of a catch-all word. The Collins 
Dictionary defines context as ‘the circumstances relevant to an event or fact’.43 Context 
is a broad and fluid term that might be described as referring to ‘the bigger picture’. The 
context of a particular crime may therefore include a range of different perspectives: 
defendants, complainants or reasonable persons. If the context of a crime is made up of 
all the relevant circumstances, then context and circumstances are synonymous. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines circumstances as ‘*t+he logical surroundings or 
“adjuncts” of an action; the time, place, manner, cause, occasion etc., amid which it 
takes place’.44 Arguably, the ‘context’ of a sexual assault is made up of all the 
circumstances that might affect the determination of the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. 
The complainant’s affective response to the touching is one circumstance of the offence 
and therefore one element of context-dependency. The complainant’s perspective is an 
important and relevant, although not decisive aspect in assessing the ‘sexual’ nature of 
conduct.   
 
5.3 ‘SEXUAL’ CIRCUMSTANCES 
There are several circumstances that both separately and/or together may render an 
action or touching ‘sexual’. These include but are not limited to the relationship 
between the parties, the defendant’s motive, the spatial and temporal environment, 
and the complainant’s experience of the action. 
 
5.3.1 Relationship between the parties 
One circumstance that might be considered in determining the ‘sexual’ nature of an 
action is the relationship between the parties. Are they relatives, friends or complete 
strangers? Spanking someone on the bottom is an action that may or may not be 
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considered ‘sexual’ and it is this issue that the courts grappled with in Court.45 If the 
person being spanked is a child and the purpose of their parents is chastisement, this 
will probably not be an action that is considered ‘sexual’. Spanking may also refer to the 
practice of striking an adult, not as punishment but as a social ritual or form of 
entertainment. The buttocks are also an intimate part of the body in close proximity to 
the sexual organs and non-consensual touching of this part of the body is certainly 
capable of being ‘sexual’. The non-consensual slapping of a woman’s buttocks by a 
stranger in a pub is an action that might be considered by C or an objective bystander to 
be ‘sexual’ given its associated sexual connotations. 
 
5.3.2 Purpose of the defendant 
A further circumstance that might be considered in determining the ‘sexual’ nature of 
an act is the purpose of the defendant. If we take the act of touching the vagina, we see 
that the ‘sexual’ nature of the act is open to different interpretations depending on the 
purpose of the defendant. Touching the vagina of a woman may be carried out to 
sexually arouse either the actor or the recipient. The purpose of sexual gratification 
thereby renders the action ‘sexual’ in this circumstance. However, where D, a doctor, is 
subjecting his patient to a vaginal examination for medical purposes, his purpose is non-
sexually motivated and therefore the touching is not ‘sexual’. One of the problems here 
is that an intimate examination may be experienced as intensely ‘sexual’ by some 
patients. This demonstrates how the purpose of the defendant does not necessarily 
determine the patient’s affective response to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. 
However, given the patient’s consent to such invasive contact, combined with the 
doctor’s non-medical purpose, the sexual touching would not constitute sexual assault 
in these circumstances. Including the purpose of the defendant as a circumstance to be 
considered in assessing the ‘sexual’ nature of conduct implies that motive is a relevant 
consideration in determining the actus reus of certain sexual offences. However, English 
law is generally reluctant to take account of motive in terms of substantive offence 
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definitions.46 Many offences are defined on the basis of simplicity and certainty, with 
context and motivation left (if at all) until sentencing.47  
 
5.3.3 Spatial and temporal environment 
A third circumstance that might be considered in determining the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching is the spatial and temporal environment. The physical location of the touching 
and when it takes place may affect the determination of the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching. If D touches C’s groin, whilst attempting to tackle C during a rugby game, one 
might argue that the touching is not ‘sexual’. In Barnes,48 the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that contacts outside of the rules of the game can in certain 
circumstances, be consented to.49 The Court of Appeal held that in highly competitive 
sports, conduct outside the rules can be expected to occur in the heat of the moment, 
and...it still may not reach the threshold level required for it to be criminal.50 The Court 
took the vague approach of stating that only conduct that was sufficiently grave to be 
labelled as criminal should result in conviction, outlining a series of relevant 
considerations.  
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5.3.4 Complainant’s affective response to the touching 
A fourth circumstance that might be considered in determining the ‘sexual’ nature of an 
action is the complainant’s affective response to the touching. In order to appreciate 
sufficiently the nature and seriousness of the action recourse must be had to the 
complainant’s experience. Sexuality is a complex and subjectively experienced 
phenomenon. Sexuality is intrinsically part of our character and decisions as moral 
agents. There is much greater general awareness of the effects that undesired sexual 
acts can have on complainants, than say 30 years ago.51 The high maximum sentences 
for crimes of sexual violence under the SOA 2003 indicate a legislative appreciation of 
the pressing need to protect society and especially the vulnerable from non-consensual 
sexual activity. Consider the slapping of a woman’s buttocks by a stranger in a pub. 
Some women may perceive this behaviour as ‘sexual’ and therefore totally 
unacceptable conduct. Other women may not consider the action ‘sexual’. A further 
group of women may acknowledge that this is common behaviour of some drunken 
men and whilst acknowledging the ‘sexual’ nature of the act, disregard the incident as 
an assault. Different people can interpret the same behaviour in different ways but this 
does not mean that those who are caused harm or offence constituted in terms of a 
violation of their sexual physical integrity should be left without criminal redress. One 
recent complainant whose bottom was groped in a nightclub described the action as 
‘disgusting, a violation. It wasn’t just a little pinch it was a squeeze done in a sexual way. 
I was really offended.’52 The criminalisation of non-consensual sexual touching exists to 
protect bodily integrity and sexual autonomy and to exclude consideration of the 
complainant’s affective response to the touching would fail to communicate law’s 
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symbolic condemnation of acts interfering adversely with bodily integrity. The 
complainant’s perspective is an important and relevant, although not decisive aspect in 
assessing the ‘sexual’ nature of conduct. In chapter 8, I will analyse the merits of a 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’. I will argue that such an 
approach demonstrates that women’s experiences of non-consensual sexual touching 
are taken seriously and can be at the heart of a substantive offence definition.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The intrinsic problem with the offence of sexual assault is that the law has to set out 
standards of behaviour in a complex cultural situation when the boundaries of 
acceptable or ‘normal’ sexual behaviour are unclear. This chapter has demonstrated 
how sexuality is a socially and historically contingent concept and how there is no 
essential characteristic that distinguishes ‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts. Sexual assault 
is a context-dependent crime because the conduct prohibited by the law is non-
essentialist. In the same way that no behaviour is deviant until it is so labelled, no action 
is ‘sexual’ until it is characterized as such. This context-dependency underlies 
controversies with the term ‘sexual’. Context-dependent offences give rise to the 
possibility of different perspectives: the defendant’s perspective, the complainant’s 
perspective, a reasonable-bystander perspective. Chapters 6 through 8 will analyse five 
possible approaches to assessing the meaning of ‘sexual’, in light of the argument set 
out here that sexual assault is a context-dependent crime and that the definition should 
therefore refer to all the possible circumstances, including the complainant’s experience 
of the touching. Then, in chapter 9, the current approach adopted in English law to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ will be analysed.  
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6 
An Analysis of the Possible Perspectives  
from which ‘Sexual’ could be Viewed and Defined 
Part 1: Non-Interpretive and Objective Approaches 
 
There are numerous ways in which the meaning of ‘sexual’ could be defined (both legal 
and non-legal) for the purposes of an offence of sexual touching. The next three 
chapters will identify five different possibilities for interpreting ‘sexual’, critiquing the 
approaches against the fundamental aims and principles of criminal law. In this chapter, 
I will analyse a ‘non-interpretive approach’, a ‘bystander-objective’ approach and a 
‘defendant -objective’ approach. In chapter 7, I will evaluate a ‘defendant-subjective’ 
approach and in chapter 8, a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach. Following this 
examination, in chapter 9 I will analyse English law’s actual approach to the meaning of 
‘sexual’ set out in s.78 SOA 2003. Whilst these chapters will be analysing an aspect of 
the conduct element within the offence rather than the fault element, when one is 
examining a context-dependent term such as ‘sexual’ which could be interpreted in 
many different ways, the difference between the two is somewhat blurred. It is possible 
to view ‘sexual’ as a word that can be assessed independently of the mens rea 
requirements and as a word that is dependent on the defendant’s mental state for 
definition.  
 
This chapter will delineate three different possible legal approaches to assessing the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ for the purpose of defining sexual assault. Taking each approach in 
turn, it will consider the benefits and drawbacks of the possible perspectives from which 
the word ‘sexual’ could be viewed and defined. Part 1 will consider the interplay 
between subjective and objective approaches to criminal liability, identifying the five 
possible legal approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’ that will be evaluated.  
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Part 2 will consider the merits of an approach that defines specifically which areas of the 
body are to be considered ‘sexual’ for the purposes of an offence of sexual assault. This 
approach would have the advantages of promoting certainty in the criminal law and 
adhering most closely to the principle of fair warning. However, such an approach would 
lack the flexibility necessary for an offence of sexual assault because it would focus 
solely on a state-of-affairs and would accordingly fail to take account of the context in 
which the touching occurred. 
 
Part 3 will consider the philosophical foundations of an orthodox objectivist approach. 
Objectivists assert that it is sufficient to prove that the reasonable person would have 
perceived the relevant circumstances or consequences comprising the actus reus, 
irrespective of whether the defendant himself was aware of them. Objectivism thus has 
a greater social dimension, applying an external assessment regardless of whether the 
defendant is aware of a particular circumstance. 
 
Part 4 will evaluate two different objective approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’. These 
will be labelled ‘bystander-objective’ and ‘defendant-objective’ respectively. A 
‘bystander-objective’ approach would hold the defendant’s conduct to a standard that 
society deems appropriate even though D may subjectively be incapable of appreciating 
the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. A ‘bystander-objective’ approach would be 
problematic because of the ambiguity of existing social norms, particularly with respect 
to sexual issues. A ‘defendant-objective’ test on the other hand is an objective test 
subject to capacity-based exceptions. The chapter concludes that the three approaches 
identified are insufficiently complainant-centred. 
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6.1 CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Over the years, two dominant approaches to criminal liability have developed. First, 
there are the subjective approaches that punish the ‘evil intent of a person’.1 The 
defendant is judged according to his mental state when he did the act prohibited by the 
law. Secondly, there are objective approaches. Lord Thomas summed up, what I will 
label a ‘bystander-objective’ approach, in debates on the SOA 2003, explaining that ‘the 
law can draw a line in the sand and say that it does not matter what the defendant was 
thinking and that if he crosses that line he has committed an offence’.2 The next three 
chapters will identify and evaluate five possible legal approaches to the meaning of 
‘sexual’, as set out in table 6.1 below, which draw on existing theories of criminal 
responsibility. As an introduction, each will be explained briefly here and then analysed 
in detail in the relevant chapters. 
 
Table 6.1: Five different legal approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’ 
 
Test 
Obligation on criminal justice 
decision maker 
Relevance of 
complainant’s 
experience 
Non-
interpretive 
1). Anatomical 
Did body part x touch body 
part y? 
None 
Interpretive 
2). Bystander-
objective 
Would a reasonable person 
consider the touching to be 
‘sexual’? 
None 
3). Defendant-
objective 
Would a reasonable person in 
D’s position appreciate the 
‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching? 
None 
4). Defendant-
subjective 
Did D appreciate that the 
touching is or might be 
‘sexual’? 
None 
5). Complainant-
subjective 
Did C experience the touching 
as ‘sexual’? 
Necessary 
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 Lord Thomas of Gresford. HL Deb 13
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 Feb 2003, col 780. 
2
 Ibid. 
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Perspective 1 is a non-interpretive approach that would define specifically which areas 
of the body are to be considered ‘sexual’ for the purposes of sexual assault. This is 
labelled a ‘non-interpretive’ approach, as it would be devoid of any reference to the 
participants’ experiences. It would define ‘sexual’ according to the body parts involved 
and without consideration of the defendant’s mental state or the complainant’s 
perception of the touching. The touching would be ‘sexual’ if body part X touches body 
part Y. Underlying this approach is the philosophical concept of essentialism: the idea 
that qualities possessed by a person or thing are unchanging and not dependent on 
context. Under this approach, action X will be ‘sexual’ rather than action X might be 
‘sexual’. Perspective 1 would establish a strict liability test, requiring the decision-maker 
to apply an anatomical test and would accordingly be devoid of any reference to C’s 
experience. 
 
Perspective 2 is labelled a ‘bystander-objective’ approach. Objectivists assert that it is 
sufficient to prove that the reasonable person would have perceived the relevant 
circumstances or consequences comprising the actus reus, irrespective of whether the 
defendant himself was aware of them.3 Objective approaches are all external 
approaches that focus on the conduct as it would seem to an outside observer. A 
‘bystander-objective’ approach concerns what a ‘reasonable person’ would believe or 
expect, as distinct from what this particular agent believed or expected.4 Under a 
‘bystander-objective’ approach, an action would be ‘sexual’ if a reasonable person 
would consider it to be ‘sexual’. The defendant’s intentions or beliefs are irrelevant to 
this form of objectivism. If D intentionally touched C, without C’s consent, and a 
reasonable person would consider the touching to be ‘sexual’, then objectively there 
would be a sexual assault. The reasonable person standard holds the defendant’s 
conduct to a standard that society deems appropriate even though he may subjectively 
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 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 11
th
 edn (OUP, Oxford, 2005) p.91. 
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 E.g. subjectively I am shooting at a person; but if a reasonable person would realize that my target is 
obviously a tree, objectively I am shooting at a tree. 
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be incapable of appreciating the ‘sexual’ nature of his action. The complainant’s 
experience of the touching is not a feature of this second perspective. 
 
Perspective 3, a ‘defendant-objective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’, would be 
concerned with what the defendant ought to have known about his conduct i.e. that it is 
‘sexual’ or is/might be considered by reasonable people to be ‘sexual’. What D ought to 
know would be measured according to the standards of the reasonable person in 
possession of the same information as D. This adds an element of subjectivity to the test 
as characteristics of D would be considered in judging whether he ought to have known 
that the touching might be ‘sexual’. Therefore, if D is a child, his appreciation of the 
‘sexual’ nature of the conduct will be viewed against the standard of a reasonable child. 
Similarly, if D suffers from a mental illness that will be taken into account in determining 
what he ought to have known about his behaviour. The complainant’s experience of the 
touching is not a feature of perspective three. 
 
Perspective 4 is labelled a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach. Orthodox subjectivists argue 
that a person’s criminal liability should be assessed on what they were trying to do, 
intended to do and believed they were doing, rather than on the actual consequences of 
their actions.5 Ashworth suggests that ‘there is no reason why a human system for 
judging and formally censuring the behaviour of others should be a slave to the vagaries 
of chance.’6 A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would require 
that D has knowledge of or appreciates the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. If an offence 
requires knowledge of a given circumstance, a person who is honestly mistaken about 
that circumstance should be acquitted for lack of knowledge. The ‘defendant-subjective’ 
approach could also be referred to as a ‘defendant-centred’ approach and attempts to 
ensure that ‘the act is attributable to the defendant’.7 
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Perspective 5, a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’, would be 
concerned with the complainant’s perception of the nature of the touching. The 
defendant’s intention or motive would be irrelevant to this account of liability; the focus 
would be on the complainant’s affective response to the action. A ‘complainant-
subjective’ approach would be experienced-centred and would enable the individual 
complainant to define the parameters of her sexual and bodily autonomy. A 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach is not a common part of orthodox criminal liability, 
being more a focus of tort liability. A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach could also be 
referred to as a ‘complainant-centred’ or ‘victim-centred’ approach. I will be argue that 
this is the most preferable approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ because it is necessary 
to refer to C’s perspective in order to appreciate the seriousness of the act’s impact and 
the level of D’s culpability. 
 
6.2 NON-INTERPRETIVE APPROACH  
This section will analyse an approach that defines specifically which areas of the body 
would be considered ‘sexual’ for the purposes of sexual assault. This is labelled a ‘non-
interpretive’ or ‘context-independent’ approach, as it would be devoid of any reference 
to the participants’ experiences. It would be based on defining ‘sexual’ according to the 
body parts involved and without consideration of the defendant’s mental state or the 
complainant’s perception of the touching. As such, a non-interpretive approach would 
be neither ‘defendant-centred’ nor ‘complainant-centred’. The acts included within this 
non-interpretive approach do not depend on any interpretation by onlookers or 
participants for their quality; they have essential qualities. The touching is ‘sexual’ if 
body part X touches body part Y. Underlying this approach is the philosophical concept 
of essentialism: the idea that certain properties possessed by a person or thing are 
universal, unchanging and not dependent on context.8 Under this approach action X is 
‘sexual’ rather than action X may be ‘sexual’. A non-interpretive approach imposes a 
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 See A. Sayer, „Essentialism, social constructionism and beyond‟ (1997) 45 Sociological Review 453. 
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strict liability test, whereby D is legally responsible for his actions regardless of 
culpability.  
 
6.2.1 Benefits of a non-interpretive approach 
A non-interpretive approach would not necessarily have to be exhaustive, but some 
indication of those acts that are considered ‘sexual’ would have the benefit of enabling 
the citizen, the police and prosecutors to have some fair warning as to which acts might 
result in liability. One argument in favour of a non-interpretive approach is that the 
citizen is entitled to specificity so that he knows which acts will result in criminal liability. 
D should have sufficient notification in a statute exactly which activities will result in 
liability for sexual assault. A non-interpretive approach would provide meaningful 
guidance on the scope of the criminal law and the conduct that may be lawfully 
pursued. The principle of legality suggests that criminal offences should be clearly 
enough defined to enable people who wish to be law abiding to live their lives confident 
that they will not be breaking the law.9 A non-interpretive approach would avoid having 
a vaguely defined offence whose interpretation can be expanded or contracted by the 
magistrates or jury to fit the justice of the particular case. A non-interpretive approach 
would also enable police officers to know with some degree of certainty whether an 
offence has, or appears to have been, committed and would promote consistency of 
approach in the arrest, charge and prosecution of sexual assault. 
 
Horder suggests that the more serious the offence, the more important it is in point of 
‘moral nominalism’, to incorporate moral detail into the definition of the offence.10 
Horder adopts the phrase ‘moral nominalism’ to describe when the definition of an 
offence details precisely what the defendant has done and argues that this gives the law 
its necessary moral substance. A non-interpretive approach would adhere to the 
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principle of maximum certainty; for justice to be done, and to be seen to be done, it is 
vital that the criminal law indicates the elements of a crime with as much precision as 
possible. This approach would also pay regard to the principle of fair labelling.11 It would 
explain to society the nature of wrongdoing and scale of harm. This would increase the 
law’s educative and declaratory functions. 
 
6.2.2 Problems with a non-interpretive approach 
(a) Defining ‘sexual’ body parts 
The difficulty of a test of this kind is establishing the touching of which areas of the body 
should be included on the list. Which actions are ‘sexual’? The statute could specify that 
touching of C’s genitals, anus or female breasts will be considered ‘sexual’ for the 
purposes of the offence. This is the approach adopted in Alaska where ‘sexual contact’ is 
defined as: 
‘(a) the intentional touching, directly or through clothing, by the defendant of the 
victim’s genitals, anus or female breasts; or (b) the defendant’s intentionally causing the 
victim to touch, directly or through clothing, the defendant’s or victim’s genitals, anus or 
female breasts.’12  
The Alaskan approach is exhaustive: it includes only touching of the genitals, anus or 
female breasts within the definition of sexual contact.13 However, what feature makes 
each of these areas of the body ‘sexual’? The genitals are the primary sexual organs, 
which are involved in sexual reproduction. In medical literature, the female breasts are 
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 Ibid. 
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 A.S. 11.81.900(b)(51). The Alaskan definition of „sexual contact‟ refers specifically to „intentional 
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breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse 
or gratify the desire of any person,‟ without that person‟s consent. In Virginia, unlawful sexual contact is 
defined as: „The accused intentionally touches the complaining witness‟s intimate parts or material directly 
covering intimate parts‟- including their genitalia, anus, groin, breast or buttocks- without that person‟s 
consent. 
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not defined as sexual organs but secondary sexual characteristics14 and are commonly 
associated in Western society as being objects of sexual gratification. The anus has a 
relatively high concentration of nerve endings and is considered a specific erogenous 
zone, an area of the body that has heightened sensitivity and where stimulation 
normally results in sexual response.15 Anal sex is an alternative form of intercourse. In 
chapter 9, these reasons will be considered more fully; what is important here is that 
there are other body parts that are more difficult to categorise as ‘sexual’. Why is kissing 
not included within the definition given that it is in some circumstances an expression of 
sexual desire and may or may not be sexually motivated? Why is the touching of other 
erogenous zones for example the neck or feet not ‘sexual’ when licking, stroking or 
caressing in these areas is sexually arousing to many people?  
 
A non-interpretive approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ fails to consider the context of 
the action. Thus kissing, stroking of the thigh, touching the shoulder or any other 
touching, might be considered ‘sexual’ if they are proximate to an exposed sexual 
organ16 or where it was suggested by the defendant that sexual intercourse take place.17 
This reiterates the context-dependent nature of sexual assault and demonstrates how 
some unacceptable conduct may escape criminality. The Alaskan definition of ‘sexual’ is 
very simplistic and does not acknowledge that the surrounding circumstances may 
render an action ‘sexual’.  It is impossible to define ‘sexual’ by reference to body parts 
given that it is a subjectively experienced phenomenon that means so many different 
things and is experienced in so many different ways by different people.  
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 K. Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology: The Unity of Form and Function (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 
New York, 2010) p.1048. Secondary sexual characteristics are traits that distinguish the two sexes of a 
species, but that are not directly part of the reproductive system. In humans the most visible are breasts of 
females and beards and moustaches of males. 
15
 R.K. Winkelmann, „Erogenous Zones: Their Nerve Supply and Significance‟ (1959) 34 Mayo Clin Proc 
39.   
16
 Beal v Kelley [1951] 2 All ER763. 
17
 R v Leeson (1986) 52 Cr App R 185. 
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(b) Fetishism 
Defining by reference to areas of the body, as in the Alaskan definition, suggests that 
there is a relationship between the genitalia and the ‘sexual’. In a non-interpretive 
definition, the nature of the relationship can be expressed in the following way: the 
genitalia are ‘sexual’ and therefore touching of the genitalia is ‘sexual’. This appears 
problematic in reference to fetishism. In fetishism, Freud argued, the libidinal 
investment in the genital is displaced onto and reinvested in another object, which may 
be another part of the body remote from the genitals, in rituals of behaviour, in objects 
such as the shoe, underwear and so on.18 Moran suggests that fetishism ‘draws 
attention to libidinal mobility and problematises the idea of the sexual as a single 
necessary relation.’19 ‘Libidinal mobility’ presumably means that sexual instinct and 
desire are not confined to the genitalia and can be freely exercised without the aims of 
reproduction. Sexual instinct manifests itself not only from the genitals but also from 
other areas of the body, most notably the erogenous zones. A non-interpretive 
approach would fail to acknowledge that the ‘sexual’ is an assignable relation: the 
interest in the ‘sexual’ may be transferred from the genitalia to other body parts, which 
may or may not have heightened sensitivity.   
 
(c) Context-independency 
A non-interpretive approach, whilst desirable, does not have the flexibility necessary for 
an offence of sexual assault. One of the drawbacks of a definition that refers to specific 
touching of certain areas of the body is that it takes no account of the context in which 
the action occurred: it establishes a context-independent test. Whilst the ‘sexual’ can be 
defined as the ‘genital’ it is also an assignable relation. Accordingly, a non-interpretive 
approach, which would specify the touching of certain body parts as ‘sexual’ to the 
exclusion of others, may fail to address the harm caused by a fetishist, whose obscure 
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 S. Freud, „Three essays on the theory of sexuality‟ in A. Richards, On Sexuality (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth, 1991) p.69. 
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 L. Moran, „Indecent Assault: What is Indecency?‟ (1989) 11 Liverpool Law Review 99. 
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touching may be experienced by a complainant as ‘sexual’. A non-interpretive approach 
would arguably protect the complainant of a paradigmatic sexual assault (i.e. one where 
there is evidence of touching of the genitals, anus or female breasts).  It would not, 
however, impose liability on a defendant whose touching of C is not ‘sexual’ by nature, 
but which, when considering the totality of the circumstances might be considered a 
‘sexual’. 
 
A definition that concentrates on certain body parts focuses solely on a state-of-affairs; 
‘this body part did touch that body part’. In doing so it fails to account for the context in 
which the touching occurred, which as was demonstrated in chapter 5 is an essential 
element in designating conduct as ‘sexual’. A non-interpretive approach does not allow 
for a context-dependent evaluation of the conduct: it makes no reference to the 
relationship between the parties, the complainant’s experience of the touching or the 
defendant’s culpability and reason for acting.20 It is devoid of any reference to the 
participants’ experiences and would therefore fail to uphold a complainant’s sexual 
integrity. A non-interpretive approach does not capture those types of touching that 
appear non-sexual to observers but which are experienced by complainants as ‘sexual’, 
or where the purpose of a defendant is ‘sexual’. For the archetypal sexual assault case, a 
non-interpretive approach may well suffice, but in some limited situations, a more 
nuanced, subtle, context-dependent approach is required. 
 
A list of the activities that were or were not to be considered ‘sexual’ would provide 
greater certainty, but only at the expense of replacing judgment with a robotic and 
inflexible approach that might be incapable of responding flexibly to atypical situations. 
In some cases, whether acts are ‘sexual’ or not will depend on their circumstances or 
attendant purpose, which cannot be defined in advance. A list that limits sexual activity 
to acts per se (i.e. by their nature) ‘sexual’ would be far too narrow. On the other hand, 
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 Although in chapter 11 I will argue that we should not read mens rea or an equivalent construction into 
the „sexual‟ nature of touching under the SOA 2003. 
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a list that refers to acts in more general terms might be incapable of taking sufficient 
account of the enormous range of circumstances and purposes that may be 
encountered.  
 
6.3 OBJECTIVISM 
The legal philosophy traditionally applied in mainstream English criminal law is known as 
‘subjectivist theory’. It rests on the principle that moral guilt and hence criminal liability 
should be imposed only on people who can be said to have chosen to behave in a 
certain way or to cause or risk causing certain consequences or circumstances. The roots 
of subjectivism lie in a liberal philosophy that regards individuals as autonomous beings, 
capable of choice and each deserving of individual respect.21 It is called ‘subjectivism’ 
because of the significance it accords to the individual’s state of mind at the time of the 
prohibited conduct. Subjectivists assert that, for serious crimes at least, the mental 
element of a crime should require that the defendant has personal awareness of his 
actions and has perceived the relevant circumstances and consequences compromising 
the actus reus of the offence.22 There is an ongoing debate between subjectivists and 
objectivists. Objectivists assert that it is sufficient to prove that the reasonable person 
would have perceived the relevant circumstances or consequences comprising the actus 
reus, irrespective of whether the defendant himself was aware of them.23 This is of 
course a very simplistic view of the competing positions and there are shades of 
objectivism and subjectivism along a spectrum. This chapter will evaluate two possible 
objective approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’ and chapters 7 and 8 will analyse two 
different possible subjective approaches to the meaning of ‘sexual’. Despite strong 
endorsement of the subjectivist position from the House of Lords in G,24 Parliament has 
demonstrated a willingness to create serious offences in which the fault element is 
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 This view can be contrasted with e.g. „utilitarian theory‟ which places emphasis on the social benefit to 
be derived from punishing a person (e.g. deterring others) rather than on the deserts to the individual 
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 D. Ormerod, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 11
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 edn (OUP, Oxford, 2005) p.91. 
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explicitly objective. Recent examples include many sexual offences in the SOA 2003 and 
some of the money laundering offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
 
6.3.1 Objectivist theory 
Objectivism grounds fault in conduct rather than choices, arguing that an action attracts 
blame if it inflicts harm when a reasonable person would not have acted that way. 
Under the objective analysis, awareness of wrongdoing is not essential. If sexual 
touching is undesirable, then D has a reason not to do it whether or not he appreciates 
the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. Sexual touching does not become acceptable just 
because it is done without advertence to the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. If the 
defendant has failed to behave like a reasonable person, we may infer culpability, since 
his conduct has fallen short of reflecting that of the archetypal reasonable person. 
 
Fletcher suggests that ‘objective standards are ‘social’ rather than individual 
standards,’25 in that they ‘sacrifice the individual to the general good.’26 Justice to the 
individual is thereby outweighed by the protection of society from crime. Subjectivism is 
a very individualistic approach, rooted in the actor’s state of mind, whereas objectivism 
arguably has a greater social dimension, applying an external assessment regardless of 
whether the actor thinks he is doing the right thing. The rationale for punishment under 
this account of liability is therefore social protection and not the distribution of 
punishment according to individual culpability.27 Perhaps the clearest examples of the 
imposition of liability for the failure to fulfil a duty of care are road traffic offences. 
Offences such as causing death by dangerous driving28 and causing death by careless 
driving29 make drivers criminally liable for the degree to which they fall below the 
standards expected of a competent motorist. In the context of road traffic offences, the 
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 G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1978) Ch 6.8. 
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 Ibid, at p.48. 
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 See further, H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968). 
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imposition of objective liability is justified because a motorist’s behaviour can so easily 
impinge on others, sometimes with disastrous consequences. 
 
Fletcher suggests that the question of wrongdoing is an objective standard, for it 
focuses on the act in abstraction from the actor; the issue of attribution is subjective in 
the sense that it focuses on the actor’s personal accountability for wrongdoing.30 
Amirthalingam has similarly argued that there is a residual objective element that is part 
of mens rea and it is that which determines whether the accused is morally 
blameworthy.31 Blameworthiness is a normative inquiry as to whether the person 
deserves to be labelled and punished as a criminal. As such, one cannot determine 
blameworthiness or culpability without reference to some external standard. An 
objective evaluation of criminal liability therefore attributes moral blameworthiness to 
the accused. Amirthalingam suggests that a dualistic model of mens rea be preferred, 
where the ‘mens’ and the ‘rea’ are separate.32 The ‘mens’ is the subjective mental 
element that attributes responsibility for the conduct and consequence to the accused; 
the ‘rea’ is the normative evaluation of that mental element, which attributes moral 
blameworthiness to the accused. With recklessness, the ‘rea’ question in many cases 
will be whether the accused should have foreseen certain additional consequences of 
his intentional or foreseeable conduct. In objectivist terms, punishment itself can be 
understood, not primarily as an efficient technique for preventing criminal conduct, but 
as an appropriate response to criminal wrongdoings: as a response which condemns or 
censures that wrongdoing. The law’s aim is to declare and seek our obedience to those 
minimal standards of behaviour that are necessary for social life and to protect rights 
and interests against infringement. Duff suggests that a focus on wrongful actions rather 
than on ‘dangerous persons’ is inherent in this account.33 
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(a) Objectivism and the morality of punishment 
Since both the operation of the criminal process and the imposition of punishment 
infringe the liberty of individual citizens, Lacey advocates that criminal justice requires 
justification.34 The main divide in debates about the morality of punishment is between 
liberalism and communitarianism. The common ground in this debate is that the 
practice of punishment can be justified by the promotion of valued social goals. The 
division concerns the nature of the goals to be pursued. Liberals are concerned with 
individual freedom and see the purpose of the state as to provide individuals with a 
secure framework within which they can pursue their personal autonomy. The function 
of punishment is to uphold the criminal law’s norms of appropriate behaviour though 
censuring and attaching unpleasant consequences to those who are found to have 
breached those norms.35 A further defining element of liberalism is that punishment 
must be distributed in a way that appropriately marks the moral distinction between 
different forms of criminal behaviour.36 Under the ‘just deserts’ model, punishment 
came to be seen as something that ought to consist of a fair or proportional amount of 
censure and retribution.37 My central focus here, however, is on the communitarian 
theory and its links with objectivism. 
 
Communitarian punishment theory, on the other hand, values collective welfare at least 
as much as individual welfare. It is based on the premise that people do not function 
autonomously in society but rather pursue their goals within webs of inter-dependency 
and social attachments.38 ‘Just deserts’ thinking is criticised by communitarian theorists 
on the basis that its premise of individual responsibility for crime and its belief in the 
deterrent and ‘social educative efficacy’ of punishment ignores the extent to which 
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aspects of social context and structure shape the ability and willingness of individuals to 
conform to the criminal law’s requirements.39 Communitarians have agitated for those 
affected by an offence, including the defendant, complainant and affected communities, 
to play a central role in deciding what the response to an offence should be.40 
Communitarian punishment prioritises the promotion of collective welfare through 
measures designed to reintegrate offenders into their ‘communities’ and to compensate 
victims.41  
 
Lacey describes the ‘principle of welfare’ as including the ‘fulfilment of certain basic 
interests such as maintaining one’s personal safety, health and capacity to pursue one’s 
chosen life plan.’42 The specification of the interests thus to be protected should be a 
matter for democratic decision-making: this means both that the interests will be 
objectively determined, not just according to the preference of each individual, and also 
that individuals whose preferences are at odds with those of the majority would lose 
out. It is therefore the responsibility of the jury, representing twelve ‘reasonable people’ 
to determine whether certain actions are capable of constituting a sexual assault. 
Whereas the principle of autonomy suggests that individual rights should be given high 
priority in the legal structure, the principle of welfare recognizes the social context in 
which the law must operate and gives weight to collective goals.43 One of these goals is 
the right to respect for sexual autonomy. 
 
What then are the functions of punishment under a communitarian approach? One aim 
of a punishment may be to deter a harmful form of behaviour, but it is also part of its 
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function to reinforce the ‘moral analogy’ (the social judgment that that form of 
behaviour is indeed harmful and wrong) which constitutes an important part of the 
social meaning of crime as opposed to civil law. From the point of view of the law of the 
community, the standards of the criminal law become non-optional- and the very idea 
of non-optionality seems to presuppose some kind of consequence on breach. A second 
justification for punishment under this model is to encourage members of the 
community to put their faith in and give allegiance to the community as guardian of the 
framework of common values within which citizens can develop their lives. A further 
educative function affirms the social values fostered by the denunciation of the 
behaviour involved in the offence. As well as a certain level of general and individual 
deterrence, there is also the aim of reducing the extent to which people might resort to 
private vengeance or self-help. Punishment also demonstrates that the community 
takes seriously the harm done to the complainant and takes upon itself the 
responsibility for upholding the standards breached. Lacey suggests that the proper 
meaning of punishment within a community has to do with its responses to actions that 
are hostile to and express rejection of fundamental community values.44 From this 
review of communitarian approaches to justice we can see how there may be sound 
reasons for adopting approaches to criminal liability that are rooted in objective 
standards of behaviour rather than depending solely on subjectivist approaches to 
liability. In the context of the meaning of ‘sexual’, we can delineate two objective 
approaches: ‘bystander-objective’ and ‘defendant-objective’. 
 
6.4 OBJECTIVE APPROACHES 
There is a range of objectivist perspectives, but for present purposes, I will limit my 
analysis to two angles, a ‘bystander-objective’ approach and a ‘defendant-objective’ 
approach. A ‘bystander-objective’ standard creates the appearance of justice, 
promoting procedural fairness for both D and C. However, such an approach is also 
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problematic because of the ambiguity of existing social norms, particularly with respect 
to the meaning of ‘sexual’. A ‘defendant-objective’ test, on the other hand, would 
preserve the principle of individual autonomy by ensuring that no person is convicted 
who lacked the capacity to conform his behaviour to the standard required. There is a 
third possible objective approach, a ‘complainant-objective’ approach. Such an 
approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would be concerned with how reasonable people in 
C’s position would experience the act. C’s affective response to the touching would be 
measured according to the standards of a reasonable person with the same 
characteristics and experiences as C. Accordingly; there is little difference between this 
and a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach and I will leave this analysis until chapter 8. 
 
6.4.1 ‘Bystander-objective’ approach 
Under a ‘bystander-objective’ approach, touching would be ‘sexual’ for the purpose of 
the section if a reasonable person would consider that it is ‘sexual’. For example, D 
believes that touching someone on the buttocks is not ‘sexual’. But if a reasonable 
person would appreciate that touching someone on the buttocks is ‘sexual’, then 
objectively, touching someone on the buttocks would be ‘sexual’ for the purposes of the 
offence. The focus would be on the act of touching and not the actor’s perception and 
therefore on the wrongdoing rather than the attribution. The focus is on the reasonable 
person’s perception of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching without reference to D’s 
experience. The ‘reasonable person’ standard is an objective standard of perception 
based on a fictitious ‘reasonable person’, which seeks to eliminate all differentiations 
among people.45 As an abstract standard, it purportedly represents the values and 
expectations of neither the judge, nor the jury, nor any other actual person. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes explained the ‘reasonable person’ standard as resulting from the fact 
that for life in organized society, ‘a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual 
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peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare’.46 The 
law, consequently, ‘does not attempt to see men as God sees them.’47 Under this 
explanation, no account is made for the infinite differences in character between men. 
Thus if a man is accident-prone, the results of his conduct are no less troublesome to 
those around him than if they arose from neglect and the courts should therefore 
‘decline to take his personal equation into account’.48 Under a ‘bystander-objective’ 
approach, ‘sexual’ would carry its normal, everyday meaning. This raises the question: 
what is the normal, everyday meaning attached to the word ‘sexual’? I will address this 
conundrum in chapter 9. 
 
(a) Merits of a ‘bystander-objective’ approach 
One of the greatest merits of a ‘bystander-objective’ approach is that it creates the 
appearance of justice: it allows for an evaluation of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching 
that is neither defendant- nor complainant-centred. The law insists on appearing neutral 
and fair and a ‘bystander-objective’ to the meaning of ‘sexual’ promotes procedural 
fairness for both defendants and complainants. Some criminal offences, especially non-
consensual sexual offences, are more open to dual interpretation by the parties 
involved than others are. Sexual assault is not an outcome-based offence where the 
actual link between mental state and actual outcome is easier to draw. As was argued in 
chapter 5, sexual assault is a context-dependent offence, so D may be oblivious to the 
possible harm of his conduct.  Where conduct does not involve tangible harm (for 
example theft of property or physical injury) there are likely to be differing perceptions 
of the action. This is especially true of those sexual assault cases at the fringes of liability 
and which are not inherently sexual/non-sexual e.g. touching of the foot or hair. 
Ehrenreich notes that the ‘reasonable person’49 is ‘portrayed as a mediating concept by 
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which the competing liberty interest of the individual defendant and security interest of 
the complainant are balanced.’50 In fairness to both the defendant and complainant, a 
‘bystander-objective’ approach would require the magistrates or jury, as twelve 
reasonable people, to reach consensus on which conduct society deems ‘sexual’. 
 
The merits of a ‘bystander-objective’ evaluation of the meaning of ‘sexual’ can be 
demonstrated by the example of a footwear fetishist who steals shoes from women’s 
feet. From the complainant’s perspective, this action may or may not, depending on 
their individual interpretation of the incident, constitute a ‘sexual’ touching. The 
defendant may deny any appreciation of the ‘sexual’ nature of the act. In fairness to 
both parties, the ‘reasonable person’ standard therefore allows for an objective 
evaluation of the action that is neither defendant nor complainant-centred. A further 
advantage of leaving the determination of the ‘sexual’ nature of an act to the jury or 
magistrates to decide is that the issue is essentially an issue of fact. It is far easier for a 
jury or magistrates to give words their normal meaning, rather than some technical, 
legal meaning that they may misunderstand. Further, giving ‘sexual’ its normal meaning 
helps to make the law predictable and readily understandable to ordinary people. 
Defining ‘sexual’ in terms of the standards of the ordinary decent person also has the 
advantage that the legal meaning of ‘sexual’ is kept in line with current standards of 
sexuality. Defining ‘sexual’ by the standard of the reasonable person also means that 
idiosyncratic and trivial harms will not be the concern of the law and people will not be 
held accountable when they could not have anticipated the complainant’s reaction and 
no one could have. A charge of sexual touching is also more likely to result in conviction 
if the jury or magistrates are required to ask what a reasonable person would have 
appreciated about the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct, rather than what D actually 
appreciated.  
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(b) Problems with a ‘bystander-objective’ approach 
The ‘bystander-objective’ approach is concerned with reasonable people without any 
particular characteristics of D or C. It therefore holds D’s conduct to a standard that 
society deems appropriate even though D may subjectively be incapable of appreciating 
the ‘sexual’ nature of his conduct. The question is whether the touching is ‘sexual’ 
according to the reasonable person and not whether, taking into account D’s age and 
characteristics, he would be capable of appreciating the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct.51 
This approach might be considered very harsh on defendants who are incapable of 
appreciating the ‘sexual’ nature of their conduct. Proponents of ‘bystander-objectivism’ 
would argue that the rationale for punishment under this account of liability is social 
protection and not the distribution of punishment according to individual culpability. 
 
English law has used a ‘bystander-objective’ approach in the criminalisation of 
harassment. Under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA 1997), pursuing a 
course of conduct which the defendant ought to know amounts to harassment is a 
‘bystander-objective’ test based upon what the ‘reasonable person in possession of the 
same information’52 would think amounted to harassment’.53 This objective 
requirement was deemed necessary to ensure that there was comprehensive protection 
of all stalking victims and that stalkers whose mental illness precluded them from 
appreciating the impact of their conduct were not excluded from the scope of the 
legislation. The objective nature of the test laid down in s.1(2) PFHA 1997 is emphasised 
in R v Colohan,54 where it was held that D’s schizophrenia could not be taken into 
account in determining whether he ought to have known that his course of conduct 
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would have amounted to harassment of another. Hughes J observed that to take into 
account the mental illness of the accused in applying the objective test laid down by 
s.1(2) would undermine the very purpose of the PFHA 1997, given that it was aimed at 
the activities of persons who might be expected to suffer from some form of mental 
illness. On the face of it, this decision appears to be very harsh and it seems as though 
very little thought was given to the implications for defendants such as Colohan. 
However, it was held that the conduct at which the PFHA 1997 was aimed and from 
which it sought to provide protection was likely to be conduct pursued by those of 
obsessive or otherwise unusual psychological make-up and very frequently by those 
suffering from an identifiable mental illness. Ormerod and Underhill suggest that the 
prosecution of mentally disordered individuals under this offence not only ensures the 
protection for victims of stalking, but also increases the chances of the offender 
receiving psychiatric assessment and treatment.55   
 
A further problem of judging ‘sexual’ according to the standard of the fictitious 
reasonable person and asking juries to apply such a standard is that it assumes juries are 
heterogeneous and have consistent values. However, there is no common consensus 
regarding what is considered acceptable sexual touching. The ‘bystander-objective’ 
approach is inappropriate in areas where there are different standards about what is 
considered appropriate behaviour and what is considered harmful. This is particularly 
true of sexual touching where there are many different perceptions of the meaning of 
‘sexual’. This is one area where depending on their age, sex, cultural or religious beliefs, 
people may perceive certain sexual conduct quite differently. Thus, the use of a 
‘reasonable person’ in designating certain types of touching as ‘sexual’ is questionable 
when there is no social consensus on appropriate standards of sexual behaviour. If 
different persons can reasonably hold different views about what is ‘sexual’, there is a 
real danger of different verdicts, on the same set of facts, from different juries. In turn, 
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this undermines the rule of law. Even an informed defendant may be unable to predict 
whether his behaviour will contravene the law. 
 
The ‘reasonable person’ standard is problematic because of the ambiguity of existing 
social norms, particularly with respect to sexual issues. A ‘bystander-objective’ test 
which would rely on how conduct appeared to the reasonable person, appears much 
more malleable and unpredictable than subjective tests which ask whether or not a 
defendant was aware of a given, and Ashworth argues that objective tests ‘explicitly 
leave room for courts and even prosecutors to make social judgments about the limits 
of the criminal sanction.’56 A further weakness of such an approach is that it does not 
take account of C’s experience. Given that, as was argued in chapter 5, sexual assault is 
a context-dependent crime, the law needs to refer to C’s perspective regarding the 
‘sexual’ nature of the conduct in order to appreciate the seriousness of the act’s impact 
and the level of D’s culpability. 
 
6.4.2 ‘Defendant-objective’ approach 
A ‘defendant-objective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would focus on the 
reasonable person in D’s position. If D is an ordinary person, he cannot be blamed for 
failing to take notice of a circumstance if it would not have been apparent to an average 
person in his position, because the criminal law cannot require an exceptional standard 
of awareness from him. The jury would therefore be asked whether a reasonable person 
in D’s position would appreciate that the touching is ‘sexual’. Under this approach, 
defining ‘sexual’ involves an assessment of culpability i.e. should D have known that his 
action would be perceived by C or the reasonable person to be ‘sexual’. Thus, if D is a 
13-year-old male, his age and gender will be taken into account in determining whether 
he ought to have known that his action would be perceived as ‘sexual’. This would 
ensure that D would have been capable of perceiving the ‘sexual’ circumstance had he 
                                                             
56
 Ashworth, op cit, n 9 at p.189. 
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directed his mind to it. A ‘defendant-objective’ test insists that D should not be punished 
for being less intelligent, mature or capable than the average person.  
 
A ‘defendant-objective’ test is an objective test subject to capacity-based exceptions. 
This preserves the principle of individual autonomy by ensuring that no person is 
convicted who lacked the capacity to conform his or her behaviour to the standard 
required. In 1982 in Caldwell,57 the House of Lords introduced a ‘bystander-objective’ 
definition of recklessness. Lord Diplock’s model direction stated that a person is guilty of 
causing damage recklessly if: 
‘(i) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious risk that property would be 
destroyed or damaged and (ii) when he does the act he either has not given any thought 
to the possibility of there being any such risk or has recognized that there was some risk 
involved and has nevertheless gone on to do  it.’ 
Lord Diplock’s test extended recklessness beyond the scope of ‘advertent recklessness’58 
to include thoughtless and inconsiderate wrongdoers. A major problem with Lord 
Diplock’s test of what would have been obvious to the reasonable person was that it 
admitted of no exceptions. The effect was to convict children and mentally impaired 
defendants by applying to them an objective standard of foreseeability that they could 
not meet, which produced unfair convictions in some cases. For example, in Elliot v C,59 
the defendant, a 14-year-old girl with learning disabilities was held liable for criminal 
damage because the risk of setting fire to the shed would have been obvious to the 
reasonable person, even though it was not obvious to her. 
 
Under a ‘defendant-objective’ approach, the question of what touching is ‘sexual’ is not 
an issue of whether the D appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct; it is a question 
of whether an ordinary and prudent person in D’s position would have been aware that 
the touching is ‘sexual’. There is no need to prove that D adverted to the ‘sexual’ 
                                                             
57
 [1982] AC 341. 
58
 Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396. 
59
 (1983) 77 Cr App R 103. See also Stephenson [1979] QB 695 (man with schizophrenia). 
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circumstance at all, so long as the court is satisfied that a reasonable person in that 
situation would have done so. So long as the individual had the capacity to behave 
otherwise, it is fair to impose liability in those situations where there are sufficient 
signals to alert the reasonable citizen to the need to take care. To this extent, 
defendants cannot be permitted to displace the law and judge what is right for 
themselves. For an objectivist, D’s knowledge of the ‘sexual’ circumstance would be 
enough to establish liability, even if reasonable people would not have known. 
 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has evaluated three possible approaches to interpreting the meaning of 
‘sexual’. The first possible approach was labeled a non-interpretive approach as it would 
be devoid of any reference to the participants’ experiences and would establish a strict 
liability test. One argument in favour of a non-interpretive approach is that it promotes 
certainty in the criminal law, adhering most closely to the principle of fair warning. 
However, an approach that focuses solely on a state-of-affairs would be unsatisfactory 
because it would lack the flexibility necessary for an offence of sexual assault and would 
fail to take account of the context in which the touching occurred. As I argued in chapter 
5, sexual assault is a context-dependent offence and the definition of ‘sexual’ should 
therefore include consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including the 
complainant’s affective response to the touching. 
 
Orthodox objectivism grounds fault in conduct rather than choices and emphasizes the 
protection of society from crime over individual liberty. Objective approaches are all 
external approaches that focus on the conduct, as it would seem to an outside observer. 
A ‘bystander-objective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would create the 
appearance of justice: it would allow for an evaluation of the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching that is neither defendant- nor complainant-centred. A charge of sexual 
touching is more likely to result in conviction if the jury or magistrates are required to 
ask what a reasonable person would have appreciated about the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
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conduct, rather than what D actually appreciated. However, there are three notable 
drawbacks of a ‘bystander-objective’ approach. First, the approach is concerned with 
reasonable people without any particular characteristics of D or C and might be 
considered very harsh on defendants who are incapable of appreciating the ‘sexual’ 
nature of the conduct. Secondly, the use of a ‘reasonable person’ standard is 
questionable when there is no social consensus on appropriate standards of sexual 
behaviour. Thirdly, such an approach does not take into account C’s experience. A 
‘defendant-objective’ approach would require the jury or magistrates to be asked 
whether a reasonable person in D’s position would appreciate that the touching is 
‘sexual’. This is advantageous in that it insists that D should not be punished for being 
less intelligent, mature or capable than the average person.  
 
Chapter 7 will continue the theme of evaluating the possible legal perspectives from 
which ‘sexual’ could be viewed and defined, analysing a ‘defendant-subjective’ 
approach. There are four possible ‘defendant-subjective’ states of mind that could apply 
to interpreting ‘sexual’, but such approaches would be unsatisfactory as they take 
insufficient account of C’s experience. 
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7 
An Analysis of the Possible Perspectives 
from which ‘Sexual’ could be Viewed and Defined 
Part 2: A ‘Defendant-Subjective’ Approach 
 
There are a variety of different possibilities for interpreting and defining the meaning of 
‘sexual’. In chapter 6, a non-interpretive approach and two objective approaches were 
evaluated. In chapter 9, the current approach adopted in English law to the meaning of 
‘sexual’, a ‘bystander-objective’ approach will be analysed. This chapter and the next 
will posit two ‘subjective’ approaches as possible ways in which the definition of ‘sexual’ 
could be interpreted. The approaches are ‘subjective’ because of the significance they 
accord to the participant’s state of mind at the time of the action. The first approach will 
be labelled ‘defendant-subjective’ because of the significance it accords to the 
defendant’s state of mind at the time of the action. This approach will be criticised for 
being insufficiently complainant-centred: it fails to take account of how the complainant 
perceived and experienced the act. The second approach will be labelled ‘complainant-
subjective’ because of the significance it accords to the complainant’s experience of the 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching. Although a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ bears significant dangers and problems for criminal law, it is the 
most complainant-centred of those analysed and is preferable because in order to 
appreciate the seriousness of the act’s impact and the level of D’s culpability it is 
necessary to refer to C’s perspective. 
 
This chapter will analyse a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’. 
Part 1 will consider the philosophical foundations of an orthodox subjectivist approach. 
The choice conception of criminal liability is criticised for failing to attribute liability to 
those who are negligent and for defining recklessness as advertent risk-taking. The 
character conception of criminal liability, on the other hand, is criticised for failing to 
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explain adequately what is meant by ‘character responsible’ and why it is fair to punish 
individuals who are ‘character responsible’. Part 1 further demonstrates how a 
‘defendant-subjective’ approach adheres to the principle of correspondence; the idea 
that the fault element of a crime correspond to the conduct element. This is criticised 
for restricting the ambit of the criminal law and for failing to acknowledge that D is able 
to exercise control through his behaviour: it is only given D’s behaviour that the 
outcome is thereafter beyond his control. 
 
There are a range of ways in which a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach might focus on D’s 
attitude to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching and part 2 will delineate four possible 
‘defendant-subjective’ approaches: (1) where D knows the touching is or might be by its 
very nature ‘sexual’; (2) where D is aware that the touching will, or might be, 
experienced by C as ‘sexual’; (3) where D is aware that the touching will, or might be, 
considered by reasonable people to be ‘sexual; and (4) where D believes that the 
touching is ‘sexual’ even though C and/or reasonable people would not consider it 
‘sexual’.   
 
Whilst a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would adhere most 
closely to the core principles of criminal liability, it is insufficiently complainant-centred. 
In part 3 the ‘defendant-subjective’ approaches will be criticised for being insufficiently 
complainant-centred because they are concerned with culpability and thereby justice to 
the individual accused. Although this must be a part of any fair and just system of 
substantive criminal law, it fails to take sufficient account of how the complainant 
experienced the act. The chapter concludes that whilst a ‘defendant-subjective’ 
approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would adhere most clearly to the core principles of 
criminal liability, it would be the least complainant-centred of the approaches analysed 
as the nature of the violation as experienced by C would be overlooked. 
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7.1 ORTHODOX SUBJECTIVISM 
Orthodox subjectivists argue that an individual’s criminal responsibility is at root based 
upon their capacities and opportunities: it is only fair to punish someone who has the 
capacity to understand what they are doing and the fair opportunity to act otherwise 
than they did.1 In legal terms, the capacity conception is generally interpreted as 
entailing the paradigm case of ‘mens rea’ or legal responsibility and comprising a 
(defendant) subjective mental state.2 There are a range of subjectivist theories with 
differing ideas and concepts, but they are all founded on similar propositions.3 Orthodox 
subjectivism, as Duff has called it,4 is founded on the political values of individualism, 
liberty and self-determination.5 Maximum freedom from state interference and 
coercion is desirable to enable individuals to choose their life plans and to pursue their 
own conceptions of the good.6 The law thus addresses the individual in Kantian terms, 
as a subject with an entitlement to respect and concern and with a commitment to 
treating them as ends, not means.7 MacCormick suggests that without allowing 
independence of action to individuals they could hardly be regarded as moral persons.8 
The criminal law accords individuals the status of autonomous moral agents who can be 
fairly held accountable and punishable for the rational choices of wrongdoing that they 
make.9 
 
                                                             
1
 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1968). 
2
 The subjective approach was recently endorsed by the House of Lords in B v DPP [2000] 1 All ER 833 
and R v G [2003] UKHL 50. 
3
 The most familiar are the „choice‟ and „character‟ accounts of criminal liability as discussed below. 
4
 R.A.Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (OUP, Oxford, 1990). 
5
 I. Dennis, „The Critical Condition of Criminal Law‟ (1997) 50 Current Legal Problems 213. 
6
 J. Feinberg, Harm to Others- the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP, Oxford, 1984) pp.206-14. 
7
 R.M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, London, 1977); D. Richards, 
„Rights, Utility and Crime‟ (1981) 3 Crime & Justice: An Annual Review 274. 
8
 D.N. MacCormick, Legal Rights and Social Democracy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982). 
9
 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP, Oxford, 1968); A. Ashworth, „Belief, Intent and 
Criminal Liability‟ in J. Eekelaar & J. Bell, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (fourth series) (OUP, Oxford, 
1987) ch 1. 
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7.1.1 Choice and criminal liability  
There are different forms of subjectivism, the most familiar being the ‘choice’ and the 
‘character’ accounts of criminal liability.10 At the heart of subjectivism is the stipulation 
that informed voluntary choices of harmful actions justify blame and punishment.11 
Individuals have ‘free will’12 and are able to make rational self-interested choices of 
action in the world.13 Subjectivists argue that we should reserve the stigma of the 
criminal sanction for the most blameworthy actors, and the most blameworthy actors 
are the ones who appreciate possible outcomes or circumstances and act anyway. For 
example, murder is a serious14 criminal offence because a person has chosen to cause 
death or grievous bodily harm. 
 
‘Choice’ theorists insist that we can only hold an agent accountable for those actions 
that he chose to perform. The ‘choice’ version of subjectivism can be defined by 
Ashworth’s ‘intent’ and ‘belief’ principles: defendants should be held ‘criminally liable 
for what they intended to do, and not according to what actually did or did not occur’ 
and must be ‘judged on the basis of what they believed they were doing, not on the 
basis of actual facts and circumstances which were not known to them at the time.’15 
This ‘choice’ conception of responsibility argues that to be liable, a person must both 
understand the nature of his actions, knowing the relevant circumstances and being 
aware of the possible consequences, and have a genuine opportunity to do otherwise 
than he did. A system of criminal justice that makes liability depend on choice respects 
individual freedom, and maximises citizens’ control over their own lives. Hart suggested 
                                                             
10
 R.A.Duff, „Subjectivism, Objectivism and Criminal Attempts‟ in A. Simester and A. Smith (eds.) Harm 
and Culpability (OUP, Oxford, 1996) pp. 19-22. 
11
 Dennis, Op cit, n 5. 
12
 A. Kenny, Freewill and Responsibility (Routledge and Kegan Paul, Oxford, 1978). 
13
 Over the centuries the „free will‟ argument has been contradicted by the „determinist‟ claim that all 
human behaviour is determined by causes that ultimately each individual cannot control. See A. Norrie, 
„Freewill, Determinism & Criminal Justice‟ (1983) 3 LS 60. 
14
  G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1978) p.352. 
15
 A. Ashworth, „Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm‟ (1988) 19 Rutgers LJ 725; and 
„Belief, Intent, and Criminal Liability‟ in J. Eekelaar & J. Bell (eds) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP, 
Oxford, 1987). 
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that the conception avoids the uncertainty and unpredictability which would be 
engendered should individuals not be able to plan their lives so as to avoid the 
intervention of the criminal law.16 A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to criminal law 
necessitates offences that are themselves defined with absolute precision and clarity, so 
that individuals can makes choices about their actions with full knowledge as to which 
of those actions will attract criminal liability.  
 
(a) Criticism of the choice conception 
One problematic area for criminal law subjectivists is liability for negligence; a failure to 
meet an objectively determined standard of behaviour.17 Some subjectivists would 
argue that to have negligence as a standard of criminal liability would move away from 
advertence as the foundation of criminal responsibility and in doing so might show 
insufficient respect for the principle of autonomy.18 Thus, it would weaken the element 
of individual culpability that justifies the condemnatory element in a criminal conviction, 
as distinct from an award of damages in tort. Choice theorists would exclude liability for 
negligence, since a negligent agent does not choose to take or create the risk to which 
he is negligent, arguing that the negligent act or omission is more a concern for tortious 
liability.19  
 
Wrongful actions done negligently may not be as culpable as those performed 
intentionally or recklessly, but are nevertheless culpable to some degree and justify, in 
the context of the criminal law, an attribution of responsibility and some punitive 
response. Negligent actions are culpable because the defendant has acted in a way in 
which a reasonable person would not have acted. One argument in favour of 
                                                             
16
 H.L.A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (OUP, Oxford, 1968). 
17
 J.C. Smith & B. Hogan, Criminal Law: Cases & Materials (Lexis Nexis, London, 2002) ch 5; Elliot v C 
(1983) 2 All ER. 
18
 Some subjectivists might accept a case for some criminal negligence liability, while insisting that it is 
categorically different from liability based on choice. See M. Moore, Placing Blame (OUP, Oxford, 1997) 
ch 9. 
19
 See, H.L.A Hart, „Negligence, Mens rea and Criminal Responsibility‟ in Punishment and Responsibility 
(OUP, Oxford, 1968) on how the theory can be adapted to portray negligence as a genuine species of fault.  
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criminalising certain instances of negligence is where there are well-known risks of 
serious harm. This argues in favour of negligence as a standard of liability for rape and 
other serious sexual offences. The risk of doing a serious wrong by non-consensually 
penetrating or touching another is so obvious that it is right for the law to impose a duty 
to take care before proceeding. There is no need to prove that D adverted to the 
consequences or circumstances at all, so long as the court is satisfied that a reasonable 
person would have done so. This was the justification for liability in Elliott v C,20 who was 
held to be liable for criminal damage to a shed to which she set fire in spite of evidence 
that she did not have the capacity to appreciate the risk she was running.21 In section 
3.1, I will argue that a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach is insufficiently complainant-
centred and that negligence is an appropriate basis for liability. Accordingly, D should be 
liable when he ought to have known that the touching is or will be experienced by C as 
‘sexual’. 
 
Another controversy with the ‘belief’ and ‘intent’ principles is that they require 
recklessness to be defined as conscious risk-taking: I choose to take or to create only 
those risks that I realise I am taking or creating. Duff argues, however, that an agent’s 
criminal recklessness can be displayed in his very failure to notice the risk that he is 
taking or creating.22 Failure to consider risk may be symptomatic of an attitude of what 
Duff calls ‘practical indifference’ to legal norms.23 An attitude of ‘practical indifference’ 
is not as blameworthy as a deliberate decision to do harm, but it may betray a 
qualitatively different but also culpable contempt for the values protected by the 
criminal law sufficient to justify punishment.24 Practical indifference extends to include 
cases in which D fails to advert to certain aspects of the situation: ‘what I notice or 
attend to reflects what I care about and my very failure to notice something can display 
                                                             
20
 [1983] 2 All ER 1005. 
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 There was extensive criticism of the decision and it was overruled by R v G [2003] UKHL 50. See 
chapter 10, section 3.1. 
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 R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990) ch.7. 
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my utter indifference to it’.25 A defendant who is practically indifferent to the ‘sexual’ 
circumstance of an action is therefore blameworthy, but not as culpable as one who 
does avert to it. In choosing to touch another person, the defendant ought to consider 
the complainant’s interests. A man who is practically indifferent as to whether pinching 
a woman’s buttock might be ‘sexual’ is not as culpable as one who is aware of the 
‘sexual’ nature of the action, but is still culpable to some degree. Both defendants’ 
demonstrate disregard for the sexual and physical integrity of the complainant. 
 
7.1.2 The correspondence principle 
The correspondence principle26 concerns the relationship between actus reus and mens 
rea, requiring intention or recklessness as to all the elements in the actus reus. 
Orthodox subjectivists insist that the fault element of a crime correspond to the conduct 
element. The intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime, for 
‘*p+resumably, no element is included in the definition of an actus reus unless it 
contributes to the heinousness of the offence.’27 This ensures that the defendant is 
punished only for causing a harm or circumstance that he chose to risk or to bring 
about. The correspondence principle has been described as a ‘limited ethical 
principle’,28 one that recognises that criminal liability should depend not only upon a 
person’s acts but also upon his moral guilt with respect to those acts. Criminal liability 
should be a matter of culpability and not of luck. As Ashworth puts it: 
‘Not only should it be established that the defendant had the required fault, in terms of 
mens rea or belief; it should also be established that the defendant’s intention, 
knowledge or recklessness related to the proscribed harm. Thus, if the conduct element 
                                                             
25
 Ibid, at 162-3. 
26
 The Law Commission Report, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com No. 
237, 1996) identifies three principles as inherent in a (defendant) subjective basis for liability. The first of 
these is the „mens rea principle‟, which imposes liability only for those outcomes which were intended or 
knowingly risked by the alleged wrongdoer. This ensures that „the act is attributable to the defendant‟. The 
second principle, the „belief principle‟, judges a defendant according only to what she believed she was 
doing or risking. The third principle is the „principle of correspondence‟. 
27
 J. Smith & B. Hogan, Criminal Law (Butterworths, London, 1999) p.72. 
28
 A.P. Simester & G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 
p.187. 
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of a crime is ‘causing serious injury’, the fault element ought to be ‘intention or 
recklessness as to causing serious injury’.’29  
Of the aggravated assaults only s.18 of the OAPA 1861 (causing grievous bodily harm 
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm) complies with the correspondence principle. 
In respect of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm30 the only mens rea requirement 
is intent or recklessness that C will be unlawfully touched or caused to apprehend 
immediate and unlawful personal violence. There is no need to show that the defendant 
foresaw any actual bodily harm.31 Similarly, under s.20 OAPA 1861 there is no need to 
intend or foresee grievous bodily harm or wounding. Even the offence of murder 
infringes the correspondence principle: intention to do grievous bodily harm is 
sufficient.32  
 
If the conduct element of sexual assault requires the touching to be ‘sexual’, in order to 
satisfy the correspondence principle the fault element ought to be the intention to 
touch another person and an appreciation of the ‘sexual’ nature of touching. A 
‘defendant-subjective’ approach to ‘sexual’ that adhered to the correspondence 
principle would therefore require the courts to ascertain whether the defendant 
appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. For choice theorists that approach is 
fairest to the defendant, who may or may not be aware that some actions would be 
perceived by the complainant or a reasonable person as ‘sexual’ in nature. 
 
The stigma attached to being labelled a sexual offender and the implications of being on 
the sex offender’s register33 provide support for the view that a defendant should not 
be guilty of sexual assault unless his mens rea is the intention to touch and he 
appreciates that the touching is of a ‘sexual’ nature. It is the ‘sexual’ element of the 
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 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 4
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 edn (OUP, Oxford, 2003) p.88.  
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 OAPA 1861, s.47. 
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 DPP v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699. 
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 Cunningham [1982] AC 566. 
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 Under the Sex Offenders Act 1997, as amended by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, all convicted sex 
offenders must register with the police within three days of their conviction or release from prison. 
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offence that distinguishes it from common assault and determines whether the 
defendant will be placed on the sex offender’s register.  Suppose D is charged with 
sexual assault, having grabbed the buttocks of a waitress. He claims that he genuinely 
believed this kind of conduct is not ‘sexual’ as between a customer and a waitress. A 
strict application of the correspondence principle would make his conduct lawful and 
infer that he should not be labelled a sexual offender. A more flexible approach to the 
correspondence principle might suggest that if the defendant intends to touch the 
waitress and is aware that his action might be perceived by C and/or reasonable people 
to be ‘sexual’ he should be responsible. 
 
(a) Criticism of the correspondence principle 
Gardner suggests that adherence to the correspondence principle is part of an 
overarching subjectivist policy of using what might broadly be called mens rea issues to 
restrict the ambit of the criminal law in the interests of liberal humanitarianism (the 
idea that in a just society free will and freedom are the ultimate goals).34 The 
wrongdoing must be ‘knowing’ and the knowledge must extend to all aspects of the 
actus reus. He criticises this for leading to the over-simplification of complex moral 
issues, such as the relationship between luck and responsibility.35 Luck it may be 
thought is involuntary and culpability should be dependent on control rather than luck. 
However, D is able to exercise control through his behaviour. It is only given D’s 
behaviour that the outcome is thereafter beyond his control. It is D’s dangerous driving 
or pulling the trigger that brings the uncontrolled factors into play and makes the luck 
relevant.  
 
Horder argues that the law is, in some circumstances, justified in departing from the 
correspondence principle. Horder argues that defendants who embark on conduct 
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 J. Gardner, „On the General Part of the Criminal Law‟ in A. Duff (ed.), Philosophy and the Criminal Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998).  
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which carries a risk that someone may be harmed should be liable for the harm caused, 
even where that harm is greater than the harm intended or foreseen, because they 
‘deserve’ their bad luck.36 Horder’s main justification for departing from the 
correspondence principle is that where D engages in violent conduct, luck legitimately 
plays a role in extending liability to cover harm of the same form but more serious than 
that which foreseen or foreseeable. In engaging in violence, the defendant changes his 
normative position towards C, and in doing so, accepts the risks involved. Applying this 
argument to sexual assault a defendant who non-consensually touches another person 
should be liable if C and/or reasonable people would consider this action ‘sexual’ 
because D has altered his normative position by engaging in unlawful battery. The most 
significant element in D’s conduct is his decision to touch another without consent and 
there is insufficient moral weight in the plea, ‘I only intended to touch C’s breasts as a 
joke’. D displays indifference to the risk of invading C’s sexual autonomy and he should 
be criminally liable even if no consequences result from his intrusion. 
 
The correspondence principle appears to apply less easily to context-dependent terms 
such as ‘sexual’. The principle is clearest when the prohibited conduct is a tangible harm 
such as death or grievous bodily harm; it is easy to argue that the conduct element is 
causing death and therefore that the person must have intended to cause or been 
reckless about causing death. When one is considering context-dependent terms such 
as ‘sexual’ or ‘damage’37 the issues are more complicated. In relation to sexual assault, 
the harm is not tangible and it appears that the correspondence principle applies less 
easily to such terms. In response, advocates of the correspondence principle might 
simply argue that D has to know, or be aware of the possibility, that the touching is or 
might be experienced as ‘sexual’ by C or viewed as ‘sexual’ by onlookers. They would 
not necessarily argue that D need to intend the touching to be ‘sexual’.  
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 J. Horder, „A Critique of the Correspondence Principle‟ [1995] Crim L R 759. 
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 See I. Edwards, „Banksy‟s Graffiti: A not so simple case of criminal damage?‟ (2009) 73 JoCL 345. 
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A further criticism of the correspondence principle is its lack of distinction between 
intention and foresight, a distinction that is crucial to fair labelling issues. The principle 
of fair labelling38  requires that there be a close match between the labels or name 
attached to a crime, such as ‘murder’ or ‘manslaughter’ and the nature and gravity of 
what the defendant has done. The correspondence principle insists that one cannot be 
fairly labelled as a ‘murderer’ or ‘manslaughterer’ unless one’s mens rea related to the 
prohibited consequence itself, the unlawful killing.39 As is well known, in English law 
both murder and constructive manslaughter fall short of this requirement: a person may 
be convicted of murder if he intended to cause grievous bodily harm40 and in 
manslaughter if he intends to commit an unlawful act.41 
 
7.1.3 Character and criminal liability 
‘Character’ theorists by contrast, hold that we should ground criminal liability in the 
character traits manifested in the defendant’s conduct. Actions for which we hold a 
person fully responsible are those in which his ‘usual character’ is centrally expressed. 
The finding of a mental element such as intention or recklessness on the character 
model provides an important piece of evidence from which the existence of ‘character 
responsibility’ may be inferred. Suppose D touches C’s vagina. If he appreciates the 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching and acts without lawful excuse,42 he merits conviction. 
The disposition to touch ‘sexually’ and non-consensually is an undesirable character trait 
that merits condemnation and punishment. Sexual assault constitutes the infringement 
of sexual and bodily autonomy, gaining non-consensually that which should only be 
shared consensually. If, however, D acted without the requisite fault element or with 
some suitable defence, then he merits acquittal: for no inference to any undesirable 
character trait is warranted. 
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Duff describes character traits as ‘relatively stable patterns of thought, emotion and 
action’ that embody a person’s ‘settled values, concerns and attitudes’.43 Why then 
should the law be concerned with character? First, the law demands of us obedience to 
its rules and respect for the values it protects, demanding certain character traits. 
Secondly, the justification for punishment is that there is something about the offender 
that requires blame, and this must be an underlying character trait revealed by his 
action. Thirdly, what makes my actions mine, as their responsible agent, is their 
relationship to my character. A character conception of liability can be related to a 
communitarian account of the proper nature and purposes of the criminal law: one that 
portrays the law, being the law of a moral community, as having a proper interest in the 
moral character of its citizens.44 Instead of inquiring directly into a state of mind 
accompanying the act, the character conception asks a wider set of questions about the 
defendant himself and the extent to which the actus reus was a truly representative 
example of his behaviour. Character theorists are only interested in those character 
traits that are defective or undesirable because they are liable to lead to familiar types 
of criminal conduct.  
 
The most obvious merit of the character conception is that it serves to highlight the 
importantly practical orientation of the criminal law as a form of social control. It seeks 
to reduce by means of prohibition, conviction and punishment, certain unwanted forms 
of behaviour, such as sexual offending, as well as to mitigate the social effects of 
unprevented crime and to uphold, perhaps symbolically, certain framework social 
values. A further strength relates to the notion that all citizens can legitimately demand 
of a criminal justice system that it respond punitively only to actions which are in a real 
sense their own and which manifest a real hostility to or rejection of the norms of the 
criminal law.45Another appeal of the character conception seems to be its relevance to 
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both backward and forward-looking aspects of the criminal process. The character 
conception fits well with the criminal law’s purposive functions such as its contribution 
to social protection both in terms of its ‘taking us as we are’ and in that it is centrally 
concerned with the extent to which the behaviour manifests settled attitudes and 
dispositions, thus linking in turn with judgments of the likelihood of repetition of the 
type of behaviour. Lacey argues that defendants should not be held liable for ‘out of 
character’ actions in which their ‘settled dispositions’ are not ‘centrally expressed’.46 
The actions for which a person is convicted and punished must be ‘his’; they must be 
suitably related to attitudes or motives which are aspects of his continuing identity as a 
person. 
 
(a) Criticism of the character conception 
The character conception of responsibility is formed on the basis that people have a 
‘usual character’ for which they are ‘character responsible’. These phrases are not 
defined in theory and are sufficiently vague as to prove problematic. A character-based 
justification for liability appears to undermine the rule of law: a person should be 
punished because they have a disposition that is not liked by the majority of society. It 
eschews equality before the law: two people might be dealt with differently when they 
have committed similar acts if those acts are deemed out of character for one, but well 
within character for the other. The most fundamental objection to this theory is that it 
does not explain what is meant by ‘character responsible’ and why it is fair to punish 
individuals who are ‘character responsible’. This conception implies that it is legitimate 
to make general assessments of the worth of offenders. The theory moves beyond a 
conception of responsibility or attribution towards a more normative judgment of 
personality based on an isolated incident or set of incidents in a person’s life.47 
Autonomy requires that the criminal process treat seriously the individuality and sense 
of identity of each citizen by responding punitively only to actions which are genuinely 
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expressive of the agent’s relevant disposition: which the agent can truly identify and call 
her own. 
 
One obvious drawback of both the ‘choice’ and ‘character’ conceptions of responsibility 
is that they do not take account of the person who lacks capacity. Bayles argues that 
mentally disordered persons should be liable to conviction for criminal offences, for 
their conduct is ‘good evidence of an undesirable character trait justifying a social 
response’.48 Lacey suggests that actions performed by a person suffering from a long-
term mental illness, whilst they call for a different reactive response in terms of 
traditional concepts of blameworthiness, still require some controlling intervention on 
the part of the state.49 Character theorists argue that mental disorder does not involve a 
kind of ‘defective character trait’ that merits criminal liability. It is a defining feature of 
some mental disorders that they involve non-rational patterns of thought, feeling and 
motivation. This means that we cannot engage with the mentally disordered person in a 
discussion of his conduct or what motivated it. 
 
7.2 POSSIBLE ‘DEFENDANT-SUBJECTIVE’ STATES OF MIND 
There are two ways in a defendant’s attitude towards a sexual touching could be 
relevant. First, his knowledge of the fact that he is touching another: does D intend to 
touch another? This element of the mens rea will be analysed in chapter 10. Secondly, 
his knowledge of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching: does D appreciate that the 
touching is or may be ‘sexual’? This second element emphasizes the defendant’s 
attitude towards the ‘sexual’ circumstance. In general terms the requirement of 
knowledge is regarded by lawmakers and academics as having the same intensity as that 
of intention, except that knowledge relates to circumstances forming part of the 
definition of the crime and intention relates to the consequences specified in the 
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definition of the crime.50 The knowledge relates to a fact or circumstance: although it 
will usually be relevant to D’s reason for acting, it may be separated analytically from 
the result that D intends. For example, D may be aware that his slapping of his 
daughter’s bottom might be perceived by her and/or reasonable people to constitute a 
sexual touching and yet his motive is disciplinary and the result that he intends to bring 
about is ‘non-sexual’.   
 
Subjectivism is a theory that argues that criminal culpability should be confined to the 
person who acts ‘knowingly’ (intentionally or subjectively recklessly), excluding the 
person who ‘gives no thought to whether there is a risk or not’.51 The ‘defendant-
subjective’ approach can be labelled a context-dependent approach as it requires 
reference to the defendant’s subjective experience of the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching, in contrast to a context-independent approach, which is devoid of any 
reference to the participants’ experiences (as was analysed in chapter 6). The jury or 
magistrates would be required to consider the defendant’s internal account of the 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching and this can be contrasted with objective approaches, 
external approaches,52 which focus on what a ‘reasonable person’ would believe or 
expect.  
 
A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach is defendant-centred: a defendant would only satisfy 
this element of the actus reus if he has knowledge of or appreciates the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the touching. It is worth reiterating here that I am analysing an element of the 
conduct element within the offence (actus reus), rather than a fault element (mens rea). 
However the difference between these two elements of an offence is somewhat blurred 
when a context-dependent term such as ‘sexual’ is used, which could be interpreted in 
many different ways. A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach accordingly imports an 
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additional fault element into the offence definition. Under this approach, a defendant 
who does not appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of his action should not satisfy this element 
of the actus reus.  
 
A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would require the jury or 
magistrates to ascertain whether the defendant appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching. If an offence requires knowledge of a given circumstance, a person who is 
mistaken about that circumstance should be acquitted for lack of knowledge. A 
defendant may intend to touch C on the breasts, but claim that his motive was not 
‘sexual’. However, what is important in establishing this element of the actus reus would 
be whether the defendant recognised that touching someone on the breasts is by its 
nature ‘sexual’, would be experienced by C as ‘sexual’ or would be viewed by onlookers 
as ‘sexual’. A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach can therefore be further subdivided. 
Although each of the following sub-categories is ‘defendant-subjective’ in terms of being 
dependent on D’s awareness or belief there are subtle differences between them. 
 
(a) D recognises that the touching is, or might be by its very nature ‘sexual’ 
The first possible ‘defendant-subjective’ state of mind is where D is aware that the 
contact is, or might be, by its very nature ‘sexual’. If D touches C’s vagina non-
consensually and appreciates the ‘sexual’ nature of the contact, then he would satisfy 
this element of the actus reus. His action is blameworthy because he has chosen the 
circumstance, in the sense of having knowledge of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. D 
is sufficiently aware of what he is doing and of the possible invasion of sexual autonomy 
and privacy and can be fairly said to have chosen the behaviour and its consequences. If 
D recognises that touching C’s vagina is ‘sexual’ then he is more blameworthy than if he 
has no awareness that the action might be by its very nature ‘sexual’. Where D believes 
that the touching might be ‘sexual’ he can be described as having ‘reckless knowledge’, 
an alternative form of fault to knowledge, where D knows that there is a risk that a 
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prohibited circumstance exists.53 If D believes that there is a risk that the touching might 
be by its very nature ‘sexual’ and goes on to take that risk then under a ‘defendant-
subjectivist’ approach, he would satisfy this element of the offence. 
 
One problem with this category is that individuals tend not to label activities as ‘sexual’. 
This raises an issue about the process of identifying and recognising something as 
‘sexual’. What does it mean for someone to recognise a touching as ‘by its very nature 
sexual’? Is the question whether D recognises at the particular time of the touching that 
it is ‘sexual’? Or that when put in the witness stand and asked about his perceptions at 
the time of the touching, he recognises his thought processes at the time as identifying 
the touching as ‘sexual’?  All reactions involve culturally and socially conditioned 
responses by individuals and it is very difficult to speak in terms of people recognising 
touchings as being ‘inherently sexual’. This first ‘defendant-subjective’ approach is 
concerned with behaviour that is discernible to D as ‘sexual’ at the time it occurs, which 
might include situations where D experiences a sexual response. 
 
An interesting question is how those across the ‘sexuality spectrum’ and from all parts 
of our pluralistic society might be treated under this approach to defining ‘sexual’ and 
whether such treatment would be fair? There will be defendants who have no concept 
of ‘sexual’ acts in the way we do in our sexualised, Western society. Consider D, an 
indigenous tribesman, who moves to England from a remote part of South America. He 
touches the breasts of a young woman standing next to him at a bus stop. He has no 
concept of sexuality other than for procreative purposes. Under this first approach, he 
would not be blameworthy because he has no awareness that the action might be by its 
very nature ‘sexual’.  
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(b) D is aware that the touching will, or might be, experienced by C as ‘sexual’ 
The second possible ‘defendant-subjective’ state of mind is where D is aware that the 
contact will, or might be, experienced by C as ‘sexual’. Consider a prison officer who 
strips a violent prisoner of all his clothes and makes him stand naked in the cold.54 
Although the prison officer might not intend that his act assume a sexual character, 
acting purely for disciplinary purposes, the issue in this second category is whether D is 
aware that the touching will, or might be, experienced by C as ‘sexual’. If D were aware 
that C will, or might, experience the action as ‘sexual’, he would satisfy this aspect of the 
actus reus. This second possible state of mind might also apply where D knows that C is 
exceptionally sensitive to being touched and perceives any touching as a sexual 
violation, having been sexually abused in her past. It might further apply if D knows that 
C has certain religious or cultural beliefs about sexuality. Suppose D shakes a woman’s 
hand in a dominating way, with his hand on top of hers. Some religious groups might 
experience such conduct as ‘sexual’ and if D knows that C will or might experience the 
touching as ‘sexual then he is more blameworthy than if he has no awareness that C 
might consider it ‘sexual’. This second ‘defendant-subjective’ approach is the most 
blameworthy of the four identified as D who is aware that C will or might experience the 
touching as ‘sexual’, has knowledge of the ‘sexual’ circumstance and C’s affective 
response to the action and chooses to act regardless. In contrast to the first category, 
where D is aware that the touching is by its nature ‘sexual’ and where C may or may not 
perceive the touching to be ‘sexual’,55 D is more culpable because he is aware of the 
possible affective response of this individual complainant. 
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(c) D is aware that the touching will, or might be, considered by reasonable people to be 
‘sexual’ 
The third possible ‘defendant-subjective’ state of mind is where D is aware that 
reasonable people may judge the touching to be ‘sexual’. Consider D, who does not 
think that patting a woman on the bottom is in anyway ‘sexual’, but is aware that the 
touching will, or might be, considered by reasonable people to be ‘sexual’. His state of 
mind as to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching is therefore culpable. What of D, who 
does not consider that touching and licking C’s earlobe is ‘sexual’ and is unable to 
contemplate that reasonable people would consider such conduct ‘sexual’? Under this 
third possible ‘defendant-subjective’ approach, D would not satisfy this element of the 
actus reus. If ‘D could not care less’ whether such a touching might be considered by 
reasonable people to be ‘sexual’ he would not satisfy this element of the actus reus, 
highlighting the potential for injustice to complainants. This third possible ‘defendant-
subjective’ state of mind is less blameworthy than the second, because although D is 
aware that the touching will, or might be, considered by reasonable people to be 
‘sexual’ he is unaware of the individual complainant’s affective response.  
 
(d) D believes that the touching is ‘sexual’, even though C and/or reasonable people 
would not consider it ‘sexual’ 
A fourth possible ‘defendant-subjective’ state of mind is where D is aware that the 
contact is, for him ‘sexual’, even though it is not by its nature ‘sexual’, it is not 
considered by C as ‘sexual’ and would not be considered by reasonable people to be 
‘sexual’. This might cover the situation where D’s secret motive is sexual gratification. 
Consider D, an armpit fetishist, who touches and smells C’s armpit. D’s perception that 
the touching is inherently ‘sexual’ based on his experiencing sexual arousal might be at 
odds with that of C and/or reasonable people. Suppose D is a shoe-shop assistant who 
obtains sexual gratification when removing women’s shoes from their feet or a 
hairdresser who experiences sexual arousal when cutting or washing his client’s hair. 
The action is for him ‘sexual’, even though there are no obvious sexual circumstances, it 
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is not considered by C as ‘sexual’56 and would not be considered by reasonable people 
to be ‘sexual’. This state of mind is the least blameworthy of the four identified as C is 
unaware of D’s secret motive. The risk of an invasion of C’s sexual autonomy is minimal, 
unless C becomes aware of D’s motive at the time of the action, or a later date. 
 
7.3 INSUFFICIENTLY COMPLAINANT-CENTRED 
Whilst a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would adhere most 
clearly to the core principles of criminal liability, it can be criticised for being 
insufficiently complainant-centred. ‘Defendant-subjective’ approaches are in themselves 
insufficiently complainant-centred because they are concerned with culpability and 
thereby justice to the individual accused. Rupert Cross lamented the fact that some 
criminal lawyers were ‘in total bondage to the subjectivist bug’.57 He suggested that 
there was an unwillingness to accept that objective standards of liability might in certain 
circumstances have a proper place. There is evidence of this in Smith and Hogan’s 
textbook on Criminal Law,58 which Wells suggested subscribed almost ‘evangelically’ to 
the subjectivist approach.59 Fletcher argues that guilt, fault and culpability are 
normative judgments based on an evaluation of the actor’s conduct and state of mind 
and that an alternative method of assessing culpability would combine both objective 
and subjective elements.60 
 
One problem with a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is that 
‘sexual’ has many different meanings, so there is a lack of clarity and certainty in the 
definition. This uncertainty may lead to a wide and strained interpretation of the law in 
ways not envisaged by the legislature and presents an obvious threat to the principle of 
legality. An inherent problem with all ‘subjective’ tests is that they are difficult to prove 
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as the jury or magistrates have to get inside the defendant’s head. This is simply an 
evidential issue but may lead to unfairness by discouraging prosecution of culpable 
defendants because of difficulty in assessing the realistic prospect of conviction. 
However, it does not preclude successful prosecutions as the decision-maker can infer 
intention or knowledge from the circumstances and evidence. This difficulty of proof 
provides an argument for adopting an objective approach to liability (as was analysed in 
chapter 6): it is easier to convict if the jury asks what a reasonable person would have 
thought, rather than what D actually thought.61 
 
A ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is insufficiently 
complainant-centred because it is only concerned with a defendant’s attitudes and 
beliefs about the touching and not the actual or possible experiences of C. The criminal 
law has to reconcile the two competing priorities of social protection and individual 
liberty. Under a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach, primacy is given to the defendant’s 
autonomy and liability is assessed on the facts as he or she believed them to be. This 
very individualistic approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ fails to take any account of the 
experience of the complainant. In doing so, it prioritises justice to the individual accused 
(in only being responsible for those acts which he chooses to bring about) over social 
protection, (C’s right not to be touched non-consensually). An examination of the 
defendant’s knowledge of the ‘sexual’ nature of the act might deflect the attention of 
the court from the degradation, fear or harm inflicted on the complainant. A defendant 
should be held criminally responsible for those beliefs that manifest insufficient concern 
for others’ interests. 
 
An orthodox ‘defendant-subjective’ test of responsibility tends to the minimum 
criminalization of individuals.62 It changes the offence from what Fletcher has called the 
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pattern of manifest criminality,63 whereby the offence is founded on some objectively 
wrongful act, to the pattern of subjective criminality, whereby the offence is essentially 
founded on the defendant’s culpable state of mind. Subjective tests heighten the 
protection of individual autonomy, but they typically make no concession to the 
principal of welfare and the concomitant notion of duties to take care and to avoid 
harming the interests of fellow citizens. The orientation to the protection of individual 
freedom generally leads to a preference for individual over collective welfare, so that it 
is only the more obvious setbacks to individual interests that count uncontroversially as 
harms.64 In respect of sexual assault, a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach to ‘sexual’ 
appears to ensure that only actions that are objectively ‘sexual’ would satisfy this 
element of the actus reus. Thus, in relation to the four possible ‘defendant-subjective’ 
categories identified above, it will be easier for the prosecution to prove category 3, 
that ‘D is aware that the touching will, or might be, considered by reasonable people to 
be ‘sexual’’.  It would prove challenging for the prosecution to prove D’s awareness of 
the ‘sexual’ nature of the act, unless the action is at least categorisable by reasonable 
people as ‘sexual’ regardless of D’s awareness. 
 
Flecther has argued that the necessity for informed rationality (that D had the capacity 
and fair opportunity to act otherwise) at the time of the act may give a misleading and 
unduly favourable picture of the defendant’s culpability.65 As was noted above, Duff 
argues that responsibility should be founded on a person’s attitude to risk.66 ‘Practical 
indifference’ is not as blameworthy as a deliberate decision to do harm, but it may 
betray a qualitatively different but also culpable contempt for the values protected by 
the criminal law sufficient to justify punishment. A defendant should be liable for sexual 
assault where he ought to have known about the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching or 
‘could not care less’ about the complainant’s experience of the action.  
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In forcing the jury or magistrates to consider exclusively the defendant’s mental state at 
the time of the touching, a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach does not refer to the 
context in which the action occurred, the nature of the activity or the relationship 
between the parties. It is plausible that the jury or magistrates would consider these 
issues, having heard the facts of the case, but these would not be factors that they have 
to take into account in determining the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. A ‘defendant-
subjective’ approach would place too much emphasis on safeguarding the defendant 
and not enough on protecting the complainant in circumstances where D should be 
aware of the possible violation of sexual autonomy. A defendant should be liable not 
only when they appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, but also where they 
ought to have appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the action. Thus, D should be liable for 
sexual assault if he is capable of perceiving the ‘sexual’ nature of the act, had he 
directed his mind to it. This can be described as constructive knowledge, which is a 
species of negligence and is indicative of a failure to live up to a certain standard of 
social behaviour. If the defendant’s conduct is objectively ‘sexual’ then it manifests a 
failing on the part of the defendant, to respect C’s sexual and bodily integrity, for which 
he may properly be blamed. Sexual assault is a violation of sexual autonomy regardless 
of the state of mind of the defendant, thus it is essential to provide protection against 
both deliberate and inadvertent sexual touching.  
 
A defendant who appreciates the ‘sexual’ nature of a touching is more culpable than 
another person who fails to think about or recognise the ‘sexual’ nature of the action. 
But, negligence is still an appropriate standard of criminal liability for sexual touching 
because there are well known risks of invading sexual autonomy, the risk is obvious to 
one who puts his mind to it and the defendant has the capacity to take the required 
precautions. In failing to recognise the risk of invading sexual autonomy, it shows that D 
is insufficiently motivated by the interests of the individual who might suffer from his 
lack of care and diligence. One argument in favour of criminalising instances of negligent 
sexual touching is that crimes of negligence may exert a general deterrent effect, by 
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alerting people to the need to take care in certain situations. One of the primary aims of 
the criminal law is the protection of fundamental social interests. If the object of the law 
on sexual offences is to prevent the occurrence of invasions of sexual autonomy, it 
would seem appropriate to include negligent actions. The invasion of sexual autonomy 
would be the trigger for state action, aimed at minimizing the risk of the harm being 
repeated.  
 
One might respond to the criticism that complainants are overlooked in a ‘defendant-
subjective’ approach by drawing attention to the opportunity for a complainant to 
institute legal proceedings under civil law. However, sexual assault is not just an 
individual injury; it is also a social injury that occurs on a personal level. Marshall and 
Duff suggest that it is not sufficient to say that crimes against individuals are penalised 
because they threaten the social order, because that diminishes the significance of the 
victimisation of the individual that is clearly central to the offence.67 Equally, they argue, 
it is not sufficient to rely merely on the State’s duty to ensure protection of these rights 
of individuals, because that could be achieved by civil law methods or by providing 
public assistance for private prosecutions. Their argument is that crimes are public 
wrongs because even those that consist of attacks on the body or property of an 
individual (such as rape, sexual assault and theft) might be seen as ‘wrongs against the 
community to which the individual belongs’.68 These wrongs are shared by other 
members of the community with which the victim is identified and by which her identity 
is partly constituted.69 The right to sexual autonomy, the right at the centre of the law of 
sexual assault is justified by the public good, which is nurtured in its existence and 
recognition.70 Sexual assault constitutes a violation of public order that necessitates a 
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state response. Thus, it should be for the state not the individual complainant to bring a 
case against her attacker, even for those sexual assaults at the fringes of liability.71  
 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
Orthodox subjectivism is concerned with culpability and justice to the individual 
accused. Whilst a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach, which is traditionally applied in 
mainstream English criminal law, might be suitable for certain areas of criminal liability, 
it would not be a desirable approach to interpreting the meaning of ‘sexual’. There are 
four possible ‘defendant-subjective’ states of mind that could apply to interpreting 
‘sexual’, but such approaches would be unsatisfactory, as they would take insufficient 
account of C’s experience. ‘Defendant-subjective’ approaches are very individual 
approaches, rooted in the defendant’s state of mind. If defendants could raise as denials 
of actus reus their own ‘defendant-subjective’ evaluation of the ‘sexual’ nature of their 
conduct, the integrity of the sexual wrong would be entirely undermined: the nature of 
the violation as experience by C would be overlooked. The question of wrongdoing 
should not be assessed by a ‘defendant-subjective’ standard, which fails to take account 
of the context in which the action occurred and the complainant’s perception and 
experience of the action.  In the context of sexual offences, negligence is an appropriate 
basis for liability: D should be liable when he ought to have known that the touching is, 
or will be experienced by C, as ‘sexual’. A person who is practically indifferent as to 
whether a particular touching might be experienced as ‘sexual’ demonstrates disregard 
for the sexual and physical integrity of C. In the context of sexual assault, the 
appropriate focus for the law should be social protection and a ‘defendant-subjective’ 
approach would undermine that priority.  
 
Chapter 8 will continue the theme of evaluating the possible legal perspectives from 
which ‘sexual’ could be viewed and defined, analysing a ‘complainant-subjective’ 
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approach. I will argue that a ‘complainant-subjective’ test is both complainant- and 
experience-centred and is therefore the most preferable approach. 
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8 
An Analysis of the Possible Perspectives  
from which ‘Sexual’ could be Viewed and Defined 
Part 3: A ‘Complainant-Subjective’ Approach 
 
In light of the criticisms of a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach in chapter 7, this chapter 
will analyse a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’. A 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach, which focuses on the complainant’s affective 
response to the touching, is not a common part of orthodox criminal liability, being 
more a focus of tort liability.1 The question that this chapter addresses is whether a 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is fair, appropriate and 
workable? I will argue that the complainant’s perspective must be an important and 
relevant factor in assessing the ‘sexual’ nature of conduct. Although a ‘complainant-
subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ bears significant dangers and problems 
for criminal justice, it is the most complainant-centred of those analysed in this thesis 
and is preferable because it requires the jury or magistrates to show solidarity with the 
person who has been harmed or wronged.  
 
Part 1 discusses how the crime victim has, until recently, been the ‘forgotten player’ in 
the criminal process. Traditionally the idea of a crime is that it is something that 
necessitates the intervention of the State and the tensions in the criminal process were 
presented by academics diametrically as those between the defendant and the State. 
Recent political and academic interest in the crime victim has attempted to challenge 
orthodox conceptions of criminal justice, positing the crime victim as a stakeholder with 
individual rights and needs. The emergence of restorative justice is evidence of a shift in 
criminal justice policy towards acknowledging that complainants and victims have needs 
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and interests and that the criminal justice system could and should acknowledge and 
respond to them. There are a range of approaches to liability that build in ‘complainant-
subjectivity’, the differences arising when we consider the relationship between C’s 
experience and D’s fault. Part 1 will delineate four policy options as to how a 
‘complainant-subjective’ offence of sexual assault might be implemented. Each choice is 
‘complainant-subjective’ in the sense of needing C to experience the act as ‘sexual’ 
before D can be liable, but with each option the weight given to C’s experience lessens. I 
will demarcate my preferred policy option, which requires only that the touching be 
intentional and that C experienced the act as ‘sexual’: it does not entail that D 
appreciated, or that reasonable people would have been aware of, the possible ‘sexual’ 
nature of the touching  
 
It may be argued that a ‘complainant-subjective’ standard is not pragmatic and that it is 
unlikely the courts will accept such a standard. However, there is precedent in English 
law for offences to be defined, if only partially, in terms of the complainant’s experience 
of an act. The partial nature arises from C’s experience being a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of liability. In part 2, criminal harassment and anti-social behaviour 
will be used as case studies to demonstrate how there is precedent in English law for 
the conduct element of offences to be defined in a ‘complainant-subjective’ manner. In 
the context of stalking, the law does not proscribe certain forms of conduct per se but 
enables the complainant to declare such violations unacceptable on an individualistic 
basis, subject to the mens rea requirements in s.1(1)(b) PFHA 1997. The definition of 
anti-social behaviour is similarly complainant-centred, with s.1(1)(a) focusing on the 
effect the defendant’s conduct had/would have been likely to have on the victim. 
Section 1 prohibits conduct which causes annoyance or anxiety to another person not of 
the same household as the defendant.  
 
Part 3 will set out my arguments for adopting a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to 
the meaning of ‘sexual’. The approach is labelled ‘complainant-subjective’ because of 
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the significance it accords to the complainant’s experience of, and affective response to, 
the touching. A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is experience-centred and takes 
account of the particular complainant and the many differences in individual’s 
experiences and perceptions of non-consensual touching. I will argue that a 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is the most favourable 
because it emphasises the context-dependent nature of the term, requiring the 
decision-maker to consider the complainant’s affective response to the touching and 
highlighting how in changing his ‘normative position’ towards C, D should be liable for 
all the consequences of his actions. 
 
Part 4 addresses some of the problems with adopting a ‘complainant-subjective’ 
approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’. Although a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to 
the meaning of ‘sexual’ is desirable, it is also beset by problems. First, it might lead to 
‘net-widening’ because it would not be subject to a de minimis exception. Secondly, it 
might create an offence of uncertainty, as a person will not be able to predict whether a 
particular type of conduct will result in criminal liability, violating the principle of fair 
warning.  A defendant might be liable as a result of a complainant’s idiosyncratic 
affective response and could be accountable in a situation when he could not have 
anticipated the complainant’s reaction and no-one could have. However, I will argue 
that the law ought to prohibit any sexual touching of another person without consent or 
lawful excuse and a ‘complainant-subjective’ test would declare the law’s regard for the 
sexual integrity of citizens. Thirdly, it might lead to unfair labelling. In spite of these 
concerns, I will argue that a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of 
‘sexual’ is the most preferable because in order to appreciate the nature and 
seriousness of a sexual touching and the level of D’s culpability it is necessary to refer to 
C’s affective response. 
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8.1 THE COMPLAINANT: THE ‘FORGOTTEN PLAYER’ IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 
The criminal law is merely one amongst several methods of social control in society.2 
The idea of a crime is that it is something that rightly concerns the State, and not just 
the person(s) affected by the wrongdoing. Civil liability is restitutive in nature, ensuring 
that a person either honours his obligations or makes good any derogation from those 
obligations. Civil law courts provide a forum for deciding disputes involving torts, 
contract and any other private matters that involve private parties or organizations. 
Many crimes are civil wrongs as well and it is for the injured party to decide whether to 
sue for damages. However, the decision to make conduct into a crime implies that there 
is a ‘public interest’ in ensuring that such conduct does not happen and that, when it 
does, there is the possibility of State punishment. What emerges is an ongoing debate 
about the interface between crimes as ‘offences against the State’ and crimes as acts 
that directly involve and affect private citizens, who may be excluded from legal 
processes in which the State ‘steals’ conflicts from those citizens.3 
 
In November 2006, the Queen pledged that ‘My Government will put victims at the 
heart of the criminal justice system’.4 This pledge had already appeared in multiple 
policy documents, including the seminal 2002 White Paper, Justice for All.5 Victims of 
crime have remained a topical and pervasive issue for politicians, policy-makers, 
academics and the media. The media and politicians frequently invoke the metaphor of 
a balance between the rights of the victim and the rights of the defendant and some 
academics argue that the current system of criminal justice is not ‘victim-centred’.6 A 
                                                             
2
 The education system, the family, morality, religion and the civil law all provide alternative and often-
complementary systems for the control of behaviour and attitudes, with their own distinctive types of 
sanction. 
3
 See A.Ashworth, „Rights, Responsibilities and Restorative Justice‟ (2002) 40 B J Crim 578. 
4
 Queen‟s speech of 15th November 2006. 
5
 Home Office, Cmnd 5563, July 2002. 
6
 See M. Hall, Victims of Crime (Willan Publishing, Cullompton, 2009); I. Edwards, „An Ambiguous 
Participant: The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making‟ (2004) 44 Brit J Crim 967. 
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recent Home Office survey, Crime in England and Wales: 2007/087 also demonstrates 
how the public perceive the criminal justice system as being ‘defendant-centred’. 80% 
of those surveyed in 2007/08 were very or fairly confident that the criminal justice 
system ‘*r+espects rights of people accused of committing a crime and treats them 
fairly’.8 This can be contrasted with only 36% who were very or fairly confident that the 
criminal justice system ‘*m+eets the needs of victims of crime’. Until fairly recently 
orthodox criminal lawyers and academics have focused on the defendant and 
assessments of his or her liability. Why then has the crime victim recently received much 
greater political and academic attention? There are a number of strands to the answer 
and the question has been addressed by other writers, such as Robert Elias.9  
 
Central to an understanding of the significance of the role of the victim in the 
development of criminal justice is the way crime is normatively viewed as the property 
of the State.10 Before the introduction of professional police forces in the mid-
nineteenth century, the investigation and prosecution of crime was, in most cases, the 
responsibility of the victim. A prosecution was virtually impossible to attain unless the 
victim was wealthy or a member of a prosecution society. Nevertheless, the process 
ensured that victims were in control of, and knew what was happening in their cases.11 
By the 1980s, amalgamated police forces had become bureaucracies positioned 
between victims and the courts and, therefore, when there was a prosecution between 
victims and their cases. For many years, victims were the ‘forgotten actors’ in the 
criminal justice system. Neither the police nor the prosecutors had any great interest in 
                                                             
7
 C. Kershaw et al, Crime in England and Wales: 20070/8 (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, London, 
2008). 
8
 Ibid at Table 5b Public confidence in the criminal justice system, 2001/02 to 2007/08 BCS. 
9
 R. Elias, Victims Still: the Political Manipulation of Crime Victims (Sage, London, 1993); R. Elias, The 
Politics of Victimization: Victims, Victimology and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986). 
See also D. Miers, „The Responsibilities and Rights of Victims of Crime‟ (1992) MLR 482; Hall op cit, n 6; 
Edwards op cit, n 6. 
10
 D. Garland, „The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society‟ 
(1996) 36 Brit  J Crim 445. 
11
 See generally, D. Hay & F. Snyder, Policing and Prosecutions in Britain, 1750-1850 (OUP, Oxford, 
1989). 
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ascertaining the views or interests of, or facts about the victim except in relation to 
information that could form legal evidence. In legal terms, the police and Crown 
Prosecution Service do not prosecute ‘for’ the victim, but rather prosecute for the State. 
Victims are simply citizens who may or may not be used as witnesses, which is again a 
matter wholly for the prosecution.12 
 
The main lines of argument and conflict in adversarial criminal justice were between the 
accused and the State. In 1968, Herbert Packer constructed two models of the criminal 
process to explain the tensions in criminal justice and consider whether the system was 
balanced primarily in favour of the State or the accused.13 The essence of each of 
Packer’s two models is captured by an evocative metaphor. The criminal process in the 
crime-control model resembles a high-speed ‘assembly-line conveyor belt’ operated by 
the police and prosecutors. The end product of the assembly line is a guilty plea. In 
contrast, the due process model is an ‘obstacle course’ in which defence lawyers argue 
before judges that the prosecution should be rejected because the accused’s rights have 
been violated. The assembly line of the crime-control model is primarily concerned with 
efficiency and operated in favour of the State, while the due process model is primarily 
concerned with fairness to the accused and ‘quality control’. Victims’ interests did not 
feature in Packer’s models. It may be argued that the emergence of ‘Victimology’ as a 
discipline in its own right, concerned with the effects of crime on victims and victim 
involvement in criminal justice, highlighted the division between victims and offenders 
as two distinct stakeholders with individual rights and needs.14 Douglas Beloof has 
suggested that a third model of criminal justice is needed to complement Packer’s two 
models: the Victim Participation Model.15 This third model recognises that the law now 
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 The CPS Code for Crown Prosecutors outlines in paragraph 5.12 the CPS‟s position on the relationship 
between victims‟ interests and the public interest. 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/Publications/docs/code2004english.pdf [Online] (Accessed: 7
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 H. Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford Cal, 1968). 
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 See J. Goodey, Victims and Victimology (Pearson/Longman, Harlow, 2005); S. Walklate, Handbook of 
Victims and Victimology (Willan, Cullompton, 2007). 
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 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=174788 [Online] (Accessed: 7
th
 January 2010). 
 231 
 
acknowledges the importance of victim participation in the criminal process. The 
important point here is that, as I noted in chapter 3, the move towards ‘victims’ rights’ 
has been dominated thus far by ‘procedural rights’ (the right of participation in the 
criminal justice system, including sentencing) and ‘service rights’  (the provision of 
facilities, services, information and support to victims) but substantive law has been a 
somewhat neglected area. There is little discussion of what it would mean to have a 
genuinely ‘complainant-centred’ offence and what such a definition might look like. 
 
In a highly influential article Nils Christie argues that the criminal law appropriates the 
experiences of victims, substituting the State for the individual victim and leaving no 
place in the criminal justice process for victims to tell their stories.16 Christie suggests 
that the key element in a criminal proceeding is that the proceeding is converted from 
something between the parties, into a conflict between one of the parties and the 
State.17 Accordingly, two important things have happened. First, the parties are being 
represented and Christie argues that with lawyers involved, proceedings are 
professionalised and thus exclude the conflict’s real ‘owners’. Secondly, the one party 
that is represented by the State, the victim, is so thoroughly represented that she or he 
for most of the proceedings is not an active participant. She or he is being denied rights 
to full participation in what might have been one of the more important ritual 
encounters in life. In theory, the victim has lost the case to the State.18 Victim 
dissatisfaction with criminal justice is in part because they lack a legitimate role in the 
processing of their cases beyond that of witness for the prosecution.19 The chance to be 
heard at all is usually the crucial aspect for victims in achieving a sense of satisfaction 
with the justice system.20 Christie argues for the creation of a victim-orientated court in 
which detailed consideration should be given to what could be done for the victim, first 
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 Ibid.  
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 N. Christie, „Conflicts as Property‟ (1977) 17 Brit J Crim 1. 
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 Ibid. 
19
 See J. Shapland et al, Victims in the Criminal Justice System (Gower, Aldershot, 1985) pp.176-78. 
20
 T. Tyler, „What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used By Citizens To Assess the Fairness of Legal 
Procedures‟, (1988) 22 Law & Society Rev 103 at pp.125-27. 
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and foremost by the offender, secondly by the local neighbourhood and thirdly by the 
State.21 Christie’s recommended court model is one ‘with an extreme degree of lay 
participation’, since, as he suggests, this is essential when conflicts are seen as property 
that ought to be shared.  His ideal is a court of equals representing themselves. When 
they are able to find a solution between themselves, no judges are needed. When they 
are not, the judges ought also to be their equals.22 Christie’s proposed ‘victim-
orientated’ model is similar to that advocated by proponents of restorative justice. 
 
Various pro-victim initiatives23 and the advent of forms of restorative justice is evidence 
of a shift in criminal justice policy towards acknowledging that complainants have needs 
and interests and that the criminal justice system could and should acknowledge and 
respond to them. Since the 1990s, restorative justice has been one of the most rapidly 
proliferating criminal justice innovations, especially in response to youth crime. A 
restorative justice approach to liability focuses on repairing the harm caused by crime, 
in contrast to retributive justice that focuses on punishing an offence. One well 
established definition of restorative justice is of a ‘process whereby parties with a stake 
in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future.’24 The overall purpose of 
restorative justice is not to inflict punishment in proportion to the seriousness of the 
offence, or to incapacitate offenders so that they pose no further risk to the public, but 
‘the restoration into safe communities of victims and offenders who have resolved their 
conflicts.’25 One claim of restorative justice is that of victim empowerment: the victim is 
at the centre of the events, in control and telling her story in her own way. The process 
offers the victim the occasion she needs not only for the offender to hear her story; but 
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 Christie, op cit, n 17. 
22
 Ibid. 
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 For example the provision of government funding for organizations such as Victim Support and the 
Witness Service; the 1996 Victim‟s Charter; the Declaration of Basic Principles for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power (United Nations 1985). 
24
 T.F. Marshall, „The Evolution of Restorative Justice in Britain‟ (1996) 4 European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research 37. 
25
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also to have it validated by others, and for him to hear that validation.26 For sexual 
assault victims in particular, what is avoided is the experience that the victim, not the 
defendant is on trial. Hulsman makes a similar claim in relation to the use of civil rather 
than criminal procedures in cases of rape and sexual assault: ‘From a victim of sexual 
violence and from a pitiful humiliated, dependent state she becomes an active party, a 
claimant in a civil law case.’27 The victim’s definition of harm and her ability to identify 
her own requirements is at the centre of proceedings. Restorative justice is 
symptomatic of the rediscovery of victims and their centrality in modern criminal 
justice.  
 
The idea of restorative justice as a diversion from adversarial criminal justice procedures 
is at the heart of the argument against its use for very serious offences, and the 
arguments are most often used in relation to gendered and sexual offences.28 It is 
assumed that if cases are diverted from court to conference, it will appear that 
offenders are being treated too leniently and that offences are not being taken seriously 
enough, what Coker evocatively terms the ‘cheap justice’ problem.29 Feminists call for 
these actions to be taken more seriously and believe that more robust forms of justice 
should be available. They suggest forms of justice that will combine strong censure with 
effective incapacitative action. Criminalization and penalization may not create societies 
that are safer for women,30 but they do show that society is serious about condemning 
this sort of action. Finstad insists that any non-imprisoning response to sexual violence 
must satisfy certain demands: 
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‘Guilt and responsibility must be firmly and unequivocally attached to the perpetrator; 
protection and compensation must be effected for the victim; the extent and seriousness of 
sexualised violence must not be made invisible.’31 
Offenders may use an informal restorative process to diminish guilt, trivialize the assault 
or shift the blame to a victim. There is also the concern that some victims may not be 
able to advocate effectively on their behalf. A further argument against the use of 
restorative justice in cases of sexual violence concerns the improbability of reaching an 
agreed outcome when the perspectives of offender and victim are likely to be widely 
separate.32 As Finstad highlights, ‘with sexualised violence, there are two non-
negotiable wrongs: his and hers’.33 
 
The problems of identifying the ‘community’ and securing its participation, 
representation and co-operation, is a further flaw of the restorative justice 
programmes. Hudson suggests that ‘without the concern to make safer communities, 
restorative justice is in danger of merely substituting civil justice for criminal justice.’34 
Daly suggests that community norms may reinforce, not undermine, male dominance 
and victim blaming and communities may not be sufficiently resourced to take on these 
cases.35 There is also the problem of conflicting community standards. By what standard 
should offences be judged? A defendant in possession of cannabis may consider this to 
be perfectly acceptable. Some community members may agree but other, maybe older 
community members may consider it wholly unacceptable.  
 
The notion of community restoration is also rather ambiguous. By what standard is it to 
be decided how much damage has been done to the community and how it needs to be 
restored and what if no harm results? Offences such as driving without a licence and 
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making hoax 999 calls involve no actual harm to a defined person or loss of property. 
For restorative justice to work it might sometimes be necessary to involve the potential 
harm that could have resulted from D’s actions. One consequence of empowering 
communities might be to sacrifice the ‘rule of law’ values that ought to be attached to 
state criminal justice. If different communities can adopt separate standards, the result 
is likely to be a form of ‘justice by geography’ or ‘postcode lottery’.36 Another criticism 
of restorative justice concerns the willingness of victims to participate. Restorative 
theories emphasise victim participation, and yet many victims are unwilling to become 
involved.37  
 
Critics of restorative justice might argue that it is impossible to reconcile a complainant-
centred approach with the traditional adversarial trial process and defendants’ due 
process rights.  However, restorative justice does not tend to exist in isolation from 
established criminal justice and in England the adversarial trial process still forms the 
dominant backdrop to alternative forms of dispute resolution. Accordingly should a 
victim or an offender claim dissatisfaction or absence of due process and legal rights in 
the course of restorative justice intervention, then the law is there to reassert its 
dominion. As Goodey quite rightly notes, ‘restorative justice appears to pose a symbolic 
and piecemeal reform, rather than a substantive and wholesale reform, of criminal 
justice.38  
 
While the criminal law judges criminal intent, restorative justice looks at the harm done 
by offenders to victims and their ‘community’. As the damage inflicted on the victim 
may be greater than the intent, it is necessary for restorative justice practitioners to 
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uphold the principle of proportionality with respect to offence and sanction. Restorative 
justice should ensure that restorative agreements do not exceed the punishment an 
offender would receive under the existing criminal law. 
 
8.1.1 ‘Complainant-subjective’ policy options 
There are four possible policy options as to how a ‘complainant-subjective’ offence of 
sexual assault might be implemented, the differences arising when we consider the 
relationship between C’s experience and D’s fault.  Each model is ‘complainant-
subjective’ in the sense of needing C to experience the act as ‘sexual’ before D can be 
liable, but with each option the weight given to C’s experience lessens.  
 
Table 8.1: ‘Complainant-subjective’ policy options 
 
Intentional 
touching 
Reasonable people 
would have been 
aware of the possible 
‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching 
D appreciated the 
possible ‘sexual 
nature of the 
touching 
C experienced 
the act as 
‘sexual’ 
Policy option 1 × × ×  
Policy option 2  × ×  
Policy option 3   ×  
Policy option 4  ×   
 
Option 1: An offence of strict liability 
The first possible model of ‘complainant-subjective’ liability is one in which C’s 
experience is determinative, and there is no fault element required. This first choice 
imposes a strict liability standard in which any touching experienced by C as ‘sexual’ 
would be an offence and is accordingly complainant-focused. Suppose D accidentally 
brushes against C’s breasts as he attempts to exit a busy dance floor. If C experiences 
the touching as ‘sexual’ D would be liable under this approach, albeit that his touching 
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was inadvertent. This demonstrates how such an approach is too broad, placing too 
little emphasis on fault. In the context of serious offences, orthodox subjectivists have 
argued that defendants should be held ‘criminally liable for what they intended to do, 
and not according to what actually did or did not occur’.39 An offence of strict liability 
would potentially lead to unfair labelling, whereby D would be labelled as a sexual 
offender even though his action was unintentional, on the basis of C’s affective 
response to the touching. There would also be an issue whether a strict liability offence 
of sexual assault infringes the presumption of innocence guaranteed under Art 6(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. Strict liability offences may offend against 
Art 6(2) because once the prohibited act is proved, D is ‘presumed’ to be liable. 
However, the European Court has held that strict liability offences are compatible with 
the Article: ‘in principle the contracting States may, under certain conditions, penalize a 
simple or objective fact as such irrespective of whether it results from criminal intent or 
from negligence’.40 The English courts have taken account of that conclusion in holding 
that Article 6(2) is restricted to providing procedural protection and does not render the 
imposition of strict liability incompatible with Art 6(2).41 
 
Option 2: Require that the touching be intentional and that C experienced the act as 
‘sexual’ 
The second ‘complainant-subjective’ option would be to require that the touching be 
intentional and that C experienced the act as ‘sexual’. If a man touches C in a manner he 
does not believe to be ‘sexual’, but the test is ‘complainant-subjective’ and C perceives 
that it is ‘sexual’ then he would be liable. This second option is also complainant-focused 
because it only requires fault in respect of the touching, regardless of whether D and/or 
reasonable people would appreciate the possible ‘sexual’ nature of the touching.  
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However, C’s experience is not determinative; it is necessary, but not sufficient for 
liability. Suppose that D accidentally touches C’s bare legs, whilst attempting to pick up 
his shopping bags on a crowded bus. Under this second policy, option there would be no 
liability, because the touching was unintentional even if such touching would be 
perceived as ‘sexual’ by the individual woman. However, where D intentionally strokes 
C’s hair and C perceives the touching to be ‘sexual’, D would under this approach be 
liable even if D does not appreciate that the touching is ‘sexual’ and no other reasonable 
people would appreciate it either. This is my preferred policy option and throughout this 
chapter, I will consider the arguments for and against it. In particular, I will argue that in 
unlawfully touching another, D has changed his ‘normative position’ towards C and his 
liability should extend to further unintended consequences that result from his 
intrusion. One particular problem with this ‘complainant-subjective’ policy option and a 
concern that equally applies to complainant-centred approaches in general, is that it 
raises issues of consistency of application of criminal law and non-retroactivity. I will 
discuss such concerns in section 8.4.2 below. 
 
Option 3: Require that the touching be intentional, that reasonable people would have 
been aware of the possible ‘sexual’ nature of the touching and that C experienced the 
act as ‘sexual’ 
The third ‘complainant-subjective’ policy option would be to require not only that the 
touching be intentional, but also that reasonable people would have been aware of the 
possible ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. If those conditions are met and C experienced 
the act as ‘sexual’ then D would be liable. This option does not require D to have been 
aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. If D is unwilling to try to understand C’s 
affective response to the touching, then he is to be blamed for treating C as a means to 
his own ends. Such an approach holds the defendant’s conduct to a standard that 
society deems appropriate even though D may subjectively be incapable of appreciating 
the ‘sexual’ nature of his conduct. This approach can also be criticised for assuming 
there is common consensus regarding what is considered acceptable sexual touching. 
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Option 4: Require that the touching be intentional, that D is aware of the possible 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching and that C experienced the act as ‘sexual’ 
The final ‘complainant-subjective’ option is like the previous one except that the test is 
what D appreciated about the possible ‘sexual’ nature of the touching42 rather than the 
reasonable person, whilst requiring C to have experienced the act as ‘sexual’. This policy 
choice is fault-based requiring D to have been aware of the possible ‘sexual’ nature of 
the touching. Whilst this option is ‘complainant-subjective’ in the sense that C must 
experience the act as ‘sexual’, it would appear to be more correctly labelled as a 
‘defendant-subjective’ approach, as was analysed in chapter 7, because it focuses on D’s 
attitude to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. 
 
Discussion of the various ‘complainant-subjective’ policy options raises the issue of 
whether D should ever be liable if C does not experience the act as ‘sexual’. There might 
be situations in which D touches C intentionally, reasonable people would have been 
aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, but C does not experience the act as 
‘sexual’ (perhaps she has led a very sheltered life, or has suffered years of abuse and no 
longer associates such touching with sexuality). In these cases, one might argue that D 
should be liable even if C does not interpret the act as ‘sexual’. In this respect, there 
may be cases on which C’s experience of the act as ‘sexual’ is not even necessary. Even 
when C does not experience the act as ‘sexual’, there is a public interest43 in intervening 
and punishing D. The essence of the wrong is the violation of autonomy, which is 
something that can and should be punished regardless of the actual extent to which C is 
aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching.  
8.2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW: THE RELEVANCE OF COMPLAINANTS’ EXPERIENCES  
It may be argued that a ‘complainant-subjective’ standard is not pragmatic and that it is 
unlikely the courts will accept such a standard. However, there is precedent in English 
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law for offences to be defined, if only partially, in terms of the complainant’s experience 
of an act. The partial nature arises from C’s experience being a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of liability. In relation to a charge of grievous bodily harm in 
Bollom,44 the Court of Appeal held that:  
‘*i+n deciding whether injuries are grievous, an assessment has to be made of, amongst 
other things, the effect of the harm on the particular individual. We have no doubt that 
in determining the gravity of these injuries, it was necessary to consider them in their 
real context.’45 
This decision gives rise to two interesting questions. First, what kind of harm would 
ordinarily and naturally be regarded as serious, given the age and state of health of the 
person on whom it was inflicted? The Court of Appeal took the view that the term 
‘grievous’ should be assessed with reference to the particular victim. They suggested 
that the injuries inflicted on the complainant in this particular case, would be less 
serious on a ‘six-foot adult in the fullness of health’ than on ‘an elderly or unwell 
person,’ or ‘someone who was physically or psychiatrically vulnerable’.  Horder labels 
this an ‘agent-specific’ view of grievous harm because it can depend on the individual 
vulnerabilities of the victim.46 Accordingly, ‘harm that would be regarded as non-serious 
if inflicted on a more robust person, can be regarded as serious if inflicted on a less 
robust person’.47 This relates to my ‘complainant-subjective’ label, which is concerned 
with the direct effects on the victim. Secondly, what if D causes C an injury that C 
dismisses as merely trifling but reasonable people would see as very serious? Bollom 
does not extend so far as to suggest whether C’s experiences in that situation are 
relevant. As the question whether the harm that resulted should be regarded as 
grievous (serious) is solely one for the jury, considering ‘amongst other things, the effect 
of the harm on the particular victim’ a conviction for grievous bodily harm may seem 
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just if D intended serious harm, whether the actual victim experienced such harm or 
not.  
 
The recommendation of the MacPherson Report that a ‘racist incident is any incident 
which is perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person,’48 can also be 
described as a ‘complainant-subjective’ test. However, there is a significant difference 
between a racist incident and a charge of racially aggravated assault.49 Section 28(1) 
Crime and Disorder Act 1997 (CDA 1997) makes it clear that it is the presence of racial 
‘hostility’ that is the key triggering device which transforms the basic offences into the 
racially aggravated offences.50 The main justification for these offences is the greater 
culpability of the perpetrator who acts out of racial ‘hostility’. In determining the 
presence of racial hostility, the courts are not required to use the MacPherson definition 
of a racial incident. The new offences shift issues of the motivation of the perpetrator 
that are typically reserved for sentencing back into the definition of the racially 
aggravated offence.51 One of the fundamental problems in s.28 is that there is no 
definition provided of ‘hostility’ and no standard legal definition. The degree of hostility 
required to demonstrate hostility on grounds of race is not clear. The law treats the 
issue as a question of fact for the jury.  
 
There are numerous examples of situations where D says or does something that C 
experiences as a racial incident, yet was not intended or foreseen by D as such. Suppose 
D calls C, a person of Chinese descent a ‘chinky’. Whilst C may experience the word as 
insulting, D may perceive it as harmless fun. This may be particularly relevant with 
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people of different generations. For example, an older, white male using the words 
‘darkie’ or ‘brownie’ without perceiving any offence. From the perspective of those 
using the terms such as ‘Gook’, ‘Gringo’, ‘Nigger’ etc they may simply be terms used to 
delineate and separate ethnic groupings, rather than principally to show hostility. The 
law has no clear approach to the issue of racial hostility; it is simply a matter for the jury 
to decide. 
 
The point is that a wholly ‘complainant-subjective’ approach focuses solely on C‘s 
reaction, making it determinative (as in policy option 1) and accordingly undermines 
mens rea principles: it turns an offence into one of strict liability. A non-determinative 
approach, on the other hand, posits C’s reaction as necessary but not sufficient, D’s 
mental state also being a condition of liability (as in policy options 2, 3 and 4). Criminal 
harassment provides an interesting example of an offence in which C’s adverse 
experience is necessary but not sufficient for liability and thus of the merits of a 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the conduct element of an offence. Both 
‘harassment’ and ‘sexual’ are context-dependent terms; both require an affective 
response by an observer.  
8.2.1 Case study 1: Criminal harassment 
Criminal harassment is a context-dependent and complainant-centred crime because 
what is essential to the offence is not what is done, but the complainant’s perceptions 
of what is done.52 It is injuries to feelings and to self-esteem that the (partially) 
‘complainant-subjective’, context-dependent character of ‘harassment, alarm or 
distress’ in s.1(1) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (PFHA 1997) is intended 
to protect. In ‘stalking’,53 the law does not proscribe certain forms of conduct per se but 
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enables the complainant to declare such violations unacceptable on an individualistic 
basis (subject to the s.1(1)(b) mens rea requirements) and punishes accordingly. The 
persistent receipt of flowers may seem innocuous to a ‘bystander-objective’ observer, 
but it is the complainant’s perception of these gifts and the defendant’s awareness of 
the impact of the gifts that is important. There are a range of possible reactions to 
stalking, ranging from amusement, indifference and tolerance to the more unwelcome 
reactions such as anger, distress and anxiety. Accordingly ‘stalking’ is a context-
dependent crime as the conduct involved may not be objectionable per se but it 
becomes so in the particular context in which it occurs. 
 
The PFHA 1997 created two substantive criminal offences: criminal harassment (s.2) and 
causing fear of violence (s.4). Section 1 prohibits a course of conduct that amounts to 
harassment of another and section 2 makes that proscribed conduct a criminal offence. 
Section 1 provides that: 
‘(1) A person must not pursue a course of conduct—  
(a) which amounts to harassment of another, and  
(b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.  
(2) For the purposes of this section, the person whose course of conduct is in question 
ought to know that it amounts to harassment of another if a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information would think the course of conduct amounted to 
harassment of the other.’ 
The process of establishing harassment can be seen as a distinct three-stage process. 
There must be a course of conduct, this must amount to harassment of another, and the 
defendant must know or should have known that this would have been so. The 
combination of the three elements of harassment has created a broad offence that 
spans an immense range of harassing conduct that will inevitably vary in seriousness. 
Each of these stages raises discrete issues which may have implications for the 
imposition of liability for harassment, but the immediate concern for understanding the 
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‘context-dependence’ of ‘sexual’ is the issue of defining harassment. I will consider 
whether an entirely ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to harassment, such as policy 
option 1, where C’s experience is determinative of liability is just and argue that it is 
necessary to have some fault element in the offence, whereby C’s experience is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition of liability. 
 
(a) Conduct that ‘amounts to harassment of another’ 
To incur liability under the PFHA 1997, the conduct must ‘amount*s+ to harassment of 
another’. Section 7(2) PFHA 1997 partially defines harassment as including, but not 
being limited to ‘alarming the person or causing the person distress’. No further 
definition was deemed necessary as ‘harassment as a concept has been interpreted 
regularly by the courts since 1986’.54 This is a reference to the Public Order Act 1986 
(POA 1986) section 4(A). However, for the purposes of s.4(A) POA 1986 the ‘harassment, 
alarm or distress’ must have been caused by ‘threatening, abusive or insulting 
behaviour’ whereas there are no restrictions upon the nature of behaviour which 
engenders liability if it results in harassment, alarm or distress under the PFHA 1997. 
The harassment need not be caused by any particular type of words or behaviour. 
 
Whether a course of conduct amounts to ‘harassment’ is a partially ‘complainant-
subjective’ matter based upon the reaction of the complainant. Under s.1(1)(a) ‘a 
person must not pursue a course of conduct- that amounts to harassment of another’. 
This ‘complainant-subjective’ focus acknowledges that individuals may react in different 
ways to similar events hence conduct that causes alarm and distress to one person may 
leave another unperturbed. However, liability for criminal harassment is also dependent 
on whether the defendant knows or ought to know that the conduct will amount to 
harassment (s.1(1)(b)) and also whether D can show that the conduct was reasonable 
(s.1(3)(c)). This is closest to policy option 4, but widens the behaviour amenable to 
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criminalization as D is also liable where he ought to know that the conduct will amount 
to harassment. 
 
During the enactment of the PFHA 1997, campaign groups55 highlighted how it was 
essential for the protection of ‘stalking’ victims that primacy was given to the 
complainant’s interpretation of events when attributing liability. The focus upon the 
impact of the conduct on the recipient was deliberately adopted to avoid the difficulties 
of formulating a definition of the conduct element of ‘stalking’. The possible range of 
conduct(s) is so broad that it is not possible to include in legislation a detailed list that 
would cover them all: 
‘Let us not worry about what any one of 1,000 activities might be. Let us worry about 
the effect on the victim. If the effect is to cause harassment to the victim, we can trigger 
the offence’.56  
All conduct which has the proscribed result is included within the definition, thus 
providing a degree of flexibility, but also uncertainty, that is absent in a more specific 
definition which delineates the precise nature of the prohibited conduct.  
 
The PFHA 1997 focuses on the harm that results rather than the inherent nature of the 
act or the seriousness of the act as assessed by the reasonable person. This 
acknowledges that many acts that are not of themselves harassing can cause 
harassment to the recipient because of the context in which the conduct occurs. The 
meaning of ‘harassment’, like ‘sexual’, is inevitably context-dependent.57 Conduct that 
appears innocuous to an objective observer may assume a more menacing characteristic 
when the history of the relationship between the stalker and complainant is taken into 
account. The persistent receipt of flowers may seem innocuous to an objective observer 
who does not possess the same information as the defendant or complainant, but it is 
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the complainant’s perception of these gifts that defines the significance of the acts. A 
reasonable observer may be unaware that the complainant is harassed by the daily 
receipt of flowers from her estranged boyfriend. Equally, sending a woman a picture of 
a baby is not an act that would be objectively judged to be harassment. When the 
relationship between the parties is known (they are ex-partners and the woman aborted 
the man’s baby against his wishes) and the context of the conduct (the pictures are sent 
every year on the date that the woman has the abortion) it is clear that this would be 
conduct which is highly likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.58  The mischief the 
law seeks to combat is the harm caused to the complainant by being the object of 
unwanted attention and relentless pursuit.  
 
Stalking is a context-dependent crime because the response of the victim is a necessary 
but not sufficient factor that delineates lawful and unlawful conduct. The law is 
concerned with whether the prohibited conduct has materialised; in the case of 
harassment, whether the victim has been caused harassment, alarm or distress by the 
defendant’s conduct. The absence of such a response places the conduct outside the 
remit of the law even if it were undertaken with the express intention of causing such 
an adverse reaction. This provision obviates the need to establish the motives behind 
the conduct or to establish whether the conduct is objectively harassing; the fact that it 
amounts to harassment of a particular individual will suffice to satisfy this stage of 
liability. The impact of the conduct upon the complainant is therefore a necessary but 
not sufficient condition of liability. The law is declaring relevant the individual’s 
experience, thus acknowledging the context-dependent nature of ‘stalking’. However, 
this ‘complainant-subjective’ focus does nothing to limit the breadth of the offence 
caused by the generality of the definition of ‘course of conduct’.59 Taken in conjunction, 
these two elements give rise to the potential to impose liability based upon two 
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incidents that nobody other than the complainant would view as harassment.60 If the 
definition of criminal harassment were wholly ‘complainant-subjective’, lacking any 
mens rea requirement, it would most closely resemble policy option 1, but as we shall 
see that would not be fair or just. 
 
(b) The defendant ‘knows or ought to know’ 
One way to ameliorate the impact of such an easily satisfied actus reus would be to 
combine it with an onerous mens rea requirement, such as an intention to cause the 
actual harm, harassment or distress. A more easily satisfied requirement would be to 
require awareness that one’s conduct might cause any harm, harassment or distress. 
The government did not adopt this approach and liability for the offence of harassment 
will be complete if it is established that the ‘defendant knew, or ought to have known, 
that his conduct would amount to harassment.’61 The offence contains alternatives of 
either a ‘defendant-subjective’ or a ‘bystander-objective’ mens rea. What the defendant 
ought to know is a ‘bystander-objective’ standard based upon what the reasonable 
person in possession of the same information as the defendant would think amounted 
to harassment. Finch argues that this dual mental element encapsulates differing levels 
of culpability, ‘as knowingly harassing is suggestive of deliberate wrongdoing, whereas 
failing to appreciate that conduct would be viewed as harassment is indicative of failure 
to live up to a certain standard of social behaviour.’62 If the defendant possesses 
information relating to a particular vulnerability of the complainant that gives him 
knowledge that his prima facie innocuous conduct will harass the complainant, this 
knowledge will be transferred to the reasonable man and the defendant will be liable 
for harassment despite the outwardly innocent appearance of the conduct.63 
 
                                                             
60
 The persistent receipt of gifts or champagne (R v Clarence Barrington Morris [1998] 1 Cr App R 386) 
might be seen by many as harassment, but the receipt of two gifts might be conduct that nobody other than 
the complainant would view as harassment. 
61
 S.2(1). 
62
 Finch, op cit, n 45, at 238. 
63
 Lord Chancellor, HL Deb, Vol 578, Col 528, 17
th
 February 1997. 
 248 
 
The ‘bystander-objective’ requirement was deemed necessary to ensure that there was 
comprehensive protection of all ‘stalking’ victims and that stalkers whose mental illness 
precluded them from appreciating the impact of their conduct were not excluded from 
the scope of the legislation. The ‘bystander-objective’ nature of the test laid down in 
s.1(2) is emphasised in R v Colohan,64 where it was held that D’s schizophrenia could not 
be taken into account in determining whether he ought to have known that his course 
of conduct would have amounted to harassment of another. The Court of Appeal 
observed that to take into account the mental illness of the accused in applying the 
objective test laid down by s.1(2) would undermine the very purpose of the PFHA 1997, 
given that it was aimed at the activities of persons who might be expected to suffer 
from some form of mental illness.65  The decision in Colohan appears to undermine 
mens rea principles and s.1(2) makes no distinction between those who did not realise 
that their conduct would cause harassment, but were capable of doing so had they 
addressed their minds to the issue, and those who are inherently incapable of 
perceiving the effect of their actions.  
 
This analysis has demonstrated how there is precedent in law for the conduct element 
of a context-dependent offence to be defined in a ‘complainant-subjective’ way. Thus, 
one might argue that it is possible for a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ to be fair, appropriate and workable. 
8.2.2 Case-study 2: Anti-social behaviour 
The above discussion of criminal harassment as an example of a complainant-centred 
offence is problematic because of the objective perception of harassment within the 
definition of the offence. The definition of anti-social behaviour is also a workable 
example of a complainant-centred offence. However, anti-social behaviour is not in 
itself a crime if it does not fall within any other defined criminal offence and this may be 
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critical in understanding why the complainant-centred approach is used there but not in 
substantive criminal law. 
 
In 1998, the Crime and Disorder Act (CAD Act 1998), s.1, created the anti-social 
behaviour order (ASBO):  
‘(1) An application for an order under this section may be made by a relevant authority 
if it appears to the authority that the following conditions are fulfilled with respect to 
any person aged 10 or over, namely—  
(a) that the person has acted, since the commencement date, in an anti-social 
manner, that is to say, in a manner that caused or was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same 
household as himself; and  
(b) that such an order is necessary to protect relevant persons from further anti-
social acts by him.’ 
In Parliament, Lord Williams of Mostyn observed that the ASBO ‘requires the subject of 
it to do no more than to behave in a decent way to the fellow citizens of our county.’66 
Although proceedings to obtain an ASBO are civil, breach of its terms is a criminal 
offence. A defendant who breaches its terms is guilty of an offence carrying a maximum 
of six months’ imprisonment on summary conviction and five years’ imprisonment on 
indictment.67 The order must last for a minimum period of two years.68 This section will 
analyse the anti-social behaviour order, in particular considering whether the definition 
of anti-social behaviour is ‘complainant-subjective’ and therefore whether the order is 
an example of a complainant-centred offence. 
 
(a) What constitutes anti-social behaviour? 
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Manning et al suggest that anti-social behaviour ‘is extremely difficult to define in any 
meaningful sense.’69 Traditionally it referred to conduct which was described in terms of 
causing a nuisance or annoyance to other people, usually neighbours.70 The first 
attempts at any statutory definition, not derived from the tenancy-related concepts of 
‘good neighbourliness’ were made by the PFHA 1997 which, borrowing language from 
the POA 1986, ss.4A and 5, referred to ‘harassment’ in terms which included causing 
‘alarm or distress’.71 This was made the basis of the only statutory definition of the 
phrase ‘anti-social behaviour’, in s.1 of the CAD Act 1998, namely conduct ‘causing or 
likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ to a person not of the same household as 
the perpetrator. To the critics, this definition is intolerably ‘sweeping and vague’.72 
Nevertheless, observers more sympathetic to the ASBO also note the intrinsically 
subjective character of harassment, alarm or distress73 and the absence of any criteria 
of seriousness.74  
 
The Home Office consultative document of 2002 ‘Tackling Anti-Social Tenants’ 
considered whether there should be a statutory definition of what is anti-social 
behaviour.75 A tightly drawn definition means that individuals can plan their affairs and 
also protects those undeserving of an order from having one imposed on them. 
However, no definition has been brought into being and some practitioners believe a 
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valuable opportunity to regulate or clarify this area has been lost.76 The Institute for 
Public Policy Research highlighted the lack of an overall definition and what problems 
that can cause:77  
‘The very elasticity of the term anti-social behaviour adds to the problem. In covering 
everything from dropping litter to serious criminal activity, it implies that the jump from 
illegally parked cars to crack dens is a short one. The ‘I know it when I see it’ approach is 
not terribly helpful in trying to disentangle what we mean by these very different- and 
admittedly anti-social behaviours.’ 
 
The government welcomed the opinion of the House of Commons Homes Affairs Select 
Committee78 whose views in this area were as follows: 
‘We have listened carefully to criticisms of the current legal definitions of anti-social 
behaviour as too wide. We are convinced however, that it would be a mistake to try and 
make them more specific. This is for three main reasons; first, the definitions work well 
from an enforcement point of view and no significant practical problems seem to have 
been encountered. Second, exhaustive lists of behaviour considered anti-social by 
central government would be unworkable. Third, anti-social behaviour is inherently a 
local problem and falls to be defined at a local level. It is a major strength of the current 
statutory definitions of anti-social behaviour that they are flexible enough to 
accommodate this. We would also argue that the definitions are helpful in backing an 
approach that stands with the victims of anti-social behaviour and their experience 
rather than narrowly focusing on the behaviour of the perpetrators.’ 79 
The Home Affairs Committee assumes that if the police and enforcement have found 
the definition simple to use, then it is essentially a good definition. In respect of their 
second argument, traditionally, the ‘exhaustive list’ of behaviour they refer to is known 
as the ‘criminal law’. However, the criminal law focuses on single events, which New 
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Labour argued meant that it is ill-equipped to deal with a course of conduct where the 
overall impact of the behaviour is far greater than the sum of its parts. The Home Affairs 
Committee further argue that anti-social behaviour is a ‘local problem’ but do not 
attempt a definition of ‘local’. In emphasizing an approach that ‘stands with the victim’, 
this reflects government statements about rebalancing justice in favour of victims. 
 
(b) Anti-social behaviour: a subjective or objective test? 
The question then arises as to whether or not the assessment of anti-social behaviour is 
a ‘bystander-objective’ or a ‘complainant-subjective’ test. The discussion centres on one 
of the three descriptions of anti-social behaviour, namely the concept of harassment. Is 
‘harassment’ judged by the standard of the independent bystander or if there were 
credible evidence that one of the complainants felt harassed is that, in itself, sufficient 
and conclusive? 80  
 
There are two possible ways in which a defendant might meet the criteria laid down in 
s.1(1)(a) CAD Act 1998. For the purposes of s.1(1)(a), behaviour which ‘causes 
harassment, alarm or distress’ is that which causes annoyance or anxiety to another 
person not of the same household.  This is a ‘complainant-subjective’ enquiry: if V 
experiences something as harassing, alarming or distressing it constitutes anti-social 
behaviour. The defining feature of anti-social behaviour, like that of stalking, is 
‘harassment, alarm or distress’ and as such, the offence can similarly be described as a 
context-dependent crime: anti-social behaviour ‘is an expression which carries different 
weight according to its context.’81 Repeatedly having a party in a deserted field is 
unlikely to make other people’s lives a misery. However, if you repeatedly have a party 
in your house in a residential area, it is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
the neighbours. The context of the party is therefore a crucial feature in determining 
                                                             
80
 See N. Botham, „What Behaviour is “Antisocial”?‟ (2005) JP 169(49). 
81
 S. MacDonald, „A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist: Refining the ASBOS‟s 
Definition of Anti-Social Behaviour‟ (2006) MLR 69(2), 183-213 at 185. 
 253 
 
whether this behaviour is anti-social. The flexibility of section 1(1)(a) stems from the 
elasticity of the definition of anti-social behaviour, which can be invoked against all 
potential forms of anti-social behaviour regardless of the degree of seriousness. 
Anecdotal examples that demonstrate the complainant-centred implementation of 
ASBOs include against an 87-year-old great-grandfather who was prohibited from 
making sarcastic remarks to his neighbours82 and a 13 year-old autistic boy whose 
neighbours complained about the noise the boy was making when jumping on his 
trampoline.  
 
The definition of anti-social behaviour in s.1(1)(a) looks only to the effect the 
defendant’s behaviour had/would have been likely to have on the victim. There are no 
safeguards within the legislation for those cases in which the victim is oversensitive or 
bigoted and thus the ASBO appears to be complainant-centred. Critics expressed 
concerns about the vagueness and breadth of the definition and about the degree of 
discretion it would confer on enforcement agencies.83 In response, New Labour pointed 
to a filtering process within the legislation that they believed would ‘ensure that such 
orders are not used for trivial behaviour’.84  Only if the applicants can prove that the 
behaviour is anti-social85 does the case continue in order to consider whether an order 
is necessary to protect persons from further anti-social behaviour by the defendant and 
if so, on what terms. Individuals seeking an ASBO must go to one of the enforcement 
agencies and ask them to apply. New Labour argued that if the person’s complaint is 
frivolous or vexatious, they are likely to ‘receive a very short answer.’86 
 
Section 1(1)(a) also allows for a hypothetical assessment of the effect of the defendant’s 
conduct, and allows for a finding against the defendant if he has acted in a manner 
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that…was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress’ (emphasis added). If a court is 
considering these words in relation to a defendant’s conduct, sufficient evidence of 
actual causation will be lacking. In Chief Constable of Lancashire v Potter87 Auld L.J. ruled 
that ‘likely’ means ‘more probable than not’ but nonetheless confessed that the 
application of a standard of proof to the likelihood element presented a task ‘difficult of 
analysis’. He further suggests that proving the probability involves the same sorts of 
inference that may be required to prove the existence of intention or recklessness, 
however, the facts proved in each case are of a different order. In the case of intention, 
a tribunal of fact is declaring itself sure that something existed, while with s.1(1)(a), the 
tribunal declares itself sure that it might have existed. Since conduct is to be considered 
‘depending on the circumstances’, the standard of sensitivity upon which the risk 
assessment is to be made is not a general and ‘objective’ one such as the likely effect of 
conduct of a person of ‘reasonable fortitude.’ Such an objective standard would be too 
narrow an interpretation of the subsection and would conflict with the essential 
context-dependency of the concept of harassment, alarm or distress. In summary the 
effect of the words ‘likely to cause’ in s.1(1)(a) is to allow a context-sensitive evaluation 
of the risk that feelings will be caused in others to substitute for evidence of feelings 
actually caused in others.  
 
During the Parliamentary passage of the CAD Act 1998, New Labour resisted opposition 
amendments aimed at tightening s.1(1)(a)’s definition of anti-social behaviour. The 
amendments included inserting the word ‘serious’, requiring that the behaviour would 
have cause harassment, alarm or distress to a person of reasonable firmness, requiring 
that the defendant intended to cause harassment, alarm or distress and requiring that 
the behaviour complained of would have amounted to either a crime or a civil wrong. It 
appears that ‘harassment’ is treated in a ‘complainant-subjective’ manner, and Botham 
argues that this runs the ‘risk of pandering to people who are either susceptible to or 
particularly offended by certain forms of behaviour on the basis of their own life 
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experience, trauma and so forth.’88 On the other hand, if you treat ‘harassment’ in an 
entirely objective manner, you are forced to ignore how the complainant says he or she 
feels and simply weigh the conduct of the defendant against the norms of society, which 
will fluctuate over time in any event?89 
 
In Stephens v South East Surrey Magistrates,90 on the question of whether anti-social 
behaviour is to be judged objectively or subjectively, Calvert-Smith J was referred to the 
judgment in Clingham v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea91 at para.22: ‘Under 
s.1(1) (a) all that has to be established is that the person has acted ‘in an anti-social 
manner, that is to say in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm 
or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself. This is an 
objective inquiry; mens rea as an ingredient of the particular offences need not be 
proved.’ Whilst it was accepted that the judgment in Clingham was dealing with 
whether or not ASBO proceedings were criminal or civil in nature, Calvert-Smith J was 
nevertheless clear that the assessment of what is anti-social cannot rest solely on the 
subjective view. A reasonable view had to be taken to the interpretation of ss.1 and 2 
and the test is an objective one to the extent that the court has to make up its mind as 
to whether such acts were such as to cause harassment alarm or distress. The CAD Act 
1998 provides a modicum of assistance in s.1(5) where it states that in assessing the test 
under s.1(1)(a) the court shall disregard any behaviour which the defendant shows to be 
reasonable. How can the court exclude evidence of behaviour that is manifestly 
reasonable where it has not been ‘shown’ to be such by the defendant? 
 
One might argue that the fact that anti-social behaviour is not a crime might be critical 
in understanding why the complainant-centred approach is used there but not in 
substantive criminal law. However, Ashworth proposes two reasons that might have led 
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the Government to look beyond criminal law and justice as a response to such 
behaviour.92 First, in the context of anti-social behaviour witnesses may be reluctant to 
come forward and therefore it may be problematic to bring a prosecution. Secondly, it 
may be difficult to assemble evidence sufficient to convey the persistence of the 
conduct. A criminal charge relates only to an individual incident and it may not always 
be possible to convey the true extent of the anti-social behaviour, even if the 
prosecution charges several offences. 
 
8.3 MERITS OF A ‘COMPLAINANT-SUBJECTIVE’ APPROACH 
In this section, I will consider the arguments for a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to 
the meaning of ‘sexual’. Having set out the broad nature of a ‘complainant-subjective’ 
approach, sexual assault will be used as a specific example of an offence where the 
conduct element could be defined in terms of C’s affective response: did C experience 
the act as ‘sexual’? The approach is labelled ‘complainant-subjective’ because of the 
significance it accords to the complainant’s experience of the touching. A ‘complainant-
subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is ‘complainant-centred’: this element of 
the actus reus would only be satisfied if the complainant experienced and defined the 
touching as ‘sexual’ in nature. The jury or magistrates would be required to consider the 
complainant’s internal account of the nature of the touching to decide whether C 
experienced or perceived the touching as ‘sexual’ and this can be contrasted with 
objective approaches, which concern what a reasonable person would consider. A 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach protects a person’s interests in his or her bodily 
integrity. Primacy would be given to the complainant in determining the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the touching and therefore distinguishing sexual assault from a battery. 
 
A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach focuses on ‘how the complainant perceived the 
nature of the conduct’. This is not a common part of orthodox subjectivist approaches 
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to criminal liability, being more a focus of tort liability: whilst criminal law has 
traditionally focused on the guilt or innocence of the accused, tort law focuses on the 
victim and compensating the victim for breach of the particular duties owed to them. 
Tortfeasors take their victims as they find them: if the complainant has an ‘eggshell 
skull’, the tortfeasor who negligently kills that complainant is liable for the death 
although anyone else would only have suffered a bump on the head. Criminal law, in 
contrast, has traditionally erred on the side of the defendant: the criminal sanction (the 
power to deprive D of his liberty) is potentially the most serious intervention that the 
State can use against an individual and it should therefore be used sparingly. However, 
there are three good reasons why, in the context of sexual assault, the criminal law 
ought to focus on the complainant’s affective response to the touching. First, a 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach emphasises the context-dependent nature of sexual 
assault. Secondly, a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is harm-centred, focusing on 
invasions of sexual autonomy. Thirdly, in unlawfully touching another, D changes his 
‘normative position’ towards C, and in doing so, accepts the risks involved. 
8.3.1 Context-dependency  
The ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is an interpretive approach as it requires the 
decision-maker to consider the complainant’s affective response to, or subjective 
experience of the action or omission, in contrast to a non-interpretive approach as was 
analysed in chapter 6. A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is not only concerned with 
C’s experienced harm and understanding of the incident. C’s experience will also be 
important where there is no tangible harm but where C is alarmed or put in fear. A 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach highlights the need to refer to C’s perspective in 
order to appreciate the seriousness of the act’s impact and the level of D’s culpability. A 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would focus entirely on 
the individual complainant and whether they experienced the act as ‘sexual’. This 
emphasises the context-dependent nature of sexual assault and demonstrates respect 
for an individual’s sexual and bodily autonomy. Consider an alleged case of sexual 
 258 
 
assault where a defendant slaps the buttocks of a woman standing at a bar. The 
defendant does not appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, but the complainant 
experiences the action as an invasion of her sexual integrity. In fairness to the 
complainant, who has been wronged, a complainant-subjective’ approach emphasises 
that the complainant’s perception of the ‘sexual’ nature of the act is determinative of 
the question whether the touching was ‘sexual’.  
 
The ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is fairest to complainants for sexual assault cases 
at the fringes of liability. This refers to those actions that are not because of their nature 
‘sexual’ e.g. brushing someone’s hair or attempting to remove their shoes.93 In chapter 
5, I argued that no touching is intrinsically or inherently ‘sexual’ and accordingly the 
term ‘sexual’ is context-dependent. A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning 
of ‘sexual’ emphasises the context-dependent nature of the term and the individual 
nature of affective responses to touching. A decision-maker cannot evaluate the 
seriousness of a sexual assault without knowing how the crime has affected the victim, 
for the degree of harm is ‘partly a function of the differential response by the victim’.94  
8.3.2 Sexual autonomy  
A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is harm-centred. The 
centrality of harm in the theory of criminal law is closely associated with the utilitarian 
tradition, which holds that the purpose of punishment is to further the interests of 
society. At the heart of liberalism is the proposition that the State is justified in 
intervening to regulate conduct only when that conduct causes harm to others. The 
Harm principle was first articulated by John Stuart Mill: 
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‘That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilised community against his will is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’95 
This then brings us to the question of what counts as harm, and in the context of sexual 
assault what is the harm that the State is attempting to prevent? On Feinberg’s account 
a harm is a ‘thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest’.96 Taken as a 
miscellaneous collection, one’s interests consist of all those things in which one has a 
stake. When we are harmed, one or more of our interests is left in a worse state than it 
was beforehand. Harm therefore involves the impairment of a person’s opportunities to 
engage in worthwhile activities and relationships and to pursue valuable, self-chosen, 
goals. 
 
Part of the rationale for laws against sexual offending is to protect the autonomy of 
individuals in sexual interaction, ensuring that there are criminal prohibitions to prevent 
unwanted sexual interference and to criminalize those who culpably interfere with 
individuals’ sexual autonomy.97 Sexual autonomy affects well-being not only because it 
promotes self-respect but also because it helps one pursue preferences of various kinds. 
The wrongfulness of sexual assault derives from the fact that the victim has a 
proprietary right over her own body. It is her body, she owns it, nobody else may use it 
without her saying so.98 Sexuality is an intrinsic part of one’s personality, it is one mode 
of expressing that personality in relation to others, and it is therefore fundamental that 
one should be able to choose whether to express oneself in this way. Even where a 
sexual assault involves no significant physical force, it constitutes a wrong in the sense 
that it invades a deeply personal zone, gaining non-consensually that which should only 
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be shared consensually.99 The right of sexual autonomy provides that people have the 
right to decide with whom to have sexual relations.100 Where a person participates in a 
sexual act in respect of which she has not freely chosen to be involved, that person’s 
autonomy has been infringed, and a wrong has been done to her.  
 
Much of our personal identity is tied to our gender and sexual expression and hence to 
our sexual self-determination. Sexual assault is a form of being subjected to another’s 
dominion. In sexual interactions, unlike in other interactions, it is more important that 
we are able to control whom we are intimate with, since sexual relationships expose us 
more than other relationships and thereby make us more vulnerable. This is a reason 
why non-consensual sexual touching, even as a ‘joke’ is offensive. It makes the recipient 
merely a sexual being, vulnerable and exposed. The essence of ‘sexual self-expression’ is 
that it should be voluntary, both in the giving and in the receiving. Gardner and Shute 
argue that the real ‘gravaman’ of rape is that it amounts to ‘the sheer use of a person, 
and in that sense the objectification of a person’.101 In their view, rape is ‘dehumanizing’ 
because it is ‘a denial of the victim’s personhood’.102 These arguments can just as easily 
be applied to sexual assault. Even the momentary non-consensual caress of a woman’s 
clothed breast is wrongful in that it amounts to regarding the complainant as an object 
and ‘using’ her.  
 
In assessing the meaning of ‘sexual’ from the complainant’s perspective, this approach is 
the most complainant-centred because it takes account of the particular complainant, 
and the many differences in individual’s experiences and perceptions of non-consensual 
touching. The focus shifts from an emphasis on the mental state of the defendant, to a 
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focus on the actions themselves and how the complainant perceives and experiences 
these actions. The ‘complainant-subjective’ standard has the advantage of avoiding 
claims of stereotyping and essentialism:  it does not assume there is a commonly held 
belief about how individuals should and do experience and react to touching. 
Complainant’s perceptions are not measured against a universalizing external standard. 
If a woman suffers an invasion of her sexual autonomy it should not matter whether she 
is particularly sensitive or insensitive.  
 
8.3.3 ‘Change of normative position’103 
A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is preferable to a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach 
because it puts the person who has been wronged, the victim, at the heart of criminal 
justice. Accordingly, it requires the law to show solidarity with those who have been 
wronged. One argument for ‘complainant-subjectivity’ is that in unlawfully touching 
another, D changes his ‘normative position’ towards C, and in doing so, accepts the risks 
involved. Horder argues that defendants who embark on conduct which carries a risk 
that someone may be harmed should be liable for the harm caused, even where that 
harm is greater than the harm intended or foreseen, because they ‘deserve’ their bad 
luck.104 On this approach, it is the commission of any crime against another that is taken 
to supply sufficient culpability to justify extended liability. The relevant normative 
position for sexual assault is the commission of a battery. By choosing to engage in 
unlawful touching, the defendant crosses a significant moral and criminal threshold and 
should be held responsible where C perceives the touching as ‘sexual’ in nature, since it 
would not have resulted if D had not crossed the moral threshold. Accordingly, once D is 
on the wrong side of the law he should be answerable for any resulting harm or 
experiences that can be said to have been caused by him.  
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This brings us to the question of when does D change his normative position, or cross a 
moral threshold, sufficiently for liability for sexual assault? Suppose D strokes C’s arm, 
with the result that C experiences the touching as ‘sexual’ and suffers long-term 
psychological effects. There are a number of possible fault elements in such a case. First, 
D could have been pushed into C at a busy shopping mall, accidentally stroking C’s arm 
as he tries to steady himself. This case can be eliminated on the basis that D did not 
intend to assault C or to commit any wrong against C. Secondly, D could have seen C 
crying, approached her and stroked her arm in order to provide comfort and 
reassurance. Here D intended to touch C but did not intend to commit any wrong 
against her. Thirdly, D could have approached C whilst she was sitting alone in a 
nightclub and stroked her arm. Such a scenario ought to be sufficient for sexual assault 
because D has intentionally assaulted C, thereby changing his normative position in 
relation to harms that might result, including C experiencing the touching as ‘sexual’. 
Despite the fact that D might have lacked any awareness of the sexual circumstance, he 
ought to be liable as he manifests a disregard for C’s sexual integrity and ought to have 
been aware of the possible invasion of sexual autonomy. There is a duty not knowingly 
to wrong another by injuring their protected interests in sexual and bodily integrity by 
way of an unlawful battery. The most significant element in D’s conduct is his decision to 
touch another without consent and there is insufficient moral weight in the plea, ‘I only 
intended to touch C’s breasts as a joke’. D displays indifference to the possibility that C 
will experience an invasion of her sexual autonomy and he should be criminally liable for 
further unintended consequences that result from his intrusion. 
 
8.4 PROBLEMS WITH A ‘COMPLAINANT-SUBJECTIVE’ APPROACH  
The criminalisation of sexual assault as partially contingent on the reaction of the 
complainant is advantageous in terms of widening the scope of behaviour amenable to 
prosecution. However, it also bears significant problems and dangers for criminal 
justice. First, it does not establish a minimum level of tolerance to the disagreeable 
actions of others. Secondly, it would create an offence of uncertainty: a defendant could 
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be liable for an act that nobody other than the complainant considered to be ‘sexual’, 
violating the principle of fair warning. Lastly, it contravenes the principle of fair labelling 
as the defendant is not labelled in proportion to his conduct. Each of these problems 
will be addressed. Whilst acknowledging these problems, I will argue that a 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach has considerable merit because it focuses on the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy, which is the humane and just thing to do. 
8.4.1 ‘Net-widening’ 
One of the criticisms of a wholly ‘complainant-subjective’ test is that it does not create 
the appearance of justice: it implies that the law is only concerned with the 
complainant’s experience and definition of the nature of the conduct.  A wholly 
‘complainant-subjective’ approach would create an offence of great breadth, as it would 
not establish a de minimis exception. An act that is de minimis is one that does not rise 
to a level of sufficient importance to be dealt with judicially. The law insists on 
appearing rational, neutral and fair and a ‘complainant-subjective’ standard 
acknowledges that defendants would be liable as a result of a complainant’s 
idiosyncratic affective response. Complexities arise when we consider the 
hypersensitive woman who perceives a touch on her shoulder as an invasion of her 
sexual autonomy. It is questionable whether the ‘reasonable person’ or even the 
‘reasonable woman’ would consider this a ‘sexual’ touching. Orthodox subjectivists 
would argue that a defendant should not be convicted of sexual assault on the basis that 
only C perceived the touching as ‘sexual’. What about the complainant who has been 
abused in her past, and consequently perceives any touching as a sexual violation, 
however innocently D meant it? A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach would make the 
experiences of those who are hypersensitive key to interpreting whether the touching 
was ‘sexual’ thereby creating an extremely wide offence with virtually no limitations. In 
the context of sexual harassment, Rubenstein suggests that a ‘complainant-subjective’ 
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test would ‘trivialise sexual harassment’ and that ‘negative publicity would result if 
minor cases were allowed and the law would not be taken seriously.’105  
 
The ‘complainant-subjective’ definition of harassment and the generality of the 
definition of ‘course of conduct’,106 give rise to the potential to impose liability107 based 
upon two incidents that nobody other than the complainant would view as harassment. 
Addison and Lawson-Cruttenden suggest that, ‘almost any form of activity which annoys 
another person could technically be described as harassment’ and they give the 
example of the person who cries ‘here comes useless’ whenever a work colleague 
enters the room.108 If repeated on two occasions this would amount to a course of 
conduct, it may well cause the recipient to feel harassed and if the court considered that 
D ought to have known that that might be the consequence of his conduct then D would 
be liable under s.2. Whilst this behaviour is clearly unpleasant, it is debatable whether it 
should attract criminal liability. There is a danger that excessive paternalism will lead to 
increased reliance upon the courts to adjudicate the most ‘minor of life’s disruptions’.109 
This is only problematic when C’s experience is determinative and I am positing a 
situation in which C’s experience is necessary, but not sufficient for liability. 
 
The introduction of a de minimis standard to the meaning of ‘sexual’ would detract from 
the ‘complainant-subjective’ nature of the offence by establishing an objective 
borderline between ‘sexual’ and ‘non-sexual’ conduct. Without a provision that 
establishes a minimum level of tolerance to the disagreeable actions of other, the level 
of criminality is exceptionally low as the ‘complainant-subjective’ standard of ‘sexual’ 
encompasses the hypersensitive. However, the law prohibits any touching of another 
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person without consent or lawful excuse and a ‘complainant-subjective’ test would 
declare the law’s regard for the sexual integrity of citizens.110 As Blackstone put it: ‘the 
law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally 
prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s person being sacred, and no  other 
having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner’. 111 Is a certain degree of 
sexual touching an acceptable aspect of everyday life? There are lots of types of 
touching that occur in everyday life, some of which are non-consensual and some of 
which may be experienced as ‘sexual’ by the recipient; however, which of these types of 
touching is routinely acceptable as part of everyday life is narrower than that within 
‘non-sexual’ assault or harassment. Sexual assault may be committed by the least 
unwanted touching or stroking of one person’s body by another and the law should 
make clear that the offence concerns the invasion of another person’s right not to be 
touched or violated in any way. 
8.4.2 Uncertainty and consistency of approach 
A second criticism of the ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is that it might create an 
offence of uncertainty,112 as a person will not be able to predict whether a particular 
type of conduct will result in criminal liability. It bases liability on that which is 
inherently unknowable to the defendant: the reaction and experience of another 
person. Different people respond to similar situations in different ways. It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to predict with any degree of certainty how another individual will 
respond in a given situation. Obviously ‘sexual’ conduct will not pose a problem.113 It is 
highly probable that most complainants would find non-consensual contact between 
the naked genitalia of the defendant and naked genitalia, face or mouth of the 
complainant harmful. Difficulty arises when more ambiguous conduct is involved, such 
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as the pinching of the buttocks, combing of the hair or removal of shoes. A defendant 
could target two women with exactly the same behaviour, resulting in two different 
responses. One may be unperturbed by the action and readily able to dismiss the 
conduct as harmless, whilst the other experiences this as an invasion of her sexual 
integrity. D might therefore be liable for his actions towards the latter woman and not 
the former. The context-dependent nature of the term ‘sexual’ renders the definition of 
conduct contingent on something that is neither ascertainable nor predictable to the 
defendant at the time of the action. However, drawing on the earlier argument that the 
defendant who unlawfully touches another person changes their ‘normative position’ 
towards that person, a ‘complainant-subjective’ test would require the defendant to 
consider the complainant’s interests.  
 
A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ might be criticised for 
lacking clarity, violating one of the fundamental principles of criminal law, fair warning. 
Defendants could be held accountable in situations where they could not have 
anticipated the complainant’s reaction and no one could have. By treating the terms 
‘sexual’ and ‘harassment’ in a ‘complainant-subjective’ manner there is a risk ‘of 
pandering to people who are either susceptible to or particularly offended by certain 
forms of behaviour on the basis of their own life experience, trauma and so forth’.114 
Many would argue that conviction of a criminal offence should not depend on the 
personality of the complainant. It is not in the interests of justice that a defendant 
should be liable for an act that only the complainant perceives as ‘sexual’. This goes 
against the principle that the criminal law punishes fault. Respect for the citizen as a 
rational, autonomous individual and as a person with social and political duties requires 
fair warning of the criminal law’s provisions and no undue difficulty in ascertaining 
them.115  
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Closely related to the idea of uncertainty, a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ also raises issues of consistency of application of criminal law and 
non-retroactivity. The concepts of equality and fairness that underlie the criminal law 
require decision-makers to apply the law consistently. The requirement that touching is 
‘sexual’ is a central element of the definition of sexual assault and implementing a 
‘complainant-subjective’ test means that this element of the actus reus would have 
different meanings depending on the individual complainant. One might argue that 
consistency in the application of the criminal law is a defendant interest and that a 
complainant-centred offence makes the law unnecessarily complex and might inevitably 
lead to inconsistencies. However, arguably, there are different types of consistency and 
in the context of sexual assault, two arguments can be put forward. First, that the 
criminal law ought to be focusing on consistency of respect for complainant’s interests 
and secondly, that consistency as a principle can be compromised. The second of these 
arguments is more defensible. Whilst consistency of application is an important 
principle of criminal law, in the context of sexual assault there are clear policy 
justifications as to why it can be compromised. In areas that are especially complex, 
such as the meaning of ‘sexual’ it would be impossible for all the contradictions and 
ambiguities in the law to be removed. Whilst a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach would 
not necessarily be any more certain or consistent the argument, as I argued above, is for 
putting victims’ at the heart of criminal justice.  
8.4.3 (Un)fair labelling  
If the definition of ‘sexual’ were to be judged ‘complainant-subjectively’, a defendant 
could be liable for an act which nobody other than the complainant considered to be 
‘sexual’. A defendant could be subject to notification requirements and entry onto the 
Sex Offender’s Register for an act that only one person distinguished as ‘sexual’ assault. 
Fair labelling requires offences to be appropriately defined so that the label reflects 
accurately what the defendant has done. One of the justifications for the principle of 
fair labelling is that offenders be labelled and punished in proportion to their 
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wrongdoing. It might be argued that a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach violates the 
principle as the ‘sexual’ nature of contact is established purely from the C’s perspective, 
when in fact nobody else would consider the defendant a ‘sexual’ offender. However, in 
chapter 4 I argued that it is important that an offence label sufficiently represents the 
nature and seriousness of the harm done to the victim. 
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
A ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is the most complainant-centred of all those 
analysed. Primacy would be given to the complainant in determining the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the touching and therefore distinguishing sexual touching from a battery. 
‘Complainant-subjective’ approaches are harm-centred: they require the decision maker 
to consider any violations of the complainant’s sexual and bodily autonomy. They 
further acknowledge the many differences in individual complainants’ experiences and 
perceptions of non-consensual touching. There appears to be greater general awareness 
and concern amongst lawmakers for offences that include experience-centred 
approaches. There is precedent in English law for offences to be defined, if only 
partially, in terms of the complainant’s experience of an act or omission and criminal 
harassment was used as a case-study. However, the emergence of victims as a central 
part of modern criminal justice policy poses challenges to orthodox conceptions of 
criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. ‘Complainant-subjective’ approaches 
might lead to ‘net-widening’, establishing too low a threshold for liability. They might 
also create offences of uncertainty, as a person will not be able to predict whether a 
particular type of conduct will result in criminal liability and lead to unfair labelling. 
Although there are certain dangers with adopting a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach 
to the meaning of ‘sexual’, for example that it could result in a defendant being 
convicted of sexual assault for an act which nobody other than the complainant 
considered to be ‘sexual’, this approach should be favoured.  A ‘complainant-subjective’ 
approach requires the decision-maker to consider the complainant’s affective response 
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to the touching highlighting how in changing his ‘normative position’ towards the C, D 
should be liable for all the consequences of his action. 
 
In chapter 9 the current legal approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’, set out in s.78 SOA 
2003 will be evaluated to test the extent to which the law actually is complainant-
centred’. The definition of ‘sexual’ and recent limited case-law interpreting the provision 
will be analysed, demonstrating the insufficiently complainant-centred nature of the 
present approach. 
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9 
To What Extent is Section 78 of the SOA 2003 Sufficiently 
Complainant-centred?  
 
The requirement that conduct is ‘sexual’ appears in a number of offences in the SOA 
2003.1 It is therefore of great significance and the Act seeks to explain an approach, 
though not a definition, based on that propounded by the House of Lords in Court.2 This 
chapter will analyse the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’. S.78 requires that penetration, 
touching or any other activity must pass one of two tests in order to be labelled as 
‘sexual’ and envisages three possible situations: (i) the act is indisputably ‘sexual’; (ii) the 
act is potentially ‘sexual’; and (iii) the act is indisputably not ‘sexual’. This chapter will 
examine the problems and ambiguities surrounding the use of the word ‘sexual’ in the 
SOA 2003 and the way it is used as a defining feature of many of the offences, with 
particular emphasis on sexual assault. It will focus specifically on the extent to which the 
current definition of ‘sexual’ sufficiently takes into account the complainant’s 
experience of the act. I will argue that the lack of certainty and clarity which has 
resulted from the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ is undesirable as the offence of sexual 
assault may not cover acts experienced by complainants’ as ‘sexual’. Accordingly, s.3 
might fail to be the complainant-centred offence envisaged by the Government during 
the early stages of the reform process. The s.78 definition is unclear, ambiguous and 
likely to lead to inconsistencies. 
 
Part 1 will analyse the original clause 80 of the Sexual Offences Bill and its subsequent 
amendments in Parliament, highlighting the lack of discussion given to the meaning of 
                                                             
1
 Including ss.2-4 (assault by penetration, sexual assault, causing sexual activity without consent), 6-12 
(offences against children), 16-19 (abuse of positions of trust), 25-26 (sexual activity with a family 
member), 30-41 (offences against those with a mental disorder), 64-65 (sex with an adult relative) and 70-
71 (sexual penetration of a corpse, sexual activity in a public lavatory).  
2
 R v Court [1989] AC 28. See chapter 2. 
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‘sexual’ and how the complex definition set out in clause 80 would have forced users to 
turn to the explanatory note for guidance. Part 2 will evaluate four criticisms of the 
existing approach to the meaning of ‘sexual’ specified in s.78: it is tautological, obscure, 
sex-negative and unclear as to when the issue must be left to the jury.  
 
Part 3 will analyse the three possible situations envisaged by the s.78 definition. It 
demonstrates how s.78 is insufficiently precise and does not provide clear guidance on 
what constitutes ‘sexual’. It will be argued that the current definition of ‘sexual’ is 
complex and vague, making it hard for judges and juries to interpret and apply to factual 
situations. There are three main grounds of criticism. First, s.78(a) provides that some 
acts may be indisputably ‘sexual’, but these acts are very limited in number and type. 
Secondly, s.78(b) gives juries and magistrates a lot of discretion to decide what else is 
‘sexual’, requiring them to consider the ‘circumstances’ and ‘purpose of any person’ in 
relation to the action. There is an inherent complexity in the concepts of ‘circumstances’ 
and ‘purpose’, resulting from the undefined form in which they have been introduced. 
In particular, this part will consider where, if anywhere, the complainant’s interpretation 
of the act is relevant for the purposes of s.78, considering whether it is a legally relevant 
‘circumstance’ or ‘purpose’ that can or must be considered by the decision-maker. 
Consideration will also be given to the decision in R v H (Karl Anthony)3 and the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal to s.78 where the touching was not 
automatically by its nature ‘sexual’. Thirdly, there is no act that is incapable of being 
‘sexual’ so that any act has the potential to be turned into a ‘sexual’ one by D’s purpose 
being sexual gratification or where C experiences the action as ‘sexual’. 
 
The definition of ‘sexual’ will be criticised for being insufficiently complainant-centred 
and in part 4, I will propose an addition to the s.78 definition that makes explicit 
reference to C’s experience. This would require the jury or magistrates to consider the 
                                                             
3
 R v H (Karl Anthony) [2005] EWCA Crim 732. 
  
272 
 
complainant’s affective response to the touching and would force the law to show 
solidarity with those who have been harmed through an invasion of their sexual 
integrity. 
 
9.1 CLAUSE 80 OF THE SEXUAL OFFENCES BILL 
Section 3(1)(b) SOA 2003 states that for a conviction of sexual assault the touching must 
be ‘sexual’. The Setting the Boundaries review was concerned not to use very broad 
terms such as ‘indecency’ in offences, preferring instead to frame clearer and more 
specific offences.4 However, ‘sexual’ is also a very broad term and arguably no clearer 
than indecency in this context. The review suggested that defining proscribed behaviour 
by body parts (breasts/buttocks/genitalia), such as the genital proximity text proposed 
in Beal v Kelly5 is inflexible and that a better alternative is to define sexual touching as 
behaviour that a reasonable person would consider ‘sexual’, thus reflecting a 
‘bystander-objective’ approach as discussed in chapter 6. 
 
The original clause 80 of the Sexual Offences Bill, as introduced in the House of Lords on 
28th January 2003, defined ‘sexual’ in the following way: 
‘For the purposes of this Part, penetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if- 
(a) from its nature, a reasonable person would consider that it may (at least) be sexual, 
and 
(b) a reasonable person would consider that it is sexual because of its nature, its 
circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it, or all or some of those 
considerations.’ 
Lord Falconer claimed that the definition was ‘guided by the case law’ on the definition 
of the word ‘indecent’ in the context of an indecent assault.6 However, in the context of 
indecent assault the standard was that of the ‘right-minded person’ whereas the 
                                                             
4
 Home Office Consultation Paper, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (July 2000) 
at para 2.14.4. 
5
[1951] 2 All ER 736, at 764. See chapter 2, ss. 2.2.1 and 2.2.4. 
6
 Lord Falconer of Thoroton, HL Deb 19
th
 May 2003 col 617. 
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definition of ‘sexual’ explicitly refers to the ‘reasonable person’. There was limited 
Parliamentary debate on the meaning of the term ‘sexual’. A significant proportion of 
the discussion on the Sexual Offences Bill focused on the scope of the offence of rape 
and the decision to provide a definition of consent. As a result, the other, ‘minor’ 
offences, such as sexual assault, were only briefly considered. The limited discussion 
given to the meaning of ‘sexual’ is surprising considering that it is a defining feature of 
many of the new offences.7 In relying on the characterization of ‘indecent’ conduct to 
define ‘sexual’ and by providing a definition that uses the very term it is defining, 
Parliament has provided a definition that is ambiguous and which has not addressed the 
problems and ambiguities that arose in attempting to distinguish ‘indecent’ assault from 
common assault. 
 
9.1.1 Paragraph (a) 
Paragraph (a) required the decision-maker to consider how the reasonable person 
would look at the nature of the activity in question. According to the official explanatory 
notes, paragraph (a) covered any ‘obviously sexual activity’ such as sexual intercourse or 
masturbation.8 If it would not occur to the reasonable person that it would be ‘sexual’, it 
did not meet the test, even if a particular individual may obtain sexual gratification from 
carrying out the activity. According to the official explanatory notes, ‘the effect of this is 
that obscure fetishes do not fall within the definition of sexual activity’.9 All fetishes are 
by their nature somewhat ‘obscure’, to the extent that sexual arousal is associated with 
a depersonalized physical thing, traditionally non-living objects. However, one 
interpretation of the explanatory note might be that there are some fetishes that are 
commonly recognised as fetishes, including boots, leather and domination. Other 
                                                             
7
 See n 1. 
8
 Sexual Offences Bill: Explanatory Notes (HL) Session 2002-03. 
9
 Ibid.  
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fetishes are obscure and might be experienced by only a very few people, for example 
dendrophilia in which a person is aroused by trees.10 
 
The meaning of the phrase ‘it may (at least) be sexual’11 would have been confusing and 
arguably unnecessary. Lord Falconer maintained that the words ‘at least’ had an 
important purpose in clause 80 because of the way in which the definition is set out.12 
He clarified by stating that the phrase was chosen in an attempt to ‘cover acts that may 
or may not be sexual,’ such as digital penetration of a woman’s vagina by a GP in his 
surgery and ‘acts that are always sexual, for example sexual intercourse.’13  Surely, the 
definition meant ‘that an activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider it 
sexual’ and if so, why did the drafters choose to make the definition more complex than 
necessary? 
 
9.1.2 Paragraph (b) 
Paragraph (b) of the original clause required the reasonable person to consider the 
nature, circumstances or purpose of the activity in considering whether it is ‘sexual’. The 
example given in the explanatory notes was the digital penetration of a woman’s vagina 
by a doctor.14 Penetration could be fundamental to diagnosis or treatment, but could 
also be wholly irrelevant and only carried out for the doctor’s sexual gratification. Lord 
Lucas was concerned that the words ‘or all or some of these considerations’ in 
paragraph (b) might allow a court merely to consider some of the circumstances, rather 
than taking into account all the relevant circumstances; or to consider the nature of the 
activity and not its circumstances.15 He expressed concern that touching a young girl on 
                                                             
10
 See J. Money, „Paraphilias: Phenomenology and Classification‟ (1984) 38 American Journal of 
Psychotherapy 164. 
11
 My emphasis. 
12
 HL Deb 19
th
 May 2003 col 619. 
13
 Ibid. See chapter 5 for discussion of the problems of defining the essence of „sexual‟ and the argument 
that penile penetration of the vagina is not always „sexual‟. 
14
 At para 65. 
15
 HL Deb 17
th 
 June 2003 col 744-7 
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her bottom might not be considered ‘sexual’ if the circumstances or the purposes of the 
action were considered. Lord Lucas moved to insert ‘in all the circumstances’ after the 
word ‘consider’ in paragraph (b). Baroness Scotland promised that this was not what the 
wording meant.16 She further explained that, ‘*w+e do not want to capture activity that 
no reasonable person would consider to be sexual just because the defendant 
happened to have a secret fetish not known to the victim’.17 Baroness Scotland clarified 
that the definition was drafted carefully to exclude touching another person for 
‘legitimate, non-sexual reasons, such as an emergency medical purpose or to touch a 
child on the bottom to push it out of the way of a speeding car’.18 
 
Bennion argues that the original definition of ‘sexual’ was useless unless you had the 
explanatory note.19 He suggests that the complex definition and meaning of ‘it may (at 
least) be sexual’ would force users to turn for guidance to the explanatory note. This 
should not be the case since most users of the act, including judges, juries and 
practitioners will not have the explanatory note. The preface to the explanatory notes 
justly points out that they have no authority and are purely for guidance purposes. 
 
Clause 80 had two limbs (paragraphs (a) and (b)), both of which must be satisfied if the 
activity in question was to be held ‘sexual’. What is relevant here is the use of the term 
‘and’ rather than ‘or’ separating the two paragraphs. Clause 80, (then clause 79) was 
amended by Standing Committee B on 18 September 2003,20 to make it easier for ‘juries 
to understand’ and to improve its ‘clarity’. Clause 79 became section 78 SOA 2003 (see 
definition below). In moving the amendment, to substitute the ‘or’ for ‘and’ Paul 
Goggins MP for the Government said: 
                                                             
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 F. Bennion, „The Meaning of „Sexual‟ in the Sexual Offences Bill 2003‟ (2003) 167 JP 764. 
20
 Cols 311-313. 
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‘The jury are required to use three criteria in their assessment of whether an activity 
was sexual: whether an act is sexual by its own nature or is only ambiguously sexual by 
nature; the circumstances in which the act took place; and the purpose of any person in 
relation to the act. In short, the test covers all activity that a reasonable person would 
consider sexual. However, it rules out any activity that a reasonable person would never 
consider sexual by reason of its nature, such as removing a person’s shoes. That ensures 
that we do not capture activity that no reasonable person would consider to be sexual, 
and may have been sexual only because the defendant happened to have a secret fetish 
not made known to the victim- in that example, a foot fetish.’21  
Paul Goggins assumed that in all situations where D has a secret fetish this is not made 
known to C. There is also the possibility that D does not know that he has a fetish, but a 
reasonable person would know. In such a situation, D’s conduct would satisfy this 
element of the actus reus regardless of the fact that D is unaware of the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the touching. 
 
9.2 SECTION 78 DEFINITION OF ‘SEXUAL’ 
Section 78 provides that: 
‘*P+enetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would 
consider that- 
(a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is 
because of its nature sexual, or 
(b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the 
purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.’ 
Section 78 applies the same test as clause 79, but clearly separates activity that is 
‘sexual’ by nature, and would be considered to be so by any reasonable person 
regardless of the circumstances in which it takes place or the purpose of any person in 
relation to it (paragraph (a)), from activity that is ‘sexual’ only because of those 
circumstances or that purpose (paragraph (b)).  
                                                             
21
 Ibid at col 312. 
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9.2.1 Criticisms of the s.78 definition 
There are four criticisms that can be levelled at the s.78 definition. First, it is not a true 
definition. Secondly, the definition is obscure. Thirdly, the definition is an example of 
what Bennion labels the ‘sex-negative’ nature of the act.22 Fourthly, the section is 
unclear as to when the issue must be left to the jury.  
 
(a) Lack of a true definition 
The s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ is not a true definition. It breaks the first logical rule of 
definitions by using the very term it is defining, and doing so with the assumption that 
the reader already knows the intended meaning of that term. As Mellone wrote, ‘A 
definition must not use the term to be defined. An apparent definition which commits 
this fault is said to be “circular” or “tautological”…’23 In the context of sexual assault this 
is significant because it assumes that the jury or magistrates already have a common 
understanding of the meaning of ‘sexual’. If the decision-maker is assumed to be aware 
of the meaning of ‘sexual’ then the s.78 definition would be superfluous. 
 
(b) Obscurity of the definition 
A further fault is that the supposed definition in s.78 is obscure. Mellone said, ‘The 
definition should not be obscure. This arises usually from the use of expressions, which 
are less familiar than the one to be defined, thus defining “the obscure by the more 
obscure” (obscurum per obscurius)’.24 Which activities are ‘because of *their+ nature 
sexual’?25 There are many popular and etymological meanings of the term ‘sexual’. The 
Oxford English Dictionary26 has no fewer than five quite different definitions of the 
                                                             
22
 Op cit, n 19. 
23
 S.H. Mellone, Elements of Modern Logic (University Tutorial Press, London, 1949). 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 My emphasis. 
26
 www.oed.com [Online] (Accessed: 1
st
 October 2007). 
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adjective ‘sexual’, highlighting the breadth of its possible interpretations.27 Of these the 
most relevant to this work are:28 
‘3.  a. Designating those organs or anatomical structures concerned in sexual 
reproduction or (esp.) in sexual intercourse, as sexual organ (often in pl.), 
sexual parts. 
 
   b. Relating to or affecting the genitals or reproductive organs. 
 
4.  a. Relating to, tending towards, or involving sexual intercourse, or other forms 
of intimate physical contact. 
 
b. Of or relating to sexuality as a social or cultural phenomenon; regarding 
sexual conduct. 
 
c. Characterized by sexual instincts or feelings, or the capacity for these; 
possessing or displaying sexuality.’ 
Bennion suggests that the SOA 2003 ‘mystifyingly’ avoids saying what the Oxford English 
Dictionary 1989 says;29 namely, that in the sense intended, penetration, touching or any 
other activity by a person, is ‘sexual’ if carried out with a view to the ‘gratification of 
their sexual appetites’.30 However, Bennion’s proposed clarification is arguably no 
clearer, as the phrase ‘gratification of sexual appetites’ is extremely vague and it is not 
‘mystifying’ that the Government should seek to avoid using it. It is plausible that the 
                                                             
27
 F. Bennion, Sexual Ethics and Criminal Law: A Critique of the Sexual Offences Bill 2003 (Lester 
Publishing, Oxford, 2003) p. 27. 
28
 The other definitions are: 
1.  Characteristic of or peculiar to the female sex; feminine. 
2. a.  Of, relating to, or arising from the fact or condition of being either male or female; 
predicated on biological sex; (also) of, relating to, or arising from gender, orientation 
with regard to sex, or the social and cultural relations between the sexes. 
    b.  Biol. Of an animal, plant, or other organism: characterized by sex; sexed, sexuate; 
capable of sexual reproduction; having distinct male and female reproductive organs, 
often (though not necessarily) in separate individuals. Opposed to asexual. 
5.  Biol. Of reproduction in animals, plants, and other organisms: taking place by means of a 
physical connection or fusion between two cells (usually distinct male and female 
reproductive cells or gametes) and the recombination of their genetic material to produce 
a new cell with a genotype containing elements from each. Esp. in sexual reproduction. 
Opposed to asexual or agamic. 
29
 J.A. Simpson & E.S.C Weiner, The Oxford English Dictionary 2
nd 
edn (Clarendon, Oxford, 1989): 
„Relative to the physical intercourse between the sexes or the gratification of sexual appetites.‟ (emphasis 
added). 
30
 Op cit, n 19. 
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Government would want to avoid the use of ambiguous phrases such as ‘gratification’ 
and ‘sexual appetite’, which would need further definition and be open to wide 
interpretation. If ‘gratification’ refers to the intention to give rise to the sexual arousal 
of either party, that would place an additional burden on prosecutors to prove that 
intention.   
 
(c) ‘Sexual’ and sex-negativism 
Bennion further suggests that the lack of definition of ‘sexual’ is another example of the 
‘sex-negative’ nature of the act. The terms and concept of ‘sex-positive’ and ‘sex-
negative’ are generally attributed to Wilhelm Reich. His hypothesis was that some 
societies view sexual expression as essentially good and healthy, while other societies 
take an overall negative view of sexuality and seek to repress and control the sex 
drive.31 Bennion argues that sex positivism or the happy acceptance of human sexuality, 
seeking its fulfilment, is largely absent from our society, even though it is essential for 
human happiness.32 He proposes that what the Act means by ‘sexual’ is having to do 
with sexual desire and what in some places it calls sexual gratification and yet it is afraid 
to say so.33 Bennion fails to consider that D’s motive for an act does not have to be 
sexual gratification. If D’s purpose in inserting an instrument in a women’s vagina is to 
humiliate and/or injure her and there is no element of sexual gratification, it would still 
be ‘sexual’ under s.78 because his purpose is to use what, in those circumstances, are 
sexual means to achieve his main purpose.  
 
(d) When must the issue be left to the jury? 
Sexual assault is a triable-either way offence and it is therefore a question of fact for the 
jury (or magistrates) whether the touching meets the requirements of s.78. If the judge 
considers that no reasonable person properly directed could find that it does, he should 
                                                             
31
 W. Reich, The Invasion of Compulsory Sex-Morality (Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1971) 
32
 F. Bennion, The Sex Code: Morals for Moderns (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975). 
33
 Op cit, n 19. 
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not leave the question to the jury.34 If the defence submit that this is the proper course, 
the judge will need to decide whether the jury could reasonably find that a reasonable 
person would consider that the alleged touching is ‘sexual’, either because of its nature 
alone or because of its nature combined with the circumstances in which it takes place 
and/or the purpose of any person in relation to it. If he concludes that a reasonable 
person could possibly answer those questions adversely to the defendant, then the 
matter would have to be left to the jury.35 The question of whether a reasonable person 
could find a particular touching ‘sexual’ may not always be easily answered. This test is 
rather ambiguous in the context of what constitutes a reasonable person. As Lord 
Northbourne rightly noted, ‘*p+eople with so many different views can all be 
reasonable’.36 There is a risk that what is considered ‘reasonable’ will be another aspect 
of the legislation which will be left to the discretion of judges and in an increasingly 
pluralistic and fragmented society this is likely to lead to inconsistent decision-making. 
There is the possibility that judges have a particular view of what constitutes ‘sexual’ 
touchings, but without empirical evidence, any judgement would be speculative. In 
practice, the perceptions of the reasonable person will be those of the jury or 
magistrates; it is unlikely that they will have other evidence of what a hypothetical 
person might think about the conduct, nor will they consider themselves anything other 
than reasonable.  
 
9.3 ANALYSIS OF THE S.78 APPROACH 
S.78 does not provide a definition of the term ‘sexual’; rather it sets out an approach for 
determining whether the activity in question is ‘sexual’ where this may be in doubt (as 
shown in figure 9.1 below).37 This approach closely mirrors the decision in Court,38 in 
                                                             
34
 R v H [2005] EWCA Crim 732, at para 12. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 HL Deb 19
th
 May 2003 col 609. 
37
 J. Temkin & A. Ashworth. „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems 
of Consent‟ [2004] Crim L R 331. 
38
 [1989] AC 28. 
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which the House of Lords distinguished three types of case in order to decide when an 
activity could be designated ‘indecent’ for the purposes of the offence of indecent 
assault (as discussed in chapter 2). The s.78 definition envisages three possibilities: (i) 
the act is indisputably ‘sexual’; (ii) the act is potentially ‘sexual’ and (iii) the act is 
indisputably not ‘sexual’. Each will be considered in detail. Although there is no 
technical distinction made between the two parts of s.78(b), for the sake of clarity I will 
refer to s.78(b) part one and s.78(b) part two to refer to the two parts respectively. 
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Figure 9.1: Section 78 flow-chart 
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9.3.1 The act is indisputably ‘sexual’  
The first situation envisaged by s.78 is where the act is indisputably ‘sexual’. The jury or 
magistrates are asked to identify and objectify particular forms of touching as being 
inherently ‘sexual’ when in fact, as was argued in chapter 5, no form of touching is 
‘sexual’ by nature, but instead is dependent on context.39 Thus, there are no acts which 
are ‘by their nature sexual’, but there are a limited number that all ‘reasonable people’ 
might consider to be ‘sexual’ ‘by their nature’. Section 78(a) is not concerned with the a 
priori nature of acts, but with how reasonable people perceive those acts.  
 
(a) S.78(a): is it ‘because of its nature sexual’?  
Under s.78(a), the first step is to consider whether the reasonable person would 
consider the conduct ‘because of its nature sexual’. This is an objective test based upon 
whether a reasonable person would consider that the nature of the touching is ‘sexual’, 
irrespective of the surrounding circumstances or purpose of any person.  S.78(a) applies 
where the nature of the sexual activity is unambiguous to a reasonable person and does 
not require any further contextual explanation such as that advanced by the House of 
Lords in Court. Where conduct was only capable of being an indecent assault, Lord 
Ackner stated that the following factors were clearly relevant: ‘the relationship of the 
defendant to this victim (were they relatives, friends or virtually complete strangers?), 
how had the defendant come to embark on this conduct and why was he behaving in 
this way?’40 Section 78(a) can therefore be described as a context-independent test as it 
is the action, as opposed to the circumstances or purpose that is being judged. 
Underlying this approach is the philosophical concept of essentialism: the idea that 
properties or qualities possessed by a person or thing are unchanging and not 
dependent on context. It is also a non-interpretive test as it is devoid of any reference to 
the participants’ experiences. 
                                                             
39
 See chapter 5. 
40
 [1989] AC 28, at 43. 
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Temkin and Ashworth argue that s.78(a) is an objective test that is based upon whether 
the conduct is ‘transparently’ sexual.41 However, one of the weaknesses of this 
classification is that ‘transparently’ is an ambiguous term that adds no value to the 
explanation of conduct as ‘sexual’. Modifiers such as ‘transparently’, ‘inherently’42 and 
‘obviously’ might add little to an already ambiguous term such as ‘sexual’ or they might 
add additional layer(s) of complexity. ‘Transparently’ for example raises the question, 
‘transparent’ from whose perspective? Transparently also implies an external visibility 
of the act. It is possible that the drafters chose to avoid coupling ‘sexual’ with a further 
vague adverb such as ‘transparently’ which does not appear in the statute, on the basis 
of the problems caused in Court in describing conduct as ‘inherently indecent’.43  
 
Examples of conduct that the reasonable person might consider is ‘because of its nature 
sexual’ would include anal or vaginal sexual intercourse, oral sex and inserting a vibrator 
into a woman’s vagina. These actions all involve the primary sex organs. Virtually any 
penetrative act would satisfy this test,44 unless conducted in the course of bona fide 
medical examinations, treatment, or intimate searches by the police and other 
enforcement agencies. The test in s.78(a) requires a correlation between the nature of 
the activity and an associated sexual connection. In terms of non-penile penetration (for 
example the forced entry of a vibrator into the vagina) which is in essence simulating 
sexual intercourse, this is easily satisfied. 
 
In relation to sexual assault, the s.78(a) definition of ‘sexual’ would apply to those 
batteries, where there can be no doubt or ambiguity as to the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
                                                             
41
 Op cit n 37 at p.331. Temkin and Ashworth do not provide any examples of conduct they describe as 
„transparently‟ sexual. 
42
 Used by K. Stevenson., A. Davies, & M. Gunn, Blackstone’s Guide to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) p.44. 
43
 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2. 
44
 Any penetrative act falling within s.78(a) would be an offence under s.2 SOA 2003 and more 
appropriately charged under that section. This demonstrates the overlap between s.1, s.2 and s.3 as analysed 
in chapter 3, section 3.4. 
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touching. This draws attention to the connection between sexuality and reproductivity. 
In theory only touching of and/or by45 the primary or secondary sex organs without the 
consent of the complainant would constitute an indisputable sexual assault. The 
reproductive system consists of primary and secondary sex organs. The primary sex 
organs, or gonads, are organs that produce the gametes (sex cells): testes of the male 
and ovaries of the female.46 The secondary sex organs are organs other than gonads 
that are necessary for reproduction.47 According to location, the reproductive organs 
are classified as external48 and internal genitalia.49 The scrotum and penis constitute the 
external genitalia of the male and occupy the perineum.50 The external genitalia of the 
female occupy most of the perineum and are collectively called the vulva (principally the 
clitoris, labia minora and labia majora). In men, the s.78(a) definition of ‘sexual’ would 
appear to apply to touching of and/or by the scrotum and penis. In women, the s.78(a) 
definition of ‘sexual’ would appear to apply to the touching externally of and/or by the 
vulva, and internally of the vagina. The acts falling within s.78(a) appear to be quite 
limited and in respect of a charge of sexual assault appear to be limited to the touching 
of and/or by the primary and secondary sexual organs. However, considering the 
context-dependent nature of sexual assault even acts involving the primary or 
secondary sex organs may be ambiguous. 
 
(b) Interpreting s.78(a) in the courts 
                                                             
45
 Conduct that a reasonable person might consider „because of its nature sexual‟ could include where a 
man rubs his penis against any part of another person‟s body or where a woman rubs her vulva against 
another person. 
46
 K. Saladin, Anatomy and Physiology: The Unity of Form and Function (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 
New York, 2010) p.1048. See also A. Bolin, Human Sexuality: Biological, Psychological and Cultural 
perspectives (Routledge, Oxon, 2009) chs 5 & 6. 
47
 In the male, they constitute a system of ducts, glands, and the penis, concerned with the storage, survival 
and conveyance of sperm. In the female, they include the uterine tubes, uterus and vagina, concerned with 
uniting the sperm and egg and harbouring the developing foetus. 
48
 The external genitalia are located in the perineum. Most of them are externally visible, except for the 
accessory glands of the female perineum. 
49
 The internal genitalia are located mainly in the pelvic cavity, except for the male testes and some 
associated ducts contained in the scrotum. 
50
 Saladin, n 46. 
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Whilst s.78(a) appears to be a straightforward test for courts to apply because it applies 
to a limited range of conduct, it might be considered problematic in two ways. First, 
s.78(a) might be regarded as ‘overly strict’ on defendants because it does not take into 
account D’s non-sexual motive.51 Leake and Ormerod give the example of a defendant 
who pulls down C’s shorts. They suggest that the case may well fall immediately into 
s.78(a), with the nature of the act rendering it ‘indisputably sexual’. If in pulling down 
C’s shorts, the defendant had a disciplinary motive, there will only be an opportunity for 
this explanation if the case is decided under s.78(b). Leake and Ormerod appear to imply 
that nudity is inherently ‘sexual’, although as was discussed in chapter 4, arguably, 
nudity is context-dependent and therefore cases of this type should typically fall within 
s. 78(b).  
 
Secondly, Temkin and Ashworth suggest that in most cases, it will not be difficult to 
apply the test in s.78(a) and only in exceptional circumstances will s.78(b) come into 
play.52 Nevertheless, if we consider a spectrum of offences from the indisputably 
‘sexual’ to the obviously not ‘sexual’, (see figure 9.2 below) s.78(b) acquires significance 
in designating ambiguous conduct ‘sexual’. Given the difficulty in distinguishing ‘sexual’ 
from ‘non-sexual’ conduct s.78(b) has an important role in differentiating between 
sexual assault and common assault. Section s.78(a) is context-independent: the limited 
acts that fall within the subsection can be so classified because there is no need to have 
recourse to the surrounding circumstances in order to appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of 
the act. S.78(a) is neither complainant nor defendant-centred. The test is objective, 
judging the action from a reasonable person’s perspective. Paragraph (a) gives no 
consideration to the purpose of the accused or the complainant’s interpretation of the 
                                                             
51
 S. Leake & D.C. Ormerod, „Sexual Assault: Whether touching of complainant‟s clothing without 
bringing pressure against complainant‟s body „touching‟ for purposes of sexual assault?‟ [2005] Crim LR 
734. 
52
 Op cit, n 37 at p.332. 
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incident. It covers a small range of acts and thus s.78(b) assumes great importance for 
deciding whether something is ‘sexual’. 
 
9.3.2 The act is potentially ‘sexual’ 
Section 78 paragraph (b) deals with those situations where the act is potentially ‘sexual’. 
Paragraph (b) is more controversial than paragraph (a) and is ambiguous as to the 
approach jurors (or magistrates) should adopt in deciding whether an act is ‘sexual’. It 
gives juries and magistrates a lot of discretion to decide what else is ‘sexual’ based on 
their own individual understanding and interpretation of the term. 
 
(a) S.78 (b) (i): Might it be ‘sexual’ by its nature?  
The first part of s.78(b) requires the jury (or magistrates) to establish that the action 
‘because of its nature’ might be ‘sexual’. Thus, although a reasonable person would not 
consider that the activity is because of its nature ‘sexual’, the reasonable person would 
nevertheless consider that because of its nature it may be ‘sexual’. The difference is 
between an activity being definitely ‘sexual’ because of its nature and being possibly 
‘sexual’ because of its nature depending on the need for further contextual information. 
Examples of touching which might be held to be ‘sexual’ because of its nature, and 
which under the old law were held to constitute an inherently indecent assault, are 
where a man grabs a woman’s breasts,53 or gives her a long, lingering sexually-charged 
kiss.54 
 
Example 1: Breasts 
One issue for consideration is whether touching of the female breasts is ‘sexual’ 
‘because of its nature’ or whether such touching is only rendered ‘sexual’ by the 
                                                             
53
 Shaukat, unreported, July 11, 2000 (No.00/3439/Z5). 
54
 M.A. [2003] EWCA Crim 716. Other examples include where D inserts his finger into C‟s vagina 
McCormack [1969] 2 QB 442; K.C.S., unreported, October 2, 1998 (No.98/02823/Z2) or removes her 
clothing Court [1989] AC 28, at 42H-43A. 
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surrounding circumstances. There is more than one function of the female breast. In 
medical literature, breasts are not defined as primary sexual characteristics, because 
they are not involved in sexual reproduction. The breasts are defined as secondary 
sexual characteristics: traits that distinguish the two sexes of a species and play a role in 
mate attraction, but that are not directly part of the reproductive system.55 In humans, 
the most visible secondary sexual characteristics are breasts of females and beards and 
moustaches of males. Breasts play an important part in human sexual behaviour. 
Touching, kissing, licking and sucking the breasts are considered in Western culture to 
be erotic and can lead to sexual arousal. The breasts of a female also contain the 
mammary glands, which secrete milk to feed infants. In some African cultures, breasts 
are not considered erotic but the source of food for an infant. In other Western cultures, 
breasts are considered both erotic and a source of food. 
 
Under s.14 of the SOA 1956, touching of the naked breasts was considered inherently 
indecent.56 It is less clear whether, following the change of adjective from ‘indecent’ to 
‘sexual’, courts will rule that breasts are ‘because of their nature sexual’. Being a 
secondary sexual characteristic, touching of the breasts has the potential to be 
considered ‘sexual’ by the reasonable person and it is this invasion of sexual autonomy 
that the law seeks to protect. However, touching of the breasts is not by its nature 
‘sexual’, as medical examinations of the breasts are not ‘sexual’. One might argue that 
non-consensual touchings of the breast are by their nature ‘sexual’ touchings.57 This 
brings us to the conclusion that consent is a relevant circumstance for the jury or 
magistrates to consider in deciding whether a touching was ‘sexual’.  
                                                             
55
 Saladin, n 46. 
56
 R v Naveed Tabassum [2000] 2 Cr App R 328; R v Kumar [2006] EWCA Crim 1946; R v Bates [2004] 
EWCA Crim 163. 
57
 An example of a situation where a non-consensual touching of breasts might be non-sexual might be 
where a stranger who is performing CPR on an unconscious woman in the street touches her breasts. Under 
s.75(2)(d) SOA 2003 there is a presumption of non-consent where the complainant „was asleep or 
otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant act‟. This raises a further complicating issue of whether 
we all impliedly consent to being rescued? 
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Example 2: Kissing 
A further issue might be whether a kiss is ‘sexual’ by its nature, or whether its 
categorization depends on the circumstances and purpose of the kisser.58 Kissing may or 
may not be sexually motivated. We can distinguish between kissing offered as a greeting 
or farewell (often consisting of brief contact with the cheek) from that offered as an 
expression of romantic affection or sexual desire (consisting of kissing on the lips or 
French kissing). In the Scottish case Boyle v Ritchie,59 the Appeal Court held that a kiss 
might be perfectly decent in an open social setting but ‘indecent’ in a lewd and 
libidinous setting. Williams suggested that deep-kissing, by which I assume he means 
kissing involving the participant’s tongues (or what is commonly referred to as French 
kissing), is ‘unambiguously sexual’ and could therefore be regarded as an indecent 
assault.60 He further suggests that ‘such an assault upon an adult woman is unlike an 
ordinary kiss, which is not an affront to modesty, even though unwelcome.’61 One 
problem with this categorisation is that where kissing is non-consensual, even the 
slightest kissing on the lips may constitute and invasion of sexual and bodily integrity. In 
British culture, kissing is normally confined to those of close acquaintance62 and being 
kissed on the lips by a stranger may invoke feelings of disgust and fear of what may 
follow (i.e. that she will be further sexually assaulted or raped).  Distinguishing on the 
basis of whether the kissing involved is ‘deep’ or otherwise is therefore not an accurate 
basis for distinction. 
 
                                                             
58
 Thus there will be no liability where a grandma issues a slobbering greeting to her reluctant grandson. 
The physical nature of the kiss, the relationship between the parties and the non-sexual purpose acquire 
great significance. For discussion of the social anthropology of kissing see chapter 5, section 5.2.1. 
59
 (1999) SCCR 278. 
60
 G. Williams, „The Meaning of Indecency‟ (1992) 12 LS 20, at 29. 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 In other cultures for example French and Italian kissing between those not of close acquaintance is 
common. 
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In M.A.63 a long, lingering sexually charged kiss was held to constitute an inherently 
indecent assault. A less passionate kiss was also capable of qualifying as indecent 
assault: in Kallides,64 a man who kissed and stroked a small boy was held to have 
committed an indecent assault. Would a jury (or magistrates) consider that kissing 
various other parts of another’s body, such as the neck, ears, breasts, and navel might 
be because of their nature ‘sexual’? These are all areas of the human body that have 
heightened sensitivity and kissing them can result in sexual arousal. Some kisses, for 
example, those placed on or near the genitals or breasts of the complainant, would 
seem clearly to fall within the possibly ‘sexual’ category. Other kisses will perhaps 
depend on the precise factual circumstances of the case in question and therefore fall 
under s.78(b).  
 
(b) S.78 (b) (ii) Is it ‘sexual’ by virtue of its circumstances and/or purpose? 
Where the conduct is ambiguous and because of its nature might possibly be ‘sexual’, 
then, under s.78(b) part two, the circumstances of the action, or purpose of any person 
in relation to it, or both are to be considered in assessing whether the conduct is ‘sexual’ 
or not. This is an important aspect of the s.78 test, widening the scope of behaviour 
amenable to prosecution. However, this feature of the definition of ‘sexual’ is also 
problematic because it is sometimes unclear when the circumstances and/or purpose of 
D are ‘sexual’. The second limb of the test only arises if the answer in respect of the first 
limb is affirmative. If we consider a continuum of touching from the obviously ‘sexual’ to 
the definitely not ‘sexual’, the circumstances and/or purpose of any person become 
increasingly important in characterizing those assaults that are not indisputably ‘sexual’ 
or ‘non-sexual’.  
 
 
                                                             
63
 [2003] EWCA Crim 716. 
64
 Referred to in Sutton [1977] 1 WLR 1086. See further A.N. Mackesy, „The Criminal Law and the 
Woman Seducer‟ [1956] Crim L R 529, at 530; G. Williams, „The Meaning of Indecency‟ (1992) 12 LS 20. 
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Figure 9.2: Spectrum of ‘sexual’ behaviour 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S.78(b) is also an objective test, but can be described as context-dependent to the 
extent that the circumstances and purpose of any person in relation to it may be taken 
into account when designating the conduct as ‘sexual’. Where the activity is, for 
example, oral sex, it seems likely that the reasonable person would only need to 
consider the nature of the activity to determine that it is ‘sexual’ by its nature. However, 
where it is digital penetration of the vagina, the reasonable person would need to 
consider the nature of the activity (it may or may not be ‘sexual’), the circumstances in 
which it is carried out (if it is in a doctor’s surgery it is probably not ‘sexual’) and the 
purpose of any of the participants (if the doctor’s purpose is medical, the activity will 
not be ‘sexual’; if the doctor’s purpose is ‘sexual’, it will be ‘sexual’). Table 9.1 below 
shows the relevance of the circumstances of an action and the purpose of any person to 
a finding of a sexual act under s.78(b) when the act is potentially ‘sexual’. 
 
 
 
 
 
Touching may or may 
not be ‘sexual’ 
More obviously ‘sexual’ Less apparently 
‘sexual’ 
Definitely not 
‘sexual’ 
Indisputably 
‘sexual’ 
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Table 9.1: Relevance of circumstances/purpose to the ‘sexual’ nature of a touching 
(s.78(b))  
 
                               Circumstances 
1. 
Sexual 
 
Non-sexual 
 
 
Purpose 
2. 
Sexual 
3.  
Sexual touching 
4.  
Sexual touching? 
Non-sexual 
5.  
Sexual touching? 
6.  
Not a sexual touching 
 
Situation 1: Circumstances alone  
The first possible situation under s.78(b) part two is whether an act could be determined 
to be ‘sexual’ by examination of the circumstances alone. One of the problems with the 
use of the term ‘circumstances’ in the definition of ‘sexual’ is that it is a vague word (as 
critiqued in chapter 5). The Oxford English Dictionary defines circumstances as ‘*t+he 
logical surroundings or ‘adjuncts’ of an action; the time, place, manner, cause, occasion, 
etc., amid which it takes place’.65 ‘Circumstances’ is such an imprecise term as to 
potentially cover anything. Several circumstances both separately and/or together may 
render a touching ‘sexual’. These include but are not limited to the relationship between 
the parties, the defendant’s motive, the spatial and temporal environment, and the 
complainant’s experience of the action. S.78(b) part two states that ‘circumstances’ and 
the defendant’s purpose are two separate issues to be considered by the jury or 
magistrates.  However, arguably the expression ‘circumstances’ refers to anything that 
                                                             
65
 Oxford English Dictionary, definition 2a [Online] Available at www.oed.com (Accessed: 12
th
 December 
2009). 
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may affect the determination of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, and this therefore 
includes the D’s purpose. 
 
It is possible that the complainant’s affective response to the touching falls within the 
‘circumstances’ to be considered by the jury (or magistrates). But, in failing to define 
what they meant by ‘circumstances’ the drafters have failed to make the complainant’s 
affective response to the touching explicitly relevant and s.78 essentially allows the 
decision-makers to consider whatever they like, which may or may not include the C’s 
experience. However, it is worth noting again that the two-stage test in s.78(b) and 
decision in H means that decision-makers cannot consider all the ‘circumstances’ at the 
first stage. 
 
Examples of touchings which are likely to be held ‘sexual’ because of their 
circumstances, and which under the old law were held to involve an indecent assault, 
are where a man with an exposed penis pulls a boy towards himself,66 or where a man 
kisses a young girl while suggesting they have sex,67 or where a woman cuddles a young 
girl, who is sexually excited and is sexually stimulating the woman,68 or where a man 
strokes a woman’s hair and touches her ankle after entering her bedroom at night while 
she is sleeping.69 Where a doctor uses his fingers to examine a patient’s vagina or anus, 
this would not ordinarily be considered ‘sexual’; but if he makes inappropriate 
comments or suggestions whilst doing so, or if there is proof that he knows the 
examination to be unnecessary, a reasonable person would probably conclude that his 
action might indeed be ‘sexual’. 
 
Situation 2: Purpose alone 
                                                             
66
 Beal v Kelley (1951) 35 Cr App R 128; and see Sargeant [1997] Crim L R 50. 
67
 Leeson (1968) 52 Cr App R 185. 
68
 Goss and Goss (1990) 90 Cr App R 400. 
69
 Turner, unreported, November 30, 1999 (No.99/1266/Z5). 
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The second possible situation under s.78(b) part two is whether an act is ‘sexual’ by 
examination of the defendant or any person’s purpose alone. The facts of Court70 itself 
fell within this category. D placed a 12-year-old girl, fully clothed, across his knee and 
beat her 12 times on her buttock. Whether that type of touching was considered 
‘sexual’ under the SOA 2003 would depend largely on whether or not his purpose was 
sexual gratification. If his purpose were purely chastisement, it would not be ‘sexual’. 
Examples of touching likely to be held capable of being ‘sexual’, so that D’s purpose can 
be used to prove that it was, are where a man touches naked young boys on the hands, 
arms, legs and torsos in order to arrange poses for photographs which he intends to sell 
to indecent magazines,71 or where  a man places plastic bags over young girls’ heads and 
takes photographs of them, which he admits later using for sexual gratification,72 or 
where a doctor unnecessarily carries out an intimate medical examination of a young 
girl, where there is evidence that he did so for purposes of sexual gratification.73 A 
reasonable person might consider that any touching of a woman’s breast may because 
of its nature be ‘sexual’, and would consider that ‘groping’ a woman’s breast for sexual 
gratification was ‘sexual’ in light of the purpose with which the touching is done. 
 
It is also worth noting that an act can be rendered ‘sexual’ by the ‘purpose of any 
person’.74 Even though D may not have a ‘sexual’ purpose, a third party’s purpose could 
make an act ‘sexual’, where for example a third person encourages D’s acts. If X 
encourages D to stroke C’s thigh and X finds the touching sexually gratifying, a 
reasonable person may conclude that the touching is ‘sexual’. This might also cover the 
situation where a medical examination, though necessary, was conducted in an 
                                                             
70
 [1989] AC 28. See chapter 2. 
71
 Sutton [1977] 1 WLR 1086. 
72
 Gosling, unreported, November 4, 1999 (No.99/02105). It is not entirely clear why placing a bag over a 
girl‟s head should be capable of being an indecent act if taking off her shoe is not (George [1956] Crim L R 
52). 
73
 Court, above n 70, at 43G-44C per Lord Ackner; at 35D, E per Lord Griffiths.  
74
 S. 78(b) emphasis added. The „purpose of any person‟ might include the purpose of the complainant, as 
explained below. 
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inappropriate manner. For example, in the Canadian case of Bolduc v Bird,75 D carried 
out a proper vaginal examination but allowed a friend to be present, masquerading as a 
medical student, for purposes of sexual gratification. 
 
Situation 3: Circumstances ‘sexual’, purpose ‘sexual’ 
The third possible situation under s.78(b) part two is where both the circumstances and 
the purpose of the accused are ‘sexual’. One of the problems here is that it is sometimes 
unclear when the circumstances are ‘sexual’. If D strokes C’s thigh whilst speaking of his 
intention to have sexual intercourse with her, it is probable that both the circumstances 
and purpose will be considered ‘sexual’. Or, if a man encourages a young child to strip in 
front of him for purposes of sexual gratification it is probable that a reasonable person 
would think that the act because of its nature may be ‘sexual’, but would also consider 
(by reference to its circumstances and the man’s purpose) that it is ‘sexual’. Here the 
circumstances appear to be ‘sexual’ by reference to the child’s nudity.  
 
A further problem here is that a person can have multiple purposes. Although dealing 
with a case of indecent assault, R v Kumar76 is instructive on this issue. D, a doctor 
carried out a clinically necessary breast examination on a patient. The Court of Appeal, 
upholding D’s conviction for indecent assault appeared to endorse the trial judge’s 
direction to the jury to the effect that an assault was indecent if they were satisfied that 
D had intended to obtain sexual gratification. Four possibilities were identified: 
(i)  D’s sole intention had been to obtain sexual gratification (D guilty); 
(ii)  D’s sole intention had been to gain clinical information (D not guilty); 
(iii)  D had a dual intention, namely, legitimate breast examination as cover with 
intention to gain sexual gratification from the outset (D guilty); 
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 [1967] SCR 677. 
76
 [2006] EWCA Crim 1946. 
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(iv)  D had, in the course of a legitimate medical examination, gained sexual 
gratification (D not guilty).   
Situations (i) and (iii) would come within s.78(b) given the admissibility of evidence as to 
D’s purpose. The issue of which kinds of touching will satisfy this element of the actus 
reus is harder to determine when only either one of the circumstances or purpose is 
‘sexual’ but not both, as in situations 4 and 5 in the table above. 
 
Situation 4 : Circumstances ‘non-sexual’, purpose ‘sexual’ 
The fourth possible scenario under s.78(b) part two is where the circumstances are 
‘non-sexual’ but the purpose is ‘sexual’. This would cover the situation where the 
complainant is not necessarily aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the act, that nature only 
becoming clear when D’s purpose is understood. This raises the question of when 
circumstances are ‘non-sexual’? Arguably, the circumstances are ‘non-sexual’ when the 
action has no associated sexual connotation: it is not commonly associated with being 
an object of sexual pleasure or gratification.  
 
Example 3: Hair 
Would a reasonable person think that the nature of combing a person’s hair might be 
‘sexual’? The answer is probably not: as a general everyday activity, it is not commonly 
associated with being an object of sexual pleasure or gratification. However, what of the 
hairdresser who is sexually aroused when cutting or washing others’ hair? Tricophilia or 
hair fetishism is a paraphilia in which one becomes sexually aroused by, or is extremely 
fond of human hair, commonly head hair.77 It is unlikely that a jury or magistrates would 
consider a hairdressers cutting of C’s hair to be ‘sexual’ unless they know about his 
motive. However, if liability is conditional upon the jury reaching agreement that the 
haircut may be ‘sexual’ in the first place, without consideration of or reference to D’s 
possible trichophilia, then it is unlikely that such conduct will be held to be ‘sexual’. 
                                                             
77
 See C. Scorolli et al, „Relative prevalence of different fetishes [2007] 19 Int J Impot Res 432. 
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Whether a jury reaches a decision that a haircut may be ‘sexual’ will be dependent on 
their understanding of the range of fetishes that exist. 
 
Example 4: Feet 
In Court, the House of Lords appears to have regarded George78 as an example of 
conduct that could never be indecent. George was charged with indecent assault on the 
basis that he had removed a shoe from a girl’s foot because it gave him sexual 
gratification, but was acquitted on the basis of the trial judge’s ruling that he had done 
nothing, on this evidence, that could be described as indecent. In the context of 
‘indecency’, George may have been correct on its facts,79 but whether such conduct 
could properly be described as ‘sexual’ under SOA 2003 is another matter. In H, Lord 
Woolf said: 
‘We would express reservations as to whether or not it would be possible for the 
removal of shoes in that way, because of the nature of the act that took place, to be 
sexual as sexual is now defined in s 78. That in our judgment may well be a question that 
it would be necessary for a jury to determine.’80 
Podophilia81 or foot fetishism is the most common form of sexual preference for 
otherwise non-sexual objects or body parts.82 A reasonable person might consider that 
the removal of a shoe may be ‘sexual’ by nature and that because of the shoe remover’s 
fetishism it is ‘sexual’, whereas he would consider that the removal of the shoe for 
                                                             
78
 [1956] Crim LR 52. 
79
 Contrast Price [2004] 1 Cr App R 145, in which D‟s conduct in stroking the complainant‟s legs through 
her trousers below her knee whilst begging her to remove her ankle boots was held to be capable of 
amounting to indecent assault, contrary to SOA 1956, s.14. It is certainly clear that his motives were sexual 
and in contrast to George this must have been obvious to the complainant and to reasonable people. 
80
 [2005] 2 Cr App R 149, at 11. 
81
 Podophilia is a type of partialism where sexual arousal is obtained by specific, non-genital body parts. 
Individuals with partialism sometimes describe the anatomy of interest to them as having equal or greater 
erotic attraction for them as do the genitals. 
82
 Scorolli et al, op cit, n 77. See also R. Dobson, „Heels are the World‟s No 1 Fetish‟ The Independent, 25th 
February 2007.  In April 2007, a footwear fetishist, who admitted eight thefts of women‟s shoes, received a 
12 month suspended sentence from the Crown Court. Jurors failed to reach a verdict on a charge of sexual 
assault and the Crown Prosecution Service said it was not in the public interest to proceed with a retrial. 
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/6567445.stm [Online] (Accessed: 21
st
 November 2009). 
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legitimate purposes by an assistant in a shoe shop is not ‘sexual’ in light of the 
assistant’s purpose and the circumstances. There seems no justifiable reason why the 
shoe fetishist who distresses a woman by an activity that gives him sexual gratification, 
possibly to the point of ejaculation, should not be liable to punishment. D changes his 
normative position towards C by touching her non-consensually and should therefore be 
responsible where C experiences his conduct as ‘sexual’. If C is completely unaware of 
D’s podophilia at the time of the act, because the ‘circumstances’ do not reveal anything 
about the act as ‘sexual’, but subsequently becomes aware of D’s sexual motive, D 
should still be culpable and guilty of a non-consensual sexual touching. If C never 
becomes aware of D’s sexual motive and does not experience the touching as ‘sexual’ 
there would be no case to answer.  
 
Situation 5: Circumstances ‘sexual’, purpose ‘non-sexual’ 
The fifth possible scenario under s.78(b) part two is where the circumstances of the 
touching are ‘sexual’, but the purpose is ‘non-sexual’. As noted above, it is controversial 
and unclear as to when circumstances are ‘sexual’. Consider the situation where D, a 
prison guard strips an inmate not for purposes of sexual gratification but to humiliate 
him in front of other convicts thereby deterring others from behaving in a similar way.83 
The circumstance of rendering someone naked and humiliating them in front of other 
inmates may be considered by reasonable people and/or C to be ‘sexual’ and it is 
possible that one or more of the inmates may receive sexual pleasure from the action, 
but the purpose is disciplinary and ‘non-sexual’. This again raises the complicating issue 
that purposes can be multi-layered.84 D’s primary purpose could be disciplinary and yet 
he might intend or hope to obtain sexual gratification. Following Kumar, as discussed 
above, D would not be guilty if his sole purpose was disciplinary, but would be guilty 
where his sole purpose was to gain sexual gratification. Where he has a dual intention 
                                                             
83
 I. Bantekas, „Can touching always be sexual when there is no sexual intent?‟ [2008] 72 JoCL 251. 
84
 Cf. the discussion of oblique intention in murder. See A. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical 
Introduction to Criminal Law 2
nd
 edn (Butterworths, London, 2001) ch 3. 
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and uses the disciplinary action as a ruse for his sexual motive he would be guilty. If his 
intention was disciplinary, but when rendering C naked, and not intending it, he or other 
inmates obtained sexual gratification, he would not be guilty. Stripping a person for 
disciplinary measures is an unjustified invasion of the person’s sexual autonomy: even if 
his sole intent is disciplinary, the prison officer in this situation is using sexual means (in 
the sense that C/and or reasonable onlookers might consider the action to be ‘sexual’) 
to achieve the designated purpose when other non-sexual actions may be just as 
effective, and should accordingly should satisfy this element of the actus reus.  
 
This fifth category, where the circumstances are ‘sexual’, but the purpose non-sexual’ 
would also cover practical jokes. In Cooney,85 D, a driving instructor put a 12-inch carrot 
down his trousers and told a pupil she had given him an erection. He took her hand and 
made her touch the vegetable before showing her the carrot. The circumstances here 
are ‘sexual’: D forced C to touch what she believed to be his genitalia, a sexual body 
part. Cooney insisted the incident was a practical joke that went wrong. He therefore 
claimed to have acted from a non-sexual purpose. Regardless that D claimed to have 
acted from a non-sexual purpose he was convicted of sexual assault.  
 
Situation 6: Circumstances ‘non-sexual’, purpose ‘non-sexual’ 
The final possible scenario under section 78(b)(ii) is where the touching might be 
‘sexual’ by its nature, but the circumstances are ‘non-sexual’ and the purpose is ‘non-
sexual’. This would include where a police officer pats down a suspect, or a rugby player 
intentionally grabs the testicles of an opponent in the scrum. If D touches C without C’s 
consent in circumstances where there is no or insufficient evidence that the touching is 
‘sexual’ D may be charged with common assault or one of the offences against the 
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 Cooney, Unreported, BBC news, 7
th
 December 2007. 
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person.86 Another example is where a mother tells her young child to strip in her 
presence before the child takes a bath; a reasonable person would consider that that 
the child’s act of stripping by its nature may be ‘sexual’, but no reasonable person would 
conclude from its circumstances or the purpose of anyone (including the mother) that it 
is ‘sexual’. 
 
A further possible situation is where the circumstances are not ‘sexual’, the purpose is 
not ‘sexual’, but C experiences the act as ‘sexual’. It is not necessary on a prosecution 
for sexual assault under s.3 for the prosecution to prove that D or C were aware that the 
touching was ‘sexual’: under s.78, it is enough for the jury (or magistrates) to find that a 
reasonable person would consider it so. The SOA 2003, and specifically s.78, is 
ambiguous as to the relevance of C’s experience. Whilst s.78 makes no explicit reference 
to the complainant’s interpretation of the incident, I have argued above (see comments 
on situation 1) that C’s experience might be implicitly referred to by the jury or 
magistrates as the term ‘circumstances’ is broad enough to include anything, including 
C’s experience. The jury (or magistrates) will also, usually, have access to C’s testimony 
and this will arguably give them an understanding of the complainant’s affective 
response to the touching. A further possible interpretation is that the reference to the 
purpose ‘of any person’ includes the person to whom it is done. Thus, if C considers the 
activity is in this case ‘sexual’, then that might satisfy this element of the offence. In 
failing to define what they meant by ‘the purpose of any person’ the drafters have 
excluded this from being a legally relevant consideration. There is also a significant 
difference in referring to C’s ‘purpose’ in relation to the touching and C’s affective 
response to the touching. 
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 Where bodily harm is caused to C, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, (OAPA 1861, S.47), 
maliciously causing grievous bodily harm (OAPA 1861, s.20) or inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent 
(OAPA 1861, s.18). 
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In Court, Lord Ackner listed three specific circumstances that he considered relevant to 
the determination of the indecent nature of the conduct: ‘the relationship of the 
defendant to this victim (were they relatives, friends or virtually complete strangers?), 
how had the defendant come to embark on this conduct and why was he behaving in 
this way?’87 Lord Ackner did not refer to the complainant’s experience of the touching. 
In this respect, s.78 is an improvement on the old law that explicitly ruled out C’s 
experience.  Lord Ackner’s list was exhaustive and interpreted as such.88 
 
S.78(b) enables the purpose of the accused or any person to be considered in 
determining whether the action was ‘sexual’ but no reference is made to the impact on 
the complainant. Section 78 can be described as ‘defendant-centred’ to the extent that 
the impact on the complainant is not an explicitly relevant circumstance to be 
considered in determining whether the touching was ‘sexual’. Section 78 is ambiguous 
as to the relevance of the complainant’s experience. Given the limited number of cases 
so far it is not possible to argue that it is not a legally relevant consideration. Even if the 
ambiguity does not produce manifest injustice for complainants, the lack of clarity is 
important in demonstrating the law’s oversight of a complainant perspective, which 
was, after all, one of the key motivations for the Government’s reform of the law. 
Section 78 fails to, but should, make explicit reference to the complainant’s experience 
of the touching. In part 4, I will propose an addition to the s.78 definition that makes 
explicit reference to C’s experience.  
 
(c) Interpreting s.78(b) in the courts 
To date, there is little case law dealing explicitly with section 78 and the process of 
defining the ‘sexual’ nature of conduct. There are two possible approaches to section 
78(b). First, a flow-chart approach could be used (see figure 9.1 above). This would 
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require the decision maker to be satisfied that part one is met before reaching a verdict 
on part two and would potentially rule out certain acts (such as fetishes as we shall see 
below). Secondly, the jury or magistrates could be entrusted to use their own skill and 
judgment in deciding what constitutes ‘sexual’. This would require the decision maker to 
read the subsection as if the ‘and’ in it were an ‘or’. 
The Court of Appeal in H has stressed that s. 78(b) creates a two-stage process and that 
the first stage (that the act because of its nature may be ‘sexual’) has to be established 
without reference to the issues raised by the second stage (the surrounding 
circumstances and D’s purpose): 
‘If there were not two requirements in subs (b), the opening words “because of its 
nature it may be sexual” would be surplus. If it was not intended by the legislature that 
effect should be given to those opening words, it would be sufficient to create an 
offence by looking at the touching and deciding whether because of its circumstances it 
was sexual. In other words, there is not one comprehensive test. It is necessary for both 
halves of s 78(b) to be complied with.’89 
Thus, the jury (or magistrates) must first be satisfied that a reasonable person would 
consider the touching to be capable of being ‘sexual’, looked at in isolation and divorced 
from the circumstances before and after the touching and from any evidence as to the 
purpose of any person in relation to the touching. Only if that hurdle is cleared should 
they consider whether a reasonable person would assess the touching, having regard to 
the surrounding circumstances and the purpose of D or ‘any person’, as actually ‘sexual’. 
In H, the jury had to establish firstly that D’s grabbing of C’s tracksuit bottoms might be 
‘sexual’ under s.78(b) part one and no account could be taken of the fact that, when he 
first approached her, he had said, ‘do you fancy a shag’, until the second stage. Section 
78(b) provides a logical two-stage process for jurors to use in reaching a conclusion. 
However, that is not to say that it is an easy test for jurors to apply; the two stages may 
confuse many. In that sense, jurors might use their own skill and judgment in deciding 
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what constitutes ‘sexual’ and ‘do their own thing in the jury room’, rather than follow 
the two-stage process. It is only possible to speculate, since s.8 of the Contempt of 
Court Act 1981 prohibits the examination of jury decision-making. 
 
The implication of this flow chart interpretation of s.78 is that there must be some kinds 
of touching which are incapable of being ‘sexual’ no matter what the surrounding 
circumstances are, or how much D is motivated by sexual gratification or whether C 
experienced the act as ‘sexual’. This two-stage process explicitly rules out some acts, for 
example fetishes. Accordingly there may be acts which the complainant experiences as 
‘sexual’, but which might not be judged ‘sexual’ following H, if the act ‘falls at the first 
hurdle’. The jury may not consider that removing someone’s shoes ‘may be sexual’ and 
therefore the action of a shoe fetishist who distresses women by removing their shoes 
for sexual gratification would fail under the first part of s.78(b). This action would not be 
ruled out if the jury (or magistrates) were required to regard the subsection as a whole, 
rather than a distinct two-stage process.  
 
Juries and magistrates will find it difficult, if not impossible, in any future comparable 
situations, to do what is expected of them as a result of the decision in H, namely to 
consider only the ‘nature’ of the activity at stage one, before being permitted to 
consider the circumstances or purpose at stage two. The wording of s.78(b) therefore 
increases the chances of a defendant convicted of sexual assault appealing. Taking the 
shoe fetishist as an example, there is a danger that the jury will conclude that the 
conduct is capable of being ‘sexual’ by referring, illegitimately,90 to D’s secret motive, 
particularly when viewed against the backdrop of C having complained.91 As such, it will 
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 In respect of considering whether the conduct „because of its nature may be sexual‟ irrespective of sexual 
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 Leake and Ormerod, n 51. 
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only be the most unusual fetishes where D derives sexual gratification from the most 
innocuous conduct that will definitely fall outside the scope of the section.92 
 
Can and should we leave vague terms such as ‘sexual’ (and ‘dishonest’ in offences 
against property) to the jury to decide? Temkin and Ashworth affirm the decision to 
include a definition of the term ‘sexual’ in the SOA 2003, highlighting how the exclusion 
of such a provision in the legislation in Canada has led to a costly proliferation of cases 
in which courts have been called upon to rule in what circumstances a particular assault 
may be described as ‘sexual’.93 The fact that jurors remain sole arbiters of what is 
‘sexual’ is not conducive to the development of a consistent jurisprudence on a 
fundamental statutory term.94 There is the possibility of inconsistency in jury decision-
making with the possibility of two cases based on the same facts being decided in 
different ways.  Which acts would the reasonable person consider ‘sexual’ because of 
their nature? I consider myself a reasonable person, but those acts that I consider 
‘sexual’ because of their nature may vary from that of another reasonable person. In an 
increasingly pluralistic and fragmented society universal ‘current standards’ may not 
exist, and in any event different courts are likely to have different perceptions of what 
they are. The SOA 2003 aims at protecting complainants, but the vagueness of the term 
‘sexual’ may result in jurors overlooking the complainant’s experience. They may be 
prevented from considering C’s experience by applying the two-stage test, if the act 
does not pass the first test.  
 
There is also an important issue in respect of the role of magistrates in defining and 
interpreting ‘sexual’. The cross-section of magistrates is unrepresentative of society as a 
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 Rook and Ward consider the example of Gosling (1999), unreported, where D placed bags over young 
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Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004). 
93
 Op cit, n 37 at 332. See further S.J. Usprich, „A New Crime in Old Battles: Definitional Problems with 
Sexual Assault‟ (1987) 29 Crim L Q 200 at 203; C. Boyle, Sexual Assault (The Carswell Company 
Limited, Toronto, 1984); R v Robicheau (2002) 209 SCC 45. 
94
 Leake & Ormerod, op cit, n 51. 
  
305 
 
whole. Martin claims that the traditional image is that magistrates are ‘middle-aged, 
middle-class and middle-minded’.95 A report in 2002, ‘The Judiciary in the Magistrates 
Court’ found that a third of lay magistrates were over 60, (only 4% were under 40) they 
were drawn overwhelmingly from professional and managerial ranks and 40% were 
retired from full time employment.96 The lay magistrates are disproportionately middle-
class, compared to the population at large. At the time of the research, 49% of lay 
magistrates were women and 6% from ethnic minorities, which suggested that the lay 
magistracy was gender balanced and ethnically representative.97 In comparison, 
stipendiary magistrates, who sit full-time and who are often assigned to deal with cases, 
which are likely to be lengthy or particularly complex, are mostly male, white and tend 
to be younger.98 The research shows that magistrates are not representative of society 
as a whole. They will have an individual and subjective interpretation of the meaning of 
‘sexual’ which might differ from those of the reasonable person and pose the possibility 
of inconsistent decisions between benches. Of course, this discussion is somewhat 
speculative, in the absence of evidence of magistrates’ attitudes to the meaning of 
‘sexual’, but one can tentatively suggest that the background of decision-makers will 
inform their understandings of the meaning of the word ‘sexual’. 
 
9.3.3 The act is indisputably not ‘sexual’ 
A further problem with the section 78 definition, as interpreted in H, is that it implies 
that there is a category of acts which by their very nature cannot possibly be ‘sexual’ no 
matter what the circumstances and motive of the actors. If D’s conduct is incapable of 
being regarded as ‘sexual’, his intention cannot make it so. One can only speculate as to 
what kind of conduct would be considered incapable of being ‘sexual’, given that the 
‘reasonable person’ must presumably be attributed with some knowledge of the 
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enormous range of fetishes and practices that may sexually excite other people. Many 
men and women are aware that some people are aroused by practices such as bondage, 
flagellation, uniforms or high heels and some are similarly excited by horse riding, 
suffocation, urination, fur or even executions. These are just a few examples of a much 
wider phenomenon. So, whereas a judge must remind the jury to consider both limbs of 
the test, it may be open to a juror to conclude that if some people can derive sexual 
gratification from a given type of behaviour, then it must indeed be capable of being 
‘sexual’. It makes no sense to include obvious fetishes while excluding others merely 
because they are unusual or bizarre and therefore that part of s.78 is redundant.  
 
One argument suggests that there should be no act that is incapable of being ‘sexual’ so 
that any act has the potential to be turned into a ‘sexual’ one by D’s purpose being 
sexual gratification. The counter-argument is that while to base conviction on D’s 
purpose where the act looks ambiguous is acceptable, that may not be the case where 
the act looks unambiguously ‘non-sexual’. It is worth noting that, even if not ‘sexual’, 
the act would still constitute ordinary battery. There should be no act that is incapable 
of being ‘sexual’: any action that C experiences as ‘sexual’ should be amenable to 
prosecution. 
 
9.4 A PROPOSED ADDITION TO S.78: REFERENCE TO C’S EXPERIENCE 
In light of the argument that the current definition of ‘sexual’ is ambiguous as to the 
relevance of C’s experience, this section will analyse a proposed addition to s.78 that 
explicitly makes reference to the complainant’s experience. Section 78 is insufficiently 
complainant-centred: C’s experience is not listed as being explicitly relevant. Juries or 
magistrates might consider it, but they should be instructed to take it into account. 
There are some acts which C might experience as ‘sexual’, but which are not by their 
nature ‘sexual’ and therefore would not get past the first test in s.78(b). Suppose D 
strokes the hair of a woman sitting in front of him at the cinema, whilst whispering of 
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his desire to ‘meet her afterwards’. C may complain that she experienced the touching 
as ‘sexual’. However, such conduct is unlikely to get past the first test in s.78(b) which 
requires the jury to ask whether the act might have been by its very nature ‘sexual’. If 
the answer to this question were in the negative, then the case would proceed no 
further, regardless of the fact that C experienced the touching as ‘sexual’. S.78(b) and 
the decision in H thereby fail to punish acts experienced by C as ‘sexual’. 
 
A complainant-centred definition of ‘sexual’ might be framed in the following way: 
‘*P+enetration, touching or any other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider 
that- 
(a) whatever its circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is 
because of its nature sexual, or 
(b) because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances, the 
purpose of any person in relation to it, or the complainant’s experience of it (or 
a combination of these factors)99 it is sexual.’ 
My proposed addition to the s.78 definition would render the definition complainant-
centred because it makes explicit reference to the complainant’s affective response to 
the touching. Thus, the decision-maker would be required to take into account the 
direct effects on the complainant. 
 
The current section 78 definition of ‘sexual’ ensures that the law does not capture an 
activity that no reasonable person would consider ‘sexual’ and this undermines the 
individual affective response of complainants to non-consensual touching. Some women 
may be just as distressed by the removal of a shoe as they would by the groping of their 
breasts or pinching of their buttocks. Sexuality is a complex aspect of our personality 
and ‘self’. Sexuality is the force that empowers us to express and display strong, 
emotional feelings for another person and is a natural stimulus for procreation. Human 
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sexuality rarely falls into neat categories or lends itself to simple labelling, but rather is a 
rich and complex area of human experience.  Sexual practices and what is considered 
‘sexual’ vary from person to person. C’s sexuality is harmed when D shows disrespect for 
her sexual autonomy: her ability to decide whom to engage in sexual activity with, when 
and in what form.  
 
Suppose D approaches C as she is walking down a busy street. He puts his hand up to 
hold the back of her neck, runs his hand up her scalp and down through her hair. She 
considers this a violation and that D is groping her hair. Under the current section 78 
definition, such an action might not be considered to be ‘sexual’ by a jury or magistrates 
on the basis that it might not pass the first hurdle of s.78(b) that ‘because of its nature it 
may be sexual’. There should be no underestimation of the physical, emotional and 
psychological harm caused to innocent complainants when they are touched non-
consensually. Acts of non-consensual touching can never be counted upon as being 
‘trivial’ as far as its effect on the complainant may be concerned. It is proper for the 
state to promote the basic value of respect for sexual autonomy and to recognise that 
this value is so significant as to justify criminalization. Even where a person who does 
not consider or appreciate how their actions might be experienced by C describes 
behaviour, such as pinching someone on the buttocks or groping their breasts as ‘trivial’ 
or ‘a bit of fun’ these actions may have severe and long-lasting results. Nevertheless, the 
harm of sexual assault is also related to the serious wrong done to the complainant: the 
‘sheer use’100 of the complainant by the defendant. 
 
In chapter 4, I argued that the section 3 definition of sexual assault should be expanded 
to include liability where C fears an immediate and unlawful sexual touching on the 
basis that fair labelling is one way in which an offence can be complainant-centred. In 
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light of this argument, my proposed addition to the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ would 
extend to situations in which what D says adds to the ‘sexual’ nature of the offence. 
Suppose D strokes C’s cheek whilst making sexually explicit comments to her. It is 
unlikely that such conduct would currently pass the first test of s.78(b). Whilst I am 
proposing only a minor amendment to s.78, it may be of practical significance for 
complainants, demonstrating that the law is showing solidarity with the complainant 
who has been wronged and potentially encouraging more people to make a complaint. 
 
When defining and interpreting a context-dependent term such as ‘sexual’, there are 
obvious concerns in relation to consistency of application. Whilst an objective approach 
to the meaning of ‘sexual’ renders the law vague and uncertain in application, that is not 
to say that a greater focus on the complainant’s perspective would be any more certain 
or consistent. My point is that the s.78 definition is insufficiently complainant-centred 
and ought to be amended to explicitly make reference to the complainant’s experience. 
As I argued in chapter 5, the meaning of ‘sexual’ is context-dependent and therefore 
decisions ought to be made on a case-by-case basis. Whilst there are inherent concerns 
about consistent decision-making, a complainant-centred approach to the meaning of 
‘sexual’ is preferable because in order to appreciate the nature and seriousness of a 
‘sexual’ touching and the level of D’s culpability it is necessary to refer to C’s affective 
response. 
 
9.5 CONCLUSION 
‘Sexual’ is that extra aggravating factor that turns battery into a sexual assault. 
However, the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ is flawed: it is unclear, ambiguous and likely to 
lead to inconsistencies. Parliament has refrained from listing those activities it considers 
‘sexual’ providing an approach that is far from satisfactory. The fact that in s.78(b) there 
are two different questions complicates the task of the judge and that of the jury and is 
liable to lead to inconsistent findings. Defining ‘sexual’ using the term itself, assumes 
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that the reader already knows the intended meaning of the term, which as has been 
shown, is inaccurate. The s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ is complex and controversial. It 
appears to assume that the ‘sexual’ nature of conduct is easily recognized and that 
there is a common consensus amongst reasonable people as to which acts are 
‘indisputably’ ‘sexual’, which acts are potentially ‘sexual’ and which acts are definitely 
not ‘sexual’.  Who constitutes the ‘reasonable person’ in a multicultural society with 
widely differing views on sexuality? 
 
Section 78 is vague, unclear, and therefore difficult for prosecutors, judges and juries to 
interpret. It is likely that most cases will be unproblematic involving touching of the 
genitals or breasts. Nevertheless, ambiguous cases will arise especially at the least 
serious end of the spectrum. Will judges and juries consider that a pat on the bottom or 
a hand placed on a thigh is capable of constituting sexual assault? I propose clear 
guidelines for judges and jurors who have to consider whether an act is to be considered 
‘sexual’. The complainant’s affective response to the touching is not an explicitly 
relevant consideration in determining the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. Section 78 
makes no explicit reference to the complainant’s perception of the action, although it is 
possibly a relevant ‘circumstance’, and therefore jurors (or magistrates) may not focus 
sufficiently on the complainant’s experience. This problem would be overcome if my 
proposed addition to the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ were introduced. 
 
It has been demonstrated that the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ provides for both a context-
dependent and context-independent test. S.78(a) focuses specifically on the activity 
‘being because of its nature sexual’ providing a context-independent test. S.78(b) 
meanwhile provides for a context-dependent test to the extent that the circumstances 
and purpose of the accused, or both, can be taken into account in determining whether 
the conduct is ‘sexual’. In failing to identify and define which circumstances are relevant 
to a finding of the ‘sexual’ nature of an act s.78(b) essentially allows jurors (and 
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magistrates) to decide whatever they like. The lack of certainty and clarity that has 
resulted from the new law is clearly undesirable for complainants and may deter some 
from pursuing a complaint. It may also have a negative effect on prosecutors who may 
prefer to use a charge of assault or be inclined to settle for a plea of guilty to assault, 
rather than take a borderline case (where the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct is in 
dispute) to court.  
 
Chapter 10 will analyse the two mens rea elements required for a conviction of sexual 
assault under s.3: that D must intentionally touch another person and must ‘not 
reasonably believe’ that the other person consents to the touching. The chapter will 
consider the relevance of intoxication to a charge of sexual assault and propose an 
extension of the offence to include liability for reckless, yet culpable, sexual touching. 
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10 
Sexual Assault, Responsibility and Blameworthiness: 
the Case for an Offence of Reckless Sexual Touching 
 
It has been demonstrated in earlier chapters how the definition of sexual assault is, in 
some respects, insufficiently complainant-centred and this criticism extends to the 
mental requirements necessary for a conviction. Some aspects of the mens rea are 
unclear and controversial and these could be modified to make the law more 
‘complainant-centred’. However, there must be limits to how far an offence such as 
sexual assault can be ‘complainant-centred’ if particular criminal law principles of 
fairness, rationality and neutrality are to be upheld. The next two chapters will analyse 
the two elements of mens rea required for a conviction of sexual assault. This chapter 
will analyse the requirement that D must ‘intentionally’ touch another person, 
considering the circumstances in which D is culpable for the touching and arguing that 
liability should extend to reckless sexual touchings. Chapter 11 will analyse the 
requirement that D must ‘not reasonably believe’ that the other person consents to the 
touching and will discuss whether s.3 requires any mens rea in relation to the intended 
touching being ‘sexual’.  
 
Part 1 will evaluate the requirement that D must ‘intentionally’ touch another person. 
This aspect of the definition will be criticised for being insufficiently complainant-
centred as it excludes reckless or careless touchings which may be culpable and worthy 
of the criminal sanction. It will be argued that there are some non-intentional sexual 
touchings that are culpable and which deserve to come within the offence and that, in 
excluding unintentional yet culpable touching, the provision is unfair to complainants. 
Reckless sexual touchings may be culpable and deserving of the label sexual assault 
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because D has manifested an attitude of ‘practical indifference’ as to whether touching 
takes place.  
 
Part 2 will consider the relevance of involuntary and voluntary intoxication to a charge 
of sexual assault and analyse case-law since the introduction of s.3. The recent decision 
in R v Heard1 is crucial in establishing that a defendant cannot raise intoxication as a 
denial of mens rea. However, the decision also formalizes the inherent failure of s.3 to 
recognise that some unintentional touchings are culpable and therefore worthy of a 
criminal response. The characterization of all intoxicated non-intentional touching as 
‘accidental’ and the opinion of the Court of Appeal that a defendant who unintentionally 
touches another whilst drunk should be acquitted, undermines the protective purpose 
of the law’s approach to intoxication and basic intent. 
 
The chapter reaches three main conclusions. First, that the current definition of sexual 
assault ought to be amended to include recklessness within s.3(1)(a) on the basis that 
reckless sexual touching shows insufficient regard to C’s sexual interests and integrity. 
Secondly, that Heard is complainant-centred in holding that s.3 is a basic intent offence, 
even though it appears to be a specific intent offence, which means intoxication cannot 
be used as an excuse or defence. Thirdly, the decision in Heard gives excessive scope to 
the concept of ‘accidental’ touching, which may have the effect of blurring the 
boundaries of recklessness. 
 
10.1 CRIMINALISATION OF INADVERTENT SEXUAL TOUCHING? 
The first issue of mens rea to be considered is the requirement set out in s.3(1)(a), that 
D ‘intentionally touches’ C. This is one aspect of the definition of sexual assault that is 
insufficiently complainant-centred. If the touching is accidental, careless or reckless, the 
offence is not committed. I will argue that a defendant who recklessly touches another 
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person is not as blameworthy as one who intentionally touches another, but that such a 
person is still culpable because he shows a lack of respect for C’s sexual integrity and 
that that culpable touching is worthy of the criminal sanction. There is accordingly an 
argument for section 3 to  be reformulated to include liability for reckless sexual 
touching. 
10.1.1 Intention to touch 
There are two subjective states of mind in orthodox criminal law theory: intention and 
recklessness. In both cases, D is aware that the prohibited act or consequence may 
occur, but with intention, there is the added aggravating factor that D aims to do the 
prohibited act or cause the prohibited consequence. Recklessness is a lesser species of 
fault than intention, since the reckless agent chooses only to take a risk of touching, 
whereas an intentional agent chooses actually to touch. Many offences, for example 
criminal damage, are satisfied by proof of intention or subjective recklessness so that 
the boundary line between intention and recklessness is not of practical importance, 
given the possibility of charging with reckless criminal damage if it is unclear that the 
defendant acted intentionally.2 However, there are some crimes, such as sexual assault, 
which can only be satisfied by proof of intention, making it important that citizens, the 
police, prosecutors and decision-makers know where intention ends and recklessness 
begins. Although intention seems a straightforward concept in everyday language, the 
courts have struggled (despite a number of attempts by the House of Lords in the 
context of murder) to define its limits.3 Lord Bridge in Moloney made clear that the legal 
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meaning of the word ‘intention’ is the ordinary meaning of the word: ‘...the judge 
should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to 
the jury’s good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the necessary intent...’4 
Following Woollin,5 in the rare case where there is no direct evidence that it was D’s 
purpose to touch C, the jury should be directed that that they are not entitled to find 
the required intention proved unless they feel sure that touching was a virtually certain 
result of D’s actions and that D appreciated that such was the case.  
 
Under s.1(1) of the SOA 2003 for a defendant to be convicted of rape, he must 
intentionally penetrate the vagina, anus or mouth or another person with his penis. On 
proof of actual penetration, there will be an almost overwhelming inference that it was 
intentional, since it is not the sort of action that generally happens by mistake or 
accident.6 Herring provides an example where proof of ‘intentional’ penetration may be 
in doubt: where the defendant intended to engage in vaginal intercourse, but in fact 
engaged in anal intercourse.7 As both are a sufficient form of the actus reus, arguably 
intent to penetrate either orifice is sufficient. However, it is conceivable that C consents 
to vaginal penetration but not anal penetration, and D mistakenly penetrates C’s anus. If 
D reasonably believes that C consents to anal penetration he will not be liable for rape. 
 
In sexual assault, the intentionality requirement acquires great significance since it is 
very easy to touch accidentally, for example, by brushing against a woman’s breast or 
bottom in a crowded street. If the touching is accidental, there is no liability for sexual 
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assault; although there would be legal responsibility if the offence was one of strict 
liability. Offences of strict liability require proof that the defendant performed the 
prohibited conduct, but do not require proof that the defendant was blameworthy.8 If 
the defendant has committed the actus reus, he or she is guilty even if he or she was 
acting reasonably.9 Once it is proved that there was a ‘sexual’ touching without the 
complainant’s consent the offence would be made out. The main argument for imposing 
strict liability is a form of protectionism or ‘social defence’.10 It maintains that one of the 
primary aims of the criminal law is the protection of fundamental social interests. The 
criminal law is regarded as an efficient social resource for the prevention of harm. The 
infliction of the prohibited harm is the trigger for state action and criminalization is 
aimed at minimizing the risk of the harm being repeated. This brings us to the question 
of whether it is just and fair to ignore completely, in all cases, the defendant’s particular 
state of mind? The criminal law is society’s strongest formal condemnation and respect 
for individual autonomy requires that criminal liability be imposed only where D has 
chosen to perform the prohibited act and has a genuine opportunity to do otherwise 
than he did. An individual is blameworthy, not because of accidental conduct, but 
because he consciously ran a risk that harm will be caused or circumstances will occur. 
Moreover, in so far as the criminal trial has a communicative function, strict liability 
impairs this by severely limiting D’s ability to explain, excuse or justify the conduct. 
 
If sexual assault was a strict liability offence there would be no requirement that D 
intended to touch C. Where D accidentally or mistakenly touches C in the course of his 
everyday activities he would be liable for sexual assault provided C did not consent. 
Thus, if D touched C’s breasts whilst attempting to leave a busy tube train he would be 
                                                             
8
 For a detailed discussion of the meaning of strict liability, see S. Green, „Six senses of Strict Liability: A 
Plea for Formalism‟ in A. Simester, Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). 
9
 Although reasonableness could play a key part in establishing D‟s defence e.g. duress or self-defence (see 
Jones, Milling et al [2007] 1 AC 136).   
10
 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 6
th
 edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p.161. 
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liable for the offence.11 It would seem unfair that defendants should be liable for all 
unintentional touching of another person, as there are many insignificant or accidental 
touches that are incidental to everyday life, as will be explored below. The significance 
of the intentionality requirement therefore arises from the implicit labelling of every 
non-intentional touching as ‘accidental’ with no intermediate category of non-
intentional yet culpable touching.  
 
In limiting the mens rea to intent and excluding recklessness, s.3 replicates Lord 
Ackner’s view in Court12 that limited the mens rea of indecent assault to intent only. 
From a practical perspective, confining the offence to intention will not seriously inhibit 
its range of application, as most archetypal sexual assaults are intentional, that is to say 
‘deliberate’.13 A defendant who brushes past a woman’s breasts as he attempts to leave 
a crowded underground train in London during the rush hour would not be liable to 
conviction for sexual assault.14 Similarly, a defendant who is pushed forward during a 
crowd surge at a busy concert and as a result touches the buttocks of a woman standing 
in front of him will not be liable.15 However, there is an intermediate category of 
touchings in which culpability or the lack of it is less straightforward. 
10.1.2 Reckless sexual touching 
Recklessness will not suffice for sexual assault under s.3(1)(a). The SOA 2003 appears 
specifically to distinguish between ‘intention’ and ‘recklessness’: sections 63(1), 69(1)(c) 
& (2)(c) and 70(1)(c) expressly refer to recklessness. In excluding recklessness from the 
definition of sexual assault, the section fails to acknowledge that there are some 
unintentional sexual touchings which are culpable and which deserve to come within 
                                                             
11
 Although liability in this situation is obviously dependent on how consent is defined. 
12
 [1989] AC 28. 
13
 An issue may arise in relation to self-induced intoxication, as will be discussed below. 
14
 If he intentionally rubs against a woman in a crowded train he will be liable. See Neem (1993) 14 Cr App 
R 18. 
15
 The importance of excluding „reckless‟ touchings depends on the breadth of „consent‟ to everyday 
touchings. See chapter 4, section 3.2. 
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the offence. There is a case for the definition to be extended to include reckless 
touching: this is needed to protect the interests and sexual autonomy of complainants. 
 
S.3(1)(a) excludes any reference to recklessness, endorsing Lord Ackner’s view in Court16 
that limited the mens rea of indecent assault to intent only. Lord Ackner, for the 
majority, described the mens rea for indecent assault in the following terms: 
‘On a charge of indecent assault the prosecution must prove (1) that the accused 
intentionally assaulted the victim, (2) that the assault, or the circumstances 
accompanying it, are capable of being considered by right-minded persons as indecent, 
(3) that the accused intended to commit such an assault as is referred to in (2) above.’17 
Lord Ackner defined the mens rea element as intent to assault C in circumstances of 
indecency, excluding recklessness as to whether C would be assaulted. He concluded 
that ‘it cannot, in my judgement, have been the intention of Parliament that an assault 
can, by a mere mistake or mischance, be converted into an indecent assault, with all the 
opprobrium which a conviction for such an offence carries.’ This was surprising in light 
of the fact that in most other forms of aggravated assault, the mens rea for the assault 
element is satisfied by intent or recklessness.18  
 
Ashworth argues that ‘the chief concern of the criminal law is to prohibit behaviour that 
represents a serious wrong against an individual or against some fundamental social 
value or institution.’19 This suggests that there are some wrongs that are not serious 
enough or appropriate for any legal liability. One assumption about the criminal law 
therefore is that it is not concerned with reckless or trivial touching. In recommending 
                                                             
16
 [1989] AC 28. 
17
 Ibid, at 46. 
18
 E.g. assault occasioning actual bodily harm, s.47 OAPA 1861; inflicting bodily injury with or without a 
weapon, s.20 OAPA 1861 (See Savage [1992] 1 AC 699); racially aggravated assault, s.29 CADA 1998. 
The only exception to this is s.18 OAPA 1861, wounding with intent, which is satisfied by proof of 
intention only and thus complies with the correspondence principle (as discussed in chapter 7, section 
7.1.5.) 
19 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 6th edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p.1. 
  
319 
 
an offence to deal with unwanted sexual touching, the Setting the Boundaries Review 
states that ‘*t+he new formulation provides for intent or recklessness as to an assault.’20 
Thus it appears that there was some motivation to allow sexual assault to be committed 
recklessly, although the Review did not state why it proposed such an offence and 
indeed elsewhere in the document, state that ‘*r+ecklessness in sex offences is 
recklessness as to the consent of the victim rather than as to the deed’.21 Despite the 
Review’s formulation of sexual assault, the offence contained in s.3 cannot be 
committed recklessly. In Court, the House of Lords held that indecent assault could not 
be committed recklessly and the drafters of the SOA 2003 may have regarded this 
decision as good law and considered that, in the context of the new offence of sexual 
assault, Court still stands on this issue. Anything less than intention does not suffice for 
sexual assault. Recklessness or negligence were not, and are not, considered 
appropriate standards for the offences of indecent assault and sexual assault. If one of 
the purposes of the criminal law is to differentiate on reasonable grounds between 
serious and minor offences this might provide an insight into why Parliament were 
unable to allow sexual assault to be committed recklessly. In addition, as I argued above 
most archetypal sexual assaults are intentional and the issue of recklessness as to the 
commission of the offence might only arise at the fringes of liability. In section 1.4, I will 
consider whether reckless touchings are too ‘trivial’ to concern the law, but first it is 
constructive to consider arguments in favour of the subjective/objective formulation of 
recklessness in relation to sexual assault. 
 
One issue that arises is whether it is possible to conceive of an unintentional yet 
culpable sexual touching. Their Lordships in Heard commented that ‘we think that such 
a possibility is a remote one, but we are unable wholly to rule it out’.22 One possible 
                                                             
20 Home Office Consultation Paper, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (July 2000) 
at para 2.14.3. 
21
 Ibid at 2.12.4. 
22
 [2007] EWCA Crim 125, at 22. 
  
320 
 
example they gave is of a defendant who intends to avoid actual physical contact, but 
realises that he may touch and nevertheless takes the risk. This is similar to the facts of 
Shimmen.23 D, a martial arts expert attempted to perform a kick near to a window 
without breaking it. His foot made contact with the window and broke it. He maintained 
that he had eliminated any risk because of his muscular control and skill in the martial 
arts. The Divisional Court held that evidence of his expertise did not displace the 
inference of recklessness and gave a direction to convict. How might facts similar to 
these apply to sexual assault?  
 
Example A  
A man brushes past a buxom woman, face to face, in a packed nightclub. He is aware 
that his chest might brush her chest, and secretly hopes that some contact will be made. 
He has not left enough room. The defendant acted intentionally in trying to move past 
the woman, but not in relation to touching her chest. He acknowledged the risk of 
touching the woman’s breasts and proceeded to continue. In Heard, the House of Lords 
held that to ‘flail about, stumble or barge around in an uncoordinated manner which 
results in an unintended touching, objectively sexual, is not this offence.’24 D, in this 
example is not carelessly stumbling around; he has seen the risk of touching C’s chest 
and gone on to take it. He manifests a disregard for C’s sexual autonomy. This 
constitutes a reckless sexual touching and would not presently result in liability. Where 
D is ‘practically indifferent’25 to touching C he is less blameworthy than D who intends to 
touch, but is still culpable to some degree.   
 
 
 
                                                             
23
 [1986] Crim L R 800. 
24
 [2007] EWCA Crim 125, at 23. 
25
 R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990) ch 7. This concept will be 
explained further below. 
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Example B 
A group of men in the pub are discussing the attractiveness of a woman standing close 
to them. One of the men, for a laugh, pretends to strike the bottom of the woman, who 
cannot see him. He aims not to make contact, but misjudges the distances and strikes 
her on the bottom. The man has foreseen the risk of touching and is therefore 
subjectively reckless as to the touching. Even if he argues that ‘I acted without thinking’, 
he should still be liable. He ought to have known that there was a likelihood that in 
getting close enough to C to pretend to strike her bottom, there was a chance that he 
would in fact make contact. In such a situation, he is Caldwell reckless. D would not be 
liable where X takes his hand and strikes C with it. D is not liable because he has done no 
voluntary act: voluntary here means that D must consciously bring about the bodily 
movement for which he is being held liable.  
 
10.1.3 Subjective or objective recklessness? 
The examples above demonstrate how there is an argument for section 3(1)(a) should 
to be amended to include recklessness on the basis that D has manifested an attitude of 
‘practical indifference’ as to whether touching takes place Thus, the section would read 
‘(a) he intentionally or recklessly touches another person’. Under this proposed 
modification a person would act recklessly as to a touching when (i) he does an act 
which in fact creates an obvious risk that he will touch another and (ii) when he does the 
act he either has not given any thought to the possibility of there being any such risk or 
has recognized that there was some risk involved and has nonetheless gone on to do it. 
This is a modification of the model direction Lord Diplock formulated in Caldwell. It 
includes advertent recklessness by referring to the person who recognizes the risk and 
takes it (subjective recklessness), but goes further, extending to all those who fail to give 
any thought to the possibility of a risk which would be obvious to the reasonable person 
(objective recklessness).  
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(a) Subjective recklessness 
A person who does not intend to cause a harmful result or consequences might have 
acted being aware of the possibility of a result or circumstance. If he so acts he is, in 
orthodox criminal law theory, subjectively reckless. The (defendant) subjective approach 
to recklessness, or what is commonly referred to as advertent or Cunningham26 
recklessness, suggests that, in fairness to D, he should be liable only when he has 
foresight of a risk; when he has foreseen an unreasonable risk and gone on to take that 
risk. The justifications for the advertent definition of recklessness are grounded in the 
principle of individual autonomy and the importance of respecting choice (as discussed 
in chapter 7). The distinction between recklessness and negligence turns on D’s 
awareness or unawareness of the risk. In both cases, there is an unreasonable risk 
taken, but D should only be held to be reckless if he or she was aware of the risk. A 
person who is aware of the risk usually (although not always)27 chooses to create it or 
run it, and therefore chooses to place his or her interests above the well-being of those 
who may suffer if the risk materializes.  
 
(b) Objective recklessness 
The (bystander) objective approach or what is commonly referred to as inadvertent or  
Caldwell28 recklessness suggests that people ought to come up to a general standard of 
behaviour in fairness to the rest of society. It includes the advertent element, but then 
goes further, extending to all those who fail to give any thought to the possibility of a 
risk in circumstances where the risk would have been obvious to the reasonable person. 
In October 2003, the House of Lords upheld its preference for a purely (defendant) 
subjective doctrine of mens rea by overruling the Caldwell29 test of recklessness. The 
                                                             
26
 [1957] 2 QB 396. 
27
 For example, D could be aware of the risk and choose not to take it. 
28
 [1982] AC 341. 
29
 The old Cunningham ([1957] 2 QB 396) requirement of actual foresight of a risk was supplemented by a 
new test of foreseeability to a reasonable person. The decision was heavily criticised, see: J. Smith & B. 
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House of Lords handed down judgment in R v G and another,30 ruling that the word 
‘reckless’ should be assessed (defendant) subjectively and that the law, as understood 
before Caldwell, should be restored. The facts in G were that the defendants, two young 
boys aged 11 and 12 set fire to some newspapers in the yard at the back of a shop and 
threw the lit newspapers under a bin. They left without putting out fire, which spread 
and caused £1 million worth of damage to the shop and adjoining buildings. They were 
charged with arson contrary to s.1(1) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (CDA 
1971). The defendants’ case was that they expected the newspapers to burn themselves 
out on the concrete floor. Neither appreciated the risk of the fire spreading as it did. 
 
The majority of the House of Lords decision was given by Lord Bingham who gave four 
substantive reasons for departing from the Caldwell decision. The first, and more 
substantial, of the four reasons is captured in the statement: 
‘It is clearly blameworthy to take an obvious and significant risk of causing injury to 
another. But it is not clearly blameworthy to do something involving a risk of injury to 
another if...one genuinely does not perceive the risk. Such a person may fairly be 
accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, but neither of those failings should expose 
him to conviction of serious crime or the risk of punishment.’31   
Lord Bingham stated that it is a ‘salutary principle’ of the law that it had to be proven, 
especially in cases of serious crime, that the defendant had the necessary mens rea to 
commit the crime. This was a clear attack on the principles for an objective test for 
recklessness. 
 
Lord Bingham’s second substantive reason for departing from Caldwell is based on the 
‘obvious unfairness’ it is capable of generating, where the defendants’ capacity to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hogan. Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law (Butterworths, London, 1988) p.67; G. Williams, „The Unresolved 
Problems of Recklessness‟ (1988) 8 LS 74; A. Norrie, „The Limits of Justice: Finding Fault in the Criminal 
Law‟ (1996) 59 MLR 540. 
30
 [2003] UK HL 50. 
31
 Ibid, at 32. 
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appreciate risks is inherently inferior to that attributable to the ordinary, prudent 
person.32 Lord Bingham added that: ‘It is neither moral nor just to convict a defendant 
(least of all a child) on the strength of someone else would have apprehended if the 
defendant himself had no such appreciation.’33 This merely provided an argument for 
preserving the Caldwell test and engrafting a capacity exception on it so as to exempt 
those who might be incapable of attaining the objective standard. The House of Lords 
rejected this solution on the ground that the decision was already complicated and that 
such a solution would over-complicate the task of jury or magistrates.34 However, it is 
not clear that such a task would be any more complicated than many of the other tasks 
juries are routinely required to perform in criminal cases.35 The third argument used by 
Lord Bingham was that he did not feel able to ignore the criticism of Caldwell given by 
academics, judges and practitioners. He added that ‘a decision which attracts reasoned 
and outspoken criticism by the leading scholars of the day, respected as authorities in 
the field, must command attention.’36 The final argument utilised by Lord Bingham was 
that the decision of the House of Lords in Caldwell was a misrepresentation of the CDA 
1971, because the judges involved in the decision failed to consult the Law 
Commission’s report that led to the passing of the Act.37  
 
In summary, the House of Lords in G concluded that it should depart from Caldwell 
because it was ‘just’ to do so and in the context of the case, the fact that the defendants 
were children and the charge related to criminal damage, there is obvious merit in the 
decision. The decision reasserts the primacy of subjectivism, echoing other recent 
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 [2003] UK HL 50, at 33. 
33 Ibid.  
34
 Ibid, at 38.  
35
 E.g. in relation to „dishonesty‟ under the Theft Act 1968, or the defences of provocation or duress.  
36 Ibid at 34. 
37 Ibid at 35. 
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decisions in the House of Lords.38 However, the choice is not simply between strict 
subjective and objective approaches. 
 
(c) The ‘hybrid’ approach 
The law of recklessness thus consists of two incompatible approaches: whilst 
subjectivism employs too narrow a conception of individual responsibility, objectivism 
involves an overbroad conception of social condemnation. In the context of sexual 
assault, there is an argument for adopting the broader form of recklessness, objective 
recklessness, with a capacity exception so as to preserve its logic but prevent injustice. 
This is similar to the hybrid approach to defining recklessness proposed by 
Amirthalingam, in which the court would focus on whether someone like the defendant 
ought to have appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching.39 The question then 
becomes: would or should D have foreseen the risk given his intellectual capacities and 
knowledge at the time. D would be liable where he has manifested an attitude of what 
Duff calls ‘practical indifference’ as to whether touching takes place.40 People who are 
practically indifferent to certain features of a situation are still blameworthy to some 
extent, although not as blameworthy as those who do advert to them. Practical 
indifference is ‘a matter, not of feeling distinct from action, but of the practical attitude 
which the action itself displays’.41 Moreover, it may include cases in which D fails to 
advert to certain aspects of a situation: ‘what I notice or attend to reflects what I care 
about and my very failure to notice something can display my utter indifference to it’.42 
                                                             
38 DPP v B [2000] AC 428; R v K [2002] 1 AC 462 (strict liability); Morgan (Smith) [2001] 1 AC 146 
(provocation). 
39
 K. Amirthalingam, „Caldwell Recklessness is Dead, Long Live Mens Rea‟s Fecklessness‟ (2004) 67 
MLR 491. 
40
 R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability (Blackwell, Oxford, 1990) ch.7. The Law 
Commission did recently provisionally propose a form of reckless indifference in its offence of second-
degree murder, but reverted to a test based on subjective recklessness in its final report. See „A New 
Homicide Act for England and Wales‟ LCCP 177 (2006). 
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 Ibid. 
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What makes a reckless agent more culpable, more fully responsible for the risks he 
creates, is that he displays a gross indifference to that particular risk or to the particular 
interests that he threatened. In negligence, there is no need to prove that D foresaw the 
consequences at all, so long as the court is satisfied that a reasonable person in the 
situation would have done so. The defendant is culpable because he was not paying as 
much attention as he could and should have paid. A defendant who negligently touches 
another person could have done otherwise; he could have taken the care necessary to 
avoid the touching. As long there is fair warning and a fair opportunity to conform to the 
standard, advertence should not always be required. Recklessness and negligence are 
appropriate standards for sexual assault because they alert people to their duties and 
the need to take care in certain situations. If a reasonable person would notice that 
touching might occur, D should be liable on the basis that he ought to have considered 
C’s interests in such cases. The fault element in sexual assault consists in a serious 
disregard for C’s sexual interests and integrity, in some cases treating her as a sexual 
object,43 rather than as an autonomous subject. 
 
In the context of sexual assault, Lord Bingham’s first reason for departing from Caldwell 
is unsatisfactory because the failure to perceive an obvious risk of touching another 
depends entirely on the context in which the action occurs. In some cases, the flaw may 
indeed amount to ‘stupidity or lack of imagination’, but in others, there is a genuine 
disregard for C’s sexual integrity. A failure to advert to an obvious risk is not always 
blameless. Ashworth suggests that ‘*w+hether it is justifiable to take a risk depends on 
the social value of the activity involved relative to the probability and the gravity of the 
harm which might be caused.44 With non-consensual sexual touching, the slightest 
                                                             
43
 There may be situations in which D inadvertently touches C and where little blame attaches. This is 
particularly so given that if one adopted a complainant-centred approach to the meaning of „sexual‟,  it 
would only be necessary to prove that D ought to have known that he might touch C, not that he ought to 
have known that the touching would be „sexual‟. Some defendants might dispute that they were treating C 
as a sexual object, given arguably how little blame attaches to his conduct.    
44 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 6th edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p.108. 
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possibility of the occurrence of harm should be enough. As we shall see in chapter 11, 
for all the offences in ss.1-4 SOA 2003, it must not only be proved that C did not consent 
to what was done, but also that D did not reasonably believe that C was consenting. This 
reasonable belief test demonstrates a desire to move away from the subjective test in 
DPP v Morgan45 that judged D on the facts as he or she believed them to be, however 
unreasonable that belief might be. In the context of sexual offences, even orthodox 
subjectivists have argued for a lessening of the strictness of the subjectivist principles.46 
There are certain situations in which the risk of doing a serious wrong is so obvious that 
it is right for the law to impose a duty to take care to ascertain the facts before 
proceeding. As Ashworth puts it, ‘not only are serious sexual offences a denial of the 
victim’s autonomy, but the ascertainment of one vital fact- consent- is a relatively easy 
matter.’47 
 
Brudner argues that mens rea should be satisfied by any state of mind that signifies 
‘disrespect’ for the equal freedom of another self.48 In the context of sexual touching the 
defendant manifests disrespect for the autonomy of the complainant when: (1) he 
intentionally touches C; (2) knowing that it will certainly or probably result from his 
action, or is indifferent to whether he touches C; (3) he knowingly risks touching C; (4) 
he is wilfully blind to the possibility of touching C. Sexual offenders should be held to a 
wider account of responsibility due to the fact that sexual choice is a most ‘intimate 
aspect of affected individuals’ lives’.49 Reckless sexual touching can be described as a 
careless direct act. Reckless sexual touchings are culpable and deserving of the label 
sexual assault because the defendant has shown insufficient regard for the interests of 
others. An offence of reckless sexual touching would demonstrate that the law does not 
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 [1976] 1 AC 182. 
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 See Temkin, J. & Ashworth. A, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults and the 
Problems of Consent‟ [2004] Crim LR 328. 
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 A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 6
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 edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) p.341. 
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 A. Brudner, „Agency and Welfare in the Penal Law‟, in S. Shute, J. Gardner & J. Horder (eds) Action 
and Value in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993). 
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tolerate invasions of C’s sexual integrity. It is insignificant whether the touching is 
intentional or reckless: both demonstrate that D has shown disrespect for C’s sexual 
integrity. It may be that recklessness will be particularly relevant to situations in which 
the touching arises whilst the defendant is intoxicated, as will be discussed in section 
10.3.  
 
10.1.4 Reckless, accidental or mistaken touching? 
One of the difficulties of framing an offence of sexual assault in terms of intentional or 
reckless touching is where to draw the line between conduct that is ‘reckless’ and that 
which is ‘accidental’50 or ‘mistaken’. There are many insignificant or accidental touches 
that occur in everyday life: the accidental brush on the underground or the hug that 
lasts a few seconds too long. Nevertheless, how do we distinguish these from those of 
closer proximity and which might be considered culpable sexual touchings? What of the 
stranger who pushes against a woman’s buttocks as he edges past her on the crowded 
dance floor; or the man who sticks his hand out as he passes a woman on the street so 
that his palm briefly grazes the side of her breasts or buttocks; or the man who shakes 
C’s right hand whilst simultaneously grasping her upper left arm in his left hand and 
rubbing up against the side of her breast. Minimizing ‘minor’ sexual touching as an 
accident, a joke or a fact of life allows assailants to treat other’s bodies as public 
property. In Elvidge,51 D was found guilty of sexually assaulting C by touching ‘her 
private parts over her trousers’.52 The defendant slid into the complainant’s seat whilst 
she went to the bar and on her return, he put his hands between her legs and squeezed 
her vaginal area. D’s defence was that what happened was an ‘accident’ and that when 
C returned to her seat, he put his palm down to move himself across and she sat on his 
hand. Cases such as this one demonstrate the difficulties courts face in distinguishing 
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 An example of a sexual touching that can be described as accidental is where D, a doctor, who is trying 
to resuscitate C, inadvertently touches her breasts. 
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 [2005] EWCA Crim 1194. 
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 Ibid, at 2. 
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between intentional, reckless and accidental conduct. It might be argued that including 
reckless touching within the definition of sexual assault provides for a wide definition of 
recklessness and that it should be confined to D who is aware of a ‘serious risk’ i.e. one 
that is ‘more than insignificant or remote’.53 However, any risk may be sufficient as a 
minimum for recklessness so long as D is aware of it and it materializes.  
A further difficulty of framing an offence of sexual assault in terms of recklessness is 
whether the conduct is serious enough to deserve the label ‘sexual assault’ and stigma 
attached to that label. Is this sort of touching too ‘trivial’ to concern the law and should 
it fall within a ‘tolerable conduct’54 exception being ‘generally acceptable in the ordinary 
conduct of daily life’?55 It has long been established that any touching of another person, 
however slight, may amount to a battery.56 The breadth of this principle reflects the 
fundamental nature of the interest so protected; as Blackstone wrote in his 
Commentaries, ‘the law cannot draw the line between different degrees of violence, and 
therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of it; every man’s person being 
sacred, and no other having a right to meddle with it, in any the slightest manner’.57 The 
effect is that everybody is protected not only against physical injury but also against any 
form of physical molestation.58 The point here is that the significance of including 
‘reckless touchings’ depends on the extent to which ‘touching’ has a broad meaning in 
law. In chapter 4 I argued that, in relation to sexual assault, touching is broadly defined 
and that there is no room for any ‘de minimis’ exception.59 
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 The Law Commission, „Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide’ (Law Com No 304) paras 3.36-3.40, 
relating to first degree murder and to reckless murder. 
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 Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All E.R. 374, at 378. 
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 Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod 149. 
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One further issue for consideration is the cumulative effect of both reformulating the 
mens rea of sexual assault and the definition of ‘sexual’. In chapter 10, I proposed an 
addition to the s.78 definition of ‘sexual’ that makes explicit reference to the 
complainant’s affective response to the touching and above I have argued that s.3(1)(a) 
should be amended to include recklessness. One might argue that the combined effect 
of both of these proposals virtually creates a strict liability offence and considerably 
widens the scope of the offence, with consequent impact on important criminal law 
principles of non-retroactivity, consistency, fair labeling etc. This is also an important 
observation because there is no requirement of mens rea in relation to the ‘sexual’ 
nature of the touching, as we shall see in chapter 11.  Whilst, thus far, each element of 
the offence has been considered in isolation, the s.3 definition of sexual assault that 
included my amendments might be framed in the following way: 
 ‘A person (A) commits an offence if- 
 (a) he intentionally or recklessly touches another person (B), 
 (b) the touching is sexual, 
 (c) B does not consent to the touching, and 
 (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents.’ 
The important point here is that my proposals to reformulate the mens rea of sexual 
assault in respect of D’s attitude towards the likelihood of touching and to require a 
complainant-centred definition of ‘sexual’ do not create a strict liability offence. The 
modified s.3 would require two elements of mens rea, namely that D ‘intentionally or 
recklessly touches another person’ and that D does not ‘reasonably believe’ that the 
other person consents to the touching. The combination of these fault elements will 
attempt to ensure that only those who are morally culpable will be punished by the 
criminal courts. The presence or absence of consent and the defendant’s lack of a 
reasonable belief in consent is at the heart of sexual offence cases. The importance of 
the reasonable belief in consent test will be analysed in chapter 11. The cumulative 
effect of my modifications would be to make the offence complainant-centred, forcing 
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the decision-maker to consider the victim’s experiences and placing victims’ interests at 
the heart of the offence definition. 
 
10.2 INTOXICATION 
One complicating aspect of the requirement that D must intend to touch C is the case of 
the intoxicated defendant. On ordinary principles, if D was prevented by intoxication 
from forming the intention to touch C, he cannot be convicted of the offence regardless 
of whether his intoxication was involuntary or self-induced. In Majewski,60 the House of 
Lords held that the rule at common law was that self-induced intoxication could not be 
a defence to a criminal charge in which no special intent was necessary. As sexual 
assault cannot be committed recklessly, it appears to be an offence of ‘specific’ rather 
than ‘basic’ intent, so that a defendant might rely on self-induced intoxication to raise a 
doubt as to whether he had the required intention. However, following Kingston,61 
involuntary intoxication is not in itself a defence to indecent assault. This is a 
complainant-centred decision for the purposes of s.3 because as long as D has the 
necessary intent to touch, it does not matter if that intent is formed whilst involuntarily 
intoxicated. The Court of Appeal in Heard62 held that s.3 is a basic intent offence, even 
though it appears to be a specific intent offence. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
argue that this is also a complainant-centred decision because it means voluntary 
intoxication is unavailable as a defence to a charge of sexual assault. Nevertheless, the 
decision formalizes the inherent failure of s.3 to recognise that some unintentional 
touchings are culpable and therefore worthy of a criminal response. The 
characterization of all intoxicated non-intentional touching as ‘accidental’ undermines 
the protective purpose of the law’s approach to intoxication. 
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10.2.1 Involuntary intoxication 
In 1995 in Kingston, the House of Lords held that involuntary intoxication is not in itself 
a defence to indecent assault. D, who had paedophiliac homosexual tendencies, was in 
dispute with a couple who arranged for X to obtain damaging information against D that 
could be used against him. X invited a 15-year-old boy to his room. According to the 
prosecution, the boy was drugged by X and fell asleep. Whilst the boy was asleep, D 
visited X’s room and indulged in ‘indecent acts’ on the boy. These were recorded by X. 
D’s defence was that he had been involuntarily intoxicated at the time because X had 
laced his drink. The judge directed the jury that they should acquit D if they found that 
he was involuntarily so intoxicated that he did not intend to commit the indecent 
assault on the boy. The jury convicted D who appealed successfully to the Court of 
Appeal. The Crown then appealed successfully to the House of Lords. Provided he acted 
voluntarily with the requisite mens rea, the fact that involuntary intoxication led D to 
commit the offence, which he would not have committed when sober, does not afford 
him a defence, and this is so even when D is acting under the influence of substances he 
was not aware he had ingested. If despite his condition, D was able to and did form the 
intention to touch, it is no defence that he acted as he did only because of a loss of self-
control or inhibition caused by intoxication.63 However, if D’s drink is spiked and he lacks 
the intention to touch through involuntary intoxication he is not liable to conviction for 
the offence. For the purposes of s.3, this is a complainant-centred decision because it 
maintains that involuntary intoxication would be no defence to a charge of sexual 
assault and is only relevant in so far as it proves or disproves mens rea. An intention to 
touch sexually produced by the surreptitious administration of drink or drugs is still a 
criminal intent. The Law Commission in its report on Intoxication and Liability have 
recommended that this common law position be retained and that there ‘should be no 
defence of reduced inhibitions and blurred perception of morality where D’s condition 
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was caused by involuntary intoxication.’64 The Law Commission suggested that such 
involuntary intoxication might be relevant as a mitigating factor and may well justify a 
reduced sentence if the defendant is convicted of an offence.65 
 
10.2.2 Voluntary Intoxication 
As discussed above, the mens rea of sexual assault is limited to intention and the 
offence cannot be committed recklessly; as a result it appears to be an offence of 
‘specific’ rather than ‘basic’ intent, so that a defendant might rely on self-induced 
intoxication to raise a doubt as to whether he had the required intention. The 
distinction between crimes of basic and specific intent is important and was emphasised 
by the House of Lords decision in DPP v Majewski.66 However, in 2007, the Court of 
Appeal held in R v Heard,67 that sexual assault is an offence of basic intent. This is 
complainant-centred because it means that self-induced intoxication cannot be used as 
an excuse or defence.   
 
(a) DPP v Majewski  
In Majewski,68 the House of Lords held that the rule at common law was that self-
induced intoxication could not be a defence to a criminal charge in which no special 
intent was necessary. The House of Lords held that the authority which had been relied 
upon for the last half century was the speech of Lord Birkenhead in DPP v Beard,69 
where he said that the cases: 
‘establish that where a specific intent is an essential element in the offence, evidence of 
a state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such an intent 
should be taken into consideration in order to determine whether he had in fact formed 
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the intent necessary to constitute the particular crime. If he was so drunk that he was 
incapable of forming the intent required he could not be convicted of a crime which was 
committed only if the intent was proved.’ 
The position would appear to be that voluntary intoxication is a defence only to crimes 
requiring a specific intent. Voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to crimes, such as assault, 
which require only a basic intent. In Majewski, Lord Elwyn-Jones defended the position 
in relation to basic intent crimes: 
‘His (the defendant’s) course of conduct in reducing himself by drink or drugs to that 
condition in my view supplies the evidence of mens rea, of guilty mind certainly 
sufficient for crimes of basic intent. It is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is 
enough to constitute the necessary mens rea in the assault cases. The drunkenness itself 
is an integral part of the crime, the other part being the unlawful use of force against 
the victim. Together they add up to criminal recklessness.’ 
 
The decision in Majewski generated confusion from the outset.70 It was unclear whether 
their Lordships’ distinction between basic and specific intent was founded on (i) a 
requirement of some element of intention beyond the immediate actus reus71 or (ii) a 
requirement of ‘purposive intent’72 or (iii) a distinction between crimes of recklessness 
and intention.73 This confusion continued to such an extent that in 1995 the Law 
Commission was unable to state with confidence what the law was.74 It became widely 
accepted that all crimes of recklessness, negligence, malice and strict liability were 
crimes of ‘basic’ intent. Those requiring knowledge or intention were crimes of ‘specific’ 
intent.75 Murder is therefore a crime of specific intent as proof of intention to kill or 
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cause grievous bodily harm is required; recklessness will not suffice.76 The confusion 
surrounding the use of the terms ‘basic’ and ‘specific’ intent has continued to attract 
criticism from the Law Commission and in its 2009 report on Intoxication and Criminal 
Liability the Commission have recommended that the terms should be discarded and 
replaced with an integral fault element.77 It further recommends the provision of a 
definitive list of states of mind to which self-induced intoxication is relevant.78 
 
Applying this interpretation of Majewski to a charge of sexual assault, with the 
requirement of an ‘intentional’ touching, it was arguable that the crime would be one of 
specific intent.79 If D therefore sought to rely on his voluntary intoxication to deny that 
he had the mens rea for the offence, the Crown would be obliged to prove that he 
formed the intent despite his intoxication. However, the Court of Appeal in R v Heard80 
concluded that sexual assault is a crime of basic intent. 
 
(b) R v Heard 
While drunk, the defendant rubbed his genitals against the complainant police officer’s 
leg. The trial judge ruled that as s.3 of the SOA 2003 was a crime of basic intent, the 
defendant was precluded from advancing self-induced intoxication as a defence. In 
greater detail he ruled that the offence was one which had to be committed deliberately 
rather than accidentally- that was the meaning, he held, of the word ‘intentionally’ in 
s.3(1)(a).81 He contrasted the offence with one that requires proof of an intention that 
goes beyond the prohibited act, such as for example the offence created by s.66, which 
provides: 
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 ‘66.  Exposure 
(1) A person commits an offence if- 
(a) He intentionally exposes his genitals, and 
(b) He intends that someone will see them and be caused alarm or 
distress.’ 
The judge graphically described a requirement such as that in s.66(1)(b), that there be 
proved an intention that someone would see the exposed genitals and be caused alarm 
or distress, as a ‘bolted on’82 intention, going beyond the intention to expose oneself 
required by s.66(1)(a). It is clear that a person who carelessly exposes his genitals does 
not commit an offence under s.66, nor does he commit such an offence even through 
deliberate exposure unless he acts with the specific intent required by s.66(1)(b). This 
requirement means that a defendant who intends that C will see his genitals, but does 
not contemplate C’s alarm or distress, or thinks that they ‘will like what they see’ will 
not be liable. If for example a person unwittingly causes alarm or distress by stripping 
off in a mixed sauna (perhaps because that is normal practice in his home country) he 
will commit no offence; and nor will a man commit the offence by deliberately exposing 
himself to a new girlfriend whom he mistakenly supposes would welcome such 
behaviour.83 It is not necessary for D’s genitals to have been seen by anyone or for 
anyone to have been alarmed or distressed. 
 
The defendant appealed on the ground that the offence under s.3 was one of specific 
intent, as it required intentional touching and the issue of the defendant’s intoxication 
should have been left to the jury. The Court of Appeal held that the judge had been right 
to rule that the touching must be deliberate. On the evidence, the appellant plainly 
intended to touch the police officer with his penis. That he was drunk may have meant 
that he was disinhibited and did something he would not have done if sober, and/or 
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that he did not remember it afterwards.84 Neither of those matters would destroy the 
intentional character of the touching on the basis that ‘*i+n the homely language 
employed daily in directions to juries in cases of violence and sexual misbehaviour, “a 
drunken intent is still an intent.’’’85 Lord Justice Hughes, delivering the judgment of the 
Court, said that some offences, including the s.3 offence, could not simply be labelled as 
either of basic or specific intent as different elements of the offence required proof of 
different states of mind. The touching had to be intentional, while the sexual character 
of the touching was a purely objective question as set out in s.78(a). In respect of the 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching, if the act itself was ‘objectively equivocal’,86 the purpose 
of the defendant may be a relevant consideration: where the conduct is ambiguous and 
because of its nature might possibly be ‘sexual’, then, under s.78(b)(ii), the 
circumstances of the action or purpose of any person in relation to it or both, are to be 
considered in assessing whether the conduct is ‘sexual’ or not.87 Finally, under s.3(2), the 
belief in consent had to be objectively reasonable.88  
 
The Court of Appeal stressed that the direction that the touching ‘must have been 
deliberate’ amounts to ‘a direction that for conviction the appellant’s mind (drunken or 
otherwise) had to have gone with his physical action of touching’.89 The judge was 
accordingly correct to direct the jury that the touching must be deliberate and the 
defence that voluntary drunkenness rendered the defendant unable to form the intent 
to touch was not open to him. The Court further held that to ‘flail about, stumble, or 
barge around in an uncoordinated manner’ when intoxicated ‘which results in an 
unintended touching, objectively sexual, is not this offence,’ on the basis that the 
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intoxication, in such a situation, has ‘not impacted on intention’. 90 The Court held that 
in such situations intention is not in question and that what is in issue is ‘impairment of 
control of limbs’.91 
 
The Court of Appeal advanced the view that an offence of specific intent is one that 
requires an ‘ulterior intent’: ‘proof of a state of mind addressing something beyond the 
prohibited act itself, namely its consequences’.92 Basic intent is concerned with 
‘intention as applied to acts apart from their purposes’ or deliberate conduct. Lord 
Justice Hughes cited a passage from the speech of Lord Simon in Majewski: 
‘A general intent attending the commission of an act is, in some cases, the only intent 
required to constitute the crime while, in others, there must be, in addition to that 
general intent, a specific intent attending the purpose for the commission of the act.’ 
The point here was that s.3 is not a specific intent crime because there is no specific 
intent needed to bring about a particular purpose or consequence, only intent to touch. 
As Ashworth quite rightly notes this ‘narrowing of the concept of ‘specific intent’ to 
cases of purpose is a poor fit with the existing case-law.’93 The intentional touching 
element of the offence fell into the category of basic intent, and it followed that 
voluntary intoxication could not be relied upon to negate that intent. In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court explicitly stated that there is a large element ‘of policy in the 
decision whether voluntary intoxication can or cannot be relied upon in relation to an 
offence.’94 It noted the decision in R v C,95 that indecent assault was a crime of basic 
intent, at least unless the act was an equivocal one so that the defendant’s purpose had 
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to be examined.96 The SOA 2003 had not altered the law so as to make voluntary 
intoxication available as a defence to an allegation of intentional touching. 
 
In its 2009 report, the Law Commission is critical of the Heard decision. It argues that 
the suggestion in Heard that recklessness can be a ‘specific intent’ is ‘contrary to an 
established interpretation of the distinction between “basic” and “specific” intents and 
should be disregarded.’97 Accordingly, an explicit requirement of intention in the 
definition of an offence does not necessarily mean that the offence is one of specific 
intent. They further suggest that, on this point, ‘the decision in Caldwell is still good 
law.’98 I shall return to this point after discussing the implication of Heard for s.3. 
 
10.2.3 Implications of the decision in Heard 
There are two note-worthy issues arising from the decision in Heard. First, the decision 
is complainant-centred in holding that s.3 is a basic intent offence, even though it 
appears to be a specific intent offence. Intoxication is therefore unavailable as a defence 
to a charge of sexual assault. Secondly, the decision formalizes the inherent failure of s.3 
to recognise that some unintentional touchings are culpable and therefore worthy of a 
criminal response. The Court’s conclusion that the crime is one of basic intent, despite 
the clear element of intention in s.3(1)(a), was anticipated by some commentators.99 
Ormerod gives two examples to illustrate how the Court’s ‘radical reinterpretation’ of 
Majewski aligning specific intent with an ulterior mens rea produces difficulties.100 First, 
there is the defendant who becomes so heavily intoxicated that he genuinely has no 
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appreciation of the circumstances or consequences surrounding his physical actions.101 
Ormerod gives the example of D who ‘might be so intoxicated that he thinks he is 
stroking an animal at the centre of the earth when in fact he is stroking a woman’s 
breast.’102 On the Court’s approach, since the offence is one of ‘basic intent’ this actor 
will be guilty. Ormerod argues that it ‘would be difficult in any ordinary sense of the 
word to say that D ‘intended’ to touch as s.3 requires’. However, the fact that his 
inebriation led him to do something he would not have done if sober, should not 
provide him a defence. Allowing a general defence of intoxication would result in too 
many acquittals of guilty defendants and would bring the law into disrepute by offering 
no protection to complainants. There is an element of prior fault in the decision of D to 
take drink or drugs to such an extent as to lose control over his behavior. It is perfectly 
fair to assume that most people realize the possible effects of taking alcohol or drugs: 
‘*i+t is common knowledge that those who take alcohol to excess or certain sorts of 
drugs may become aggressive or do dangerous or unpredictable things.’103 However, 
there is a notable difference between appreciating the general risks of drunkenness and 
appreciating the risk of specific acts one might be likely to perform when drunk. 
Sentencing decisions suggest that intoxication may mitigate on the first occasion it is 
raised, if the offence can be portrayed as ‘out of character’, but it will not mitigate any 
subsequent offences committed in an intoxicated state.104 After G,105 voluntary 
intoxication does not provide a defence for a defendant who realised when he was 
getting drunk that he was putting himself in a condition where he would be likely to 
engage in the prohibited conduct in question. The Court did not rule on whether it 
would be open to a defendant to argue that as a result of his voluntary intoxication ‘his 
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mind did not go with the physical act’, with the result that he could not be convicted of 
an intentional offence even if the crime is one of basic intent. 
  
The second situation is one in which Ormerod argues that a ‘no more deserving actor’ 
will, following the Court’s approach, be acquitted. D who is heavily intoxicated, fooling 
around with his mates in a pub pretends to strike the bottom of a woman who is 
bending over to reach the bar and who cannot see him. He aims not to make contact by 
stopping his hand short, thereby amusing his mates in the process. His intoxication 
causes him to misjudge the distance and he ends up patting her on the bottom. He 
intends to move his arm and intends to come close to touching her, but not to do so. He 
is reckless about that consequence: he has seen the risk and gone on to take it.106 
However, recklessness will not suffice under s.3 as the Court acknowledges. It is possible 
that D is this situation might try to argue that because of his intoxication he did not have 
the requisite mens rea; because he was drunk he did not know what he was doing. As 
sexual assault is an offence of ‘basic intent’, it would seem he would be liable. However, 
Hughes L.J. concluded in Heard that D must in these circumstances be acquitted, but 
does so by describing his conduct as ‘accidental’.107 This type of actor is deserving of 
criminal liability and the action should properly be charged under a reformulated 
section 3 (as suggested above). It is misleading to describe the defendant’s conduct as 
‘accidental’: he is treating the complainant as an ‘object’ and using her for his own 
purposes. Even where D claims that ‘I was just having a laugh’, he is using C ‘as a means 
to an end’. The wrongfulness of sexual assault derives from the fact that the victim has a 
proprietary right over her own body. It is her body, she owns it, nobody else may use it 
without her saying so.108 Sexual assault is a form of being subjected to another’s 
dominion. In sexual interactions, unlike in other interactions, it is even more important 
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that we are able to control with whom we are intimate, since sexual relationships 
expose us more than other relationships and thereby make us more vulnerable. This is a 
reason why non-consensual reckless sexual touching, even as a ‘joke’, is offensive. It 
makes the recipient merely a sexual being, vulnerable and exposed. 
 
The Court also discusses the drunken dancer whose control of his limbs is 
uncoordinated or impaired, which leads him to touch a woman’s ‘private parts’ as he 
flails around.109 The Court concludes that the conduct is ‘accidental’ and that he should 
be acquitted. Again, D is reckless as to whether he will touch C. What is the difference 
between the hypothetical dancer and the appellant in Heard? Whilst the touching of the 
policeman’s thigh was not accidental, neither can the uncontrolled dancing be described 
as accidental. This broad application of the word ‘accidental’, which results in acquittal, 
undermines the whole protective purpose of the law’s approach to intoxication and 
basic intent. The voluntarily intoxicated defendant who is charged with having ‘groped’ 
a person at a party may claim that the touching was unintentional and that he was, in 
the words of Ormerod ‘merely flailing around (in what nowadays passes for dancing) or 
holding his hands out to steady himself in his stupor.’110 Consider D, who is drunk at the 
office party, and gropes C. In excluding recklessness from the definition of sexual 
assault, D is provided with a possible argument that any contact was ‘accidental’. 
 
The decision in Heard gives excessive scope to the concept of ‘accident’, by treating it as 
covering not only acts that are not voluntary or willed, but also those that are willed and 
involve unintended but foreseeable touching. This may have the effect of blurring the 
boundaries of recklessness. The Court reiterated that just as a drunken intent remains 
an intent, a drunken accident remains an accident.111 This overlooks the complainant’s 
experience of the touching and places too much emphasis on D’s blameworthiness.  
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These problems are implicit in the exclusion from s.3(1)(a) of recklessness and the 
decision in Heard merely formalizes the inherent failure of s.3 to recognise that some 
unintentional touchings are culpable and therefore worthy of a criminal sanction. 
Ormerod suggests that the Court seems to be using the word ‘accidental’ in distinction 
to ‘intention’ to describe both the state of mind of the actor as to the proscribed act 
(the ‘sexual’ touching) and the voluntary willed movement of the actor in controlling his 
arms.112 This interpretation of the meaning of ‘accident’ echoes the decision in Brady,113 
where the Court of Appeal considered whether D’s conduct in perching on the balcony 
over a dance-floor and falling onto the victim, rendering her paraplegic, was an 
‘accident’. D was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s.20 of the 
OAPA 1861.114 D’s deliberate bodily movement to perch on the balcony was not an 
accident. The conduct produced a risk of falling and injured those below. D saw that his 
conduct produced that risk and was reckless in unreasonably taking that risk. D’s appeal 
against conviction was allowed because the trial judge, in focusing simply on whether D 
acted maliciously, failed to separate out issues regarding accidental/deliberate risk of 
harm, and unlawfulness of D’s conduct as part of the external elements of the 
offence.115 
 
As noted, on its facts, Heard should never have given rise to problems. D’s plea was that 
he had no recollection of the incident. That is never a basis for a plea of intoxication and 
that should have been the end of the matter. In Caldwell,116 the House of Lords held that 
for offences of basic intent, intoxication provides evidence of mens rea, effectively 
relieving the prosecution of the burden of proving mens rea. It is therefore possible that 
                                                             
112
 Ormerod, op cit, n 93. 
113
 [2006] EWCA Crim 2413. 
114
 The decision in Brady can be distinguished from Heard on the basis that with s.20 recklessness is 
included in the definition, through interpretation of the word „malicious‟. 
115
 See D.C. Ormerod, „Assault: Whether recklessness requires proof that defendant had foreseen “an 
obvious and significant risk” [2007] Crim L R 564; A. Reed, „Subjective recklessness and the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861, s.20‟ [2007] Crim Law 175. 
116
 [1982] AC 341. 
  
344 
 
the decision in Caldwell applies to both Heard and s.3: as sexual assault is a basic intent 
crime, if D claims to have been so drunk as not to have intended to touch, that in itself 
provides evidence of an intention to touch. Heard is a very confusing case: the Court 
appears to have reached a decision based on the facts of the case and swayed by policy 
considerations and then attempted to make the basic/specific intent principles match 
their conclusion.  
There is a further issue to be discussed here and that is the question of how s.3 would 
work if the Law Commission’s proposed Criminal Law (Intoxication) Bill were to be 
introduced. As s.3 requires that D acted with subjective fault (i.e. an intention to touch) 
then the applicable provisions of Part 1 would apply. Clause 2 states that ‘*i+f D’s 
intoxication was involuntary, evidence of it may be taken into account in determining 
whether the allegation has been proved.’ Accordingly, if D did not act with the required 
intention to touch on account of being involuntarily intoxicated, then D would not be 
liable for sexual assault. In relation to voluntary intoxication clause 3 states that ‘in 
determining whether the allegation has been proved, D is to be treated as having been 
aware at the material time of anything which D would have been aware of but for the 
intoxication.’ There are several exceptions to this general rule and these are listed in 
clause 3(5). Under this approach, a defendant whose voluntary inebriation led him to do 
something he would not have done if sober would be liable for sexual assault. This is 
complainant-centred to the extent that evidence of D’s voluntary intoxication cannot 
refute a claim that D intended to touch C. 
 
10.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered the circumstances in which D is responsible and 
blameworthy for the touching. Three main conclusions have been reached. First, the 
requirement that D must intentionally touch another person and the decision to exclude 
recklessness from this element of the mens rea fails to acknowledge that there are 
certain unintentional, yet culpable, actions that deserve to come within the offence. The 
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current definition of sexual assault should be amended to include recklessness within 
s.3(1)(a) on the basis that the law’s failure to capture reckless sexual touchings shows 
insufficient regard to C’s sexual interests and integrity. However, framing an offence of 
sexual assault in terms of recklessness as to the touching is not without its problems: 
distinguishing reckless from ‘accidental’ conduct might prove problematic and it is also 
questionable whether all forms of reckless sexual touching are deserving of the sexual 
assault label and the opprobrium attached to that label. Secondly, the recent decision in 
R v Heard is complainant-centred in holding that s.3 is basic intent offence, even though 
it appears to be a specific intent offence. This is crucial in providing that a defendant 
cannot raise intoxication as a denial of mens rea. Thirdly, the decision in Heard also 
gives excessive scope to the concept of an ‘accident’ by treating it as covering not only 
acts that are not voluntary or willed, but also those that are willed but have unintended 
though foreseen consequences. The Court of Appeal inappropriately distinguished 
between intentional and accidental touchings. 
 
Chapter 11 will analyse the requirement that D must ‘not reasonably believe’ that the 
other person consents to the touching, arguing that it is inappropriate for the 
reasonableness of a belief to be determined in light of D’s characteristics. It further 
discusses whether s.3 requires any mens rea in relation to the intended touching being 
‘sexual’, arguing that the law ought not to require such awareness.  
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11 
Sexual Assault, Responsibility and Blameworthiness:  
 the Reasonable Belief in Consent Test and the Ambiguity 
of a Sexual Intent 
 
In chapter 10, I analysed the requirement that D must ‘intentionally’ touch another 
person and argued that liability should extend to reckless sexual touchings. In this 
chapter I will scrutinize the second element of mens rea set out in s.3 that D must ‘not 
reasonably believe’ that the other person consents to the touching. Whilst this test is an 
improvement on the old law, it allows for the reasonableness of a belief to be 
determined in light of D’s characteristics and this is inappropriate. The chapter further 
discusses how s.3 is unclear whether D must appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching, arguing that the law ought not to impose such a mens rea requirement. Part 1 
will consider why the ‘mistaken belief in consent’1 test was deemed unsatisfactory and 
analyse the current ‘reasonable belief’ in consent test as set out in s.3(2). The test will 
be criticised for establishing a ‘defendant-objective’ standard, which allows the jury to 
look at personal characteristics of D in deciding the reasonableness of his actions. This 
might encourage jurors to scrutinise C’s behaviour to determine whether there is 
anything about it that could have induced a reasonable belief in consent. This is 
insufficiently complainant-centred because it might result in juries responding to the 
reasonable belief test in different ways and might further reinforce stereotypes and 
value judgments about ‘appropriate’ sexual behaviour. 
 
Part 2 will discuss whether s.3 requires any mens rea in relation to the intentional 
touching being ‘sexual’. It will consider whether, in light of the decision in B v DPP,2 
                                                             
1
 DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182. 
2
 [2000] 2 AC 428. 
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appeal courts might read in to s.3 a presumption of mens rea: namely that, in order to 
be guilty, D must either know the act is ‘sexual’, know that reasonable people would 
consider the act ‘sexual’, be aware of the possibility of the touching being ‘sexual’, or be 
aware that reasonable people might label the touching ‘sexual’. This is one aspect of the 
definition that ought to be resolved so as to make the offence more complainant-
centred; requiring that D be aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching might deflect 
the court’s attention away from the invasion of C’s sexual autonomy and fail to 
communicate law’s symbolic condemnation of acts interfering adversely with sexual 
self-determination.  
 
11.1 REASONABLE BELIEF IN CONSENT 
The second element of the mens rea of sexual assault, under s.3(1)(d) SOA 2003 is that 
the defendant does not ‘reasonably believe’ that the other person consents to the 
touching. Prior to the SOA 2003, there existed a ‘mistaken belief’ in consent test that 
was unsatisfactory and insufficiently complainant-centred, as it did not require D’s 
mistake to be objectively reasonable. The Sexual Offences Bill introduced a reasonable 
person test that was unnecessarily complex and criticised for its failure to take account 
of D’s particular characteristics. This reasonable person test was changed through its 
Parliamentary progress and the SOA 2003 now provides a general test of what is 
reasonable in ‘all the circumstances’. Section 3(2) states that: ‘*w+hether a belief is 
reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any 
steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents.’3 The ‘reasonable belief’ test 
establishes a ‘defendant-objective’ test and shows considerable leniency towards 
defendants because it allows the jury to look at the personal characteristics of D in 
deciding the reasonableness of his actions. The Government specifically mentioned an 
intention that the defendant’s particular characteristics will be relevant in order to 
                                                             
3
 This provision is identical to that used in relation to rape (s.1), assault by penetration (s.2) and causing 
another person to engage in sexual activity without consent (s.4). 
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determine whether their belief was reasonable, as will be discussed below. The 
‘reasonable belief’ test explicitly focuses on any steps that D has taken to ascertain 
whether C was consenting, which appears to be quite complainant-centred. However, it 
might encourage jurors to scrutinise C’s behaviour to determine whether there is 
anything about it that could have induced a reasonable belief in consent. I will argue 
that although the ‘reasonable belief’ test is a marked improvement in the law it is still 
insufficiently complainant-centred and a better approach would involve a test for 
consent that did not require the individual characteristics of the defendant to be taken 
into account. This could be subject to an exception for those who lack capacity, for 
example because they have a learning disability or mental disorder. 
 
11.1.1 Reform of the ‘mistaken belief’ test 
Before the SOA 2003, to be guilty of rape, a man must have known that, or been 
reckless as to whether, the other party was not consenting.4 The ‘mistaken belief in 
consent’ test, which was established in DPP v Morgan,5 was a (defendant) subjective 
one, which did not require the defendant’s mistaken belief to be objectively 
reasonable.6 Any belief that the complainant was consenting, no matter how 
unreasonable, would negate this element of the mens rea. This landmark decision was 
widely applauded by subjectivists for its upholding of an important criminal law 
principle, since it emphasised that people ought to be judged on the facts as they 
believed them to be, and not on facts to which they had given no thought.7 It was 
reviled by many academics and women’s advocates as too favourable to defendants.8 In 
                                                             
4
 SOA 1956, s.1 (as amended). 
5
 [1976] AC 182. 
6
 Following the decision in Morgan, legislation was introduced to require that when a jury considers 
whether a belief was genuine, they have regard to the „presence or absence of reasonable grounds for such 
belief‟: Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, s.1(2). 
7
 J.C. Smith, „Rape‟ (1975) Crim L R 41.  
8
 T. Pickard, „Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime‟ (1980) 30 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 75; C. Wells „Swatting the Subjectivist Bug‟ [1982] Crim L R 209; R. Charlow, „Bad 
Acts in Search of a Mens Rea: Anatomy of a Rape‟ (2002) 71 Fordham Law Review 263; K. Huigens, „Is 
Strict Liability Rape Defensible?‟ in R.A.Duff & S. Green, Defining Crimes (OUP, Oxford, 2005) p.202. 
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Kimber,9 the Court of Appeal held that the decision in Morgan applied equally to 
indecent assault. The fault element of the crime included knowledge or recklessness as 
to whether the other person was consenting. Here, as with rape, it was sufficient to 
show that D ‘could not care less’ whether the other party was consenting.10 Following 
Morgan the prosecution had to prove not only that C did not consent, but also that D 
did not, in fact, honestly believe that C consented (in the sense that D knew that or 
could not care less whether, C was not consenting). In respect of C’s behaviour, Morgan 
arguably put the focus of trials on complainants in order to assess whether D did 
believe, or might have actually believed, in consent. 
 
In support of the reform to introduce a ‘reasonableness’ requirement, the Minister of 
State at the Home Office, Lord Falconer, said: 
‘The unsatisfactory elements of the current position are, first that it implicitly authorises 
the assumption of consent regardless of the views of the victim. Secondly, it is easy for 
the defendant to seek consent- the cost to him is very slight and the cost to the victim of 
forced sexual activity is very high indeed. We believe that it is not unfair to ask any 
person to take care to ensure that their partner is consenting and for them to be at risk 
of a prosecution if they do not…. So we take a strong view that there should be an 
objective element in the matter.’11 
Lord Falconer suggested that introducing an objective element to the mens rea of rape 
is a ‘more just approach’ and is ‘likely to produce more convictions.’12 In considering 
where justice lies, Lord Falconer went on to say that, ‘it is important to consider not only 
the interests of the defendant but the interests of the victim.’13 In defending the 
introduction of an objective element into the mens rea of rape, he suggested that as a 
matter of justice the risk of non-consensual sexual activity should lay with the 
                                                             
9
 (1983) 77 Cr App R 225. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 HL Deb, 2
nd
 June 2003, col 1060. 
12
 HL Deb, 31
st
 March 2003, col 1088. 
13
 Ibid. 
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defendant, as the victim would suffer doubly; from the humiliation of being raped and 
not receiving justice. Lord Falconer suggested that the honest belief in consent test 
‘undermines the faith that victims are prepared to place in the justice system and we 
believe that it discourages them from bringing cases to court.’14  
 
Clause 1 subsections (2) and (3) of the Sexual Offences Bill originally proposed to replace 
the Morgan test with a two-stage test: 
‘(2) This subsection applies if A does not believe that B consents (whether because he 
knows that B does not consent, gives no thought to whether B consents, or otherwise). 
 (3) This subsection applies if— 
(a) a reasonable person would in all the circumstances doubt whether B 
consents, and 
(b) A does not act in a way that a reasonable person would consider 
sufficient in all the circumstances to resolve such doubt.’15 
This required the jury to consider first, whether a reasonable person would, in all the 
circumstances have doubted whether the complainant was consenting. If there was the 
possibility of doubt, then the jury was required to consider, secondly, whether the 
defendant acted in a way that a reasonable person would consider sufficient in all the 
circumstances to resolve such doubt. The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
feared that this formulation would lead to injustice in some cases because it failed to 
take account of the defendant’s particular characteristics: 16 it would result in conviction 
of defendants who lacked the capacity to act in a way that a reasonable person would 
consider sufficient (such as children and the mentally disordered).17  
 
                                                             
14
 HL Deb, 2
nd
 June 2003, col 1060. 
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 This clause defined rape, but would equally have applied to sexual assault, see s.5 (2) & (3). 
16
 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Sexual Offences Bill, Fifth Report of Session 2002-03, 
HC 639, para 23. 
17
 There is a problem here of treating mental disorder as if it is a cohesive set of conditions, when in fact it 
is very broad. See G. Richardson, „Mental Capacity at the Margin: The Interface Between Two Acts (2010) 
18 Med L R 56. 
  
351 
 
Clause 1 was also said to be unnecessarily complex and made more difficult by its 
operation in connection with the presumptions in clauses 76 & 77.18 Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick suggested it was in danger of confusing juries and generating more appeals:  
‘For the jury would presumably have to be asked after the defendant had been 
convicted on which of the two grounds they had convicted him, whether under Clause 
1(2) or Clause 1(3). That is always a source of trouble, as anyone who has had 
experience of dealing with juries will know.’19 
The Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association suggested that the test be amended to 
require the jury to consider ‘what a reasonable person “sharing the characteristics of 
the defendant” would have thought.’20 The Government opposed this, however, 
because it would require the jury to consider all the characteristics of the individual 
defendant. Viscount Bledisloe used the example of the defendant who arrives in 
England or Wales from a country where ‘whenever ladies say “no” they meant “yes’’’.21 
He questioned whether this background characteristic should be submitted to the court 
as a defence, arguing that once one begins taking into account individual characteristics, 
trials will go on indefinitely.22 Can and should we consider all aspects of a person’s life 
and personality in order to determine whether their belief was reasonable? Whilst it is 
necessary to consider the defendant’s beliefs in the context in which those beliefs are 
made, it would unduly burden a jury and prove very time-consuming to require that 
every individual aspect of a person’s life and character that might be relevant to the 
question of whether D’s belief was reasonable be provided as evidence to support or 
discredit their belief in consent. Although this might make trials fairer for defendants, 
ensuring that only those who are truly culpable (rather than merely ignorant are liable) 
it also places too much emphasis on the complainant’s behaviour.  
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 For discussion of the evidential and conclusive presumptions see chapter 4, section 3.2. 
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Hilary Benn, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Home Office, indicated that the 
drafting in clause 1(3) already took sufficient account of the individual defendant 
because the jury was invited to look at ‘all the circumstances’. Against that, however, 
Viscount Bledisloe argued that ‘“circumstances” means surrounding facts…not the 
peculiar characteristics of the individual defendant.’23 The government agreed to 
reconsider the formulation of clause 1(3), and when introducing the amendments the 
Minister of State in the Home Office, Baroness Scotland of Asthal QC, said that: 
‘the revised version of the reasonableness test moves away from the concept of ‘the 
reasonable person’ and requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant did not 
have a reasonable belief in consent. The test is supported by an explanation of the type 
of criteria to be used to determine whether the D’s belief in consent was reasonable in 
relation to the alleged offence. The jury is directed to have regard to all the 
circumstances at the time, including any steps taken that the D may have taken to 
establish that the complainant consented to the sexual activity.’24 
 
11.1.2 ‘Reasonable belief’ in consent test 
S.3(2) provides that ‘*w+hether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard 
to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B 
consents.’ S.3(2) makes it clear that the defendant will have the mens rea if he lacks a 
reasonable belief that the complainant consents. This includes any one of three states of 
mind. First, where he knows the complainant does not consent. Secondly, where he 
gives no thought to whether the complainant consented. Thirdly, where he does not 
reasonably believe the complainant consented. The test suggests that there is an onus 
on D to verify C is consenting. Heaton suggests that this is easily achieved and that 
‘there is no room for a modern Casanova to assume his irresistibility.’25  
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Lacey et al describe the ‘reasonable belief’ standard as a ‘half-way house’ for it allows 
the defendant’s reasonableness to be measured in relation to his own perception of the 
circumstances.26 Despite the reference to ‘all the circumstances’ in s.3(2), one might 
argue that characteristics should only be taken into account to the extent that they 
could reasonably affect the defendant’s perception or understanding of whether or not 
the complainant is consenting. S.3(2) does not rely on a ‘reasonable person’ standard, 
adopting instead a general test of what is reasonable in all the circumstances. As such, 
this provision might not only permit, but might actually invite jurors ‘to scrutinise the 
complainant’s behaviour to determine whether there was anything about it which could 
have induced a reasonable belief in consent’.27 Thus, an examination of the 
complainant’s conduct, her relationship with the defendant and her previous sexual 
history might be dissected. This might further reinforce stereotypes and value 
judgments about ‘appropriate’ female sexual behaviour in our society e.g. that if a 
woman drank with him, flirted with him, or invited him in for coffee she is partly to 
blame for being raped.28 It is also unclear whether as a matter of law ‘all the 
circumstances’ would include D’s inebriated state, although it would seem contrary to 
the intentions of the Government for the test of ‘reasonable beliefs’ to be adjusted to 
take account of drunken beliefs. The key issue seems to be whether the jury (or 
magistrates) can be trusted to come to a fair and just conclusion. There is empirical 
evidence suggesting that concerns about leaving the jury to interpret and apply the 
reasonable belief test are well founded. 
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 N. Lacey., C. Wells & O. Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law 3
rd
 edn (Lexis Nexis, London, 2003) 
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 J. Temkin & A. Ashworth, „The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (1) Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems 
of Consent‟ [2004] Crim L R 328. 
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11.1.3 Mock jury study on sexual consent 
In 2006, Finch and Munro conducted seven scripted rape trial scenarios on sexual 
consent in the jury room to examine the ways in which the concepts of freedom, 
capacity and reasonableness were interpreted.29 They found that participants 
responded to the reasonable belief test in divergent ways.30 Some of the jurors 
retreated to a more ‘traditional’ objective test, focusing on whether the belief was one 
that the majority would consider reasonable. By contrast, other participants interpreted 
the SOA 2003 as requiring them to adopt an at least partially subjective approach, 
considering whether it was reasonable for the defendant to think that C was consenting. 
The study presented two significant findings on the reasonable belief test. First, it 
illustrated that the current terminology of the statute is confusing for jurors who find 
themselves left to interpret the level of objectivity or subjectivity required by the test. 
Secondly, the findings support the concerns expressed by critics that the move away 
from an unmodified objective test (applying a test of whether the belief was one that 
the majority would consider reasonable) will considerably reduce the impact of the new 
legislation, at least in terms of its aim of imposing a duty on men to ascertain consent.  
 
Finch and Munro’s study also highlighted the extent to which, in the absence of specific 
guidance to the contrary, jurors often interpreted the notion of ‘reasonable in all the 
circumstances’ extremely broadly, taking into account ‘wider circumstantial factors’ e.g. 
factors about the whole situation, the party, the drinking and so on.31 The introduction 
of these factors is problematic as it shows that jurors effectively deduced sexual consent 
from other events that lacked ‘any temporal correspondence with intercourse’.32 In 
addition, it generates an opportunity for the introduction into the jury room of a range 
of views about ‘appropriate’ socio-sexual interaction. One of the conclusions of the 
                                                             
29
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mock jury study was that the ‘defendant-objective’ test ‘generated considerable 
leniency towards the defendant’, far more so than had the test been purely objective.33 
This was because the subjective requirement caused jurors to fall back on stereotypes 
about rape on the ground that the defendant’s own thinking might have been 
influenced by them. On the other hand, jurors who applied ‘an unmodified objective 
standard [...] generally held the defendant to a higher standard of care and 
responsibility.’34  
 
Finch and Munro’s research focused on rape and as such there are limits in terms of the 
conclusions we can draw from their survey with respect to sexual assault. There are also 
obvious methodological problems of jury-simulation research. In the absence of being 
able to undertake research into actual jury deliberations,35 we can never be certain 
which factors influence jurors in rape trials and the extent to which jurors are capable of 
impartially interpreting and applying judicial guidance on the meaning of complex 
terms. In Weiten and Diamond’s landmark study on jury simulation method they 
identified a number of threats to its value, relating in particular to inadequate sampling, 
inadequate stimuli, inappropriate dependent variables, the issue of role playing and the 
failure to include group deliberation and corroborative field data.36 Finch and Munro 
attempt to respond to these concerns in their article.37 Despite obvious trepidation 
about mock juries ‘verisimilitude to real juries’, Finch and Munro’s study is perhaps the 
closest we can hope to get to the jury room and highlights the, albeit generalised, 
processes of reasoning that lead to a particular verdict.38  
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11.1.4 Reasonableness: a ‘defendant-objective’ test? 
By focusing on the reasonableness of the individual defendant’s belief, s.3(2) also allows 
the jury to look at personal characteristics of the defendant, such as learning disability 
or mental disorder, and consider them. The test of reasonableness is thus ‘defendant-
objective’ or what Temkin and Krahe label ‘subjective/objective’39 rather than purely 
objective: a purely objective or ‘bystander-objective’ approach focuses on a reasonable 
person with no characteristics of the defendant, whereas a ‘defendant-objective’ 
approach focuses on a reasonable person in D’s position.40 Lord Falconer, while refusing 
to require the jury to take account of all the personal characteristics of the defendant in 
assessing what would be reasonable in all the circumstances,41 also refused to rule out 
consideration of factors beyond age and mental impairment, opining that it would be 
for the judge and jury, applying their good sense, to decide which characteristics were 
relevant for this purpose.42  
 
On the one hand, courts might take an expansive approach to the inclusion of 
characteristics, as in Smith (Morgan)43 on provocation and allow any relevant 
characteristics to be considered. On the other hand, courts might take a more restrictive 
approach, as in Colohan,44 concerning the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, in 
which the Court of Appeal refused to accept that the defendant’s characteristics 
rendered his actions or beliefs reasonable. Although these two cases applied to 
different contexts, respectively a defence to murder and the offence of harassment, 
they highlight the possible judicial interpretation of a fundamental statutory phrase. The 
Protecting the Public White Paper stated that ‘“reasonable” will be judged by reference 
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to what an objective third party would think in the circumstances.’45 Cowan has 
expressed concern for this development, highlighting the need for greater guidance on 
the question of to whom the belief needs to be reasonable: 
‘What if the accused has led an especially sheltered life, in a rural place, within a sexist 
family, has not been schooled in the shifting gender power relations of the 21st century, 
and believes a sexual partner to be consenting despite her protestations: will it be 
reasonable for him to think she is consenting?’46 
Mackinnon, writing on rape in the 1980s, forewarned of the dangers of moving away 
from an honest belief test and assuming that this in itself represented a progressive step 
towards protecting sexual autonomy.47 She argued that ‘to attempt to solve (the 
problem of rape) by adopting reasonable belief as a standard without asking, on a 
substantive social basis, to whom the belief is reasonable and why- without asking what 
conditions make it reasonable- is one sided: male sided’.48 Temkin and Krahe argue that 
‘introducing an element of subjectivity into the issue of determining a defendant’s belief 
in consent is likely to raise the conviction threshold.’49 
 
This brings us to the question of the possible alternative approaches to the ‘reasonable 
belief’ test and the extent to which these alternative approaches might be better for 
complainants and fairer and which approach ought to be preferred. The first option is a 
purely objective or what I labelled in chapter 6 as a ‘bystander-objective’ approach. A 
‘bystander-objective’ approach would involve a test for consent that did not require the 
individual characteristics of the defendant to be taken into account. The defendant 
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would be held to the standard of a ‘reasonable person’, similar to that set out in clause 
1(3) of the Sexual Offences Bill. A ‘bystander-objective’ approach phrased in this way 
would suffer from serious drawbacks. It would convict a mentally disordered defendant 
who does not realise, because of his disorder that C was not consenting. However, a 
purely objective approach ought to be preferred over a ‘defendant-objective’ approach 
because it focuses on social protection. Although I acknowledge the importance of D’s 
state of mind, the law needs to emphasise the potential seriousness of non-consensual 
sexual touchings. 
 
An alternative and more preferable ‘complainant-centred’ approach might be to include 
additional elements to the ‘reasonable belief’ test. For example, one could add to the 
‘reasonable belief’ test that the decision-maker should ‘consider the importance of 
protecting C’s autonomy’. A further option would be to make an addition to the list of 
circumstances that jurors or magistrates must explicitly consider. At present, the 
decision-maker is instructed to consider ‘any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B 
consents’ but this could be amended to explicitly require jurors (or magistrates) to 
exclude consideration of any rape myths. Thus, D would be blameworthy where his 
reasonable belief was founded on the basis of stereotypes or rape myths. In other 
words what C was wearing, whether C had been drinking or whether C had behaved in a 
flirtatious manner would all be irrelevant to establishing D’s reasonable belief in 
consent. The most ‘complainant-centred’ approach would be to adopt a strict liability 
approach. In the context of sexual assault, this would mean that D would be guilty if C 
did not in fact consent even if D reasonably believed that C consented. This might be 
very harsh on defendants who, on perfectly reasonable grounds believed the 
complainant consented, but in fact it is proved she did not. One way in which such an 
approach could be made less severe on defendants would be to require mens rea in 
relation to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. In the next section, I will consider this in 
more detail. 
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11.2 INTENTION TO TOUCH SEXUALLY? 
The issue here is the significance of the defendant’s perception at the time of acting of 
the nature of his action. There is a lack of clarity in the law about whether a defendant 
needs mens rea in respect of each element of the actus reus. Section 3(1)(b) is silent as 
to whether D must appreciate that his actions are ‘sexual’ or know that reasonable 
people would consider the act ‘sexual’, or be aware of the possibility of the touching 
being ‘sexual’, or that reasonable people might consider the touching ‘sexual’. This is 
one unresolved aspect of s.3 that means we cannot properly evaluate how sufficiently 
complainant-centred the definition is. The principle of correspondence dictates that the 
fault elements of a crime correspond to the conduct elements.50 Section 3 does not 
adhere to the correspondence principle: it does not appear to require any mens rea in 
relation to the intended touching being ‘sexual’. This is rightly so; it is not necessary for 
every element of an offence to have a corresponding mens rea. In chapter 7, I argued 
that the correspondence principle appears to apply less easily to context-dependent 
terms such as ‘sexual’. Requiring that D be aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching 
might deflect the court’s attention away from the invasion of the complainant’s sexual 
autonomy. Although there are good reasons for the correspondence principle, namely 
that it ensures that the defendant is punished only for causing a harm or circumstance 
that he chose to risk or to bring about, in the context of sexual assault it would place too 
much emphasis on culpability and would lead to an insufficiently complainant-centred 
approach to the offence. The debate as to whether s.3(1)(b) requires any mens rea 
ought to be resolved to make the definition more complainant-centred because there 
are sound policy reasons for not requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant 
appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching.  
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11.2.1 Sexual intent 
The existing literature contains little discussion of whether the many offences under the 
SOA 2003 requiring proof that the conduct was ‘sexual’ also require that the Crown 
establish any mens rea on the part of the defendant as to that element. Section 3 makes 
two requirements in subsections 1(a) and 1(b), that A intentionally touches another 
person, B, and that the ‘touching is sexual’. It does not seem to require any mens rea in 
relation to the intended touching being ‘sexual’. Sexual assault can thus be described as 
an offence subject to what Simons calls ‘impure formal strict liability’. Simons contrasts 
‘substantive’ strict liability with two kinds of formal strict liability: pure and impure.51 
Substantive strict liability is a moral notion meaning liability without fault. By contrast, 
formal strict liability is a technical concept depending on the practice of analysing the 
elements of an offence. An offence is one of ‘pure’ strict liability if it requires no 
culpable mental state with respect to any of the constituent elements making up the 
proscribed act. An ‘impure’ strict liability offence requires no mens rea with respect to 
at least one of these act elements, but mens rea in relation to others. In sexual assault, 
there is no requirement of mens rea in relation to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. 
Therefore, a defendant might be convicted of sexual assault even if he did not 
appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching.52 In light of B v DPP53 (discussed below) it 
is possible that appeal courts might read in to the statute a presumption of mens rea, 
namely that in order to be guilty D must either know that the act is ‘sexual’, know that 
reasonable people would consider the act ‘sexual’ or be aware of the possibility that 
reasonable people would consider the act ‘sexual’.  
 
One of the difficulties of speaking in terms of a ‘sexual intent’ is distinguish ing this from 
a ‘sexual motive’ and ‘sexual gratification’. A ‘sexual intention’ requires that D intend to 
                                                             
51
 K.W.Simons, „When is Strict Criminal Liability Just?‟ (1997) 87 J Crim L & Criminology 1075. 
52
 Chapter 7 analysed an approach to the meaning of „sexual‟ that is dependent on the defendant‟s mental 
state for definition. 
53
 [2000] 2 AC 428. 
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touch C and appreciates the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. A ‘sexual motive’ is D’s 
purpose or reason for acting, for example to obtain sexual gratification. Norrie has 
argued that the line between motives and intention is in fact almost impossible to 
draw.54 He argues that once we start looking at what causes intentions and including an 
analysis of motive, we inevitably bring in complex social and political explanations for 
people’s actions. Often a person’s motive is to produce a particular result (in which his 
or her motive and intention are the same). This is especially true for sexual assault. If a 
defendant’s reason for touching C is to obtain sexual gratification, he is arguably aware 
of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. In the context of sexual assault, sexual motivation 
therefore provides evidence of the defendant’s intention.  
 
11.2.2 Sexual motivation 
Orthodox criminal liability generally excludes issues of motive, unless Parliament has 
declared it to be relevant as part of the definition of an offence. Certain offences in the 
SOA 2003 expressly provide that liability depend on whether the defendant acted for 
the purpose of sexual gratification,55 and the implication is that where this is not an 
element of the offence, such a purpose need not be proved. Under s.78(a) the jury (or 
magistrates) need only establish that the touching is ‘because of its nature sexual’, 
irrespective of the purpose of any person. Where the conduct is ambiguous and because 
of its nature might possibly be ‘sexual’, then, under s.78(b)(ii), the circumstances of the 
action, or purpose of any person in relation to it, or both are to be considered in 
assessing whether the conduct is ‘sexual’ or not. There may be limited circumstances 
where in practice a jury (or magistrates) is likely to find that D’s ‘ambiguous’ touching of 
C was ‘sexual’ without being satisfied that D had a sexual purpose. Evidence that D had a 
non-sexual purpose is therefore likely to be of real practical significance. However, in 
                                                             
54
 A. Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility and Justice: A Relational Critique (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000) p. 170-81. 
55
 See ss. 11-12, 18-19, 32-33, 36-37, 40-41 and 67. 
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Pratt,56 D’s non-sexual motive did not result in a successful appeal against conviction for 
indecent assault. The defendant gave evidence that his sole motive in causing the boys 
to expose their private parts was to search for cannabis, which he thought the boys had 
taken from him. The prosecution needed only to prove intention or recklessness as to 
the common assault and the jury could then find if there were circumstances of 
indecency accompanying the assault. The Crown Court held that even though he did not 
touch either of the boys, there were circumstances of indecency accompanying the 
assault.  
 
A similar conclusion was reached in Tabassum,57 where the appellant appealed against 
his conviction for indecent assault on the grounds that no sexual motive could be 
proved. He had asked several women to take part in a breast cancer survey in order to 
create a database and they had consented in the mistaken belief that he was qualified. 
In order to undertake the agreed breast self-examination they removed their clothes in 
front of him and allowed him to feel their breasts. There was no evidence of sexual 
motive but the Court of Appeal held that, as the touching was prima facie indecent 
there was no requirement to prove any sexual motive and the appeal was dismissed. 
The decision in Tabassum appears to undermine the decision of the House of Lords in 
Court and is arguably more complainant-centred because it does not require the 
defendant to intend that his act assume an indecent character. Lord Ackner in Court 
stated that ‘any evidence which tends to explain the reason for the defendant’s 
conduct, be it his own admission or otherwise, would be relevant to establish whether 
or not he intended to commit, not only an assault, but an indecent one.’58 On this basis, 
the defendant in Tabassum ought to have been acquitted. Interpreting s.3 in light of 
Tabassum and Court, it would appear that provided the touching is ‘sexual’ it is not 
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 [1984] Crim L R 41. 
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 [2000] 2 Cr App R 328. 
58
 [1989] AC 28, at 44. 
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necessary to prove any sexual intent, only intent to touch. However, evidence of 
purpose/intent/motive is admissible to explain the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. 
 
As was demonstrated in chapter 9, it is clear from H59 that, in some cases, conduct will 
be ‘sexual’ per se and in those cases the accused’s awareness of the ‘sexual’ nature of 
the conduct need not be established. However, in other cases, where the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the conduct is in issue, D’s motivations will be a relevant factor for the jury to 
consider.60 The jury (or magistrates) will need to consider first whether they as twelve 
reasonable persons, considered that the touching could be ‘sexual’. Secondly, they will 
need to consider whether they, as twelve reasonable persons, considered that in light of 
all the circumstances of the case, the purpose of the touching had in fact been ‘sexual’. 
Lord Woolf in H drew attention to s.63(2) SOA 2003 (‘committing an offence with intent 
to commit a sexual offence’) as providing an alternative charge to s.3 where the first 
requirement of s.78(b) cannot be established, but where what took place was certainly 
done with the intention to do the prohibited act of a relevant sexual offence. If a 
person therefore committed an assault, which does not come within 
s.3, but he intended to commit, for example, a sexual assault, then he 
could appropriately be charged under s.62.  
 
After the decision in H, it appears that too much emphasis is being placed by the court 
on the defendant’s motive in order to establish whether the touching is ‘sexual’ and this 
might deflect the court’s attention from the complainant’s affective response to the 
touching and the potential seriousness of non-consensual sexual touchings. As was 
demonstrated in chapter 5, the defendant’s motive is one of several circumstances 
which both separately and/or together may render a touching ‘sexual’ and this includes 
C’s experience. Although D’s motive is, in certain situations, an important aspect of 
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 [2005] EWCA Crim 732. 
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 Ibid at 15. 
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designating ambiguous conduct ‘sexual’, it must be remembered that, whatever D’s 
reason for acting (unless D has a reasonable belief in consent) he has still manifested 
disrespect for C’s sexual integrity. The most complainant-centred version of liability 
would disregard D’s motive, but this would raise additional dangers of injustice to 
defendants. The point here is that there might be situations in which D wants to adduce 
evidence of a non-sexual motive and where in doing so he deflects the decision-makers 
attention from C’s affective response to the touching. Ultimately, D’s explanation for his 
conduct ought to be judged in light of C’s experiences.   
11.2.3 B v DPP61 and presumption of mens rea 
In 2000, the House of Lords in B v DPP reinforced the common law that in constructing 
statutory offences there is a presumption against strict liability and in favour of mens 
rea. One issue for consideration is how the appeal courts would approach an appeal in 
which D has been convicted of sexual assault, but argues he honestly believed that his 
actions were not ‘sexual’, and he honestly believed that reasonable people would not 
consider the act ‘sexual’? I will argue that there is no justification for a requirement in 
s.3 that D must appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. Such a necessity would 
make the offence insufficiently complainant-centred, focusing the court’s attention on 
D’s reason for acting and deflecting attention from the complainant’s affective response 
to the touching. 
 
In B v DPP, D, a boy aged 15, repeatedly requested a 13-year-old girl to perform oral sex 
during a bus journey. He was charged with inciting a girl under 14 to commit an act of 
gross indecency, contrary to the Indecency with Children Act 1960 (IwCA 1960) s.1(1). D 
maintained a not guilty plea on the basis that he had honestly believed that the girl was 
over 14. The House of Lords overturned the Divisional Court’s view that the crime in 
s.1(1) was one of strict liability, and hence that D’s belief was legally irrelevant. The 
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House unanimously held that the ‘common law presumes that, unless Parliament has 
indicated otherwise, the appropriate mental element is an unexpressed ingredient of 
every offence.’62 The common law presumption of mens rea dictated that the 
prosecution must prove that D did not believe C was aged over 14. Accordingly, a belief 
that C was aged over 14, whether or not based on reasonable grounds, amounted to a 
denial of mens rea.63 The Law Lords were drawn by what they perceived to be the force 
of the subjectivist understanding of the correspondence principle: ‘By definition, the 
mental element in a crime is concerned with a subjective state of mind.’64 Lord Steyn 
accepted the description of the presumption of mens rea as a ‘constitutional principle’ 
that is not easily displaced by a statutory text.65  The reference is to a constitutional 
principle and not an absolute rule. Lord Nicholls held in B v DPP that courts may rebut 
the presumption of mens rea by reference to ‘the nature of the offence, the mischief 
sought to be prevented, and any other circumstances which may assist in determining 
what intent is properly to be attributed to Parliament when creating the offence’.66 
 
In a scathing criticism of the House of Lords’ decision, Horder describes it as acquitting 
an accused who had behaved in a manner ‘outside the bounds of what humane and 
decent people regard as tolerable’.67 He lays the blame for the outcome squarely on the 
orthodox subjectivist approach to mens rea: 
‘The decision of the House of Lords, a decision that flies in the face of legislation and 
case law across much of the rest of the common law world, can be attributed more or 
                                                             
62
 Ibid at 460. 
63
 Section 1 of the IwCA 1960 has been replaced by s.8 and s.10 SOA 2003, causing or inciting a child 
under 13 to engage in a sexual activity and causing or inciting a child to engage in a sexual activity 
respectively. Following R v G [2006] EWCA Crim 821 there is no need to show that the defendant was 
aware that the victim was 13. The Court of Appeal rejected a claim that the offence interfered with the 
defendant‟s human rights under Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life). 
64
 Per Lord Nicholls, at 462. 
65
 Per Lord Steyn at 470, borrowing the expression from Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation 3
rd
 edn 
(Butterworths, London, 1995) at 166. 
66
 Ibid at 463-4. 
67
 J. Horder, „How Culpability Can and Cannot, be Denied in Under-age Sex Crimes‟ [2001] CLR 15. 
  
366 
 
less directly to the pervasive influence of a subjectivist understanding of the so-called 
‘correspondence principle’ in criminal law theory.’68 
Horder argues that the prosecution should not be obliged to show, as an integral part of 
proving mens rea, that a defendant realised the victim was under-age. Whatever C’s 
age, he suggests that it should be a defence for the defendant to raise a doubt as to 
whether he or she was aware that his or her conduct was outside the bounds of what 
‘humane and decent people regard as tolerable, “in society as it is today”’.69 This is an 
incredibly vague test, focusing on the hypothetical ‘decent’ person, and in the context of 
sexual touching, might provide a defence for a defendant who does not consider or 
appreciate how their actions might be experienced by the complainant and believes 
their ‘wandering hands’ are tolerable ‘in society as it is today’.70 Horder’s exception 
would cover cases in which the conduct complained of is properly regarded as tolerable, 
as one of life’s vicissitudes, and thus the kind of conduct described in Collins v Wilcock71 
as ‘generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life’.72 Even if the conduct is not 
regarded as having fallen within the scope of Horder’s proposed exception, he suggests 
that the defendant may have had one of two beliefs about it, which become a mens rea 
issue. First, he may have believed that the conduct is tolerable, as one of life’s 
vicissitudes. This principle is wholly (defendant) subjective, and thus focuses on whether 
D himself regarded the conduct as tolerable ‘in society as it is today’, even if it was not 
considered tolerable by ‘humane and decent’ people. Secondly, he may have believed 
that humane and decent people would regard it as tolerable, as one of life’s 
                                                             
68
 Ibid at 16. 
69
 This is Lord Diplock‟s phrase, in describing the levels of self-control to be expected of ordinary people: 
see DPP v Camplin [1978] AC 705, at 717. 
70
 Ibid. 
71
 [1984] 3 All ER 374. 
72
 The case concerned a police officer who was deemed to be acting outside the course of her duty when 
she detained the defendant for questioning by grabbing her arm. The action was unlawful and amounted to 
a battery since it went beyond the generally acceptable conduct of touching a person to engage their 
attention. 
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vicissitudes.73 Horder argues that either of these two beliefs may be regarded as a 
denial of culpability. 
 
The decisions of the House of Lords in B v DPP, and more recently in R v K,74 have 
strengthened the presumption of mens rea. In light of B v DPP, are the appeal courts 
likely to read in to the SOA 2003, s.3 a presumption of mens rea, namely that in order to 
be guilty D either must know the act is ‘sexual’, know that reasonable people would 
consider the act ‘sexual’, be aware of the possibility of the touching being ‘sexual’, or be 
aware that reasonable people might label the touching ‘sexual’? In Sweet v Parsley,75 
Lord Reid expressed the presumption of mens rea as follows: 
‘*T+here has for centuries been a presumption that Parliament did not intend to make 
criminals of persons who were in no way blameworthy in what they did. That means 
that whenever a section is silent as to mens rea there is a presumption that, in order to 
give effect to the will of Parliament, we must read in words appropriate to require mens 
rea... [I]t is firmly established by a host of authorities that mens rea is an essential 
ingredient of every offence unless some reason can be found for holding that that is not 
necessary.’76 
Following the decisions in B v DPP and R v K the court will read mens rea into a statute 
unless either (1) there is clear wording in the statute indicating that the offence is to be 
one of strict liability,77 or (2) there is a ‘compellingly clear’78 inference that the offence is 
to be one of strict liability. If some sections of a statute refer explicitly to a mens rea 
requirement and others do not that may indicate that those sections that do not are 
meant to be strict liability.79 However, this will not be a conclusive factor,80 as is clear 
                                                             
73
 Horder terms this the „Ghosh principle‟ [1982] QB 1053. The test for the mens rea element of dishonesty 
was whether ordinary people would regard D‟s conduct as dishonest, and whether D realized that this was 
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 [2001] UKHL 41. 
75
 [1970] AC 132. 
76
 Ibid at 148-9. 
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 Kirk and Russell [2002] Crim LR 756. 
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 [2000] 2 AC 428, at 464. 
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from the decision in K itself. In the context of sexual assault, one might argue that the 
statute should be taken at face value: there are mens rea requirements in relation to 
touching and consent, but not in relation to ‘sexual’. In that sense, it might be 
contended that ‘sexual’ is just an ordinary, objective term and it is not necessary for the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that D appreciated that the touching 
might be, or might be perceived by reasonable people as, ‘sexual’. 
 
The Privy Council in Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney General of Hong Kong81 stated 
that the presumption of mens rea is ‘particularly strong where the offence is “truly” 
criminal’. In deciding whether an offence is ‘truly criminal’, the court will consider, 
amongst other things, the severity of the punishment82 and the level of stigma that 
attaches to conviction for that offence.83 Sexual assault carries a maximum penalty of 10 
years imprisonment, with a requirement to sign on to the Sex Offenders Register and 
therefore fault-based liability is inferred.  A court will not presume mens rea when there 
is a ‘compellingly clear’84 inference that the offence is to be one of strict liability. This 
requires examination of the offence in its statutory and social contexts. The question is 
whether Parliament, by failing to include any fault terms in s.3(1)(b), did intend to 
exclude fault, or whether it was merely leaving the issue to be determined by the 
courts.85 The intention of Parliament was not to introduce a distinct mens rea with 
regard to the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, opining instead that the intentional 
character of the touching and the new test on the existence of consent and of the term 
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‘sexual’ sufficed to guide the courts.86 One cannot, therefore, read mens rea into 
s.3(1)(b) or s.78 where Parliament has consciously omitted such an inference. However, 
following B v DPP, in the absence of mens rea in s.78, one cannot read a presumption of 
strict liability either. Despite pronouncements from the House of Lords in B v DPP and K 
on the existence of a ‘constitutional principle’87 requiring fault, English law remains in an 
unsatisfactory state. Whilst different statutes continue to be promoted by different 
government departments without an overall standard, progress towards a consistent 
approach to the presumption of mens rea will be hampered. The law is in a confused 
state and I would argue that section 3 ought to be amended to resolve any ambiguity 
regarding the presumption of mens rea in s.3(1)(b). In particular, it should be amended 
to exclude the defendant’s motive or awareness of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. 
 
The important issue here is the effect of the defendant denying committing sexual 
assault on the basis that he honestly believed that what he was doing was not ‘sexual’ 
or he gave no though to the possibility that C and/or reasonable people would consider 
it ‘sexual’. A provision that required that D be aware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching might deflect the court’s attention away from the invasion of the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy. It would place too much emphasis on culpability and 
thereby justice to the individual accused, creating an insufficiently complainant-centred 
approach to the offence. There are sound policy reasons for not requiring the 
prosecution to prove that the defendant appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching. The offence of sexual assault exits to protect bodily and sexual integrity, and 
to allow a sexual offender to avoid criminal liability by showing that he considered his 
action to be non-sexual would fail to protect sexual autonomy and fail to communicate 
law’s symbolic condemnation of acts interfering adversely with sexual self-
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 See Explanatory Notes to the Sexual Offences Bill [HL Bill 26], 28 January 2003, para. 65, „Clause 80: 
“Sexual”, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/026/en/03026x-
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determination. The defendant’s opinion that his action was not ‘sexual’ ought to be 
irrelevant where C experiences the touching as ‘sexual’ in nature. 
 
The problem that arises is that, as I argued in chapter 5, sexual assault is a context-
dependent offence; there is no essential quality that makes an action ‘sexual’ and the 
offence requires an affective response by an observer.88 One consequence of a 
requirement in s.3 that D appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching may be that the 
chauvinistic male or the defendant who gives no thought to whether his actions might 
be perceived by C and/or reasonable people to be ‘sexual’, will avoid liability by virtue of 
honestly believing his actions are not ‘sexual’. Inherent in the law’s protection of sexual 
autonomy is the marginalisation of other conceptions, in this context D’s awareness of 
the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct. Defendants should not be able to determine whether 
the actus reus of sexual assault is established. A defendant ought to be held liable under 
s.3 where he touches C without her consent, there is no sexual intent or purpose 
motivating the touching, he does not appreciate that the touching might be ‘sexual’, but 
C does actually experience it as ‘sexual’ or reasonable people would consider it ‘sexual’. 
As I argued in chapter 9, it is C’s interpretation and experience of the touching as 
‘sexual’ that ought to be a key factor in deciding whether the touching was ‘sexual’. 
 
11.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter and the previous one have analysed the mens rea elements required for a 
conviction of sexual assault under s.3 SOA 2003. It has been shown that in relation to 
these requirements the legislation suffers from drawbacks and in some respects does 
not afford greater protection to complainants than the previous law did. 
Recommendations for modifications to the present definition have been made, whilst 
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 In the context of criminal damage see I. Edwards, „Banksy‟s Graffiti: A not so simple case of criminal 
damage?‟ (2009) 73 JoCL 345 on the problems of having a mens rea requirement that D appreciate his 
actions‟ consequences were, or might have constituted „damage‟. 
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acknowledging that there must be limits to how far an offence such as sexual assault 
can be complainant-centred, if particular criminal law principles are to be upheld. This 
chapter has reached two main conclusions. First, that the ‘reasonable belief in consent’ 
test still leaves much scope for interpretation by judges and juries in individual cases. 
This raises concerns that similar cases may be treated differently. Although the new test 
for consent is a considerable improvement in the law, it is ‘defendant-objective’ and 
therefore shows considerable leniency towards defendants because it allows the jury to 
look at personal characteristics of the defendant in deciding the reasonableness of his 
actions. The alternative approach to a reasonable belief in consent test, a ‘bystander-
objective’ or a ‘complainant-objective’ approach would be better for complainants and 
fairer. Secondly, the relationship between the fault element and conduct element of 
sexual assault is somewhat unclear in respect of D’s honest belief that his conduct was 
not ‘sexual’. The law should be clarified in this respect. The prosecution should not have 
to prove mens rea in respect of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching: a statutory provision 
which required that either D appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, knew that 
reasonable people would or might consider the act ‘sexual’, would fail to protect sexual 
autonomy and fail to communicate law’s symbolic condemnation of acts interfering 
adversely with sexual self-determination. 
 
Having analysed the complainant-centred nature of the various requirements that make 
up the substantive definition of sexual assault, in chapter 12 I will consider the degree to 
which the law should and does take account of complainants’ experiences of sexual 
assault at sentencing. 
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12 
To What Extent are Victims’ Experiences of Sexual Assault 
Acknowledged or Taken into Account at Sentencing? 
 
This thesis has argued that the substantive offence of sexual assault is insufficiently 
complainant-centred. In light of the insufficiently complainant-centred nature of the 
definition of sexual assault, this chapter will consider the degree to which the law 
should and does take account of complainants’ experiences of sexual assault at 
sentencing. This chapter aims to examine the extent to which the seriousness of a 
sexual assault is determined by the complainant’s perspective. This chapter will not 
provide a comprehensive overview of sentencing and sexual assault because without 
empirical research it is difficult to identify how sexual assault cases are actually 
sentenced. The chapter provides an analysis of the theoretical terrain and provides 
tentative suggestions as to how sentencing could be more complainant-centred, whilst 
acknowledging the problems with such an approach. Part 1 introduces the sentencing 
dilemma; the difficulty of assessing seriousness when there is a disparity between 
culpability and harm. It considers the possible approaches available to sentencers when 
there is a disparity between D’s appreciation of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching and 
C’s experience of the sexual touching. It will be argued that in cases of sexual assault 
there is a sound penological basis for holding defendants responsible when the invasion 
of sexual autonomy is not intended or foreseen. 
 
Part 2 will analyse the implications of sentencing on the basis of (1) standard harm and 
culpability and (2) individual victim experiences. The tension here is between sexual 
assault as primarily a personal offence and sexual assault as a public offence.  Von 
Hirsch and Jareborg have developed a method for assessing the effect of particular 
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crimes upon the ‘living standard’ of typical victims.1 This has the benefit of taking 
account of setbacks to collective interests and of the public dimension of wrongs 
inflicted on individuals but will be criticised for failing to take account of how the 
particular complainant has experienced the sexual assault. I will argue that the harm on 
which seriousness is measured and the offender accordingly punished should be that 
suffered by the particular victim in the instant case, rather than that caused in the 
average case. Nevertheless, there is scope for individual experiences to be factored in to 
sentencing, by treating victim harm as an aggravating factor and through the use of 
Victim Personal Statements (VPS). Determining offence seriousness, even in part, on the 
victim’s actual harm or loss is problematic as it might compromise fundamental 
principles of procedural fairness and justice. 
 
Part 3 will demonstrate how the law is somewhat unclear as to the place of individual 
victims’ experiences in determining the seriousness of an offence. Section 143 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003) and the introduction, in 2001, of VPS suggest that 
sentencers are now required to take account of individual victims’ experiences, 
indicating how sentencing has moved towards a more victim-centred approach. 
However, these provisions must be read in light of the Sentencing Guidelines Council’s 
guideline Overarching Principles: Seriousness which emphasises standard harm and 
culpability as the main determinants of seriousness, stating that ‘*h+arm must always be 
judged in the light of culpability’.2 In the context of sexual assault, the SGC’s guidelines 
are welcome, but the categorisation of harm in terms of the physical nature of the 
touching that occurred will be criticised for failing to take account of the level of harm 
actually suffered by the victim. The chapter concludes that the actual place of victims’ 
experiences of sexual assault in sentencing is somewhat ambiguous.  
                                                             
1
 A. von Hirsch & N. Jareborg, „Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living Standard Analysis‟ (1991) 11 OJLS 1. 
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 Sentencing Guidelines Council, „Overarching Principles: Seriousness’ (16 Dec 2004) at para 1.17, 
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12.1 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE SENTENCING DILEMMA 
Sentencing is another area in which the law on sexual assault faces a dilemma, 
specifically, how to assess seriousness when there is an imbalance between harm and 
culpability. The conflict here is between sentencing based on the defendant’s intended 
consequences or consequences about which he was reckless and sentencing based to 
some degree on the actual consequences.3 Under s.3, sexual assault can only be 
committed intentionally and so the offence can only be perpetrated at the highest level 
of criminal liability. Accordingly, one might argue that in the context of sexual assault 
the difficulty of assessing seriousness when there is a disparity between culpability and 
harm does not arise. Anyone who touches another intentionally and non-intentionally 
risks causing harm and ought to be liable for the harm actually caused. The issue of an 
imbalance between harm and culpability is only really a problem when considering 
reckless or negligent offences. An issue may also arise in relation to intentional 
touchings in which D is unaware of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching, but where C 
experiences the touching as ‘sexual’. Sexual offences are somewhat different to other 
offences, in that the offender’s intention may be to obtain sexual gratification, financial 
gain or some other result, rather than to harm the victim. Sexual assault is not an 
outcome-based offence, where the actual link between mental state and actual 
outcome is easier to draw. As was argued in chapter 5, sexual assault is a context-
dependent offence, so D may be oblivious to the possible harm of his conduct. However, 
where the activity is in any way ‘non-consensual, coercive or exploitative,’4 the offence 
is inherently harmful and therefore the offender’s culpability is high.  
 
                                                             
3
 A classic example of an offence involving unforeseen harm is causing death by careless or inconsiderate 
driving. See S. Cunningham, „Punishing Drivers Who Kill: Putting Road Safety First?‟ (2007) 27 LS 288. 
4
 Sentencing Guidelines Council, Sexual Offences Act 2003: Definitive Guideline, May 2007 at para 1.10. 
The guidelines do not define the terms „coercive‟ or „exploitative‟ but in the context of sexual offences they 
might refer to situations that involve psychological pressure, familial abuse and/or an abuse of a position of 
trust. See ss.16-24 SOA 2003 and Attorney General's Reference (No.121 of 2006) [2007] EWCA Crim 181. 
Exploitation could also refer to commercial exploitation that occurs in offences such as „trafficking‟ (ss.57-
60 SOA 2003). 
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In situations where the harm caused by a sexual assault exceeds that intended or 
foreseen by the defendant, there are three ways of approaching the issue of offence 
seriousness. First, the seriousness of the offence could be determined by the extent of 
harm caused to the victim. This would involve consideration of V’s individual experience 
of the touching and results in an offender simply ‘taking his victim as he finds her’. 
Secondly, the sentence could be determined principally by reference to the defendant’s 
own culpability. This would involve consideration of the extent to which D appreciated 
the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching and his foresight of harm. Thirdly, the sentence could 
be enhanced to a certain degree, but not to the same extent that would have been 
appropriate had the defendant appreciated the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching and 
appreciated the consequences. This would involve a consideration of V’s experience in 
light of D’s awareness of the ‘sexual’ nature of the conduct and of the harm that might 
result and would allow for an increase in sentence above the starting point. The victim’s 
experience would be an aggravating factor that increased the length of the sentence. 
Consider the example of a defendant who approaches a woman in a nightclub, engages 
in conversation with her and then grabs her breasts. The assault has a serious emotional 
effect on the victim, who previously to the incident suffered long-term sexual abuse 
from her ex-husband. She requires medical treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) and anxiety.5 Whilst anxiety and PTSD are foreseeable consequences of sexual 
assault, the impact of the sexual touching and the extent of her emotional distress, is 
not actually foreseen by this defendant. Should this additional degree of harm be left 
out of account in sentencing, or can it ‘fairly be attributed to the actor’s choice’?6  
 
The converse situation is a case where the victim has suffered less harm from the sexual 
assault than might reasonably have been expected. Consider a victim who thinks 
nothing of the non-consensual touching of her breasts or her buttocks. If there has been 
                                                             
5
 See R v Ralston [2005] EWCA Crim 3279 where following a sexual assault, V‟s panic attacks, for which 
she was already taking medication became more frequent and more severe. 
6
 A. von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986) pp.64-5. 
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significantly less harm from the offence than might have been expected, affecting one 
of the dimensions of crime seriousness, this indicates a sentence somewhat nearer to 
the lower end of the normal range for the offence. However, this focus on individual 
harm overlooks the public dimension of the wrong of sexual assault: it will be argued 
below that sexual assault is a serious offence even if the victim suffers little harm, 
because non-consensual sexual touching is also a collective wrong against the 
community to which the individual belongs. The offender is still deserving of 
punishment: as long as D was aware of the possibility of standard harm resulting the 
lesser degree of harm should not be a mitigating factor.7 It is those comparatively rare 
cases at the fringes of sexual assault, where there is a conflict between the perceptions 
of the defendant and complainant that is the concern of this chapter. This brings us to 
the theoretical question, what ought to be the place of victim’s experiences in 
sentencing and whether in determining offence seriousness, the individual V’s 
experience should determine the harm component of the harm/culpability dyad or 
whether it should be based on standard harm. 
 
12.2 PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE DIMENSION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 
In determining offence seriousness there are two possible options for establishing the 
harm component of the harm/culpability dyad: (1) sentencing based on standard harm 
and (2) sentencing based on individual victims’ experiences. In the context of section 3, 
the debate is between sexual assault as primarily a personal offence and sexual assault 
as principally a public offence. Whilst sentencing based on standard harm is 
insufficiently complainant-centred, there are problems with incorporating a victim 
perspective: doing so might compromise fundamental principles of procedural fairness 
and justice. 
                                                             
7
 Discussion of the various factors that affect sentencing decisions also raises the issue of whether D‟s 
sentence should be reduced where V is forgiving and does not agree with D‟s punishment. This is beyond 
the scope of this thesis but see I. Edwards, „The Place of Victim‟s preferences in the Sentencing of „their‟ 
Offenders‟ [2002] Crim L R 689 at pp.697-700. 
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12.2.1 Sentencing based on standard harm 
In the majority of cases the harm caused by a sexual assault will fall somewhere within a 
range of broadly what might have been expected, in which case it can be left to the 
judge to take the expected degree of harm into account.8 This is what is described by 
von Hirsch and Jareborg in their influential essay, ‘Gauging Criminal Harms: A Living 
Standard Analysis’ as the ‘standard case’.9 Von Hirsch and Jareborg have tried to 
develop a considered, rational and principled approach to proportionate sentencing. 
They argue that the highly subjective nature of victims’ responses mean that it is unfair 
to base sentencing decisions on such a dimension. They note, however, that ‘*h+ow 
hurtful a given intrusion is depends on the situation of the victim, and the particular 
victim’s situation varies greatly’,10 arguing that such variations should be taken into 
account in mitigation or aggravation of sentence. In developing a method by which 
harms can be standardised and built in to sentencing appropriately, von Hirsch and 
Jareborg argue that it is inappropriate to take account of the individual victim. In rating 
the standard case of a given species of crime, they assume that injury occurs to 
someone who is neither ‘especially vulnerable nor resilient.’ They argue that victim 
harm and characteristics are relevant only to the classification of the offence and its 
seriousness and that ‘*p+articular criminal acts are too diverse to be rated on an 
individual basis.’11 Von Hirsch and Jareborg appear to take a subjectivist stance 
highlighting how culpability theory requires that ‘in assessing the seriousness of 
conduct, unforeseen consequences should not be taken into account.’12 They further 
contend that: 
‘The criminal law is a system of rules, not an arena for personalized judgments. If the 
law can assess crime-seriousness in the standard case, and then make deviations from 
                                                             
8
 The Sentencing Guidelines Council, Definitive Guidelines, note at para 1.13 that „In general, the difficulty 
of assessing seriousness where there is an imbalance between culpability and harm does not arise in 
relation to sexual offences.‟ 
9
 A. von Hirsch & N. Jareborg, „Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living Standard Analysis‟ (1991) 11 OJLS 1. 
10
 Ibid, at p.4. 
11
 Ibid at p.4. 
12
 Ibid at p.5. 
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that assessment for various types of special circumstances, this is all one can reasonably 
hope to accomplish.’ 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg argue that sentencing must be logical, rational, consistent and 
structured, all of which would be lost by focusing on the individual victim’s experience. 
 
One argument for sentencing based on standard harm is that it takes account of set-
backs to collective interests and the public dimension of wrongs inflicted on individuals. 
Marshall and Duff suggest that it is not sufficient to say that crimes against individuals 
are penalised because they threaten the social order, because that diminishes the 
significance of the victimisation of the individual that is clearly central to the offence.13 
Equally, they argue, it is not sufficient to rely merely on the State’s duty to ensure 
protection of these rights of individuals, because that could be achieved by civil law 
methods or by providing public assistance for private prosecutions. Their argument is 
that crimes are public wrongs because even those that consist of attacks on the body or 
property of an individual (such as rape, sexual assault and theft) might be seen as 
‘wrongs against the community to which the individual belongs’.14 These wrongs are 
shared by other members of the community with which the victim is identified and by 
which her identity is partly constituted.15 Marshall and Duff suggest that a group of 
women might respond to a sexual assault on one of them as a collective rather than an 
individual wrong: they associate and identify themselves with the individual victim.16 An 
attack on a member of the group is therefore an attack on the group, on their shared 
values and their common good. A group can in this way ‘share’ the wrongs done to its 
individual members, insofar as it defines and identifies itself as a community united by 
mutual concern, by genuinely shared values and interests, and by the shared 
recognition that its members’ goods are bound up with their membership of the 
                                                             
13
 S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, „Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs‟ (1998) 11 Canadian J of Law and 
Jurisprudence 7. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
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community.17 The point here is that assessments of the seriousness of wrongs ought to 
take proper account of this wider community element, even in respect of crimes with 
individual victims. In emphasising the individual victim’s harm sentencing would move 
further away from emphasising the broader, public dimension of the violation. 
 
A closely connected theory of harm is what Hampton labels ‘moral injury’.18 This implies 
that some wrongful actions have, over and above their direct physical or psychological 
damage, the expression of diminution or degradation of the victim’s value.19 Moral 
injury is objective in that it is not dependent on the victim feeling a particular way: 
regardless of her psychological response to it, she has been wronged.20 In the case of 
sexual assault, the diminishment in the victim’s respect is tied to group membership. 
Women are primarily the target of sexual assault in society and the moral injury is 
thereby shared by women as a group.21 Sexual assault is therefore not just an individual 
injury; it is also a social injury that occurs on a personal level. It is this wider community 
element that justifies the punishment of sexual assault as a criminal rather than a civil 
wrong. The public dimension of sexual assault is also an element of offence seriousness 
that should be considered in the sentencing of an offender. One might argue that if the 
seriousness of sexual assault arises from the violation of public interests, is it so very 
important to take account of the particular victim’s experiences. To feminists22 the 
crime of rape has been understood not primarily as a specific, singular crime, but rather 
                                                             
17
 Ibid. 
18
 J. Hampton, „Defining the Wrong and Defining Rape‟ in K. Burgess-Jackson, A Most Detestable Crime 
(OUP, New York, 1999) p.123. 
19
 J. McGregor, Is it Rape: On Acquaintance Rape and Taking Women’s Consent Seriously (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, 2005) p.229. 
20
 Op cit, n 18 at p.135. 
21
 It is worth reiterating that sexual assault is a gender-neutral offence. However, there were 15,510 sexual 
assaults on a female aged 13 or over recorded by the police in 2008/09, compared with 1,154 on a male 
aged 13 or over. A. Walker et al, „Crime in England and Wales 2008/09: Volume 1 Findings from the 
British Crime Survey and police recorded crime‟ (Home Office, July 2009). 
22
 Researchers often organise feminism into four main perspectives: liberal, socialist, radical and Marxist,  
but they can be summarised by Brownmiller‟s statement: „rape is nothing more or less than a conscious 
process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear‟. S. Brownmiller, Against our 
Will: Men, Women and Rape (Penguin Books, New York, 1975). 
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as the most blatant example of systematic misogyny and masculine dominance.23 
Brownmiller argues that rapists do not rape individuals, but members of a class. To be a 
man is to be a member of the dominant class and thus to have nearly limitless power. 
Feminists might argue that taking account of the individual victim’s experience would be 
missing the point; the sentencing structure of rape and sexual assault ought to reflect 
the seriousness of offences of sexual violence regardless of the individual victim’s 
experiences. 
 
In relation to sexual assault, sentencing on the basis of standard harm and culpability 
means the process is insufficiently complainant-centred. Sexual assault is not an 
outcome-based offence: the occurrence of harm is not explicitly made a condition of 
criminal liability. Section 3 simply describes the prohibited conduct, non-consensual 
sexual touching, which the legislature is assumed to have considered harmful enough to 
be criminalized. The impact of a sexual assault upon the victim is a highly subjective 
matter and including information about victims’ harm is therefore important for 
determining offence seriousness. 
 
12.2.2 Sentencing based on individual experiences 
The law’s criteria for harm could make allowances for differences in how people 
experience sexual touching. The harm on which seriousness is measured and the 
offender accordingly punished could be that suffered by the particular victim in the 
instant case, rather than that caused in the average case. Marvin Wolfgang argued that 
a sentencing system based on just deserts and offence seriousness can and should take 
the degree of harm inflicted on specific victims as a principal factor in establishing the 
seriousness of an offence.24 According to Wolfgang: 
                                                             
23
 A.J.Cahill, Rethinking Rape (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2001). 
24
 M. Wolfgang, „Basic concepts in victimological theory: individualisation of the victim‟ in H.J.Schneider, 
The Victim in International Perspective (de Grutyer, New York, 1982). See also L.Sebba & E. Erez, „From 
individualization of the offender to the individualization of the victim: an assessment of Wolfgang‟s 
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‘The principal point is that a variety of victim attributes and characteristics relative to 
the harm inflicted on the victim might be taken into account not only in scientific 
research but in statutory provisions and in the adjudication and offender sentencing 
process.’25 
Wolfgang also noted that: 
‘Although some provisions exist which recognize the specificity of some victims, 
legislative recognition has been minimal, perhaps because of a vague sense of 
democratization of victims of similar cases so as not to acknowledge a hierarchy of 
differences, perhaps out of fear of retrogression to an earlier stage of social 
evolution.’
26 
He suggested that more crimes might be defined and sanctions provided on the basis of 
specific attributes of the victimization process. Wolfgang stated that his propositions are 
‘provocative and heuristic’, rather than denoting his opinion about the relevance of 
victims’ experiences in criminal justice decision-making.       
 
A judge cannot evaluate the seriousness of a sexual assault without knowing how the 
crime has affected the victim, for the degree of harm is ‘partly a function of the 
differential response by the victim’.27 The substantive definition of sexual assault fails to 
focus on the victim and instead reflects more the intent of the criminal offender, 
providing a sound argument for sentencing to take account of individual experiences. It 
is consistent with ‘just deserts’ philosophy to claim that differential degrees of 
psychological harm caused to the victim should be included in the meaning of gravity. 
There are varying psychological effects on sexual assault victims as a function of age, sex 
and other physical, psychological and cultural factors. Reactions to rape and sexual 
assault probably are amongst the strongest and most lasting trauma. Violations of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
conceptualization of a victim-oriented criminal justice system‟ in W.S.Laufer & F. Adler, The Criminology 
of Criminal Law (Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1999). 
25
 Wolfgang, op cit, n 24 at p.48. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid, at p.49. 
  
382 
 
sexual autonomy are subjectively experienced and to emphasise standard harm, rather 
than particular harm means that only the most glaring and obvious psychological and 
emotional effects would be taken into account. Victim individualization does not violate 
the model of just deserts; it may indeed enhance it, ‘by providing greater precision in 
the proportionality of the severity of sanctions to the gravity of victimization.’28 It 
further reminds decision-makers that sexual assault is not just a crime against the State, 
but a crime against an individual person, with an interest in how the case is resolved. 
 
Individualization of the victim at the sentencing stage may, in terms of its content, be 
expressed in at least three different ways.29 First, the victim-related input may be 
concerned with the nature and degree of suffering inflicted upon the victim as a result 
of the crime. Secondly, it may be concerned with the personal attributes of the victim. 
Thirdly, victim-input may comprise the views of the victim regarding the offender and 
the sentence to be imposed. Whilst there are sound arguments for including victim 
information about the impact of the crime and for the consideration of victim attributes, 
it is not advocated here that the views of the victim regarding the sentence to be 
imposed should be admissible in sentencing proceedings.30 Allowing victims to express 
an opinion on sentence might undermine the culpability principle and might also be 
unpredictable in that the majority of victims will be unaware of the full range of 
sentencing options and the statutory restrictions. 
 
Sentencing ought to be based on retribution: the sentence should fit the seriousness of 
the offence and offence seriousness ought to be determined by reference to standard 
harm in most cases, but individual harm when it is particularly serious. D has chosen to 
                                                             
28
 Ibid, at p.57. 
29
 Sebba & Erez, op cit n 24 at 186. 
30
 Whilst there is a clear theoretical distinction between the impact of the offence on the victim and the 
opinion of the victim as to sentence, in practice there is inevitably a danger that victims will be tempted to 
exaggerate the impact the offence has had on them in the hope of increasing the severity of the sentence 
imposed by the court.  
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interfere with the interests of others and harm criteria are supposed to measure the 
degree of that intrusion. Assessing seriousness in terms of individual victim experiences 
would also respect cultural variations in being subject to non-consensual sexual 
touching. A defendant should be held responsible for any extra degrees of harm: the 
outcome should not rest on his claimed lack of foresight.31 As Horder quite rightly notes, 
defendants who direct their efforts towards harming someone should be liable for the 
harm caused, even where that harm is greater than the harm intended or foreseen, 
because they ‘deserve’ their bad luck.32  
 
Whilst sentencing ought to take account of individual experiences, there are arguments 
against determining offence seriousness even in part on the victim’s actual harm or loss. 
Sentencing based on individual victim’s experiences has the potential to compromise 
fundamental principles of procedural fairness and justice. One of the fundamental 
theoretical constraints on the inclusion of individual victim experiences in the 
determination of the seriousness of a sexual assault is procedural fairness for the 
offender.33 There is a concern that complainant-centred sentencing might compromise 
central tenets of the criminal process: impartiality, objectivity, rationality. It is a basic 
principle of the rule of law that a person should be sentenced for acts on which he has 
been found, or to which he has pleaded, guilty. Procedural fairness requires an 
independent and impartial decision-maker to take account only of relevant factors. 
Fairness also demands that the factual basis on which an offender is sentenced is 
accurate, based on objective facts. Determining seriousness on the basis of individual 
victim experiences threatens to undermine the objectivity and rationality of the 
sentencing process, unless those claims are scrutinised and corroborated. Procedural 
                                                             
31
 See chapter 8, section 3.3 for discussion of the idea that when D‟s crosses a moral threshold he accepts 
the risks involved.  
32
 J. Horder, „A Critique of the Correspondence Principle‟ [1995] Crim L R 759. 
33
 See A. Ashworth, „Victims‟ Rights, Defendants‟ Rights and Criminal Procedure‟ in A. Crawford & J. 
Goodey, Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice: International Debates (Ashgate, 
Dartmouth, 2000). 
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fairness thus requires offenders to be accorded an opportunity to challenge the 
accuracy of the factual basis on which they are to be sentenced. 
 
Sentencing based on the victim’s perception and experience of the touching may 
introduce inconsistencies. Two offenders may have committed similar acts, but one has 
a victim who is unperturbed by the action, while the other’s victim has suffered severe 
emotional trauma. Courts would then be obliged to sentence more severely in the 
second case. Giving weight to the impact of a sexual assault on the individual victim 
moves the sentencing process away from a focus on the defendant’s culpability and 
towards sentencing based on luck.34 Orthodox subjectivists would argue that the 
severity of punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the criminal conduct 
and this is based on the notion of fairness: punishment as a censuring response to 
criminal behaviour should reflect the degree of blameworthiness of the criminal 
conduct. 
 
A further argument against complainant-centred sentencing is that criminal offences are 
offences against the State, which are prosecuted in the public interest and therefore the 
sentence should be passed in the public interest. Under this rationale, the victim’s 
interest is only a small part of the public interest. This approach gives primacy to the 
State’s interest in controlling the response to crime: ‘those who violate the Queen’s 
peace should be dealt with on that basis and not according to the desires of the 
individual victim, whether they be forgiving or vengeful.’35 Sentencing in the public 
interest aims for consistency of treatment, which may both inspire public confidence 
and achieve fairness amongst defendants.36  
 
                                                             
34
 For discussion see A. Ashworth, „Taking the Consequences‟ in J. Gardner, J. Horder and S. Shute, Action 
and Value in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993); J. Gobert, „Fortuity of Consequence‟ (1993) 3 
Criminal Law Forum. 
35
 A. Ashworth, „Victim Impact Statements and Sentencing‟ [1993] Crim L R 498. 
36
 D. Miers, „The Responsibilities and Rights of Victims of Crime‟ (1992) 55 MLR 482. 
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12.3 SEXUAL ASSAULT AND INDIVIDUAL VICTIM’S EXPERIENCES 
In general, a court is required to pass a sentence that is commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence.37 However, the current law is somewhat unclear as to the 
place of individual victim’s experiences in determining the seriousness of an offence. 
Section 143 CJA 2003 provides that the court must consider ‘any harm which the 
offence caused, was intended to cause or might foreseeably have caused’ and this 
implies that English law is placing increasing emphasis on the harm experienced by 
victims. However, the SGC’s Overarching Principles: Seriousness emphasises standard 
harm and culpability. The introduction, in 2001, of the VPS Scheme also suggests that 
victims’ experiences are relevant and will be taken into account by sentencers.  
 
12.3.1 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s.143 
In every case where the offender is aged 18 or over at the time of conviction, the court 
must have regard to the five purposes of sentencing contained in s.142 CJA 2003:  
‘(a) the punishment of offenders,  
(b) the reduction of crime (including its reduction by deterrence),  
(c) the reform and rehabilitation of offenders,  
(d) the protection of the public, and  
(e) the making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences.’ 
The Act does not indicate that any one purpose should be more important than any 
other should and in practice, they may all be relevant to a greater or lesser degree in 
any individual case. Ashworth argues that this ‘invites inconsistency, by requiring judges 
to consider a variety of different purposes and then, presumably, to give priority to 
one.’38 Whilst the punishment of offenders and the making of reparation relate 
specifically to the victims’ of crime, the rehabilitation of offenders and purposes of 
                                                             
37
 Sentencing Guidelines Council, „Overarching Principles: Seriousness’ (16 Dec 2004) at para 1.4, 
available at www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk (Accessed: 12
th
 May 2008). Although for dangerous 
offenders proportionality is not the guiding feature of sentencing and there are exceptions to s.142(1) set 
out in s.142(2). 
38
 A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 4
th
 edn (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) 
p.74. 
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general deterrence and protection of the public have little to do with individual victims. 
The SGC guideline, Overarching Principles, sets out the terms of s.142 and then goes on 
to state that ‘the sentencer must start by considering the seriousness of the offence,’ 
before setting out the terms of s.143. This implies that it is s.143, rather than s.142 that 
will underpin the guidelines it issues. 
 
The assessment of the seriousness of the offence arises in respect of specific questions 
in sentencing: the assessment will (i) determine which of the sentencing thresholds has 
been crossed;39 (ii) indicate whether a custodial, community or other sentence is the 
most appropriate and (iii) be the key factor in deciding the length of a custodial 
sentence,40 the nature of the requirements to be incorporated in a community 
sentence41 and the amount of any fine imposed.42 s.143(1) of the CJA 2003 provides that 
in determining the seriousness of an offence ‘the court must consider the offender’s 
culpability in committing the offence and any harm which the offence caused, was 
intended to cause or might forseeably have caused.’ The seriousness of wrongdoing is 
therefore determined by two main parameters: the culpability of the offender and the 
harm caused, or risked by the offence.43 This implies that English law is placing 
increasing emphasis on the harm experienced by victims. However, s.143(1) is a broad 
provision, lacking clear guidance on the practical relevance of victims’ experiences. In 
theory, courts’ must take into account individual victim experiences, but the extent to 
which they do ‘consider’ such experiences and act on that information is likely to vary 
greatly. There is also an ambiguity in s.143(1) that being that the harm actually caused 
may be different from the harm intended or foreseen. 
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 s.148(1) & s.152(2). 
40
 s.153(2). 
41
 s.148(2). 
42
 s.164(2). 
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 Clarkson‟s survey of 93 assault victims in 1990-91 found that there is in fact a very weak correspondence 
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12.3.2 Sentencing Guidelines Council’s guidelines  
The provisions of the CJA 2003 must be read in light of the SGC’s guideline Overarching 
Principles: Seriousness, which emphasises standard harm and culpability as the main 
determinants of seriousness, stating that ‘*h+arm must always be judged in the light of 
culpability.’44  In 2007, the SGC issued a Definitive Guideline for sentencing the sexual 
offences contained in the SOA 2003. In respect of a conviction of sexual assault, this 
guidance is structured around the type of touching that occurs. This is inappropriate 
because it fails to account for the individualised responses of victims to non-consensual 
sexual touching. 
 
(a) Sentencing Guideline on Seriousness 
The SGC guideline, Overarching Principles: Seriousness, provides that ‘*a+ssessing 
seriousness is a difficult task, particularly where there is an imbalance between 
culpability and harm.’45 The guideline suggests that in some cases the harm that actually 
results is greater than the harm intended by the offender and in others circumstances, 
the offender’s culpability may be at a higher level than the harm resulting from the 
offence.46 Where there is an imbalance between culpability and harm, the culpability of 
the offender in the particular circumstances of an individual case should be the primary 
factor in determining the seriousness of the offence.47 This means that harm will always 
be judged in light of culpability. According to the SGC’s guideline on Seriousness, four 
levels of criminal liability can be identified for sentencing purposes: intention, 
recklessness, knowledge and negligence.48 In broad terms, an intention to cause harm is 
at the highest level of criminal culpability; the worse the harm intended, the higher the 
offender’s culpability. Ashworth has argued consistently that culpability should be the 
                                                             
44
 Sentencing Guidelines Council, „Overarching Principles: Seriousness’ (16 Dec 2004) at para 1.17, 
available at www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk [Online] (Accessed: 23
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 October 2008). 
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 Ibid at para 1.16. 
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 „Culpability will be higher if an offender deliberately causes more harm than in necessary for the 
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 Ibid at 1.19. 
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prime determinant of sentencing: the ‘sentence should be governed not by the vagaries 
of chance but by what the offender believed he was doing or risking’.49 Orthodox 
subjectivists argue that the criminal law should punish blameworthy choices, and that if 
harm results that has not been chosen, a defendant should not be liable to punishment 
for that.50 
 
Under some conceptions of retribution the harm caused by an offender is relevant to 
the determination of the seriousness of an offence and information about the 
consequences of an offender’s action should be incorporated to facilitate accurate, 
proportionate sentencing. The guideline on Seriousness suggests that ‘[t]he nature of 
harm will depend on personal characteristics and circumstances of the victim and the 
court’s assessment of harm will be an effective and important way of taking into 
consideration the impact of a particular crime on the victim.’ One particular problem in 
assessing the seriousness of sexual assault is dealing with those cases in which there is a 
disparity between the defendant and complainant as to the ‘sexual’ nature of the 
touching. A further issue for consideration is whether there could be situations in which 
‘non-consensual, coercive or exploitative’ behaviour takes place yet no harm results? 
Arguably sexual offences are by their nature harmful, which is why (combined with the 
defendant’s culpability) they are offences. However, this brings us back to the question 
of what is ‘harmful’ and the potential physical and/or psychological effects of sexual 
offending. The actual harm caused by a non-consensual sexual touching is very much 
dependent on the individual victim’s experience and interpretation of the incident. The 
individual victim’s reaction can vary greatly, and there may be a disparity between the 
level of harm intended or foreseen by D and that which actually results. In the context 
of sexual assault, some ‘minor’ sexual touching such as pinching someone on the 
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 Ashworth op cit, n 37 at p.122. See also A. Ashworth. Principles of Criminal Law 5
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buttocks may cause no harm to certain persons, whereas other persons may be severely 
distressed by the action. 
 
(b) Definitive Guidelines on SOA 2003 
By virtue of s.172 of the CJA 2003, every court must ‘have regard to’ a relevant 
guideline. In 2007, the SGC issued a Definitive Guideline for sentencing the sexual 
offences contained in the SOA 2003. The SGC states that ‘the exact nature of the sexual 
activity should be the key factor in assessing the seriousness of a sexual assault’.51 This 
should be used as the starting point from which to begin the process of assessing the 
overall seriousness of the offending behaviour. The Definitive Guidelines also state that 
‘[s]ome offences may justify a lesser sentence where the actions were more offensive 
than threatening and comprised a single act rather than more persistent behaviour.’52 
The maximum penalty for sexual assault is 10 years custody on indictment,53 and 6 
months imprisonment or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both, when 
tried summarily.54 This rises to 14 years imprisonment if the victim is under 13.55 The 
sentences for public protection must be considered in all cases of sexual assault.56 They 
are designed to ensure that sexual offenders are not released into the community if 
they present a significant risk of serious harm. Table 12.1 below shows the starting 
points and sentencing ranges for sexual assault. It must be recognized, however, that in 
many cases a sentence will need to reflect the fact that an offence has encompassed a 
range of these types of activity.  
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Table 12.1: Starting points and sentencing ranges for sexual assault in Crown Court57 
Type/nature of activity 
 
Starting points 
 
Sentencing ranges 
 Contact between naked genitalia of 
offender and naked genitalia, face or 
mouth of the victim 
5 years custody if the 
victim is under 13 
 
3 years custody if the 
victim is aged 13 or over 
4-8 years 
 
 
2-5 years 
 Contact between naked genitalia of 
offender and another part of 
victim’s body 
 
 Contact with genitalia of victim by 
offender using part of his or her 
body other than the genitalia or an 
object 
 
 Contact between either the clothed 
genitalia of offender and naked 
genitalia of victim or naked genitalia 
of offender and clothed genitalia of 
victim 
2 years custody if the 
victim is under 13 
 
 
12 months custody if 
the victim is aged 13 or 
over 
1-4 years custody 
 
 
 
26 weeks-2 years 
custody 
 Contact between part of offender’s 
body (other than the genitalia) with 
part of the victim’s body (other than 
the genitalia) 
26 weeks custody if the 
victim is under 13 
 
 
Community order if the 
victim is aged 13 or 
over. 
4 weeks-18months 
custody 
 
An appropriate 
non-custodial 
sentence e.g. 
community order or 
fine. 
 
According to the SGC, for the purpose of the guideline, types of sexual touching are 
‘broadly grouped in terms of seriousness’.58  However, the table categorises harm in 
terms of the specific physical nature of the touching and it appears therefore that the 
                                                             
57
 The Magistrates Court Sentencing Guidelines for sexual assault are also taken from the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council‟s definitive guideline. See Magistrates’ Court Sentencing Guidelines: Definitive 
Guideline, May 2008, Appendix 2 Table 1.0.available at 
http://www.sentencingguidelines.gov.uk/docs/magistrates_court_sentencing_guidelines_update.pdf  
[Online] (Accessed: 23
rd
 October 2008). 
58
 Op cit n 4 at part 2B.5. 
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issue of seriousness is determined at least in part by reference to which body parts 
touched which body parts, rather than the impact on the victim. The guideline focuses 
on sentencing on the basis of the nature of the contact as opposed to sentencing based 
on the amount of harm inflicted on the victim. The SAP, in response to the criticism that 
their categorization took no account of the level of harm actually suffered by the victim, 
stated that they ‘*do+ not minimize the need for the courts to take account of levels of 
psychological harm and any actual physical injuries sustained by an individual victim.’59 
The SAP further added that: 
‘in view of the very wide range of behaviour encompassed within the term ‘sexual 
touching’ we believe it is essential for the courts to have some initial guidance on the 
relative seriousness of the various types of touching and for related sentencing starting 
points to reflect that assessment.’60  
The specificity of the sentencing guideline is noteworthy, given the lack of guidance and 
clarity in the substantive offence about the conduct that is considered ‘sexual’. The 
purpose of the SGC is to produce workable guidelines and to assist in rational and fair 
decision-making, promoting ‘consistency in sentencing’.61 The objective here is 
uniformity of approach, not uniformity of outcome.   
 
Unlike the SAP consultation paper,62 which listed 13 categories of sexual touching, the 
sentencing guidelines delineate just 5 categories of contact. This is beneficial in that it 
allows room for judicial creativity and flexibility. However, it may be criticized for the 
injustice of very different cases being grouped together and treated alike. In view of the 
wide range of behaviour encompassed within the offence, it is preferable for the courts 
                                                             
59
 Sentencing Advisory Panel, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: The Panel’s Advice to the Sentencing 
Guidelines Council (7
th
 June, 2006) available at http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/docs/advice-
sexual-offences.pdf [Online] (Accessed: 18
th 
July 2009) at para 27. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 CJA 2003, s.170(5). See M. Wasik, „Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales- State of the Art? 
[2008] Crim L R 253; M. Wasik, „The Status and authority of sentencing guidelines‟ (2007) 39 Bracton 
Law Journal 9.  
62
 Sentencing Advisory Panel, Sentencing Guidelines on Sexual Offences: Consultation Paper (February 
12, 2004). 
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to have some guidance on the relative seriousness of the various prohibited types of 
touching. The categories seem to assume intentional touching, presumably because this 
is the mental state required under s.3.63 In focusing specifically on the issue of contact 
the sentencing guidelines appear to denote the level of the defendant’s 
blameworthiness by the type of touching. This might be grounded in arguments about 
the physical risks associated with certain types of touching, (e.g. the risk of disease 
transmission or physical injury associated with contact in the top category) and the 
extent to which the contact involves touching with or of the genitalia, rather than the 
impact on the victim’s personal dignity. However, is this an appropriate means of 
deciding on starting-points? 
 
Categorising harm in terms of the specific physical nature of the touching is deficient in 
that it takes no account of the level of harm actually suffered by the victim. Is there 
anything intrinsically more serious about the activities listed at the top of table 12.1? 
Whilst it is reasonable to assume the categories at the top of the table are more serious, 
there is nothing inherent in the types of contact listed to indicate seriousness. As we 
have seen earlier in this thesis, sexual assault is a context-dependent offence and as a 
result there are numerous ways of interpreting the meaning of ‘sexual’ and thereby 
defining the scope of sexual assault. The guidelines appear to assume that particular 
types of touching will impact in a similar way on all such complainants. However, there 
is no essential characteristic that makes an act ‘sexual’ and so recourse must be had to 
the complainant’s experience of the touching. Courts should be required to take 
account of levels of psychological harm and any actual physical injuries sustained by an 
individual victim. There is the possibility of cases arising where the touching involved 
matches the criteria listed as the top of the table, but where the incident is not 
considered by either the victim and/or the reasonable person to be very serious. 
                                                             
63
 In chapter 10 it was argued that the offence of sexual assault be extended to include cases of reckless 
touching. In order for an offence of reckless sexual assault to prove workable, the sentencing guidelines 
would have to be extended to reflect the defendant‟s mens rea. 
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Consider the situation where V and D who have previously engaged in consensual sexual 
activity, remove their clothes and enter V’s hot tub. D straddles V and his naked 
genitalia touch her naked genitalia. V does not consent and asks D to leave. This contact 
matches the activity listed in the top category of the table but V does not consider that 
it was particularly serious.  Similarly, there is the possibility of cases arising where the 
touching involved matches the criteria listed at the bottom of the table, but where the 
victim and/or reasonable people consider the incident as very serious. For example, 
consider the situation in which D, who is unknown to V, approaches her and engages in 
conversation with her. He begins to sniff her hair and stroke her arm. D asks V ‘Can we 
make love?’64 V can smell alcohol on D’s breath and is terrified that D may rape her. As 
this involved contact between a part of the offender’s body (other than the genitalia) 
with part of the victim’s body (other than the genitalia) the starting point is a 
community order. This implies that all non-consensual touching that does not involve 
contact with genitalia is not serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence, although 
courts do have discretion to alter sentencing based on the presence of aggravating and 
mitigating factors, as we shall see below. 
 
Courts have a duty to ‘have regard to’ sentencing guidelines,65 but the extent to which 
they do so is likely to vary greatly and possibly to lead to inconsistencies. Cooper reports 
a belief amongst members of the Bar that some judges are treating the guidelines as if 
they were a statutory formula that cannot be departed from.66 However, as Davies 
argues, although not in relation to the SGC, guidelines are designed to ‘strike a proper 
balance between rule and discretion’.67 A number of important recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeal stress the flexibility that is inherent in the proper application of 
                                                             
64
 See R v Deal [2006] EWCA Crim 684. 
65
 CJA 2003, s.172. 
66
 J. Cooper, „The Sentencing Guidelines Council- A Practical Perspective [2008] Crim L R 277. 
67
 K. Davies, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 
1969) p.42. 
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sentencing guidelines.68 In Larcombe,69 the Court of Appeal made clear that the starting 
points and ranges were not rigid and the sentence would depend on the circumstances 
of the individual case. In this case, the nature and repetition of the offending completely 
changed the complexion of seriousness. The trial judge had expressed the view that the 
sentencing guidelines were of limited value since they looked only at the mechanics of 
the offence, that is to say the touching and not at the wider aggravating features. The 
Court of Appeal did note however, that ‘the sentencing tables do not stand alone, and 
sentencers will be misled if they neglect the principles and explanatory guidance which 
apply to them.’ Movement within and between ranges will depend on the 
circumstances of individual cases, particularly aggravating and mitigating features. The 
Court of Appeal added that the ‘the expected approach is for the court to identify the 
description which most nearly matches the particular facts of the offence. This will 
identify a starting point from which the sentencer can depart to reflect aggravating or 
mitigating factors affecting the seriousness of the offence.’ 
 
The presence of aggravating factors can make an offence significantly more serious than 
the nature of the activity alone might suggest. The SGC guideline, Overarching 
Principles: Seriousness, suggests that aggravating factors indicate either a higher than 
usual level of culpability on the part of the offender, or a greater than usual degree of 
harm caused by the offence (or sometimes both).70 Factors indicating a more than 
usually serious degree of harm include where there are multiple victims; where there is 
an especially serious physical or psychological effect on the victim, (even if unintended); 
where there is a sustained assault or repeated assaults on the same victim; the location 
of an offence (e.g. in an isolated place) and additional degradation of the victim.71 The 
                                                             
68
 Oosthuizen [2005] EWCA Crim 1978; Last [2005] EWCA Crim 106; Peters [2005] EWCA Crim 605; 
Bowering [2005] EWCA Crim 3215. 
69
 [2008] EWCA Crim 2310. D was convicted of two counts of sexual assault which involved him touching 
the victims‟ legs over clothes and on the second occasion stroking the boy‟s genital area over his trousers. 
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 Op cit, n 2 at para 1.20. 
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 Ibid, at para1.23. 
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fact that ‘an especially serious physical or psychological effect on the victim’ is an 
aggravating factor that can increase the length of a sentence appears to imply that 
sentencing does in fact reflect individuals’ experiences. Factors indicating higher 
culpability include the planning of an offence, the deliberate targeting of vulnerable 
victims and the abuse of power or a position of trust.72 Table 12.2 shows the additional 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances for a conviction of sexual assault in the SGC’s 
guidelines. 
 
Table 12.2: Additional aggravating and mitigating factors for sexual assault 
Additional aggravating factors Additional mitigating factors 
1. Offender ejaculated or caused victim to 
ejaculate 
2. Background of intimidation or coercion 
3. Use of drugs, alcohol or other substance 
to facilitate the offence 
4. Threats to prevent victim reporting the 
incident 
5. Abduction or detention 
6. Offender aware that he or she is 
suffering from a sexually transmitted 
infection 
7. Physical harm caused 
8. Prolonged activity or contact 
Where the victim is aged 16 or over 
 Victim engaged in consensual sexual 
activity with the offender on the same 
occasion and immediately before the 
offence 
Where the victim is under 16 
 Sexual activity between two children 
(one of whom is the offender) was 
mutually agreed and experimental 
 Reasonable belief (by a young offender) 
that the victim was aged 16 or over 
 
Youth and immaturity of the offender 
Minimal or fleeting contact 
 
An example of a case in which the presence of aggravating features made the offence 
significantly more serious than the nature of the activity alone would have indicated is 
Piper.73 The defendant appealed against a total sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment 
imposed following guilty pleas to seven offences of sexual assault on a female and one 
offence of possession of an offensive weapon. D ‘indecently’74 touched the women 
                                                             
72
 Ibid, at para 1.22. 
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 [2007] EWCA Crim 2151. 
74
 This is the phrase used in the judgement and presumably refers to the touching of the breasts. One of the 
victims said that „he brushed his hand against her nipples‟. 
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whilst purporting to measure them and secretly filmed them in their underwear whilst 
conducting bogus interviews. The judge referred to the sentencing guidelines and found 
the sexual touching to be at the lower end of the scale of seriousness, but that D had 
used a deliberate device to lure women into a situation where he could film them. The 
appeal was dismissed on the basis that there was considerable organisation and 
planning involved in the offences and the victims were deceived, exploited and, with the 
benefit of hindsight, humiliated. 
 
12.3.3 Victim personal statements 
In October 2001, the Home Office introduced the Victim Personal Statement (VPS) 
Scheme to allow victims to have input into criminal justice decision-making. Whenever 
the police take a statement from a victim, they must also inform the victim of the right 
to make a VPS. The statements are supposed to be taken into account at each stage of 
the criminal process, including sentencing,75 and provide a formal opportunity for the 
victim to explain in their own words how the crime has affected them physically, 
emotionally and financially.76 Victims who make a VPS have the right to update it at any 
time before the trial. When a VPS is presented to a court, the proper approach is set out 
in a Practice Direction by the Lord Chief Justice. The VPS statement and any evidence in 
support ‘should be considered and taken into account by the court prior to passing 
sentence’.77 The relevant Practice Direction states that: 
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 Home Office, Making a Victim Personal Statement (Home Office Communications Directorate, London, 
2001). 
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‘The court must pass what it judges to be the appropriate sentence having regard to 
the circumstances of the offence and of the offender, taking into account, so far as the 
court considers it appropriate, the impact on the victim.’ 
R v Perks78 laid down general guidelines for sentencers on how to deal with the impact 
of an offence on the victim. Perks makes clear that a sentencer must not make 
assumptions unsupported by evidence, about the effects of an offence on a victim. 
Perks goes on to make clear that evidence of the effects on a victim must be in a proper 
form; a Section 9 witness statement, an expert’s report or otherwise, duly served on the 
defence. This is so that the defence may challenge the evidence regarding the effect the 
offence had on the victim and if necessary call evidence in refutation. The Court of 
Appeal went on to stress that evidence of the victim alone should be approached with 
care, the more so if it relates to matters the defence cannot be realistically expected to 
investigate. In Ismail,79 the Court of Appeal stated that for offences which appear to 
have had a significant impact on the victim, it is essential for sentencing judges to have 
VPS, especially where a sexual offence has been committed against a young victim, so 
that that impact can be taken into account when determining the appropriate sentence. 
 
The VPS scheme appears to mean that sentencers are now required to take account of 
individual victims’ experiences, but that is only possible when a VPS is made available to 
them.80 A study by Carolyn Hoyle and others of a pilot scheme in 1997-8 found that only 
a small minority, about 30 per cent of victims, took advantage of the opportunity to 
make a VPS.81 Hoyle’s research concluded that, if anything, the statements tended to 
understate rather than overstate the effects of the offence: this was largely because the 
                                                             
78
 [2001] 1 Cr App R 19. 
79
 [2005] EWCA Crim 397. 
80
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statements were prepared so soon after the offence and not updated.82 One reason 
given by victims for not making a VPS is that they did not perceive the impact of the 
crime as serious or find it particularly distressing.83 It is, therefore, likely to be rare for 
sentencers to be faced with a VPS where the distress caused to the victim was minimal, 
or less than might have been expected given the nature of the crime, and thus rare for a 
VPS to lead to a sentence that is less than might be expected. Sanders argues that one 
reason why VPS rarely influence sentence decisions is because most cases are ‘typical 
cases: that is, the impact of the crime on the victim is as one would expect given the 
nature and seriousness of the crime.’84 In most cases, the VPS is likely to confirm 
information about the effect of the crime already known to the court, in which case it is 
unlikely to influence the sentence imposed.85 However, there may be the occasional 
case where the information provided is significant and was not already known. There is 
a need for judges to take account of the serious and long-lasting effects of sexual 
offences. Information concerning the mental and psychological effects of sexual assault 
might be of particular relevance for those cases at the fringes of liability, where the 
‘sexual’ nature of the touching is ambiguous.  
 
12.4 CONCLUSION 
In penology, there exists a conflict between sentencing based on the defendant’s 
intended consequences or consequences about which he was reckless and sentencing 
based on the actual consequences. In all likelihood the relevance of individual victim 
experiences may be of practical value in only a small percentage of cases, because in the 
majority of cases the harm caused will fall somewhere within a range of broadly what 
might have been expected. However, in respect of sexual assault, which is not an 
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outcome-based offence, particular victim experiences as opposed to typical experiences 
acquire great significance, especially when there is a disparity between the victim and 
offender’s perception of the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching. One argument for 
sentencing based on standard harm is that it takes account of set-backs to collective 
interests and the public dimension of wrongs inflicted on individuals. However, in 
determining offence seriousness, the individual C’s experience should determine the 
harm component of the harm/culpability dyad. Such an approach is not unproblematic 
and might compromise fundamental principles of procedural fairness and justice. 
Although sentencers retain discretion in determining offence seriousness, the law is 
somewhat ambiguous as to the relevance of individual victims’ experiences. Whilst 
s.143 CJA 2003 suggests that individual victim experiences are relevant, the SGC’s 
Overarching Principles emphasises standard harm and states that harm is not 
determinative of seriousness and ‘must always be judged in the light of culpability’.86 In 
relation to sexual offences, where the psychological effects of the crime can be far-
reaching, the law demands flexibility. The SGC’s Definitive Guideline on the SOA 2003 
categorises the harm of sexual assault in terms of the specific nature of the touching. 
The Guideline is welcome but flawed in focusing on the nature of the physical contact 
involved: it fails to take account of the level of harm actually suffered by the victim. 
Victims’ experiences of sexual assault are individualised and any attempt to standardise 
the harm caused by sexual touching is insufficiently complainant-centred. However, the 
guidelines merely provide starting-points and there is scope for individual experiences 
to be factored in by treating victim harm as an aggravating factor and using VPS. 
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13 
Conclusion 
 
13.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis analysed doctrinal and theoretical approaches to sexual assault, considering 
the extent to which the offence is and could be complainant-centred. This is a timely 
and relevant inquiry, since there has been insufficient research and commentary on the 
scope and application of sexual assault since the implementation of the SOA 2003. The 
terms of reference for the Sexual Offences Review included making recommendations 
that ‘*p]rovide coherent and clear sex offences which protect individuals...from abuse 
and exploitation’.1 In light of this aim, this thesis analysed the extent to which sexual 
assault is in fact ‘coherent’ and clearly defined. Whilst the law cannot ‘protect’ citizens 
from sexual assault, in the sense that the law cannot prevent sexual assault from 
occurring in the first place, this thesis examined the extent to which the law 
appropriately labels conduct and communicates the nature of the offender’s 
transgression to the complainant’s satisfaction.  
 
Section 3 prohibits any unwanted sexual touching ostensibly promoting respect for 
individual sexual and bodily autonomy. One question addressed by this thesis is how is 
the offence currently defined and another how could the offence be defined. Most 
importantly, this thesis made recommendations for how the offence should be defined, 
examining critically the case for a more complainant-centred approach and arguing that 
certain areas of the s.3 definition could be clarified and/or amended to make it more 
complainant-centred. Hence, this thesis began by examining the old law on indecent 
assault, setting the offence of sexual assault in its historical context and providing a 
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comparison against which the offence of sexual assault could be evaluated. Chapter 2 
demonstrated how indecent assault was a widely and ill-defined offence which caught 
all non-consensual sexual behaviour falling outside the scope of rape. Indecent assault 
was insufficiently complainant-centred in four important respects. First, the label on 
conviction did not differentiate between the vastly different forms of conduct (i.e. both 
psychic and physical assault) and their disparate seriousness. Secondly, in respect of the 
indecent nature of the act, the law failed to adequately acknowledge and include the 
experiences of complainants. Lord Ackner’s categorisation of certain acts as incapable of 
indecency implied that the complainant was denied the status of ‘privileged speaker’. 
Thirdly, the definition of indecent assault was under-inclusive because it prevented 
conviction of a reckless, yet culpable indecent assault. Lastly, the obligation on the 
prosecution to prove an indecent intention where the conduct itself was ambiguous 
might have deflected the court’s attention from the invasion of sexual autonomy. 
 
In light of these criticisms of indecent assault chapter 3 assessed the extent to which the 
various committees and reports dealing with the sexual offences reform adopted a 
sufficiently complainant-centred approach. Chapter 3 found that the review process 
failed to scrutinise sufficiently the conduct falling within each of the new offences. 
Section 3 was barely discussed in the reform process and parliamentary debates and the 
result is an offence with ambiguity that fails to include adequately those types of 
activities and complainant experiences that such an offence ought to include. Sexual 
assault is over-inclusive as it includes penile and non-penile penetration within its ambit, 
giving rise to the option of plea-bargaining. 
 
Perhaps the greatest problems with the definition of sexual assault stem from the broad 
definition of the central elements of ‘sexual’ and ‘touching’. As shown in chapter 4 
touching is broadly defined and contains no de minimis exception. This is an important 
complainant-centred aspect of the definition to the extent that there are no touchings 
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that are ‘too trivial’ to be the subject of legal control. However, sexual assault is 
narrower than indecent assault because it does not extend to cases where D 
intentionally or recklessly causes C to fear an immediate unlawful sexual touching. 
Whilst there are other offences that could be charged in such situations, section 3 ought 
to be extended to cover such scenarios for the sake of clarity and consistency in the 
criminal law. Sexual assault is a broad offence, over-inclusive at times, under-inclusive at 
others and for some cases the overarching label is not entirely accurate. As sexual 
assault is a widely defined and contentious offence, it fails to reflect accurately the 
defendant’s conduct and the impact on the victim. Offence labels ought to be fair to 
victims so that the legal record accords with their own perceptions of the nature and 
seriousness of the harm done to them. An accurately labelled offence demonstrates 
that society is showing solidarity with the victim and appropriately condemning the 
defendant’s actions. 
 
The presence or absence of consent to sexual interaction is a difficult determination. 
Whilst the SOA 2003 is to be praised for being the first piece of English legislation to 
define consent in statute there is still concern about its interpretation. Section 74 
defines consent in terms of four other contested concepts: agreement, freedom, choice 
and capacity. Consent thus remains a somewhat vague term that juries and magistrates 
can interpret and apply for themselves. In the context of sexual assault, there also 
remain issues about which touchings are impliedly consented to both between 
strangers and between those in an intimate relationship. These two situations, 
admittedly at the fringes of liability, demonstrate how the meaning of consent is vague 
and how the boundaries of sexual assault might become indistinct.  
 
One of the intrinsic problems with the offence of sexual assault is that the law has to set 
out standards of behaviour in a complex cultural situation when the boundaries of 
acceptable or ‘normal’ sexual behaviour are unclear. Chapter 5 demonstrated how 
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sexuality is a socially and historically contingent concept and how there is no essential 
characteristic that distinguishes ‘sexual’ from ‘non-sexual’ acts. Sexual assault is a 
context-dependent crime because the harm that the law strives to avert is non-
essentialist. Sexual touching can only constitute an assault when it is experienced and 
defined as such by the complainant. The complainant’s experience of an action is 
therefore a necessary and important, although not decisive aspect in assessing the 
‘sexual’ nature of an act. 
 
Context-dependent offences give rise to the possibility of different interpretations, one 
of which is complainant-centred. Thus in relation to the meaning of ‘sexual’ there are 
numerous perspective from which the nature of the conduct might be judged. In 
chapters 6 through 8 I identified five possible perspectives from which the meaning of 
‘sexual’ could be viewed and defined and critiqued the approaches against the 
fundamental aims and principles of criminal law. First, there is a non-interpretive 
approach that would define ‘sexual’ according to the body parts involved and devoid of 
any reference to the defendant’s knowledge or awareness of the act’s nature or the 
complainant’s experience of the touching. Whilst adhering strictly to criminal law 
principles of certainty and fair warning this approach was criticised in chapter 6 for 
failing to take account of the context in which the touching occurred. Secondly, there is 
a ‘bystander-objective’ approach which would arguably be the fairest approach as it 
would require an evaluation of the action that is neither defendant- nor complainant-
centred. The law insists on appearing neutral and fair and a ‘bystander-objective’ to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ promotes procedural fairness for both defendants and 
complainants. However, such an approach may be criticised for holding the defendant’s 
conduct to a standard that society deems appropriate even though D may subjectively 
be incapable of appreciating the ‘sexual’ nature of his conduct. It was also criticised for 
implying that there exists social consensus on appropriate standards of sexual touching. 
Thirdly, there is a ‘defendant-objective’ approach, where the reasonable person is in the 
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same position as and is credited with the knowledge of the defendant. Whilst a 
‘defendant-objective’ approach preserves the principle of individual autonomy by 
ensuring that no person is convicted who lacked the capacity to conform his or her 
behaviour to the standard required, it was criticised for being insufficiently complainant-
centred.  
 
The fourth approach is a ‘defendant-subjective’ approach, which is traditionally applied, 
in mainstream English criminal law. Whilst chapter 7 acknowledged the importance of 
orthodox subjectivist approaches to liability that would be dependent on the 
defendant’s knowledge and awareness of the act’s nature, such an approach was 
criticised for being insufficiently complainant-centred. If defendants could raise as 
denials of actus reus, their own ‘defendant-subjective’ evaluation of the ‘sexual’ nature 
of their conduct, the nature of the violation as experience by C would be overlooked. 
Thus, there are cogent arguments for adopting a ‘complainant-subjective’ or 
complainant-centred approach to defining ‘sexual’ as put forward in chapter 8. Whilst 
‘complainant-subjective’ approaches, which focus on the complainant’s affective 
response to the action are not a common part of orthodox criminal liability, being more 
a focus of tort liability, I argued that a ‘complainant-subjective’ approach is the most 
preferable because the complainant’s perspective is an important and relevant factor in 
assessing the seriousness of the conduct and the level of D’s culpability. 
 
Both the Sex Offences Review and the Government made much of the SOA 2003 aim of 
introducing greater clarity into sexual offences law. ‘Sexual’ is a key term used in the 
Act, but s.78 is not satisfactorily defined, leaving the possibility that different juries and 
magistrates will interpret the term differently and that old stereotypes will continue to 
exert an influence. ‘Sexual’ is that extra aggravating factor that turns battery into a 
sexual assault and whilst ‘sexual’ is a term within everyone’s understanding, ‘this does 
not entail that everyone understands the term to mean the same things, either in the 
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abstract or in specific cases.’2 Defining ‘sexual’ using the term itself, assumes that the 
reader already knows the intended meaning of the term and that there is a common 
consensus amongst reasonable people as to which acts are ‘indisputably’ ‘sexual’, which 
acts are potentially ‘sexual’ and which acts are definitely not ‘sexual’. However, this 
raises the question of who constitutes the ‘reasonable person’ in an increasingly 
multicultural society with widely differing views on sexuality? Even if the definition 
cannot be improved, steps should be taken to incorporate a model direction listing 
examples of activities that are ‘sexual’ for the purposes of the Act. The lack of certainty 
and clarity that has resulted from the new law is clearly undesirable for complainants 
and may deter some from making a complaint. Juries and magistrates ought to be 
instructed to take into account C’s experience, because as demonstrated in chapter 9 
there are some acts which C might experience as ‘sexual’, but which are not ‘sexual’ by 
nature and therefore would not get past the first test in s.78(b). I proposed an addition 
to the s.78 which would require the law to show solidarity with those who have been 
harmed through an invasion of their sexual integrity.  
 
In Chapter 10, I recommended modifications to the mens rea of sexual assault that 
would make the definition more complainant-centred. First, the definition should be 
amended to include recklessness within s.3(1)(a) on the basis that reckless sexual 
touchings show insufficient regard to C’s sexual interests and integrity. Secondly, in 
Heard the Court of Appeal held that s.3 is a basic intent offence, even though it appears 
to be a specific intent offence. This is complainant-centred because it means 
intoxication cannot be used as an excuse or defence. However, the decision also 
formalizes the inherent failure of s.3 to recognize that some unintentional touchings are 
culpable and therefore worthy of a criminal response. The decision gives excessive 
scope to the concept of an ‘accident’ by treating it as covering not only acts that are not 
voluntary or willed, but also those that are willed but have unintended though foreseen 
                                                             
2
 V. Munro & E. Finch, „Breaking Boundaries? Sexual Consent in the Jury Room‟ (2006) 26 LS 303. 
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consequences. Thirdly, the law is unclear whether D must appreciate the ‘sexual’ nature 
of the touching and this ought to be clarified so that one cannot legitimately read mens 
rea into the ‘sexual’ nature of the touching on the basis that this might deflect the 
court’s attention from the complainant’s affective response to the touching. Fourthly, 
the reasonable belief in consent test, whilst a considerable improvement in the law, 
shows considerable leniency towards defendants because it allows the jury or 
magistrates to look at personal characteristics of the defendant in deciding the 
reasonableness of his actions. The introduction of reasonableness into the mens rea of 
the belief in consent is to be celebrated, but how it is interpreted in case law is a 
different matter. The SOA 2003 appears to offer little reassurance that similar cases will 
not in fact be treated differently. 
 
Sentencing is another area in which the law on sexual assault faces a dilemma of 
assessing seriousness when there is a disparity between harm and culpability. Chapter 
12 demonstrated how the law is somewhat unclear as to the place of individual victims’ 
experiences in determining the seriousness of an offence. The CJA 2003, s.143 and the 
introduction of VPS suggest that sentencers are now required to take account of 
individual victims’ experiences, indicating how sentencing has moved towards a more 
victim-centred approach. However, these provisions must be read in light of the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council’s guideline Overarching Principles: Seriousness which 
emphasises standard harm and culpability as the main determinants of seriousness, 
stating that ‘*h+arm must always be judged in the light of culpability’. The SGC’s 
guidelines on sexual offences are welcome but flawed in focusing on the nature of the 
physical contact involved. In determining offence seriousness, the individual V’s 
experience should determine the harm component of the harm/culpability dyad and not 
standard harm. Whilst the law on sentencing is more complainant-centred since 2003 
than the respective provisions that existed for sentencing sexual assault, the actual 
place of victims’ experiences in sentencing is still somewhat ambiguous. 
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To conclude, the definition of and processes of sentencing for sexual assault are an 
improvement on the respective provisions on indecent assault pre-2003. However, the 
substantive offence of sexual assault is still insufficiently complainant-centred and 
certain areas of the definition in s.3 could be clarified and/or amended to make it more 
complainant-centred. Sexual assault is an important and yet broadly defined offence 
which is predominantly ‘over-shadowed’ in academic commentary and empirical 
research by the crime of rape. Further research into the investigation, prosecution and 
sentencing of sexual assault cases is needed. Statistics demonstrate that the number of 
police recorded incidents of non-consensual sexual touching committed against women 
has fallen slightly from 2.9% in 2005 to 2.3 % in 2009.3 However, the sensitivity of 
reporting sexual offences has resulted in under-reporting of these offences to the 
police. The statistics on sexual assault should therefore be interpreted with caution, 
given that they might substantially under-represent the extent and nature of the 
problem. The SOA 2003 has been in force for six years and whilst there are some 
notable limits to its reach in the context of sexual assault, it was a timely and necessary 
piece of legislation that has predominantly clarified the law on sexual offences and 
strengthened victim’s interests and rights. 
 
13.1.1 Future research 
This thesis highlights the importance of and pressing need for empirical research into 
the processes of investigation, trial and sentencing for sexual assault. In focusing 
exclusively upon the legal definition of sexual assault, this thesis has been limited to a 
‘black-letter’ approach and an examination of the way in which sexual assault cases are 
interpreted and enforced by the criminal justice system is left for future work. This 
limitation was also evident in the review process. In concentrating on narrow 
statements of what the law is the sexual offences reform process failed sufficiently to 
                                                             
3
 A. Walker et al, „Crime in England and Wales 2008/09: Volume 1 Findings from the British Crime 
Survey and police recorded crime‟ (Home Office, July 2009) Table 3.12. 
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consider the offences in the context of interpretation and enforcement. A thorough 
analysis of the sexual assault cases arising in the magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts 
would give us a better indication of the extent to which the problems highlighted in this 
thesis have practical significance. There is also a need for a comprehensive overview of 
the sentencing of sexual assault cases to determine the extent to which individual 
victim’s experiences actually affect sentencing decisions. Empirical studies in the form of 
questionnaires and interviews with individuals involved in the processing of sexual 
assault cases can help us better understand how the decision to prosecute is made. In 
the absence of being able to undertake research into actual jury deliberations, mock 
jury simulations would give an indication of how the meaning of ‘sexual’ is interpreted 
and how jurors respond to the section 78 test. A public survey about opinions as to the 
meaning of ‘sexual’ and the scope of sexual assault is also important. This thesis has also 
highlighted the need for greater public awareness about the nature and scope of the 
offence of sexual assault and how it differs from rape and assault by penetration. This is 
particularly important given the tendency of the media to refer to and to label any 
sexual violation as ‘sexual assault’.   
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Appendix 
 
Sexual Offences Act 1956 
1.   Rape of a woman or man 
(1) It is an offence for a man to rape a woman or another man. 
(2) A man commits rape if- 
(a) he has sexual intercourse with a person (whether vaginal or anal) 
who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it; and 
(b) at the time knows that the person does not consent to the 
intercourse or is reckless as to whether that person consents to it. 
(3) A man also commits rape if he induces a married woman to have sexual 
intercourse with him by impersonating her husband. 
(4) Subsection (2) applies for the purpose of any enactment. 
 
14.  Indecent assault on a woman 
(1) It is an offence, subject to the exception mentioned in subsection (3) of 
this section, for a person to make an indecent assault on a woman. 
(2) A girl under the age of sixteen cannot in law give any consent which 
would prevent an act being an assault for the purposes of this section. 
(3) Where a marriage is invalid under section two of the Marriage Act 1949, 
or section one of the Age of Marriage Act 1929 (the wife being a girl 
under the age of sixteen), the invalidity does not make the husband guilty 
of any offence under this section by reason of her incapacity to consent 
while under that age, if he believes her to be his wife and has reasonable 
cause for the belief. 
(4) A woman who is a defective cannot in law give any consent which would 
prevent an act being an assault for the purposes of this section, but a 
person is only to be treated as guilty of an indecent assault on a defective 
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by reason of that incapacity to consent, if that person knew or had 
reason to suspect her to be a defective. 
 
15.  Indecent assault on a man 
(1) It is an offence for a person to make an indecent assault on a man. 
(2) A boy under the age of sixteen cannot in law give any consent which 
would prevent an act being an assault for the purposes of this section. 
(3) A man who is a defective cannot in law give any consent which would 
prevent an act being an assault for the purposes of this section, but a 
person is only to be treated as guilty of an indecent assault on a defective 
by reason of that incapacity to consent, if that person knew or had 
reason to suspect him to be a defective. 
 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 
1.  Rape 
(1)  A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another 
person (B) with his penis, 
(b) B does not consent to the penetration, and 
(c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
(2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to 
all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain 
whether B consents. 
(3) Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section. 
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on 
conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life. 
 
2.  Assault by penetration 
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(1)  A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another person (B) 
with a part of his body or anything else, 
(b) the penetration is sexual, 
(c) B does not consent to the penetration, and 
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
(2)  Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all 
the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether 
B consents. 
(3) Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section. 
(4)  A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction 
on indictment, to imprisonment for life. 
 
3.  Sexual assault 
(1)  A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally touches another person (B), 
(b) the touching is sexual, 
(c) B does not consent to the touching, and 
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
(2)  Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all 
the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether 
B consents. 
(3)  Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section. 
(4)  A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable- 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 10 years. 
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4.  Causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent 
(1)  A person (A) commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally causes another person (B) to engage in an activity, 
(b) the activity is sexual, 
(c) B does not consent to engaging in the activity, and 
(d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. 
(2)  Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all 
the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether 
B consents. 
(3)  Sections 75 and 76 apply to an offence under this section. 
(4)  A person guilty of an offence under this section, if the activity caused 
involved- 
(a) penetration of B's anus or vagina, 
(b) penetration of B's mouth with a person's penis, 
(c) penetration of a person's anus or vagina with a part of B's body or by 
B with anything else, or 
(d) penetration of a person's mouth with B's penis, 
is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life. 
(5)  Unless subsection (4) applies, a person guilty of an offence under this 
section is liable- 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 10 years. 
 
7.  Sexual assault of a child under 13 
(1)  A person commits an offence if- 
(a) he intentionally touches another person, 
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(b) the touching is sexual, and 
(c) the other person is under 13. 
(2)  A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable- 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 
months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both; 
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 14 years. 
 
74.  ‘Consent’ 
For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has 
the freedom and capacity to make that choice. 
 
75.  Evidential presumptions about consent 
(1)  If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved- 
(a) that the defendant did the relevant act, 
(b) that any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) existed, and 
(c) that the defendant knew that those circumstances existed, 
the complainant is to be taken not to have consented to the relevant act 
unless sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue as to whether he 
consented, and the defendant is to be taken not to have reasonably 
believed that the complainant consented unless sufficient evidence is 
adduced to raise an issue as to whether he reasonably believed it. 
(2)  The circumstances are that- 
(a) any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before 
it began, using violence against the complainant or causing the 
complainant to fear that immediate violence would be used against him; 
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(b) any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before 
it began, causing the complainant to fear that violence was being used, 
or that immediate violence would be used, against another person; 
(c) the complainant was, and the defendant was not, unlawfully 
detained at the time of the relevant act; 
(d) the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of 
the relevant act; 
(e) because of the complainant's physical disability, the complainant 
would not have been able at the time of the relevant act to 
communicate to the defendant whether the complainant consented; 
(f) any person had administered to or caused to be taken by the 
complainant, without the complainant's consent, a substance which, 
having regard to when it was administered or taken, was capable of 
causing or enabling the complainant to be stupefied or overpowered at 
the time of the relevant act. 
(3)  In subsection (2)(a) and (b), the reference to the time immediately 
before the relevant act began is, in the case of an act which is one of a 
continuous series of sexual activities, a reference to the time 
immediately before the first sexual activity began. 
 
76.  Conclusive presumptions about consent 
(1)  If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved 
that the defendant did the relevant act and that any of the circumstances 
specified in subsection (2) existed, it is to be conclusively presumed- 
(a) that the complainant did not consent to the relevant act, and 
(b) that the defendant did not believe that the complainant consented to 
the relevant act. 
(2)  The circumstances are that- 
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(a) the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the 
nature or purpose of the relevant act; 
(b) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to 
the relevant act by impersonating a person known personally to the 
complainant. 
 
77.  Sections 75 and 76: relevant acts 
In relation to an offence to which sections 75 and 76 apply, references in those 
sections to the relevant act and to the complainant are to be read as follows- 
 
Offence     Relevant Act 
An offence under section 3 The defendant intentionally 
(sexual assault)    touching another person   
(‘the complainant’), where  
the touching is sexual.  
 
78.  "Sexual" 
For the purposes of this Part (except section 71), penetration, touching or any 
other activity is sexual if a reasonable person would consider that- 
(a)  whatever its circumstances or any person's purpose in relation to it, it is 
because of its nature sexual, or 
(b)  because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances 
or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual. 
 
79.  Part 1: general interpretation 
(2)  Penetration is a continuing act from entry to withdrawal. 
(3)  References to a part of the body include references to a part surgically 
constructed (in particular, through gender reassignment surgery). 
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(8)  Touching includes touching- 
(a) with any part of the body, 
(b) with anything else, 
(c) through anything, 
and in particular includes touching amounting to penetration. 
(9)  ‘Vagina’ includes vulva. 
 
Magistrates Court Sentencing Guidelines 
Sexual assault4 
Examples of nature of activity Starting point Range 
 
Contact between part of 
offender’s body (other than the 
genitalia) with part of the victim’s 
body (other than the genitalia) 
 
26 weeks custody if the 
victim is under 13 
 
Medium level community 
order if the victim is aged 
13 or over 
 
4 weeks custody to 
Crown Court 
 
Band C fine to 6 weeks 
custody 
 
Contact between naked genitalia 
of offender and another part of 
victim’s body 
 
Contact with genitalia of victim 
by offender using part of his or 
her body other than the genitalia 
or an object 
 
Contact between either the 
clothed genitalia of offender and 
naked genitalia of victim or naked 
genitalia of offender and clothed 
genitalia of victim 
 
 
 
 
Crown Court if the victim 
is under 13 
 
Crown Court if the victim 
is aged 13 or over  
 
 
 
 
Crown Court 
 
 
26 weeks custody to 
Crown Court 
 
Contact between naked genitalia 
of offender and naked genitalia, 
face or mouth of the victim 
 
Crown Court 
 
Crown Court 
 
                                                             
4
 These guidelines are taken from the Sentencing Guidelines Council‟s definitive guideline Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 published 30 April 2007. 
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Abbreviations 
CAA 1981  Criminal Attempts Act 1981 
CDCD   Causing death by careless or inconsiderate driving 
CDDD    Causing death by dangerous driving 
CDA 1971  Criminal Damage Act 1971 
CDA 1998  Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
CJA 1991  Criminal Justice Act 1991 
CJA 2003  Criminal Justice Act 2003 
CJPOA 1994  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 
CLAA 1885  Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 
CLAA 1951  Criminal Law Amendment Act 1951    
CLRC   Criminal Law Revision Committee 
ECHR   European Convention on Human Rights 
EE (SD) R  Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 
OAPA 1861  Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
OPA 1959  Obscene Publications Act 1959 
PFHA 1997  Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
POA 1986  Public Order Act 1986 
SDA 1975  Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
SAP   Sentencing Advisory Panel 
SGC   Sentencing Guidelines Council 
SO(A)A 1976  Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
SOA 1956  Sexual Offences Act 1956 
SOA 1967  Sexual Offences Act 1967 
SOA 1985  Sexual Offences Act 1985 
SOA 2003  Sexual Offences Act 2003 
YJCEA 1999  Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
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